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ABSTRACT 
During the period 1848 to 1934 a number of theorists and intellectual movements 
stand out as political discourses and practices that might be termed, ‘Third Roads’ or 
‘Third Ways’. These theorists include Ferdinand Lassalle, Eduard Bernstein, Rosa 
Luxemburg, Karl Kautsky and the Austro-Marxists. However, almost no scholarly 
work has been undertaken to understand these theorists in relation to each other, as 
either Third Roads or Third Ways. More broadly, the study of Lassalle, Kautsky and 
the Austro-Marxists is especially rare; and what study there is of Kautsky in particular 
tends to adhere to the (overwhelmingly negative) Bolshevist perspective. In this 
thesis, Third Roads and Third Ways are understood as emerging in relation to the 
‘First Way’, of hegemonic capitalism and an evolving ‘Second Way’ comprising the 
relatively hegemonic left-revolutionary discourses of their time. In other words, these 
approaches developed firstly in relation to each other and, secondly around a series of 
contentious themes, including, for example, voluntarism/determinism, principle/ 
pragmatism, and conflict/conciliation. 
Generally speaking, Third Roads share the same goals as the relative Second Way, 
but Third Ways project a different end-goal. For example, it could be said that with 
Stalinism arising as the hegemonic left-revolutionary discourse (i.e., the Second Way 
during its time), its real-world objectives were no longer compatible with those that 
had been adhered to, say, by the likes of Luxemburg. Luxemburg’s position could be 
conceived as a Third Road before Stalinism, with the ascent of Stalin her position 
might otherwise be interpreted as having been a more distinct Third Way. The relative 
standing of Kautsky and of the Austro-Marxists is likewise affected. 
This thesis suggests that it is precisely through the ways in which they deal with 
contested themes that Third Way and Third Road theorists offer a potentially 
important legacy in our thinking about political contestation. Therefore, one of the 
central questions of this thesis concerns what responses to different contested 
ideological themes can provide a basis for arguing that Third Way and Third Road 
approaches have defensible political and theoretical legacies. 
All of the Third Road and Third Way theorists considered here have contributed 
important legacies with regard to their theoretical innovations and insights – and often 
in response to the contested themes as noted above – but also with regard to practical 
contributions to the development of socialist traditions that hitherto have been largely 
overlooked. They have made important contributions both as political actors and as 
social theorists. This they have done both in the context of their activism, in their 
time, and also in the more lasting legacy they have left as a consequence for their 
many and varied practical and theoretical insights. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Some mainstream opinions on Marxism commonly suggest that it is a discredited and 
totalitarian ideology, responsible for some of the most repressive and murderous 
regimes the world has known. Confusingly, such assumptions are accompanied by 
situating Marxism on one side of supposedly diametrically opposed frameworks – for 
example, of principles of principles of collectivism/equality versus 
freedom/inequality. Thus the term ‘communism’ commonly is associated with a 
model of centralized planning which was inflexible and unresponsive to consumers’ 
needs. Social democracy, by comparison is considered a more moderate alternative on 
the relative centre-left of the Western political spectrum, which accepts market 
relations and which has relegated Marxian analyses of exploitation, surplus value and 
class struggle to the dustbin of history. The most influential modern interpretation of 
social democracy is the specific Giddensesque Third Way, which substitutes inclusion 
in place of equality and redistribution. Furthermore, the assumption underlying much 
‘modern’ liberal and social democracy is that history has made its judgement, that the 
‘good guys’ (i.e., liberal capitalism as the exemplar case) ‘won’ and that new global 
struggles will exclude the democratic class struggle, focusing instead on 
cosmopolitan-globalized-liberal capitalism in opposition to qualitatively different new 
opponents – for instance, radical, militant Islam. 
 
The subject of this thesis is significant in that it sets out to refute misassumptions 
concerning what might be referred to as ‘radical social democracy’. This is 
approached through positing and interrogating what will be called ‘relative Third 
Roads and Third Ways’ (Lassalle, Centrism, Revisionism, Luxemburgian ‘leftism’, 
Austro-Marxism). Unlike the modern-day Giddensesque Third Way, these examples 
comprise alternative interpretations of socialism or alternative routes to socialism. 
The fact of the differing nature of these across the 1848–1934 period and today also 
illustrates the relative nature of the concepts involved. Definitions of Third Roads and 
Third Ways are elaborated on subsequently in this chapter.  
 
Interrogating and tracing the contributions of the radical social democrats is important 
at a number of levels. There are the many insights to be gained through a re-
engagement with, and re-conceptualization of radical social democracy. The 
separation of the Left into communist and social-democratic camps needs to be 
traced, and also questioned, in order to retrieve the insights of thinkers such as 
Bernstein, Kautsky, Luxemburg, Otto Bauer and others. Lassalle is interesting also as 
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a precursor to later German social democracy. Indeed, he was important in its early 
and foundational Development; and his work remained influential in Germany into 
the early 20
th
 century despite his premature death. 
 
The central means that I use in order to trace the insights and contributions of such 
thinkers is analysis of their responses to a wide variety of contested ideological 
themes, and it includes attempts to mediate, negotiate and reconcile those themes. The 
challenge of discerning a defensible legacy from the attempts of various relative Third 
Roads and Third Ways in their mediation of contested themes is the main problem for 
this thesis. For example, there are the themes of authoritarianism versus freedom and 
of voluntarism versus determinism. It is in the context of interrogating such themes 
that I demonstrate the defensible political-theoretical legacy of Third Roads and Third 
Ways during the 1848-1934 period. 
  
To take one example, teleological assumptions of inevitable progress towards socialist 
transition from social democracy’s early days appear to have been refuted upon 
consideration of socialism’s long retreat from the late-twentieth century to the current 
day. However, certain tendencies identified by the radical social-democratic thinkers 
of interest remain pertinent today. These legacies are defensible precisely because 
they address perennial themes that are pertinent even today, and hence their 
examinations suggest signposts that need to be addressed by the modern Left, 
including recognition of the relative and non-absolute nature of today’s Third Ways in 
social democracy and, so, the possibility of an alternative that draws on a now-largely 
forgotten history of radical social democracy. 
 
Defining ‘Third Roads’ and ‘Third Ways’  
 
Throughout the history of progressive political movements, particular movements and 
tendencies, in this thesis will be called ‘Third Roads’ or ‘Third Ways’ have been 
recurring features. Such middle or ‘alternative’ ways have changed composition 
depending upon the relativities of the time. Often these movements and tendencies 
have played an important conciliating role, mediating between different impulses in 
social democracy and on the broader Left. Sometimes compromise positions have 
proved crucial for maintaining mass electoral appeal, and gradually shifting the 
relative centre – as opposed to some ‘frontal assault’. At other times, middle ways 
have provided a corrective to the most radical voluntarism in which even terroristic 
tactics have been seen as justified, as the ends justifying the means. Various Third 
Roads and Third Ways have also provided alternatives to and critiques of short-
sighted and unprincipled opportunism – especially amongst right-revisionist social 
democracy. Others have been criticised as being opportunistic of themselves, for 
example, Lenin’s criticisms of Karl Kautsky. 
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Importantly, the terms ‘Third Road’ and ‘Third Way’ do not necessarily have the 
same meaning. A Third Road might be seen by its proponents as an alternative path to 
the same goal, as presented by a dominant revolutionary path: that is, a ‘Second 
Way’. The term ‘Third Road’, originating with Palmiro Togliatti in the Communist 
Party of Italy (Pierson, p 91), can be applied reasonably to the prior history as an 
distinct analytical category. A Third Way by comparison involves a fundamental 
compromise with regard to the goal itself. Here, the term ‘Third Way’ reflects the 
work of writers such as Anthony Giddens in the 1990s. However, it can also usefully 
be applied relatively, historically, and retrospectively as an analytical category, as I 
am doing here. This thesis will thus consider the ways in which currents in social 
democracy have filled either, or even both of these categories in different relative 
senses. More specifically, this thesis shall explore the questions of relative Third 
Roads and Third Ways, mainly in the European context, and spanning the period from 
1848 to 1934, that is, from the origins of Marxism and Lassalleanism to the defeat of 
Austro-Marxism. 
 
An examination of the Third Roads and Third Ways of this period is important today 
in that it provides a sense of, and adds to our understanding of the origins of social 
democracy, and of various perennial themes that remain relevant to political thinking. 
It is important also in that it demonstrates that the concepts of ‘Third Road’ and 
‘Third Way’ are relative; and hence suggests how we should be open to alternatives to 
today’s prominent Third Ways. This addresses the practical problem of contemporary 
politics in which neo-liberalism comprises a closed system, and socialism is rejected 
out of hand through misconstruing its principles and history. In this context, the 
present study is also important because in the long run it is useful to retrieve 
perspectives that have been obscured and marginalised by dominant discourses with 
the passage of time. This is important as the perspectives in question hold insights that 
might be relevant for today and for our understanding of the past. It is especially 
important with regard to popular assumptions about socialism, and socialism’s 
historic legacy. These issues are not the subject of the present thesis or form part of its 
central argument. Nevertheless, they provide a sense of its motivating rationale. 
 
This thesis contributes something new to the existing literature in that it provides a 
new perspective on Third Roads and Third Ways as relative concepts useful for 
describing political movements as far back as the nineteenth century. In this field, an 
examination of Lassalle and of the Austro-Marxists is especially rare. A consideration 
of Kautsky beyond his polemic with Lenin is also rare today. The thesis will provide 
both a historical backdrop as well as a history of ideas, with analysis of important 
primary texts in the relevant fields.  
 
Apart from the rarity of enquiry into the works of the thinkers concerned, there are 
particular reasons for focussing on them. Lassalle is important for his specific role in 
the foundation of German social democracy. He is also interesting as a Third Way 
theorist during his period in that he poses a qualitative alternative to Marx on the 
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socialist Left. Anarchists such as Proudhon are also interesting, but being anarchists 
(as distinct from identifying as socialists) they are ruled out of the examination here. 
 
The main focus of this thesis is upon the most important and most prominent theorists 
of the Second International – the umbrella group for radical social-democratic parties 
from 1889 to 1916. This includes from different perspectives – Kautsky 
(orthodoxy/centrism), Luxemburg (leftism), Bernstein (revisionism) and the Austro-
Marxists (practical and theoretical innovation upon the base of Second International 
social-democratic politics). The Austro-Marxists are also considered. It is they who 
attempted to carry on radical social-democratic traditions after World War I with their 
efforts to reconcile communists and radical Social Democrats through the 
International Working Union of Socialist Parties (also known as the Two and a Half 
International). After that group’s dissolution, the theorists in question continued to 
adhere to the radical social-democratic perspective independently of the (communist) 
Third International via the Labour and Socialist International (LSI) One exception 
was Luxemburg who – as we will see – had attempted a clean break with pre-existing 
social democracy.  
 
Apart from the limitations of space, analysis of Austro-Marxism was preferred over 
an analysis of Swedish social democracy because, from around the 1930s, Swedish 
social democracy develops its own traditions around corporatism and the welfare 
state, which were quite independent of the old Second International ways. How then 
are these intellectuals to be considered as Third Road and Third Way writers when 
most of these thinkers were part of the movement for social democracy as represented 
in the Second International? This I respond to as follows: if anything, it was the 
original insights of Marx himself and the orthodoxy developed and disseminated by 
Kautsky that could fairly be considered as the Second Way in the pre-1909 period. 
Even though Bernstein and Luxemburg contested the terrain of social democracy, 
they were relatively marginalised by the central position of the orthodoxy itself. In 
that sense, they could have been considered Third Roads or Third Ways.  
 
From 1909 it is clear that Kautsky himself was being marginalised within German 
social democracy. The Praktiker (pragmatic) social-democratic leadership attempts to 
prevent, and refuses to endorse, his important work, The Road to Power because it 
was seen to be too radical, and with World War I, social democracy is torn asunder. 
Kautsky, Luxemburg and Bernstein all come to oppose the war and become central 
figures in the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and the Independent Social 
Democratic Party of Germany (USPD). As revolutions explode throughout Europe 
after years of misery of the World War, much of the Left looks to Bolshevism for 
inspiration. As Bolshevism became the Second Way, that is, the dominant socialist-
left-revolutionary discourse, even Kautsky’s orthodoxy and centrism may be recast as 
a relative Third Road. 
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So, for the purposes of this thesis it is relevant to look back even before World War I 
for the origins of that centrism and orthodoxy which retained a hold as a Third Road 
or Third Way amidst rising Bolshevism. Luxemburg’s libertarianism and anti-
centralism marks her out, also, as a critic of emerging Bolshevik dominance. Hence, 
her theoretical insights and innovations may also be considered as the substance of a 
Third Road or Third Way – even though we are largely considering traditions that 
emerged initially in the context of the Second International (even Bolshevism itself). 
 
In exploring and interrogating this terrain of Third Roads and Third Ways, this thesis 
takes up a series of specific research questions, which are elaborated below. These 
questions and the associated arguments follow in a logical analytical sequence, with 
the responses to succeeding questions building upon the research conducted into prior 
questions. However, the narrative of the thesis is organized chronologically. This 
means in practice that the questions and associated arguments of the thesis recur 
throughout various chapters.  
 
Basic Questions and Arguments 
 
Question 1. What approaches in the socialist movement from the 1848 to 1934 can be 
considered to have been Third Ways or Third Roads – and what specific contributions 
did these approaches make to the broader Left throughout this period? 
 
The first general argument explored across the thesis will be that the defining 
approaches of Third Ways and Third Roads developed relative to consolidating and 
changing dominant (mainstream) First Ways and dominant alternative (revolutionary) 
Second Ways. For this to be more than a definitional claim, the thesis will trace the 
inter-relational development of Third Way and Third Road approaches. With regard 
to the second part of this question, suggestions about specific contributions will be 
made in the course of each chapter of the thesis.  
 
Question 2. How did the Third Ways and Third Roads, in relation to First and Second 
Ways, develop across the period 1848 to 1934? 
 
Having suggested that Third Ways and Third Roads are conciliating, mediating or 
rival approaches relative to unevenly consolidating mainstream (First Ways) and 
unevenly dominant alternative approaches (Second Ways), the thesis explores the 
shifting relativities that governed different Third Roads or Third Ways for any given 
period. The second generalizing argument will involve making a claim about the 
status of these relativities. To summarise the core argument here: Third Way theories, 
perspectives and traditions have always been relative; a contributing factor to their 
diverse nature and composition. 
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One way of pursuing this, and the way the thesis will adopt, is by examining different 
responses to contested ideological themes. This leads to the third basic question 
addressed by the thesis. 
 
Question 3. Which responses to different contested ideological themes provide a basis 
for arguing that Third Way and Third Road approaches have a defensible political-
theoretical legacy? 
 
In this thesis, I provisionally chose the following basic tensions as the most important 
across the period 1848 to 1934: 
 
 authoritarianism/freedom; 
 inclusion/exclusion; 
 voluntarism/determinism; 
 principle/pragmatism; 
 conflict/conciliation; 
 nationalism/internationalism; and 
 liberalism/socialism. 
 
However, across the course of my research I found that other themes such as 
reform/revolution and orthodoxy/revisionism were relevant – with the orthodoxy/ 
revisionism theme also incorporating a number of mediating sub-themes – for 
instance, ‘objectivism versus subjectivism’ in relation to debates about the labour 
theory of value. 
 
The linking argument of the thesis is that over and above any specific contributions 
that Third Way and Third Road approaches might have made to specific debates 
during different historical periods, their defensible legacy rests in large part on their 
contribution to mediating or sometimes reconciling different contested ideological 
themes. In other words, Third Way approaches from the period continue to be 
important because they provide us with a way of exploring how to negotiate or 
reconcile fundamental political themes in tension. 
 
Some Third Ways and Third Roads embody rather than necessarily reconcile one side 
or other of the contested themes we have considered. They can still be considered 
Third Ways or Third Roads in their pursuit of atypical ways of achieving socialism, or 
in so far as they present alternatives to the dominant First and Second Ways of the 
periods in question. 
 
Method and Analysis 
 
To maintain a simple and straightforward structure the study proceeds 
chronologically. Most chapters begin by providing a summary of their structure and 
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content. Thereafter, the historical context is provided for the period concerned, 
drawing upon historians such as Eric Hobsbawm, James Joll and George Eley. 
Following that, each chapter involves deep textual analysis of those canonical texts by 
the authors in question, Thus, for instance, my analysis of Rosa Luxemburg includes 
an analysis of Reform or Revolution and The Mass Strike. Each chapter also provides 
an analysis on contested themes and the consequent legacy arising from the texts in 
question. A summary of those contested themes and the legacy of the theorists in 
question is provided at the conclusion of each chapter. Finally, more-sweeping 
conclusions are provided in the final chapter, drawing upon the entire breadth of 
material covered. 
 
The central argument of the thesis, that the defensible legacy of Third Way and Third 
Road approaches between 1848 and 1934 rests in large part on their contribution to 
mediating different contested ideologies – where ‘mediating’ here refers to bringing 
into negotiable relation – is developed on the basis of some methodological 
considerations and conceptual definitions. 
 
1. The term ‘reconciling’ does not mean dissolving the differences between 
fundamental ideologies but rather allowing for dialogue that brings them into 
negotiable relation. 
 
2. Here the concept of ‘ideologies’ does not necessarily mean distorted or 
manipulated ideas but rather patterned sets of normative ideas organized through 
relations of power. However, at times I will employ also the more specific classical 
Marxist meaning. Marx specifically refers in ‘Feuerbach: Opposition of Materialist 
and Idealist Outlooks’ to the ‘ruling ideas’, where ‘the ruling material force in society 
is at the same time its ruling intellectual force’ [and] … ‘the ideal expression of the 
dominant material relations’ (Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, p 49, 1989). 
Hence, later Marxists have developed notions of Ideology (with a capital ‘I’) as that 
body of ideas used to rationalise capitalist social relations and naturalise bourgeois 
interests. 
 
Data Collection 
The research depends overwhelmingly on published material, that which may be 
called canonical theoretical texts by key theoretical figures in the history of radical 
social democracy. Language and geographical barriers would create difficulties with 
some information on the key thinkers and issues not being available, locally or in 
English, but most of the material has been translated into English and was accessed in 
the course of the research. There was no way of interpreting non-translated works – 
but because the most important (canonical) material has been translated, this was not 
too much of a problem. It is appropriate to focus on published material, including 
collections, because we are interested in public debates. The research therefore has 
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pursued the most widely employed references, both the ‘canonical’ and ‘iconic’ texts 
on each theme, but also some less familiar but nonetheless insightful texts. 
 
Across the different historical periods, the analysis will centre on several Third Way 
or Third Road authors. They provide the primary sources in the field for analysing the 
nature of their approaches. This will include those of Lassalle, Kautsky, Bernstein, 
Luxemburg, Bauer, Renner, Max Adler and Rudolf Hilferding, which will be 
analysed in relation to the writings of figures such as Marx, Engels, Trotsky and 
Lenin. The thesis is part-history, part-interpretation, part-critique. At various points, it 
also draws from insightful histories in those fields by, for instance, Anson Rabinbach 
and Ilona Duczynska on Austro-Marxism. Through close engagement with those texts 
the aim is to provide an explanation of the ways in which those theorists’ work can 
now be considered relative Third Roads or Third Ways, and in that context, to provide 
insight into their legacies with regard to various important enduring, contested themes 
in political thought. 
 
Further Literature Issues 
There is no existing literature of which I am aware that takes the perspectives that I 
develop in the thesis. That is, I am not aware of anyone dealing with the specific 
theorists of interest as relative Third Roads and Third Ways, either in relation to each 
other or in relation to the ‘Second Ways’ as I call them. Further, there are few works 
in the field that examine all these theorists and movements from the perspective of 
what I call radical social democracy. 
 
A relatively small number of works look into Kautsky, Lassalle, and Austro-Marxism, 
etc. (e.g., Steenson, Beilharz, Footman, Bernstein, Gruber, Rabinbach and Ducynska). 
This I discovered in the course of my research. I referred to them as well as to the 
primary sources, the works of the various key theorists themselves. Peter Beilharz is a 
leading contemporary thinker who has also grappled with a socialist ‘history of ideas’ 
from a more decidedly Left vantage point, in particular with his Labour’s Utopias: 
Bolshevism, Fabianism and Social Democracy (1992). Beilharz observed that 
attempts to ‘reassess both Bernstein and Kautsky, to actually read their works, and to 
discover the nuances and insights contained in them’ were very rare (Beilharz, 1992, 
p 93). 
 
Other works date from the 1970s, and some (e.g., Bernstein’s critique of Lassalle) are 
from the nineteenth century; Footman from 1947, when his work on Lassalle was first 
published. On the socialist Right Leszek Kolakowski’s Main Currents of Marxism was 
published in 1978. Main Currents of Marxism is an iconic history of Marxist ideas, even 
if from a critical and relatively conservative perspective. Thus, there have been a 
number of attempts at a socialist history of ideas over the decades but they are rare, 
indeed, in the post-Soviet context. The Socialist Left has still failed to recover even as 
triumphalist assumptions on the permanence, universality and supposedly 
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unchallenged status of liberal capitalism associated with the likes of Fukuyama are 
themselves widely seen as discredited (Harmon, C, p 258)  
 
A reassessment of the ‘classical’ Marxist thinkers and their contemporaries, and based 
on close reading of their works, is overdue. This rich and historically important period 
of socialist thought remains relevant despite its neglect in contemporary scholarly 
thinking. Following Beilharz and Kolakowski, the time is right for a new history of 
socialist ideas, with special emphasis on radical social democracy. In part I seek to 
build on Beilharz’s work by exploring previously neglected material; considering 
Lassalle and Kautsky in greater depth, for instance, and also the Austro-Marxists. I 
also develop new perspectives on the relevance of post-Marxist insights for a close 
reading of radical social democracy and ‘classical’ Marxism’. In this process a close 
reading of the primary references from Marx, Engels, Lenin, Kautsky, Trotsky, 
Luxemburg, Lassalle and the Austro-Marxists is also crucial. 
 
To summarise: the core purpose in this thesis is to engage with the primary texts 
produced by the theorists of radical social democracy, and intimately and in detail, but 
also to situate them historically, and also contextualise them along the lines of the 
contested themes I develop. The aim is one of creating new interpretations in a field 
that has been neglected historically by most within the Left. Though radically 
opposed to each other, Bolshevists and contemporary Third Way theorists both reject 
the radical social democrats, accusing them of being mere historic curiosities without 
modern day relevance or of having been apologists for war, or for surrendering in the 
face of counter-revolution and imperialism. Much is at stake. My aim is to 
demonstrate a historical legacy that remains valuable regardless of those who would 
relegate all the thinkers whom I explore ‘to the dustbin of history’. (Trotksy in 
Getzler, p 162) 
 
Finally, from Stephen Bronner’s Socialism Unbound I derive several elements for my 
approach to elaborating the topic of socialist Third Roads and Third Ways from 1848 
to 1934 and their legacies. Like Bronner, 1848 is my starting point, for practical and 
for symbolic reasons. This was the period of capitalism’s rise, a period of nationalist 
and liberal revolutions that seemed suggestive of the future. It was also the year that 
Marx wrote The Communist Manifesto, which would become one of the most 
influential and important political documents in modern history. Progressively 
thereafter, the mantle of the revolutionary social class was to be taken on by the rising 
proletariat (Bronner, 2011, pp 1-5). Like Bronner, I emphasize the liberation of ‘the 
ideology of socialism from its authoritarian and parochial shackles’ (Bronner, 2011, p 
xiv). This manifests in a more positive appraisal of theorists like Kautsky, Bernstein 
and Luxemburg who variously took relatively liberal or libertarian approaches, in 
contrast with Lenin and Trotsky. 
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Finally, following from Bronner, a motivating assumption behind this thesis is that 
reinterpretation for the future depends on a critical engagement with the past. The 
contested themes I consider in this thesis are often perennial. Even a century after 
Marx, themes such as liberalism and socialism, conflict and conciliation, and 
voluntarism and determinism are still pertinent to modern socialism. 
Hence, drawing from Bronner: 
 
Teleology is a thing of the past. Dialectics will not magically resolve 
contradictions between freedom and necessity, liberty and authority, 
individuality and solidarity. Judgement is always required, not only with respect 
to an action’s prospects for success, but also to its moral legitimacy. Freedom 
may ultimately rest on what Hegel and Marx would have termed the ‘insight 
into necessity’: Socialist theory today rests on the ability to create a plausible –
not an absolute – connection between ends and means. Years of ideological 
neglect and intellectual ignorance have produced a lack of clarity about 
socialism that is so debilitating precisely because its reinterpretation for the 
future depends on a critical engagement with its past. (Bronner, 2011, p xviii) 
Finally, my approach to interpretation is similar to that deployed by Stephen Bronner 
in Socialism Unbound in that: 
 
1. I draw on key public texts from the period written by left thinkers and 
participants whose work was important to evoking debate in their time, and 
in some cases still evokes debate today; 
2. I have closely read those texts in order to interpret them, and to draw useful 
lessons that are applicable to contemporary debate; and 
3. I interrogate those texts in the context of responding to key analytical 
tensions. 
 
Interpretative Method 
The thesis will consider a variety of texts – including primary references and histories 
relevant to the field. These texts shall then be located in their broader political and 
cultural contexts. The interpretative method comes from theorists of what might be 
called ‘Third Way historical materialism’ and includes the following considerations: 
 
 An acceptance of the tension between contingency/ choice and materialism/ 
structure/ determinism in the constitution of historical processes – that is, that 
people make their own history, but not under conditions of their own 
choosing; 
 A rejection or fundamental modification of the base/structure framework; 
 A rejection of hard structuralism; and 
 An acceptance of the importance of textual production and contested ideas in 
the development of political practices. 
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Here I have drawn upon a number of assumptions present in Anthony Giddens’s 
theory of structuration and his critique of historical materialism. This is not to say I 
consistently apply the full range and framework of Giddens’s theory of structuration 
or agree with his overall standpoint. Rather, in light of Giddens’s status as a modern 
Third Way theorist, he provides an important symbolic as well as practical guide to 
method. At various times in the thesis this approach is complemented, qualified or 
tested in comparison with Hobsbawm’s relative orthodoxy and the post-Marxism of 
Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau. These theorists all help provide perspectives 
from which to maintain a critical history of ideas. I draw from these theorists as 
required. 
 
The following is a summary of those elements in Giddens’s theory that are useful for 
the thesis, but also highlights criticism where Giddens’s assumptions and my own are 
not entirely aligned. Giddens rejects the functionalist and evolutionary undertones that 
most definitely can be detected in Kautsky, and in other ways in Luxemburg 
(Giddens, 1981, p 14). Along with Giddens, through the course of this thesis I accept 
the complexity of history: Where the evolving means and mode of production, and 
also the class struggle, are important aspects. They are not the only important aspects, 
however. Hence, for Giddens there is no universal unfolding class-struggle dialectic, 
for instance, as suggested in Marx, that struggle emerges according to its own 
necessary and inescapable internal logic. Rather, historical development and change is 
held to be non-teleological and contingent (Giddens, 1981, pp 20-21). 
 
Giddens develops a concept of ‘inter-societal systems’. By this he means that systems 
‘interpenetrate and influence each other’ as against (Marxist and Hegelian) 
conceptions which regard society (or history) as an ‘isolated unit’, and as ‘containing 
within itself the mechanisms which necessarily bring about its transformation’ 
(Giddens, p 23). Yet, despite rejecting Marx’s dialectic, Giddens supposes the seeds 
of change are present in discourses and social structures through the interventions and 
mediations of knowledgeable and wilful social actors. Still, it should be noted that the 
Marxist approach is corrective in the sense of seeking to grasp underlying social 
conflicts beyond typical ideological narratives of national glory and great men, even 
including those considered in this thesis. 
 
Significantly, Giddens explains his conception of contradiction as: 
 
an opposition or disjunction between structural principles of a social system, 
such that the system operates in negation. That is to say, the operation of one 
structural principle presumes another which negates it’ (Giddens. P 29, 1981). 
 
Giddens’s notion of contradiction is compatible with a Marxist analysis of class 
struggle. That is, the structural principle of exploitation in the context of giving rise to 
the proletariat as a conscious agent for change involves a potential for negation 
(Giddens, 1981, p 29). One difference, again, is that Giddens rejects a determinist 
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interpretation of class struggle and other loci of contradiction. Because of the element 
of choice, it is uncertain where contradictions will take us. I also accept such 
underlying assumptions in my criticisms of the theorists referred to in this thesis. 
 
Also of use in Giddens is his supposition that power can take enabling and positive as 
well as exploitative and oppressive forms. To summarise: Giddens sees power as 
being present in all social interaction, and whether in an enabling form or otherwise in 
relations of domination, exploitation and, or oppression. This governs opportunities 
for social transformation. (Giddens, 1981, pp 28-29). Giddens also identifies diverse 
forms of oppression and exploitation, criticising Marx for an over-emphasis on class. 
This is especially relevant to a history of ideas, particularly when developed by 
intellectuals such as those discussed in this thesis who have an ambiguous relation to 
class (e.g., Lassalle’s rejection of the class-struggle schema accepted by many 
Marxists where in the necessary course of events liberal bourgeois revolution comes 
first) (Giddens, 1981, pp 28-29). 
 
Perhaps most important for this thesis and its underlying theoretical assumptions is 
Giddens’s ‘duality of structure’. That is, his theorization that people as social actors 
are involved internally in the reproduction (and alteration) of social systems and 
social structures. For instance, there is the example of language. If Giddens’s 
presumptions are correct this provides an opening for change – a degree of 
contingency about future possibilities. Assuming free will the supposition is that 
similar scenarios may have radically different outcomes. That is, they are 
unpredictable. Hence, Giddens argues that, 
 
an episodic transition that occurs in one historical conjuncture may have quite 
a different form, and quite different consequences, to an apparently similar 
episode in another conjuncture (Giddens,1981, p 24) 
. 
A consequence of Giddens’s theory here is that evolutionary approaches to history – 
thought of in terms of necessary stages (again, take Kautsky, Martov and the notion of 
a progression from liberal bourgeois to socialist revolution) – is rejected (Giddens, 
1981, p 23). 
 
Giddens’s approach to the question of social change is similar to Mouffe and Laclau 
for whom social relations are not sutured or closed. Rather, social change is up for 
renegotiation through counter-hegemonic strategy and collective will formation. This 
thesis shares those assumptions. However, if anything, perhaps Giddens is too 
optimistic. Here, because social actors are constantly involved in the renegotiation of 
social discourses from within, Giddens contends: 
 
The inherent relation between production and reproduction involved in the idea 
of the duality of structure carries with it the implication that the seeds of change 
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are present in every moment of the constitution of social systems across time 
and space (Giddens, 1981, pp 24-25). 
 
Hence, Giddens’s approach is in some ways similar to my positioning, that structure 
and agency condition each other. Also, Giddens’s anti-functionalism leads him to 
reject any concept of system-needs, that is, needs are held by agents and not by 
systems. While we can agree that the capitalist system is not an agent and does not 
have needs in the same way as human beings, we can identify certain requirements 
necessary for capitalist systemic reproduction. 
 
Functionalism can be interpreted conservatively as ruling out alternatives, but it can 
also be interpreted in the sense of systemic imperatives. Here, so long as there are 
openings to challenge such systems and their imperatives (especially capitalism), 
recognition of the function of the reserve army of labour under capitalism, for 
instance, ought not be seen as a problem for us (Giddens, 1981, p 17). Giddens tries to 
deny functionalism ‘without sacrificing an interest in long term, large-scale social 
processes’ (Giddens, 1981, p 19) Again, he attempts this through his notion of a 
‘duality of structure’. To elaborate further, according to Giddens’s theory, active, 
knowing agents, including the writers discussed across this thesis, are complicit in 
producing and reproducing virtual structures (and hence discourses) of language, 
knowledge and so on. 
 
Giddens thinks that regardless of Marx’s idea of praxis that Marx and Marxists have 
not sufficiently emphasized human beings as active, knowing beings (Giddens, 1981, 
p 22). This is relevant to the kind of history of ideas presented in this thesis. As 
Giddens explains, this means that ‘the structured properties of social systems are 
simultaneously the medium and outcome of social acts’ (Giddens, 1981, p 19). 
Furthermore, Giddens contends: 
 
The most trivial exchange of words implicates the speakers in the long-term 
history of the language in which those words are formed, and at the same time 
in the continuing reproduction of that language. (Giddens, 1981, pp 19-20) 
 
Giddens’s interpretation of social change is much more open-ended – involving 
contingency and choice – whereas orthodox Marxists had supposed a (dialectical) 
systemic unfolding with a pre-given logic and teleology, and with social change 
occurring after the fashion of iron-clad necessity. Here, again, the assumption of 
choice is taken as refuting the assumption of some necessary functionalism. However, 
again, a rejection of the conservative assumption of necessary function (even 
considered in the sense of Hegel’s ‘the real is the rational’) should not mean a denial 
of systemic imperatives under capitalism that can potentially be overcome through 
collective will formation and counter-hegemonic strategy that brings about some 
transition beyond capitalism, or at least, capitalism as we know it. 
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This enables the development of a history of ideas that recognises but does not depend 
upon the relationship between the structure of social relations during the time frames 
in question and the ideas of the writers concerned. Here the contextualisation of the 
various periods is deployed as a framing process. Importantly, global systemic 
imperatives and social, economic logic make the economic and social prison house of 
capitalism very hard to escape, even in the time of the writers in question. If anything, 
Giddens downplays this aspect. However, drawing upon Mouffe and Laclau, we can 
say that the suturing (of social relations and social struggles) is not absolute. 
 
All such elements inform Giddens’s theory of structuration. Giddens appears to reject 
the most radical voluntarism but, again, also rejects determinism in favour of the 
competent, intending, knowing and reasoning agent. The agents that this thesis is 
trying to understand are left, political writers engaged in debate where they are 
intending and reasoning subjects – making history but not under conditions of their 
own choosing. 
 
The Period in Question 
 
The period covered by the thesis was one of tumultuous change. There was the 
industrial revolution and growth of the industrial proletariat across Europe, 
accompanied by the growth of the organised working class. The 1848 European 
revolutions had illustrated the continued resistance of liberalism in the face of 
absolutism, but the publishing of Marx’s The Communist Manifesto during this period 
prefigured the rise of a new working-class movement. Different factions vied for 
control of this movement. There was conflict in the First International between the 
anarchists and the Marxists; in Germany between the Lassalleans and the Marxists; 
between revisionism, the left social democracy of Luxemburg, and the orthodoxy of 
Karl Kautsky and August Bebel. 
 
Socialism originally rose to prominence in Germany, as a consequence of co-
operation on the part of Marxists and Lassalleans. A Marxist position would hold that 
the real precondition of socialism was the growth of the industrial proletariat and, 
indeed, the proletariat grew substantially in much of Europe throughout the second 
half of the nineteenth century. 
 
Before these events, the major socialist influence in Europe had been that of the 
utopians (Fourier, Owen, Saint-Simon) who like Proudhon preferred a range of 
methods including small-scale communes and mutual aid. The Social Democratic 
Party’s (SPD) Gotha Programme (1875) was central to early German socialism, which 
was a negotiated compromise between Marxists and Lassalleans. Marx’s response to 
it helped mobilise support behind the explicitly Marxist Erfurt Programme in 1892. 
This marked a period of orthodox Marxist ascendance in Germany. 
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Then there was the period of the anti-socialist laws of the Bismarck rule in Germany 
(1878-1888). These laws helped provide the rationale for the pragmatism and social-
democratic embrace of nationalism and even imperialism that followed. During the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the relativities of German social 
democracy shifted with rising German nationalism and an arms race, especially with 
Britain. This helped set the scene for the rise of the so-called Praktiker faction, which 
drew upon Bernstein’s revisionism to complement aggressive nationalism and 
ultimately supported German involvement in the Great War (much to Bernstein’s 
horror). Even for Kautsky there was a determination not to provoke the bourgeoisie, 
but to wait until the time was ripe. Also of note was the 1871 Paris Commune, the 
example of which – in addition to that of the Jacobins in the French Revolution – 
Kautsky was later to regard as central for his critique of Bolshevism. All this was 
crucial - because the demographic expansion of the working class made the question 
of its leadership ever-more important.  
 
If anything, the early to mid-twentieth century was to comprise an even more 
tumultuous era. There was war, a depression and the growth of an organised 
capitalism, which the Austro-Marxists thought would add to capitalism’s longevity 
but also perhaps lay the foundations for socialism. The 1905 Russian Revolution 
inspired Rosa Luxemburg’s enthusiasm for spontaneity. Crucially there was the 1917 
Russian Revolution with the split in the social democratic movement, which set the 
scene for divisions that were to dominate left politics for most of the remainder of the 
century. The Bolshevist tendency, which became hegemonic in the world communist 
movement, rested on concepts such as the vanguard party, democratic centralism, 
openness to insurgency as a means of seizing power, and an interpretation of Marx’s 
dictatorship of the proletariat as the revolutionary dictatorship of communist parties, 
being the representatives of the working class. The Bolshevist tendency also exhorted 
the example of workers’ councils or Soviets, as opposed to liberal and democratic 
pluralism and conventional representative democracy. 
 
Hence, for much of the twentieth century, social-democratic Third Roads and Third 
Ways were largely conceived as middle ways between mainstream social democracy 
and Bolshevism. Mainstream social democracy, on the other hand, became 
increasingly focused on parliaments as the primary arena for contesting power. It 
embraced a reform agenda that promoted policies of amelioration rather than 
fundamental changes in the structures of political and economic power. It is in this 
context that the contributions of the Austro-Marxists and their attempts to heal the 
socialist movement were so important. 
 
Exploring the Basic Questions in Context 
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Question 1 in Context 
Question 1. What approaches in the socialist movement from the 1848 to 1934 can be 
considered to have been Third Ways or Third Roads – and what specific contributions 
did these approaches make to the broader Left throughout this period? 
 
This question relates to a structure alluded to earlier. The main authors and activists 
under consideration as relative Third Roads or relative Third Ways include Ferdinand 
Lassalle, Eduard Bernstein, Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Kautsky and various Austro-
Marxists. The chapters will consider in depth the complex contributions of each of 
these. Each has left us a significant practical and theoretical legacy. 
 
Question 2 in Context 
How did the relativities of Third Ways and Third Roads in relation to First and 
Second Ways, develop across the period of 1848-1934? 
 
In relation to this second question, the thesis explores the shifting relativities that 
governed that which could be considered a Third Way or Third Road for any given 
period. That is, across the broad expanse of history certain tendencies could be 
considered Third Roads to socialism or Third Ways depending how we treat them in 
relation to other dominant tendencies. Nevertheless, for analytical purposes, our 
conception of the First Way is largely consistent throughout the period of study – 
comprising the various forms of mainstream ideology in the context of capitalism 
with bourgeois ascendance. This includes those social-democratic Praktiker who 
effectively made their peace with nationalism, capitalism (and ultimately militarism); 
as well as the fascism arising in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. The Second Way, 
defined as the dominant revolutionary discourse of a time and place, shifts throughout 
our chosen period in Europe. Hence, Marxism is clearly elucidated in 1848 with The 
Communist Manifesto but as late as 1875 has to compromise in several critical areas 
with Lassalleanism. This is relevant for the period 1848 to 1880. The hold of 
Lassalleanism on German social democracy is not decisively loosened until the Erfurt 
Conference in 1891. In hindsight, Marxism is the most significant revolutionary 
discourse of the period. In this context Lassalleanism is defined as a Third Way for 
the period. 
 
For our second period, 1880-1905, things become more complex. Marxism as the 
emerging dominant revolutionary discourse crystallises around an orthodox centre, 
especially the figure of Karl Kautsky in Marxist theory. Hence, it comprises the 
dominant Second Way, though later on, from 1917, as discussed in Chapter Seven, 
this orthodoxy was itself to become a relative Third Road to socialism, and because 
Bolshevism emerges as the dominant socialist-revolutionary discourse. So, later in the 
thesis, we will return to this period to establish the historic roots of the orthodox 
Marxist challenge to Bolshevism. 
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Notably, for the period 1880-1905 a number of tendencies are notable as Third Roads 
and Third Ways. To the left of the orthodox Centre there arose the Left epitomised by 
Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht; to its right arose the revisionism of Bernstein. 
The consequent debate has been referred to as the Revisionist Controversy and is an 
important focus for study in Chapter 2. The Erfurt Programme adopted in 1891 was 
also crucial in that it comprised a decisive break of German social democracy from 
Lassalleanism. Here, it is also necessary to look back, in a sense, as Marx’s ‘Critique 
of the Gotha Programme’ was an essential document with regards to that process. It 
may have been written in 1875 but was not published until 1890-1891. 
 
For our third period, 1905-1914 (spanning three chapters), some things remain the 
same, but new currents also arise. The Bolsheviks are at the fringes of the world 
socialist movement during this period compared with German social democracy. The 
orthodox Centre remains the dominant revolutionary socialist discourse (and hence 
the Second Way), although it is increasingly displaced by rising social-democratic 
pragmatism. Kautsky’s The Road to Power received a hostile reception from 
mainstream pragmatic German social democracy. It is during this period that the 
school known as Austro-Marxism begins to develop. This development is of special 
interest as its leaders and chief theorists were to be at the forefront of attempts to 
reconcile communist and social-democratic currents, as they came to be understood, 
after the organisational and theoretical split which developed as a consequence of 
World War I (1914) and the Russian Revolutions of 1917. Austro-Marxism is also 
important; even during this early period its protagonists developed original and path-
breaking insights independently of the orthodox Marxist centre as epitomised by Karl 
Kautsky. 
 
During the fourth period, 1914-1924, everything changes. Social democracy splits 
with the onset of World War I. For the purposes of this thesis, it thus becomes 
important to follow this change to test the general applicability of the argument about 
relative relations. By 1917, triumphant Bolshevism arises as the new dominant 
revolutionary socialist discourse – the new Second Way. The subsidiary argument 
here is that exponents of the old Marxist orthodoxy retreat to comprise a relative 
Third Road, and a relative Third Way. At this point, therefore, it is important to revisit 
the old Marxist centre orthodoxy to establish its origins and foundations. The Lenin-
Kautsky debate is crucial. The year 1924 is an appropriate point to end for this chapter 
as it is the year of Lenin’s death. The Austro-Marxists very notably attempt to 
reconcile the self-avowed communist and social-democratic movements. 
 
The fifth period of our analysis spans 1924 to 1934. The First Way changes during 
this period with the capitalist world split along liberal, authoritarian and fascist lines. 
Meanwhile, the Second Way, the dominant socialist-revolutionary discourse, 
metamorphoses into Stalinism. As far as Third Roads and Third Ways go, Austro-
Marxism continues its attempts to reconcile communism and social democracy, and 
its theorists develop powerful critiques of fascism and of left sectarianism. Karl 
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Kautsky pens his final critique of Bolshevism, which itself is mutating at this point 
into fully-fledged Stalinism, with permanent institutional terror and the cult of 
personality. 
 
Question 3 in Context 
What responses to different contested ideological themes provide a basis for arguing 
that Third Way and Third Road approaches have a defensible political-theoretical 
legacy? 
 
This question is important in establishing the specific debates, thematic conflicts and 
mediations of interest. It asks for a discussion of the substance of the defensible 
legacies of the Third Road and Third Way theorists considered in the thesis. 
 
The following themes are unevenly and differentially negotiated by the various 
writers across the different periods. It is important to note that this list of contested 
themes is not exhaustive of the material we deal with in this thesis. 
 
Orthodoxy versus Revisionism and Leftism 
These themes, contested through conflict and mediation, involve many aspects and 
sub-themes with aspects emerging through the theoretical standpoints of the various 
theorists that I explore. Most notably, these themes arose in the context of the 
revisionist controversy involving the orthodoxy of Kautsky versus the leftism of 
Luxemburg and the revisionism of Bernstein. These were important theoretical 
struggles for the heart and soul of social democracy, and the insights so arising 
arguably remain a valuable legacy. Kautsky held to a strategically conservative but 
nonetheless revolutionary perspective on the disciplined class struggle. Bernstein 
rejected central Marxist tenets, adopting an evolutionary and gradualist position, 
while nonetheless retaining much from Marx. Luxemburg adopted a more 
strategically and tactically aggressive posture, promoting the mass strike and a 
perspective which later became known as ‘spontaneism’ (Geras, pp 111-112) Arising 
from this discourse and sometimes arising in other contexts such as the writings of 
Lassalle are sub-themes such as idealism and utopianism versus scientific socialism as 
well as philosophical and historical materialism. Also there are the sub-themes such 
as sceptical empiricism and eclectic theorization versus comprehension of totality 
through the dialectical method. This also involved the conflicting theme of assumed 
historical contingency as distinct from assumed fixed and progressive teleology. 
Crucial to the revisionist controversy there also arose such contested themes as 
capitalist adaptation versus capitalist collapse, and the associated middle-class 
resilience versus class bifurcation. 
 
Reform versus Revolution 
The reform versus revolution theme is also crucial in the history of Third Roads and 
Third Ways and the other discourses to which they relate, such as Leninism. It is 
central to the revisionist controversy but important enough to treat separately. Further, 
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it is a theme that can be interpreted in more than one manner: Either as qualitative 
versus merely quantitative change, or as the imposition of a new constitution as 
opposed to legislated reform within the existing framework. For others it is a matter 
of swift and violent change through insurrection – again as opposed to gradual reform 
within the existing constitutional framework. This multitude of interpretations can 
also give rise to syntheses such as the Austro-Marxist notion of slow revolution or 
ideas of revolutionary reforms. Also arising from such mediations are notions of 
sustained dual power, which was essentially the means employed by the Austro-
Marxists to defend the democratic path to socialism. For Kautsky there were two 
possible revolutionary paths: Of attrition and of annihilation, perhaps linkable to 
Gramscian notions of war of position and war of movement. 
 
Voluntarism versus Determinism 
The theme of voluntarism versus determinism is also important in the context of 
Marxist orthodoxy versus Bolshevism, that is, in the materialist, determinist and 
economist premises of the orthodoxy versus the attempts of the Bolsheviks to pursue 
a revolution regardless of the working class being in a minority. Other relevant issues 
include Bernstein’s position and that of the Austro-Marxists. Also important was the 
Eugen Dühring of Anti-Dühring fame. (Eugen Duhring being a well-known Kantian 
socialist scholar who was the subject of Engels’ critique) The Kantian socialist 
critique of materialism is also interesting for its insistence on free will and, hence, 
some kind of transcendentalism or Cartesian dualism. Other issues that will arise in 
my treatment of Lassalle include, for instance, the determinist implications of 
Hegelianism, but also Lassalle’s personal influence on the development of labour and 
socialism, especially in Germany. The voluntarism versus determinism opposition can 
also be negotiated in the form of necessity versus choice, with that also being 
grounded on assumptions of philosophical materialism versus philosophical anti-
materialism, for example, in the form of Cartesian dualism. 
 
Authority and Authoritarianism versus Freedom 
The theme of authority versus freedom is important in the instances of socialism from 
below as compared with the centralism and discipline demanded by both Lassalle, the 
Bolsheviks, and finally by the Stalinists. For the Bolsheviks, revolution in its actual 
practice meant ‘the highest possible intensification of the principle of the state’ 
(Trotsky, pp 157-159) whereas for Kautsky and Luxemburg this broke the nexus 
between revolution, socialism, liberty and democracy. These themes are also relevant 
in relation to the authoritarian and nationalist currents that developed, most notably in 
Germany. Luxemburg and Kautsky defend even the freedoms of the bourgeoisie, with 
the defence of liberal rights as part of a broader democratic schema. This is also 
connected to notions of the state as potentially enabling, versus the notion that state 
power is inherently repressive for the purposes of one class repressing another. 
Lassalle is the dissenting voice here, viewing the state as an enabling and benign 
force. Finally, are liberal arguments accusing socialism generally of being 
authoritarian, on the basis of the interests of a laissez-faire ruling ideology. 
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Inclusion versus Exclusion 
The theme of inclusion versus exclusion is relevant to the whole theme of Third 
Roads and Third Ways in that these are relative to and excluded by the dominant First 
and Second ways. Here the content is entirely different from today where the relative 
Third Way ideology of Giddens has become hegemonic in Western social democracy. 
 
Conflict versus Conciliation 
The theme of conflict versus conciliation is elaborated most by the Austro-Marxists 
who sought to reunite and mediate between that which became known as the 
communist and social-democratic currents on the left after 1914-1917. It is also 
relevant for those who could be considered liberal socialists in their attempts to 
reconcile ideologies that were widely presumed to be conflicting. Some social-
democratic currents also came to renounce class struggle in favour of conciliation 
based upon social welfare. The orthodox Marxists are notable for their insistence on 
class struggle, with a liberal bourgeois revolution to be followed by socialist 
revolution. Again, the Bolshevist variant presumed the possibility of skipping over the 
bourgeois revolution. Lassalle is notable for his hostility towards the liberal 
bourgeoisie and for his attempts to force a tactical alliance with Prussian absolutism 
in pursuit of social welfare and equal universal suffrage. Also relevant to the conflict 
versus conciliation theme are various interpretations of the nature of state power. 
Some liberals suppose the possibility of a neutral and, or liberal state but this is 
rejected by most Marxists. This is also relevant for the other theme, of reform versus 
revolution. 
 
Nationalism versus Internationalism 
From the beginning Marx professed a commitment to internationalism, that ‘the 
working people have no country’ (Marx and Engels, 1989, p 129) In this he was to 
stand in stark contrast to Lassalle’s proclaimed nationalism. Notably, though, Lassalle 
also had an interest in progressive struggles in other countries, for example, 
Garibaldi’s struggle in Italy. Marxist internationalism also stood in stark contrast to 
the self-proclaimed ethno-nationalists on the right of German social democracy, 
specifically within the so-called Praktiker faction. (ie: the practical or pragmatic 
faction) (Steger, 1997, pp 73-74) The nationalist/internationalist divide is also 
interesting with regard the Austro-Marxists’ attempts to support national self-
determination in the context of a broader internationalism, including their critique of 
pre-World War I Austro-Hungary. This was done effectively in defence of a kind of 
early multiculturalism. Finally, the Soviet commitment to internationalism declined 
under Stalin, with the pursuit of socialism in one country, while the Second 
International, including the social-democratic countries, became weaker and weaker, 
with Social Democrats increasingly operating in the national, not international, 
context. The result was a weakened international social democracy incapable of 
responding to the threats of capital flight and capital strike or effective solidarity in 
the face of the threat posed by fascism. 
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Liberalism versus Socialism 
Finally, there is the theme of liberalism versus socialism arising with the self-
proclaimed liberal revisionism of Bernstein. It is seen, perhaps, in relation to the 
analysis of authority/freedom, including Luxemburg’s position. Although Bernstein’s 
position is crucial in that he sees socialism as liberalism’s spiritual successor, that is, 
that they complement rather than contradict each other. 
 
To conclude this summary of themes: The above list is not exhaustive of the scope of 
this thesis and other opposing and mediating themes will be discussed from chapter to 
chapter and in the Conclusion. 
 
Structure and Chapter Outlines 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 
 
Chapter One will begin by setting the historical context for the period 1848 to 1875. 
Thereafter there will be a brief consideration of the origins of socialism, and the 
utopian socialists that preceded Marx. From here the first chapter will span from 
1848, the year of European revolutions and of Marx’s The Communist Manifesto, to 
1880, the year in which Engels’s Socialism: Utopian and Scientific was published. 
The year 1880 is an important date to include in the period covered by Chapter One 
given that Engels’s work was a seminal piece in establishing the content of the 
scientific socialism which was to become hegemonic on much of the left, especially in 
Germany. It is crucial to establish the meaning and content of this scientific socialism 
as it became the main Second Way of this period with which the  First and Third 
Ways and Roads in this study are compared. Here the First Way refers to those 
various forms in which the bourgeois and capitalist order were defended; in other 
words, the hegemonic mainstream ideological discourse. The Second Way refers to 
the hegemonic revolutionary socialist discourse, changing in relative terms as history 
progresses as already explained. We will examine Lassalleanism as the main socialist 
challenger to Marxist hegemony on the Left during this period. 
 
Chapters Three and Four will take up the period that Hobsbawm calls the ‘Age of 
Empire’. These chapters will range from 1880 to 1914. This time-frame is chosen so 
as to encompass the revisionist controversy in social democracy, especially the 
exchanges between Karl Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg and Eduard Bernstein. These 
chapters together will also encompass the pre-World War I period, including 
important Austro-Marxist perspectives on the nationalities question that are relevant 
for the pre-war context. This period also includes an important work by Karl Kautsky, 
The Road to Power, which is relevant to Kautsky’s later exchanges with Lenin as well 
as his differences with the German social-democratic right pragmatists. (though we 
will not deal with this part of Kautsky’s work at length until Chapter Five) 
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These chapters suggest that both the revisionist (Bernsteinian) and left-Marxist 
(Luxemburgian) currents had certain strengths which are worthy of recognition, and 
remain potential sources of inspiration. Both currents could be considered Third Ways 
in the sense of standing as an alternative to the current that was to become the 
dominant Stalinist current in Marxism. I draw this conclusion as the notion that Stalin 
was pursuing the same communist end goal as Marx is untenable in the light of the 
practice of terror and the cult of personality. However, compared with the prior 
orthodoxy, Bernstein may appear to herald a Third Way because he renounces the 
final goal. Luxemburg’s position can be called a Third Road because she maintains 
the same end goal as the orthodoxy proponents and centrists. They also stood as 
alternatives to the opportunist currents in social democracy, which we identify as part 
of the First Way of various base capitalist ideologies. Though, as we will see all this is 
debatable, and can be considered in differing relative senses. That these perspectives 
may have comprised Third Ways in some interpretations helps us relativise the 
concept of the Third Way both historically, and in its modern application. 
 
On the Left, again influenced by the Marxist mainstream, Bernstein has often been 
dismissed as the arch revisionist and, hence, rejected out of hand. However, I will 
contend that Bernstein’s eclecticism involved many insights. Especially important 
were his attempts to wed socialism and liberalism, and thus his fruitless striving for a 
liberal-socialist alliance in Germany. Bernstein’s evolutionary socialism denied a 
violent, revolutionary rupture. And his impression became a one that the future was 
not closed off by metaphysical historic forces (although Bernstein did seem to 
entertain a notion of a march forward for social democracy that was accumulative and 
which did not involve dead ends and defeats). Despite this, the German liberal 
movement, such that it was, was co-opted by nationalist and governmental forces. 
And Bernstein’s ideas were taken up, in part, by opportunists (Praktiker)seeking to 
use it as a cloak of legitimacy behind which to advance a nationalist and class-
collaborationist agenda. 
 
Chapter Four, however, will mainly concern Rosa Luxemburg’s response to the 
revisionist controversy; as well as her theorization: Of the mass strike as a 
revolutionary strategy; on the notion of socialist revolution as a necessity; and of the 
meaning of ‘spontaneism’ as it relates to class struggle and revolution. 
 
Chapters Five to Eight will explore the first part of the period that Hobsbawm calls 
the ‘Age of Extremes’. Chapter Five will range from 1907 to 1915, with its 
development of Kautsky’s centrist Marxism, and Chapter Six will consider pre-World 
War I Austro-Marxism. Chapter Seven takes in the landmarks of World War I, the 
Russian Revolution (1917) and Lenin’s death (1924). Chapter Eight will range from 
1925 to 1934 and will be mainly concerned with the rise and fall of Austro-Marxism 
in practice. 
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Kautsky’s contribution to the Erfurt Programme is very important here, epitomising 
the orthodox or Marxist centre position of the period. Kautsky’s (earlier) position is 
notable for its rejection of class alliance between socialists and middle-class liberals, 
but also his preference for peaceful methods of class struggle. Here he was in 
agreement with Bernstein in his wariness of insurrection as a strategy, and yet, he 
nonetheless departed from Bernstein in his insistence on a clear rupture: A political 
revolution in Germany. This was to become even more apparent in The Road to 
Power (written 1909). In terms of this argument, the orthodox Marxist centrist 
position held by Kautsky, and as perhaps epitomised later in the position of Julius 
Martov in Russia, only emerged later as a Third Way as this position was itself 
displaced by Bolshevism (then Stalinism) as the Second Way on the Left. 
 
I intend to show via engagement and analysis of both The Erfurt Programme 
(Otherwise published as ‘The Class Struggle’; and listed as such in our Bibliography) 
and The Road to Power that Kautsky demonstrated a keen strategic sense whereby 
one organisational stronghold after the other would be consolidated by the working 
class. Accordingly, the influence and preponderance of the working class could not 
but grow as a result of irresistible historical forces. Yet I also intend to show how this 
vision, informed by a teleological (practical as well as philosophical) historical 
materialism, ultimately failed. The forces of nationalism usurped the forces of 
internationalism, and the craving of some for order and authority eclipsed the 
impulses towards freedom. The theme of principle versus pragmatism will also be 
considered in this and other chapters, and especially how they played out in the 
context of German social democracy and in relation to issues of nationalism, authority 
and order. 
 
Chapter Six will range from 1905 to 1914, that is, to the end of the period of 
Hobsbawm’s ‘Age of Empire’. I will consider Austro-Marxist analyses of the national 
question that were especially important in light of the impending world war. The 
works of Karl Renner and Otto Bauer are especially relevant here. Renner, in 
particular, imagined the transformation of Austria-Hungary into a democratic and 
federal state of nationalities, Nationalitatenstaat, in which nationalities could find 
self-expression but at the same time be reconciled (Bottomore pp 31-32). 
 
Chapter Seven will focus on war and revolution in the period spanning 1914 to 1924, 
from the First World War to the death of Lenin and the end of the Russian Civil War. 
The chapter will consider Austro-Marxist analyses of the war economy and of the 
ideology underscoring it. The debate between Kautsky and Lenin is important here. 
The Austro-Marxists also attempted to take the lead in forming a new International 
during this period. This is also especially worthy of consideration in the context of 
Third Ways and Third Roads. 
 
In the context of a successful Russian Revolution, Bolshevism became the hegemonic 
current on the Marxist left and orthodox positions held by Martov and Kautsky were 
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cast as Third Ways in a new relative sense. Here the perspective of Rosa Luxemburg 
also comprised a relative Third Way or Third Road of sorts: A libertarian socialist 
critique of Bolshevik authoritarianism and centralism that later could be applied 
without equivocation to the regime of Stalin. 
 
Chapter Eight focuses on Austro-Marxism. In the wake of the Bolshevist and social-
democratic split, the Austro-Marxists attempted to reconcile the competing currents 
on the Marxist Left. During the post-war period in question, the Bolsheviks were cast 
effectively in the tradition of the Jacobins who preceded them, and, as with the 
Jacobins, terror was seen as a legitimate instrument in the face of counter-revolution. 
During this period, Austro-Marxist analyses of fascism and changes in the 
composition and outlook of the working class were insightful. Austro-Marxist calls 
for left unity were suggestive of their conciliatory stance. As a practical expression of 
this, there was also an attempt to unite the various Marxist currents under the auspices 
of an International called the International Revolutionary Marxist Centre, or 
otherwise, the London Bureau. However, the Austro-Marxists are most well known 
for their positions on slow revolution, growth from within (counter-culture), 
progressive provisions of social infrastructure and services, and a lasting strategy of 
dual power as a last resort to defend the democratic path. 
 
The thesis will conclude with a summary of the ways in which the many and varied 
Third Ways and Third Roads have defensible left legacies. This will be approached 
from a number of directions. I will make conclusions as to the ways in which various 
Third Roads and Third Ways sought to reconcile or otherwise simply navigate 
competing or contradictory trends/themes ranging from authority/freedom, to 
nationalism/internationalism. Where conciliation did not occur I will summarise the 
legacy of the various currents in the context of unresolved conflict. This, I argue, is 
the lasting legacy of the Third Way and Third Road writers – that they attempted to 
negotiate the political discursive and practical tensions of their time. 
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Chapter One: 
 
Establishing the ‘First Way’ and ‘Second 
Way’ 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One concerns the establishing of the First and Second Ways. That is, it 
concerns the proponents of hegemonic capitalism and the emerging Second Way of 
Marxist scientific socialism, which itself became hegemonic on the revolutionary 
Left. The chapter begins with a historical introduction that examines the emerging 
social forces from the period covered by both Chapters One and Two from 1848 to 
1880. This includes an appreciation of emerging capitalism. Then, the origins of 
Marxism are traced with consideration given to a variety of thinkers who came to be 
known as ‘the utopian socialists’, and to Marx’s early works, including The 
Communist Manifesto. 
 
The origins of what Marx and Engels called “scientific socialism” are considered at 
length, especially through analysis of Engels’s Anti-Duhring, as well as of the Young 
Hegelians and Greek philosophy. Despite publication immediately before the time-
frame of the thesis, early intimations of Marx’s scientific socialism are also 
considered, and in the context of works such as the ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ (1845) and 
The German Ideology (1846). Marxist scientific socialism emerges as the most 
influential socialist discourse compared to other movements that might be considered 
Third Ways or Third Roads. Here the very idea of a Third Way must, in and of itself, 
always be considered relative. The Communist Manifesto marked the starting point for 
the rise to ascendancy of Marx’s developing theoretical framework and, for a time, 
hegemony on the Left. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. The period to be considered is circa 1848 to 
1880, with occasional reference to the pre-1848 period. It is important to establish the 
roots of much of Marx’s thought, which go back to the time of the Young Hegelians. 
The first task will be to establish the broad historical context, and here I draw on the 
histories of Eric Hobsbawm: The Age of Capital, 1848-1875, and How to Change the 
World. I also draw from Geoff Eley’s Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in 
Europe, 1850-2000. The industrial revolution, the revolutions of 1848, the formation 
of the German Social Democratic Party, the Paris Commune of 1871, the rise and fall 
of the First International were each important events of this period and form 
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background to the work of Marx and Engels and their contemporaries. At this stage, I 
will also locate the important Marxist texts of interest in their specific historical 
contexts. 
 
Thereafter, the chapter presents an analysis of the crucial texts and controversies of 
the period. Marx and Engel’s own theory during the period in question is considered, 
beginning by establishing the bedrock of Marx’s theory and the intellectual debts he 
owes to the so-called utopian socialists. This entails an examination of the sources and 
development of Marx’s historical materialism, which he and Engels were to refer to as 
‘scientific socialism’. Alienation, class struggle, the division of labour, philosophical 
materialism, dialectics were also crucial to Marx and Engels and, so, will be treated in 
detail. 
 
The chapter will also consider Marx’s critique of the utopian socialists in The 
Communist Manifesto and in Engels’s own deep treatment of their contribution in 
Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (Marx and Engels, 1977, pp 102-143; Vol II, pp 95-
151). Other sources will be drawn from intermittently, but there is not the scope here 
for an exhaustive study of Marx. Rather, the intention is to establish a reference point 
for the analysis of Third Roads and Third Ways relative to Marxism. 
 
Introducing the Historical Context 
 
The 1840s to the 1880s was a period of unprecedented technological and economic 
advancement. As Eric Hobsbawn explains, there was a massive expansion in the 
production of iron and the first mass production of steel, and there was the spread of 
rail infrastructure and the laying of submarine cables across the Atlantic. The 
telegraph enabled almost instantaneous communication across great oceans, and so 
revolutionised the media of the day (Hobsbawm, 1996, pp 4, 40-41, 58-60). Emergent 
capitalism involved great human suffering and waste, but also spurred world-
changing innovations. There was the displacement of the peasants, and of the petty 
bourgeoisie by capitalism and the emerging capitalist class – and there were the brutal 
work conditions of industrial labour. Free labour became integral in playing one 
worker off against another at the time of the rise of an industrial reserve army. 
Capitalism was ultimately to prepare the way for relative abundance, but not before a 
terrible human cost had been paid. 
 
This fundamental change was accompanied by a legitimising ideology of meritocracy. 
Nonetheless, most bourgeois ideologues ignored the reality of unequal opportunity, 
and the fact that capitalism was based on the systemic extraction of surplus value. 
Furthermore, self-proclaimed liberals often were quite comfortable with a 
class/property-weighted franchise, which marginalised the working class. In this 
context the very idea of a scientific socialism resonated with the spirit of the age. For 
the liberal bourgeoisie, at least, there was a seemingly boundless faith in ‘reason, 
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science, progress and liberalism’ (Hobsbawm, 1996, p 3; Ely pp 30-31). For the 
revolutionary Left it was much the same, save for faith in bourgeois liberalism. 
 
The benefits of massively increased productivity flowed mainly to the bourgeoisie 
and the middle classes, with workers realising little of the fruits of their labours. This 
imbalance was to fuel the supposition of absolute emiseration upon which Marxist 
theory then rested (Hobsbawm, 1996, pp 34-35). For instance, in the absence of an 
aged pension, survival to old age “was a catastrophe to be stoically expected” 
(Hobsbawm, 1996, pp 221). It was a world where, as Hobsbawm explains, workers 
were ‘pushed into a common consciousness not only by … social polarisation but, in 
the cities at least, by a common style of life – in which the tavern (“the workman’s 
church” as a bourgeois liberal called it) played a central role – and by a common style 
of thought’ (Hobsbawm, 1996, p 223). This was Marx’s famous “class 
consciousness”. In consequence, and along with the escalation of the urbanisation 
process, was a shift in “the balance of power between classes”, most markedly in the 
years 1870-1914. This gave rise to demands for universal suffrage and representative 
government (Joll, p 26). 
 
The trade cycle remained a feature of emerging capitalism. Although a great boom 
began in 1850 (p 30), by the 1870s Europe entered a great depression – not as severe 
as that which was to follow in the 1930s – but such as to fuel the radical critique of 
capitalism (Hobsbawm, 1996, pp 30, 45-46). The exponential expansion of trade 
increasingly meant, as Marx anticipated in his Manifesto, the creation of a world 
culture and a world market—so downturns and crises thus could not be quarantined. 
Increasingly global capitalism gave rise to a global movement for socialism. 
 
In addition to emerging class consciousness the fires of nationalism also kept burning 
– Slavic nationalism, Italian nationalism and elsewhere, Arab nationalism. These were 
further complicated by religious tensions and feelings of religious solidarity 
consequent to Protestant, Orthodox and Catholic faiths. Italian nationalism was to 
result in a series of wars in pursuit of independence and expansion/national 
consolidation, though no single political change in the nineteenth century compares to 
occurrences to follow in the twentieth century. The varied nationalist tensions and 
ambitions were to erupt over 60 years later as part of the pretext for world war in 
1914, and, indeed, the Austro-Marxists were to devote significant attention to the 
national question in the years preceding that catastrophe (Hobsbawm, 1996, pp 91-
95). 
 
As Hobsbawm explains, when faced with the prospect of real revolution, 
conservatives and the supposedly liberal bourgeoisie tended to draw together. In 
Germany especially much of these strata ended up embracing an ethno-nationalist 
ideology, such that there is reason to believe critics such as Kautsky were right to fear 
being compromised through any dealings with them. Hobsbawm concludes that the 
bourgeoisie widely abandoned its own politically liberal programme and effectively 
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“ceased to be a revolutionary force” (Hobsbawm, 1996, p 20). Although in an 
economic sense the bourgeoisie continued to develop the means of production, and in 
so doing, displaced old economic relations and redrew class lines to make way for its 
own rising influence. For instance, bourgeois economic interests for this period 
became dominant even in the absence of political liberalism (Hobsbawm, 1996, pp 
104-105). 
 
For Marx’s own part, he lost confidence in the immediate prospects for radical change 
after the “capitalist crisis of 1857” failed to lead to revolution. Engels was to outlive 
Marx, living to witness the rise of mass European socialist parties. As a consequence, 
according to Hobsbawm, German Social Democrat leader, August Bebel might have 
convinced Engels of the possibility of “direct transition”. Yet he also argues that until 
the end Engels did not have “legalistic and electoralistic illusions” (Hobsbawm, 2011, 
pp 65-67). 
 
However, the socialist movement did grow and mature, as did organised labour more 
broadly, arising irresistibly as a consequence of the human conditions of 
industrialisation and capitalist exploitation and crisis. Amidst this drama there arose 
trade unions, socialist parties with mass memberships, thriving journals and socialist 
newspapers, and all amidst a struggle to establish the hegemonic revolutionary left 
ideology of the age. 
 
Left historian Geoff Eley suggests that in addition to underlying economic causes 
political sources contributed to the growth of socialist movements and parties. For 
Eley, the 1860s were a turning point, with the spread of liberal constitutionalism 
across much of Europe. This included limited extension of the franchise, limited civil 
rights and limited legalisation of trade unions. A notable exception to this tendency 
was Bismarck’s anti-socialist laws. Specifically Eley observes that repression in 
Germany during the years of the anti-socialist law actually “encouraged German 
militants into socialism, while in Britain union toleration and parliamentary reform 
sealed ties with Liberalism.” Through strategic concessions, Eley argues, these 
constitutional settlements enjoyed remarkable resilience (Eley, pp 5-6, 33-34, 74). 
The fight that followed for “bourgeois democracy” was [increasingly] “conducted 
under working-class leadership, [and] won rights which enormously facilitated the 
mobilisation and organisation of mass working-class parties” (Hobsbawm, 2011, p 
72). 
 
Constitutional conditions in combination with breakneck industrialisation had the 
effect of enabling the rapid growth of social-democratic parties during the 1870s and 
1880s. These parties were typified by centralized organisation, alliance with national-
independent trade unions, and an electoral/parliamentary footing, and they were the 
main proponents of democracy in Europe. As Eley notes, by 1914 in the north-Central 
European ‘core’ countries social-democratic parties enjoyed between 25 and 40 per 
cent support in their national electorates. Before World War I, many Social 
36 
 
Democrats believed the extension of the suffrage, combined with a working-class 
electoral majority in favour of social-democratic parties, would make socialist 
transition inevitable and irresistible. These constitutional conditions were only to be 
radically advanced after the revolutions of 1917-1919. 
 
It is worth noting, too, that after Marx’s death, the revisionist controversy and the 
later world war saw social democracy increasingly divided into reformist and 
revolutionary streams, a process of bifurcation that only intensified with the passage 
of time. However, even after 1917 radical (theoretically revolutionary) traditions in 
social democracy survived this process and were only to be extinguished by the onset 
of fascism (Hobsbawm, 2011, pp 6-7). 
 
The radical rationalist Enlightenment tradition helped foster future conditions 
conducive to a socialist critique of society, elements of which could already be 
discerned in left Jacobinism, and inspired in part by Rousseau (Hobsbawm, 2011, pp 
21-22). Eley further observes that “the [specific] term “socialism” only entered into 
general currency after 1850”; and the social component here started to imply “an idea 
of society as mutual co-operation” as opposed to one based on ‘individual 
competition’ (Eley, p 21). However, Kolakowski traces the term to the followers of 
Robert Owen and to Pierre Leroux, a devotee of Saint-Simon during the 1830s 
(Kolakowski, p 151). 
 
Socialists became preoccupied with more than the extension of political democracy, 
or the extension of economic democracy in the form of co-operative, collective and 
social ownership and control. Further, as Hobsbawm insists, this also implied 
“equality” and “interference with property rights” (Hobsbawm, 2011, p 24). 
 
Meanwhile, operating in the period 1864-1872 The International Workingmen’s 
Association, or the First International, was the first organisation of its kind to attempt 
international solidarity and co-ordination of strategy for the left and workers world-
wide. The Marxists won the battle for control of the International for a time, although 
Hobsbawm contends that later on, Marx effectively wound up the organisation rather 
than lose control to the anarchists (Hobsbawm, 1996, pp 110-111; Joll, pp 52-53). 
 
Until his death in 1865 Ferdinand Lassalle played a key early role organising the 
General German Workers’ Association, part of the nucleus around which future 
German social democracy and organised labour would coalesce. This was despite 
frankly irreconcilable differences between Lassalle and Marx on the orientation of the 
German workers’ movement, and the substance of internationalism and class struggle. 
Lassalle sought a specifically German and, more particularly, Prussian solution 
(Hobsbawm, 1996, p 111). These and other differences were to emerge publicly with 
the publishing in 1875 of Marx’s ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme’. Specifically, the 
Gotha Programme was a compromise document between Marx and the Lassalleans. 
Even after the deaths of both of Lassalle and Marx, Lassalle’s efforts to advance what 
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we can now interpret as a relative Third Way provide an example worthy of attention. 
(that is, as a consequence of Lassalle’s historical importance; including his 
organisational work; and his specific platform of co-operatives with state aid, 
universal suffrage, and strategic class collaboration) 
 
Although the international socialist Left remained contained at the relative fringes, 
radicals had reason to believe the future may be theirs. At its peak the First 
International had attracted the support of many tens of thousands of workers 
throughout Europe – 35,000 in Vienna alone – and by 1877, the Social Democrats 
harnessed some half a million votes for a German parliament whose power was 
admittedly limited but this, even in the context of very limited suffrage (Hobsbawm, 
1996, pp 108-115). 
 
The Utopian Socialists 
 
The consideration of left movements of this period will begin with a brief 
examination of the utopian socialists so as to establish Marxism’s debt to the utopians, 
but also their role in sowing the seeds for future socialist thought. 
 
Many socialists might have been described as ‘utopian’ in the sense of promoting a 
detailed, speculative – and sometimes experimental – vision of an alternative future. 
Marx lists Owen, Fourier and Saint-Simon. Generally, though, the term ‘utopian’ has 
taken on a connotation of dismissal, and of people who ‘have their heads in the 
clouds’, but, as many authors have insisted, the utopians prepared the way for later 
socialism, including Marxism. Marx’s emphasis on politics being superseded by the 
administration of things can be traced to Saint-Simon, Owen, and Fourier; and the 
Saint-Simonians (like Marx and Engels) implied communal social organisation 
(Taylor, pp 4-5). Marx himself openly recognised the contribution of the utopians in 
his Manifesto, despite the fact that for those who followed him the term ‘utopian’ had 
degenerated into a term of derision. 
 
Like Marx, the utopians placed their faith in science, and given this, it seems 
somewhat ironic the Marx would counter-pose their works against his interpretation 
of scientific socialism. Owen’s vision, still under the influence of the philosophical 
Enlightenment (and for some, the French Revolution) especially was one of the 
perfectibility of the human character. This he sought to address through systemic and 
universal education and the provision of an amenable environment. Therefore, as 
opposed to some violent rupture, Owen preferred gradual reform informed by reason, 
and social peace through co-operation (Taylor, pp 77-78). 
 
In short, Saint-Simon’s was a radical, constructive, co-operative meritocracy in 
which, in Eley’s words, “rational and progressive centrality” was given to “all those 
performing productive functions, from industrialists to scientists and engineers, 
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professional men and labourers”. This necessitated an abolition of inheritance, for 
instance. “In the absence of aristocrats, kings and priests, these “industrialists” would 
replace privilege, competition, and laziness with functional hierarchy, mutualism and 
productivity” (Eley, p 27). 
 
Saint-Simon was also an early advocate of economic planning who recognised the 
centrality of class struggle to progress. He was also the first to predict the eventual 
“absorption” of politics into economics, with the “government of men” being replaced 
by the “administration of things” (Hobsbawm, 2011, pp 28-29). 
 
Taylor sees utopian socialism as being more generally embodied in the principles of 
association, community and co-operation (Taylor, pp 7-9). The principle of 
association was later to be promoted by Marx as a necessary condition of revolution; 
but for the likes of Owen, too, association through trade unions was essential in 
establishing bargaining power for workers. Co-operation suggested co-operative 
ownership (and perhaps control), but also the principle of co-operation, and could be 
realised along statist or non-statist lines. Hence, the rise of workers’ co-operatives and 
various mutualist associations. 
 
In particular, Fourier and Owen stand out as resisting the telos of industrialisation: 
suggesting “phalanxes” (Fourier), or in the case of Owen, in effect democratic, small-
scale semi-agricultural communes in the vicinity of 500 to 1,500 persons. Although 
Taylor insists, “Owen did not wish to halt the spread of mechanisation” and Cabet and 
Weitling (also later, Marx!) were more interested in realising the potential of 
emerging productive technology and methods with socialism on a large scale (Taylor, 
pp 92-96). 
 
As Taylor observes, the utopians drew attention to such social problems as “acute 
poverty, disease, bad housing conditions, unemployment and illiteracy” (Taylor, p 
30). Hence, Marx’s praise for the critical element contained within these varied 
movements. As Marx proclaims in the Manifesto: They “are full of the most valuable 
materials for the enlightenment of the working class” (Marx and Engels, Selected 
Works, Vol. I, pp 141-142). The charge made by Marxism, however, was that the 
utopians attempted experiments behind society’s back, or that they suggested an 
alternative future that in reality could only be achieved on the basis of capitalism’s 
maturation, and the rise of class struggle. Here history was presumed to be on the side 
of socialist transition as the proletariat were the emerging majority and were 
strategically placed as the true producers of wealth under capitalism (S. Bernstein, pp 
66-67). 
 
Importantly, the substance of Marx’s charge here against the utopians rested upon the 
notion that, as Hegel put it, “philosophy always comes too late and can only interpret 
a completed process”. Hence, Marx was sceptical and perhaps too sceptical of the 
39 
 
powers of human anticipation and imagination (Kolakowski, p 66). Marx’s criticisms 
of the utopians came to overshadow them overwhelmingly. 
 
The plans of Owen, for instance, were logistically possible for the British state to 
realise, had England’s rulers had the inclination to do so. He had experienced initial 
success at the New Lanark mills – private concerns that he managed for a quarter of a 
century – though the failures of his experimental home colonies in the United States 
must have shaken the confidence of many (Taylor, pp 69-71, 76-77). 
 
For Marx, though, the very possibility of change only arose from the material 
circumstances of the maturing class struggle. This distinguished him from certain 
utopians (e.g., Considerant) who instead emphasized the ideals of equality and liberty 
arising from the French Revolution (S. Bernstein, pp 60, 67). 
 
While dissenting bourgeois intellectuals and benefactors might have provided 
important assistance in this process (Engels’s support for Marx not least of all), the 
majority of bourgeois were not interested in a social peace that required a rescission 
of either power or privilege, or in a questioning of the ideology that legitimised this. 
That is not to say that altruism – or collective political will – is dismissed, but 
following Taylor, it could be argued that the utopians did not appreciate the need for a 
social base upon which to ground their struggles and policies, and nor the difficulties 
in mobilising any such base. They all attempted to influence the powerful political 
and economic leaders of their day: Kings, emperors, prime ministers and 
businessmen, but without a solid class base, “successes were not consolidated”, and 
“no permanent centre of power was ever established”. (Taylor, p 35; S. Bernstein, 
n.d., p 48, p 60) This issue of a political base – and to this we may add economic and 
social bases – was also crucial to Marxism, and to dissenting Marxists’ critique of 
Bolshevism. 
 
The differing brands of utopian socialism promulgated by Owen, Fourier, Saint-
Simon were fading into the background by the time Marx began to develop a more 
mature outlook from 1848 onward. While it is attractive to consider the utopians in 
greater depth here, that would comprises a detour beyond the time frame. For current 
purposes the utopians’ influence on Marx is clear, and on later socialists who could be 
seen as having pursued Third Roads and Third Ways of the own. 
 
Identifying the Second Way 
 
Marx’s The Communist Manifesto, published in 1848 during a time of great 
revolutionary ferment, is the definitive statement of Marxist communism. Considered 
together with Engels’s Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, it provides the reader with a 
broad understanding of early Marxism’s essential tenets. 
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These writings, long considered as the Marxist canon, stand out as a kind of Second 
Way of revolutionary social democracy. While the writings of the Marxist centre 
(otherwise, orthodox Marxism) came to be overshadowed by the rise of Marxism-
Leninism, the works and Marx and Engels themselves were not relegated to obscurity 
by the movement they spawned. Establishing the context of the Second Way during 
this period (1848-1880) can assist in considering the ways in which various 
Lassalleans, revisionists and others stood in contrast. 
 
Marx’s Communist Manifesto was published in February 1848. The time of 
publishing was crucial as the 1848 revolutions followed soon after. Hobsbawm argues 
that the Communist Manifesto was likely ‘the most influential single piece of political 
writing since the French revolutionary “Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen’ (Hobsbawm, 2011, pp 102, 106-107). The Manifesto begins with the now-
famous assertion: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class 
struggles.” It was this class-struggle perspective that distinguished Marx from the 
utopians. For Marx, class struggle provided the real-world material base for socialist 
transition. It was grounded in real processes in history and in society, rather than a 
marginalised ideal. 
 
Modern capitalism had arisen as the latest consequence of a series of revolutions in 
the modes of production and exchange spanning back to ancient times and early 
experiences of slavery. While manufacturing had replaced the guild system it was 
itself replaced by modern industry. Now spurred by new technology the modern 
bourgeoisie had emerged as “the leaders of whole industrial armies” (Marx and 
Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, pp 113-114; Hobsbawm, 2011, p 33). Certainties and 
securities of Ages past were smashed for all the contending classes. The only nexus 
remaining “between man and man” was “naked self-interest” and “callous cash 
payment”. The illusions of the past were superseded by “naked, shameless, direct, 
brutal exploitation”. (Marx and Engels, Vol. I, p 115) 
 
The industrial revolution was progressive also, overwhelming the remnants of 
feudalism and absolutism, and providing the material basis for a potentially better 
society. Competition, both international and between domestic capitalists demanded 
the constant revolutionising of the means and relations of production, producing a 
new social order. In a famous and evocative passage, Marx observes: 
 
All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable 
prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become 
antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy 
is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real 
conditions of life, and his relations with his kind (Marx and Engels, Vol. I, p 
116). 
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Here we have an early intimation of Marxist dialectics: All social relations in a 
constant process of change and flux but with an underlying core process upon which 
everything hinges – a process animated by the class struggle at the heart of ever-
evolving means of production – and for all the suffering unleashed by the industrial 
revolution, some supposed that the end of illusion held promise for a radically new 
society, of abundance and associated humanity ushering in a new history of 
happiness, plenty and peace. 
 
In this context revolutionised communications and transport technology saw the 
preconditions for unprecedented growth in the world market, and in keeping with the 
structural demands of capitalism itself. Anticipating globalization, Marx observed 
how, with “intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations” the 
bourgeoisie “chased”’ “over the whole surface of the globe”. “On pain of extinction” 
in this new era of competition and empire, the bourgeois mode of production was 
adopted over the world. Advanced capitalist nations became increasingly 
cosmopolitan. There arose for the first time a “world literature” (Marx and Engels, 
Vol. I, p 116). 
 
In this context, Marx announced the internationalism of the Communists, declaring: 
“The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not 
got” (Marx and Engels, Vol. I, pp 129-130). Marx’s internationalism was to put him at 
odds with later social democrats and also with the Lassalleans. However, the inverse 
side of the globalization announced by Marx was to include nationalism, imperialism, 
protectionism and war. Indeed, as Marx declared in explaining his concept of 
ideology: “The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class” 
(Marx and Engels, Vol. I, pp 116, 130). Nationalist ideology was to be deployed as a 
discourse of legitimisation, integration, mobilisation and social control long after 
Marx’s passing. 
 
Marx writes that the modern bourgeoisie “is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to 
control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells” (Marx 
and Engels, Vol. I, p 18). There are “periodic crises” that convulse bourgeois society. 
In the midst of relative plenty there is overproduction, which the bourgeoisie responds 
to with ‘enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces’, “by the conquest of new 
markets” and “by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones” (Marx and Engels, 
Vol. I, pp 117-118). 
 
Most important of all, the bourgeoisie had “called into existence … the modern 
working class”. In keeping with his supposition of class bifurcation, Marx writes: 
  
In proportion as the bourgeoisie, i.e., capital, is developed, in the same 
proportion is the proletariat, the modern working class, developed – a class of 
labourers, who live only so long as they find work, and who find work only so 
long as their labour increases capital (Marx and Engels, Vol. I, p 119). 
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Yet, because the capital relationship depends in the last analysis not upon the 
individual capitalists but upon the workers collectively: “Capital is, therefore, not a 
personal [power], it is a social power” (Marx and Engels, Vol. I, p 126). In Marx’s 
schema, then, in appropriating these means of production collectively, the aim for the 
proletariat is to abolish the class nature of these relations – relations of domination 
and exploitation. 
 
Here it is important also to establish that capitalism is that mode of production which 
is characterised by this form of property (i.e., capital); and the dominance of that class 
which overwhelmingly owns that capital. As such, capitalism should not be conflated 
with markets and other forms of personal and non-state ownership. The trick in 
conflating capitalism with markets underscores popular assumptions of capitalism as 
natural and eternal. With the extension of capitalist social and economic relationships, 
meanwhile, Marx made the further observation that skilled labour was progressively 
being replaced with monotonous wage labour in the factory. Hence, workers could no 
longer “find themselves” in the products of their labour but, rather, were “alienated” 
as if “an appendage of the machine”. This is a further development of his theory of 
alienation, intimated first in The German Ideology, where alienation was given rise to 
by the division of labour and the non-voluntary nature of work (Marx and Engels, Vol. 
I, pp 36-37). In Capital, Volume One, Marx also observes how “the labourer therefore 
constantly produces material, objective wealth, but in the form of capital, of an alien 
power that dominates and exploits him” (Marx in Kolakowski, p 232). 
 
Hence workers “find themselves” only when they are outside of their labours. At 
work they are beholden to the capitalist, and they do not enjoy any sense of ownership 
or creative control. This alienation is compounded by the commodity fetishism that 
workers experience as consumers. As Kolakowski puts it: 
 
The relation of the producers to the sum of their own labour is presented to them 
as a social relation existing not between themselves but between the products of 
their labour. (Kolakowski, p 226) 
 
Here, according to Marx’s schema, wages are reduced to the mere “means of 
subsistence”, as the intensity of labour, and hence exploitation, increases. So, in 
keeping with Marx’s assumptions of immiseration and class bifurcation there is 
pauperisation, with the worker sinking deeper and deeper “below the conditions of 
existence of his own class” (Marx and Engels, Vol. I, pp 119, 124). 
 
However. under conditions where “masses of labourers crowded into the factory are 
organised like soldiers”, the context is provided for the ever-expanding association 
and solidarity between workers. Class consciousness – collective consciousness of 
shared circumstances and interests – leads to an intensification of class struggle. In 
Marx’s words, this “replaces the isolation of the labourers due to competition, by their 
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revolutionary combination, due to association” (Marx and Engels, Vol. I, p 119-121, p 
124). 
 
For Marx, writing in 1848, the role of communists was to “point out the … common 
interests of the entire proletariat independently of all nationality”; to promote the 
“formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of bourgeois supremacy, conquest 
of political power by the proletariat”. Here, rather than promoting some utopian vision 
or plan Marx held that communists “merely express … actual relations springing from 
an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes” 
(Marx and Engels, Vol. I, pp 124-125). Herein was the genesis of the divide between 
scientific and utopian socialism that thereafter was to characterise so much debate 
among Marxists through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
 
Finally, Marx makes the aims of communists’ plain, stating that, 
 
the first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to 
the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy. The proletariat will 
use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, 
to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the 
proletariat organised as the ruling class; and to increase the total productive 
forces as rapidly as possible (Marx and Engels, Vol. I, p 131). 
 
The final consequence of this for Marx was that “the public power will lose its 
political character”’; the political state, after all being the “organised power of one 
class for oppressing another”. Having abolished class distinction, “thereby [the 
proletariat will] have abolished its own supremacy as a class”. Under conditions of 
economic super-abundance, “the state as state” would “wither away”. Politics would 
be replaced by “the administration of things” (a notion developed by Engels, and 
before him by Saint-Simon) (Marx and Engels, Vol. I, pp 131-132). 
 
Here it is interesting to note that Chantal Mouffe, a contemporary post-Marxist 
scholar rejects all notion of an end to the political. She speaks of the rise of apolitical 
technocracies under the aegis of Third Ways that seek to relegate political conflicts to 
the past on the basis of dialogue and consensus. By contrast, for Mouffe the political 
is “a space of power, conflict and antagonism” (Mouffe, 2005, pp 8-10). 
 
Socialism: Utopian and Scientific 
 
First compiled in 1880 and published in English in 1892, this work by Fredrick 
Engels comprised selections from his 1878 work Anti-Duhring: a critique of the neo-
Kantian socialism of the German philosopher, Eugen Duhring. More specifically, 
Socialism: Utopian and Scientific comprised a summary of main Marxist positions on 
the development of materialist philosophy, Marxism’s critique of utopian socialism, 
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of dialectics, and of class struggle. Socialism: Utopian and Scientific is important as a 
succinct statement of Marxist analysis, concepts, and categories. 
 
Importantly, Marxism had developed in several stages, with intimations of Marx’s 
historical materialism as early as the 1840s with the ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, The 
German Ideology and the Communist Manifesto where Marx traced the connections 
between the social division of labour and the nature of class divisions, as well as the 
role the consequent antagonisms, alienation of labour and class struggles played in 
driving the epochal transformation of economy and society. It was from this historical 
materialist method that the idea of a scientific socialism was to emerge, developing 
ultimately into the hegemonic perspective on the radical Left. 
 
Here Marx’s ideas rose to relative hegemony on the Left over decades: Developing 
via the conflicts within the First International; with the rise of the Eisenacher 
movement in Germany from the late 1860s; and with the compromise Gotha 
Programme of the Social Democratic Party of Germany in 1875; though it was not 
until the Erfurt Programme that orthodox Marxism had its definitive and decisive 
victory over Lassalleanism. When originally published, Engels’s Socialism: Utopian 
and Scientific saw off the challenge to Marxism from the neo-Kantians. 
 
Much of Engels’s Socialism: Utopian and Scientific simply re-iterates the position of 
Manifesto. Therefore, the following discussion will seek to avoid replicating the 
substance of those areas already analysed in the consideration of that text, except 
where Engels expresses something especially well or adds something new. 
Consideration of this text and where relevant, Marx’s The German Ideology can help 
clarify both the sources and substance of scientific socialism. To begin with, Engels 
makes several important observations in the ‘Special Introduction to the English 
Edition of 1892’ (i.e., of Socialism: Utopian and Scientific) that are worthy of 
analysis, and most importantly because they provide support for arguments as to the 
principles of materialism and history-in-motion as the basis for socialist science. 
 
As opposed to epistemological scepticism, for Engels, practical success in our 
interactions with the world provides “positive proof” that our sense perceptions “agree 
with reality outside ourselves” (Marx and Engels, Selected Works III, p 101). This 
emphasis on practicality is typical of Marxist analysis, and responding to the neo-
Kantians Engels claims that with modern science “ungraspable things have been 
grasped”. With progress in chemistry Engels prophesises that organic life may one 
day be creatable by man (Marx and Engels, Selected Works III, p 102). To illustrate 
his argument Engels argues: 
 
If you know all the qualities of a thing, you know the thing itself; nothing 
remains but the fact that the said thing exists without us; and when your senses 
have taught you that fact, you have grasped the last remnant of the thing-in-
itself. (Marx and Engels, Selected Works III, p 102) 
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Both Engels and Marx come to reject important epistemological and metaphysical 
questions – for a “practical” outlook. Yet, did Engels really know all he claimed to 
know? He mentions ‘the British schoolman, Duns Scotus [who] asked “whether it was 
impossible for matter to think?”’ Even in the twenty-first century, can we claim all 
ungraspable things have been grasped? Thus, Engels observes: “In order to effect this 
miracle [Scotus] took refuge in God’s omnipotence, that is, he made theology preach 
materialism” (Marx and Engels, Selected Works III, pp 97-98). Yet, without resort to 
God – or at least Cartesian dualism – Engels cannot explain either consciousness or 
free will. 
 
Indeed, Marx himself notes in The German Ideology (1846): “Religion is from the 
outset consciousness of the transcendental arising from actually existing forces”. 
(Marx & Engels, Selected Works I, p 83). While for the most part among Marxists 
historically those questions have been abandoned as being non-practical, these 
uncertainties were to provide the source of significant controversy between the neo-
Kantians and those socialists who engaged with them, including Bernstein and the 
Austro-Marxists. Important here is to establish the disposition of Marx and Engels 
towards materialism, both philosophic and practical. 
 
The Foundations of the Marxist ‘Scientific Method’ 
 
For Hegel and later for Marx, a central task of theory was “to trace out the inner law 
running through all its apparently accidental phenomenon” (Marx and Engels, 
Selected Works III, p 130). Hegel saw this inner law as comprising the evolution of 
the Idea; that is, the essentially spiritual (and mental) historic journey towards 
freedom – of absolute mind – where it could be said that mind, or the Idea, comprises 
the structure, and the material world, the superstructure. That is, the material world is 
dependent upon the Idea and not vice versa. 
 
This final destination of absolute mind comprises freedom from contingency in that 
while individual conscious is finite, in the absolute it achieves infinity. And yet, the 
idea, on its journey towards absolute mind, maintains its “richness” through the 
process of “sublation” (Aufheben). Hence, in a logical spiral moving progressively 
from one negation and synthesis to another, that negation is not one of annihilation 
but of assimilation, driven by mutual penetration of thesis and antithesis (i.e., 
mediation). Here the past stages are preserved in the new stages “at a higher plane”, 
and even at the destination point of absolute mind; absolute mind may be interpreted 
as union with God, total self-knowledge, recovery of essence (Kolakowski, pp 48-52; 
pp 63-67).  
 
The development of the family, the state and all social forms therefore occurs as a 
teleological historical process that is driven by this unfolding or becoming of the idea, 
46 
 
and not by material contradictions arising from the mode of production. However, the 
journey towards absolute idea or absolute mind suggests interconnectedness in a 
transcendence of individual mind to a state of spiritual and mental totality (absolute 
knowledge/consciousness). Hence, collectivism is implicit in Hegel. Against this, 
there is our intuitive sense of ourselves as individuals, and the sense that amidst the 
various synthetic parts that contribute to our emotions, our identity and memory, our 
consciousness and the ways in which we perceive existence: that at the deepest level 
we are individual souls regardless of our interconnectedness. 
 
Hegel had framed much of his philosophy in the context of religion. Indeed, he sought 
to reconcile permanently religion and philosophy. More specifically, his idealisation 
of Christianity and the state, and with it the assumption in his Philosophy of Right that 
“the real is the rational” (Kolakowski, p 55) was adapted as a useful legitimising 
instrument for the Prussian authorities. 
 
Later on, critics were to assault Marxism with the charge that underlying Hegelian 
assumptions in its framework of understanding provided an excuse for oppression, on 
the grounds that it has been historically necessary in the process of social evolution. 
Contrary to this Hegel might be interpreted as assuming that while specific parts of 
the historical process are necessary, they are not always desirable or just. Hence, 
Marx deplored the inhumanities of capitalism but in Hegelian fashion supposed the 
capitalist phase to be necessary to create the preconditions for socialism. Yet, Hegel 
can also be interpreted as urging individuals to quest after what is necessary for the 
achievement of freedom (Kolakowski, p 56). 
 
Indeed, as Kolakowski observes, for Hegel “state violence could [not] fulfil the 
demands and requirements of Reason” and, therefore, coercion suggested an 
“immature” society (Kolakowski, pp 62-63). Though Marx was to follow Hegel in his 
historicism, giving rise to fears of moral relativism as a rationale for oppression 
(Kolakowski, p 64). 
 
Following Hegel’s death in 1831, however, there arose a movement of Young 
Hegelians, which David McLellan has described as a movement of “speculative 
rationalism” and which, inspired by Hegelian dialectics and the French Revolution, 
saw “reason as a continually unfolding process”. Here philosophy was the rational 
and superior successor to religion, rather than its edifying counterpart, and rather than 
mediation between opposites – as with Hegel himself – the Young Hegelians came to 
emphasize the importance of radical negation, further setting the scene for Marx’s 
theory (McLellan, pp 6-8, 18). 
 
Interestingly, one Young Hegelian, August Cieszkowski, developed a “theory of 
action”. Instead of mere contemplation, he advocated action to actually change the 
world. However, he broke with Feuerbach on the theme of materialism, and this may 
have informed his voluntarism. Arguably, he helped to inspire Marx’s classic maxim: 
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“The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, 
however, is to change it” (Kolakowski, pp 71, 72). Although Marx also broke with 
those Young Hegelians who posited the existence of a “free spirit” and hence radical 
voluntarism. Instead, he suggested “praxis”, that consciousness arises through the 
historical process itself, and hence could not be pre-empted and anticipated by Reason 
(Kolakowksi, p 87). 
 
In the years preceding the 1848 liberal and nationalist revolutions, various Young 
Hegelians came out openly in favour of democracy and republicanism, and some 
ultimately, for humanist communism. Foreshadowing his future preoccupation with 
worldly injustice, Marx himself provided a critique of poverty among Moselle vine-
growers. In this Marx was certainly influenced by Feuerbach’s emphasis on the 
sensual world. Further, though, here he was in conflict with some Young Hegelians 
such as Bruno Bauer. While some imagined the most important struggle was to free 
humanity from the perceived religious illusion, which they believed to be degrading, 
Marx was developing a perspective on freedom that emphasized class-based 
oppression and alienation stemming from the division of labour. The repression and 
collapse of the Young Hegelian movement that followed most likely also influenced 
Marx’s future views on the futility of sectarianism, and the need for a real social 
grounding of any movement pertaining to the advance of radical change (McLellan, 
pp 30-32, 47; Kolakowski, pp 96-98). Grasping Marx’s critique of Feuerbach and 
other Young Hegelians is a key to discerning the origins of scientific socialism. 
 
Responding to Hegel and the Young Hegelians 
 
Engels’s rendition of dialectical materialism in Anti-Duhring comprises a relatively 
concise rendition of his and Marx’s broad social scientific framework. And to begin 
with it is essential to note that Marx and Engels’s dialectical materialism varies 
radically from Hegel and the Young Hegelians in that he and Marx unambiguously 
privilege the material world – and the concrete struggles therein – over the world of 
ideas. Marx and Engels apply the dialectical method to the material world, with 
special emphasis on the class struggle and the mode of production (Marx and Engels 
Selected Works, Vol. III, p 98; Joll p 51). 
 
In Anti-Duhring, Engels follows the Greek philosopher Democritus in holding that 
science “is based on experience, and consists in subjecting the data furnished by the 
senses to a rational method of investigation. Induction, analysis, comparison, 
observation, experiment, are the principal forms of such a rational method” (Marx and 
Engels Selected Works, Vol. III, p 98). This is compatible with Engels’s analysis of 
materialist philosophy and of idealism. As opposed to any static materialism, 
therefore, Engels asserts that: 
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Among the qualities inherent in matter, motion is the first and foremost, not 
only in the form of mechanical and mathematical motion, but chiefly in the 
form of an impulse, a vital spirit, a tension … of matter (Marx and Engels 
Selected Works, Vol. III, p 98). 
 
Hence the perspective of “ancient Greek philosophy … first clearly formulated by 
Heraclitus: everything is and is not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, 
constantly coming into being and passing away” (Marx and Engels Selected Works, 
Vol. III, p 127). 
 
This, then, is a simple rendition of dialectics from Engels:  
 
Dialectics, on the other hand, comprehends things and their representations, 
ideas, in their essential connection, concatenation, motion, origin, and ending. 
 
Furthermore:  
 
“Nature is proof of dialectics” working “dialectically, not metaphysically” and 
moving “not in the eternal oneness of a perpetually recurring circle, but goes 
through a real historical evolution.” (Marx and Engels Selected Works, Vol. III, 
pp 128-129) 
 
To provide proof of this, Engels turns to human biology. With regard to the human 
body, “every moment it assimilates matter supplied from without”, “and gets rid of 
other matter”; “at every moment … the same and not the same”; “every organic being 
is always itself, and yet something other than itself” (Marx and Engels Selected 
Works, Vol. III, pp 128-129). Kolakowski explains it as follows. The “truth” of seed is 
a tree. This is a kind of logic – and applies to both the idealistic schema of Hegel and 
the materialist schema of Marx. It is a way of thinking, as well as the logic that Hegel 
and Marx perceive at work in the world. It is a logic that attempts to grasp the world 
through its movement as a totality; specifically, through the relation of the whole to 
its parts (Kolakowski, p 51). Engels also explains how: “[The] two poles of an 
antithesis, positive and negative, … are as inseparable as they are opposed”; “they 
mutually interpenetrate”. In the totality, therefore, “causes and effects are eternally 
changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and 
vice versa”. (Marx and Engels Selected Works, Vol. III, pp 128-129) 
 
Engels further develops this materialist outlook with his famous division of society 
into base and superstructure. Hence, as opposed to Hegel and the Young Hegelians: 
 
[The] economic structure of society always furnishes the real basis, starting 
from which we can alone work out the ultimate explanation of the whole 
superstructure of juridical and political institutions, as well as of the religious, 
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philosophical, and other ideas of a given historical period. (Marx and Engels 
Selected Works, Vol. III, p 132) 
 
Finally, Engels attempts to specify the substance of historical materialism as the basis 
of socialism as science: scientific socialism. Thus, he summarized historical 
materialism as designating, 
 
that view of the course of history which seeks the ultimate cause and the great 
moving power of all important historic events in the economic development of 
society, in the changes in the modes of production and exchange, in the 
consequent division of society into distinct classes, and in the struggle of these 
classes against one another. (Marx and Engels Selected Works, Vol. III, p 103) 
 
It is also instructive to consider Marx’s original responses to Hegelianism and to the 
Young Hegelians in particular. ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ (1845) and The German 
Ideology (1846) comprise the relevant texts, the origins of Marx’s dialectical 
materialism as contrasted with Hegelian idealism and the contemplative materialism 
of Feuerbach in particular. 
 
In essence Marx accused the Young Hegelians of idealism for their apparent 
supposition that “conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of 
consciousness” and especially religion enjoy an independent existence. In contrast, 
Marx proposes his materialist conception of history, which starts with the assumption 
not just of consciousness but the social nature of humanity in organising its material 
means of subsistence through labour. With the progress of history and the 
development of productive forces thereafter, in the context of private ownership and 
the evolving and increasing division of labour, this socio-economic dynamic gives 
rise to shifting social cleavages on the basis of class. 
 
Here men and women “work under definite material limits, presuppositions and 
conditions independent of their will”. Hence, according to this world view: “It is not 
consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness” (Marx and 
Engels Selected Works, Vol. I, pp 19-22, 25-26). The consequence of this is that “real 
liberation” is possible, “only in the real world and by real means”; it is a “historical 
and not a mental act”, based on the development of the means and the mode of 
production, and ultimately, the abolition of the division of labour. This, in turn, is held 
to enable “personal freedom”, not of isolated individuals but through mutual 
“association” providing “the means of cultivating [our] gifts in all directions” (Marx 
and Engels Selected Works, Vol. I, pp 27-28, 68). 
 
Further, real liberation was not to be merely political but also social. Hence, for Marx, 
man’s essence was social, and not spiritual. (though again, we may argue that there 
remain some ways in which we remain alone; that is, we only know our own 
consciousness; and this is an important facet of human experience) 
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Here much of the superstructure takes the form of ideology; according to Marx the 
ruling ideas of every epoch were, in fact, the ideas of the ruling class, and in Marx’s 
words, the dominant material force here was also the dominant intellectual force. 
Moreover, the consequently dominant ideas – representing the dominant interests – 
are passed off as “the common interest … expressed in ideal form”. Not only are these 
ideas presented as being “rational”, they are held to be “universally valid”. However, 
these ideas do not arise outside or above society but arise from material conditions of 
domination (Marx and Engels Selected Works, Vol. I, pp 49-50). 
 
In response to those who claimed the (bourgeois) state to be a the vehicle for the 
general interest, Marx indicates the state’s alienation from the actual needs of 
particular individuals, most particularly those of the proletarians (but arguably also 
the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie). Hence, individual liberation – manifest as 
freedom from alienating labour and freedom to find ourselves through creative labour 
– depended upon social liberation. Under capitalism the state does not mediate 
between interests, but defends the interests of the ruling classes (Kolakowski, p 102). 
However, later on, Marx was to suggest the possibility of relative autonomy with his 
‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’ (1852). 
 
Elaborating on Dialectical Materialism 
 
As we have seen with regard to the Marxist schema, first there is materialism, 
practical and philosophical. Second is the dialectical approach, but inverted from the 
Hegelian idealist form to focus instead upon the practical, sensuous, material world. 
Third is the focus upon the evolving means and mode of production and progressing 
class struggle as the core dialectical process in history, providing the economic 
structure upon which the cultural and ideological superstructure rests. 
 
Importantly, this is an abstraction of the social process, but for Marx is it a necessary 
abstraction for grasping the movement of society and economy as a whole. Here 
social relationships can be seen to develop their own laws of movement, and these are 
grasped by moving from the abstract to the concrete. Yet, perhaps given that all 
perception and understanding are only partial, all of our intellectual constructions fail 
to fully grasp totality, including those of the Marxists. To grasp totality is something 
to be strived for but can never be fully achieved in the last instance. 
 
Fourth is the chief claim of Marxism and contrary to idealism, is its claim to focus 
upon the possibilities latent under present material conditions, and its effective 
insistence that the horizon imposed by these material conditions cannot simply be 
overcome by force of free will or by virtue of the imagination. This refers not merely 
to the possibilities imaginable within the confines of the present means of production 
and their development, but also that which is possible in light of the development of 
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the class struggle – the balance of class forces locally and globally, and the status of 
the state (and to this we might add the possibility of hostile or friendly states). 
 
Finally, for Marx the proletariat is the “universal class”. Through the social conditions 
of capitalism the proletariat achieves “true consciousness”; that is (as Kolakowski 
puts it), “awareness of interests and the direction of human history” (Kolakowski, pp 
143-145). As opposed to Hegelian notions of spiritual reconciliation, for Marx 
redemption (or conciliation) is achieved in the world and through the world. Man is 
essentially finite, but he finds himself through communism; through communism he 
rediscovers his essence, which had been lost through various class societies, and 
through the division of labour. He recovers his species being. 
 
These are the essential ingredients of the worldview of Marxist scientific socialism as 
developed in such works as The German Ideology, The Communist Manifesto and 
Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The claims alluded to above also underline the reluctance of Marx and Engels and 
those who followed in their tradition to speculate as to the specifics of any future 
socialist society. Apart from anything else, Marxism lays down general principles of 
analysis but its application must necessarily differ from country to country, from 
context to context through history. One can see clearly here the possible 
interpretations of determinism and economism resorted to by the orthodox Marxists in 
the face of the Bolshevik revolution. If anything, the experience of Bolshevism 
illustrated the possibility of a path to socialism at variance with the assumptions of 
orthodox Marxism. The Bolshevists and Stalinists’ swimming against the tide of 
history – harnessing collective will to the ends of forced industrialisation – came at 
such a terrible cost. 
 
Hence Marxism and socialism are seen by many to be discredited by the very 
movements of Bolshevism, and then Stalinism, which themselves defied central 
Marxist tenets regarding the preconditions of socialism. Thus, it is necessary to 
present a clearer vision of the manifest possibilities of socialism; a response to the 
many and varied dystopian visions of socialist society. The development of the means 
of communication can provide the basis either for our freedom or our enslavement in 
a bad totality, and perhaps with no way out (Adorno, Beilharz). 
 
Here, again, it is interesting to return to Chantal Mouffe and her critique of dialectics, 
whether idealistic or materialistic. Mouffe argues: 
 
Society is not to be seen as the unfolding of a logic exterior to itself, whatever 
the source of this logic could be: forces of production, development of what 
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Hegel called the Absolute Spirit, laws of history, etc. Every order is the 
temporary and precarious articulation of contingent practices. The frontier 
between the social and the political is essentially unstable and requires constant 
displacements and renegotiations between social agents. (Mouffe, On the 
Political, pp 17-18, 2005) 
 
Thus is the picture that emerges in a study of the development of socialist theory 
during the period 1848 to 1880. The utopians are crucial for the influence they hold 
on future theorists, including Marx himself, but as the so-called utopians recede in 
their relative significance and prominence, Marxism gradually emerges as the Second 
Way or hegemonic revolutionary discourse. The Marxist position is developed 
through the 1840s with the ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ and The German Ideology (though 
not released until much later), and most famously with the Communist Manifesto. 
These contain the historical materialist seeds of the future scientific socialism, which 
Engels elucidates clearly later on with his famous Anti-Dühring in 1877. 
 
In his time, Marx came to be well known in the relatively undeveloped European left 
community. Engels was crucial in popularising Marx’s legacy, and devoted himself to 
the cause of global socialist organisation. Hence, Engels was known affectionately as 
‘the General’. To summarise, in Eley’s words: “The period between [the] publication 
of Engelss Anti-Dühring in 1877 and his death in 1895 saw the transition, so to speak, 
from Marx to Marxism” (Eley, pp 33-37, pp 41-42). The baton was passed on to Karl 
Kautsky after Engels own passing, with the socialist movement exploding in size and 
relevance during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
 
Having established the content of the scientific socialist Second Way of Marx and 
Engels, the next chapter considers the life and works of Lassalle: one of the founders 
of German Social Democracy, and an original theorist who grappled with themes 
including universal suffrage, and co-operatives with state aid. 
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Chapter Two: 
 
The Lassallean Third Way 
 
 
 
 
The object of this chapter is an analysis of the Third Way of Lassalleanism, which 
was pivotal in the early development of the German Left. This chapter works to trace 
the origins of Lassalle’s movement and the ways in which his philosophy comprised a 
socialist Third Way. Thereafter I will provide an account of the personal life of 
Lassalle and of his political activism. Here I will draw from Eduard Bernstein and 
David Footman who were among the most important critics of Lassalle. Also drawing 
from Bernstein and Footman (and from Lassalle himself), I will consider Lassalle’s 
important political works separately. In this context, we will consider important 
opposing themes in Lassalle’s life and works. The underlying theme for this chapter is 
that Lassalleanism comprised one of the first socialist Third Ways; and that through 
his writing and political activism he left a valuable legacy, not least of all in the way 
certain themes were treated in his work. 
 
Lassalle (1825-1864) was to be deeply influenced by the Hegelian doctrine early in 
his life. He developed an interest in radical politics, and later briefly participated in 
the 1848 revolutions in Europe. (Footman pp 40-41, pp 62-63) During his brief life 
Lassalle wrote extensively about legal theory, philosophy, international politics – and 
even tried his hand at being a playwright. (Footman, pp vii-xx) 
 
Eduard Bernstein traces Lassalle’s ‘socialist Damascus’ to Paris in 1844 where “the 
tide of the socialist movement was running very high”. (Bernstein, n.d., pp 34-41) But 
Footman claims it was Lassalle’s later study of Hegel at university that led to his 
embrace of socialism, ”within the limits of Hegelian evolutionary idealism”. Change 
was not to come, therefore, according to Footman, “as a consequence of barricades, of 
risings or conspiracies but in the train of the inevitable triumph of the Hegelian Idea”, 
and disseminated inevitably and in good time via culture and philosophy (Footman, p 
36, 38). Importantly, while a Left Hegelian, Lassalle was not a Young Hegelian. That 
is - he was not part of that intellectual movement arising from around 1840 which 
sought to radicalise Hegel in their critique of religion as self-alienation amongst other 
things. Unlike Marx they emphasised the power of  Ideas rather than the primacy of 
the material. (Kolakowski, p 195, McLellan (1980), pp 6-9). 
 
In 1861, Lassalle threw himself fully into socialist agitation. However, he shifted 
between the themes of conflict and conciliation. In the context of a constitutional 
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struggle between the liberal parliament and the royalist Prussian state, Lassalle 
attempted to out-manoeuvre the liberals by dealing directly with Bismarck. While 
Lassalle’s aims included universal suffrage, producer-co-operatives with state aid and 
a German republic, critics such as Eduard Bernstein later condemned his conciliatory 
strategies. 
 
Lassalle’s historic appeal to authority is notable in contrast to the Marxist doctrine of 
a stage-based class struggle; and Lassalle’s attempt to outflank the bourgeoisie 
through this strategy is notable in contrast to the common left strategy of first 
establishing a united front for liberal democracy with the liberal bourgeoisie. His 
positioning can be traced both to his Hegelianism and to his strategic mindset. 
 
Lassalle’s personal socialist agitation arose in the context of the constitutional 
struggle. The overall context also included the authoritarian royalist Prussian state, 
counter-posed by a working class only in the infancy of its conscious organisation. 
Though Lassalle personally was not to live to see his efforts come to full fruition, the 
Lassallean movement was to assist in the future rise of the Social Democratic Party in 
Germany. 
 
With the Erfurt Programme of 1891, the Marxists in the German social-democratic 
movement were to feel confident enough to break with Lassalleanism, and their case 
was strengthened by the posthumous release of Marx’s own ‘Critique of the Gotha 
Programme’ and Eduard Bernstein’s critique of Lassalle (‘Ferdinand Lassalle as a 
Social Reformer’) which I draw liberally from in this chapter. 
 
With Lassalle dying tragically in 1864, the Lassallean movement outlived Lassalle 
himself. It is possible, also, that Lassalle’s influence on Bismarck provided an 
inspiration for the latter’s state socialism or practical Christianity in the 1880s. The 
context of royalist authoritarianism was to persist in Germany until the revolution of 
1918-19, but after Lassalle’s death German working-class organisation was to grow 
steadily. These pressures most likely also influenced Bismarck. 
 
The following sections provide brief biographical background, followed by an 
account of his political agitation, and then a more detailed account of his works. 
 
Lassalle’s Life and Times 
 
Diary entries from 1840 provided by Lassalle’s biographer, David Footman, reveal a 
young Lassalle concerned plainly with his own class interests. Hence, he declares 
simply: “Had I been born a prince I would have been an aristocrat heart and soul. As 
it is I am one of the middle classes, and, therefore, a democrat” (Footman, pp 19-20). 
As an adult, in 1846 Lassalle made the acquaintance of the Countess Sophie von 
Hatzfeldt, whom he represented in a legal fight with her husband over their marriage 
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(Footman, pp 51-55). Footman writes: “Old scandals were raked up and embellished. 
Witnesses were bought, suborned or terrorised” (Footman, p 55). 
 
Marx was unimpressed with Lassalle’s dedication to the von Hatzfeldt case as well as 
his various intrigues with spies and diplomats (Footman, pp 78-81). At this time, as 
suggested by his work, ‘The Italian War’, Lassalle was also active in supporting the 
revolutionary, Garibaldi and the cause of Italian nationalism. He and his co-
conspirators believed they could isolate Austria as well as promote German 
unification (Footman, pp 129-132). 
 
Approaching the close of 1861 a constitutional conflict between Liberals and Prussian 
Absolutism gathered place over the issue of army reform, around conscription, army 
organisation and the like. Lassalle responded to the crisis with two important 
speeches: ‘The Working Class and its Significance in the Present Age’, and ‘The 
Nature of Constitutions’ (Footman, pp 134-136). Lassalle’s promotion of an 
independent working-class party infuriated liberals who saw such an agenda as a 
distraction from the immediate struggle, and perhaps as a provocation that could only 
harm their cause (Footman, p 139). 
 
Lassalle responded to what he perceived as the timidity of the liberals in Prussia, 
comparing their prospects to that of slaves in ancient Rome who enjoyed liberty once 
a year at the festival of Saturnalia. In contrast Lassalle asserts: 
 
When Spartacus and his men raised the banner of the slave insurrection in Rome 
in order to make free men of slaves he was doing more than engaging in 
Saturnalian festivities. (Lassalle, pp 59-61) 
 
‘The Working Class and its Significance in the Present Age’ was later republished as 
The Worker’s Programme (Footman, p 143). Impressed by this workers’ programme 
a number of labour activists approached Lassalle about leading a new movement 
(Footman, pp 155-157). Lassalle was to respond to this call with another work, ‘The 
Open Answer’, published later in 1863. Lassalle’s openly professed vision around this 
time revolved mainly around the proposal for workers’ co-operatives with state aid, 
but privately Lassalle was considering rather more radical options. Lassalle wrote to 
his friend, the influential economist Johann Karl Rodbertus on 28 April 1863: 
 
That private ownership of land and capital is to be abolished, that has been the 
inner kernel of my conviction ever since I began to think about economic 
matters … True one cannot tell the mob that now, and that is why I avoided 
mention of it in my pamphlet. But I believe State credit for co-operatives is the 
first little step. (Lassalle in Footman, p 169) 
 
Further, on 30 April Lassalle provides the rationale for his strategy: 
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Without universal suffrage, i.e., a practical instrument with which to enforce our 
demands, we might grow into a philosophical school or a religious sect. But 
never into a political party. (Lassalle in Footman, p 169) 
 
A meeting at Leipzig endorsed ‘The Open Answer’ ‘by 1,350 votes against two, and a 
new committee was set up to organise the formation of a General German Workers’ 
Association’ (Footman, p 171). Within three months, the association had mobilised 
900 members. At Lassalle’s own request he was provided with “dictatorial” powers 
(Bernstein, n.d., pp 180-181). In fact, Lassalle’s tactics demanded dictatorship of a 
sort, as he had to be in a position to deliver the support of the German workers to the 
powers with which he was dealing. That is – to deliver proletarian support to the 
Crown against a ‘liberal bourgeoisie’ that refused to consider free, universal and equal 
suffrage. He needed to be seen as “a power to be treated with” (Bernstein, n.d., p 
211). But without the organised working class having developed and matured 
sufficiently, he was fighting an uphill battle.  
 
During these final years of his life in which he pursued the cause of building the 
General German Workers’ Association – and starting in May 1863 – Lassalle was to 
meet with Prince von Bismarck four times (Footman, p 175). Bernstein observes that 
some “in Government circles” were considering whether the “social question” could 
be used as a wedge to “break up the Progressivist majority in the Chamber” 
(Bernstein, n.d., p 201), but Lassalle’s organisation as yet was not that strong. 
 
An idea of Lassalle’s style of approach to Bismarck can perhaps be gleaned from the 
following excerpt – a part of a letter from Lassalle to Bismarck from 8 June 1863: 
 
the working class is instinctively inclined to dictatorship if it feels that such will 
be exercised in working class interests [and thus workers would] be prepared to 
see in the Crown the natural bearer of a social dictatorship in contradiction to 
the egoism of bourgeois society. [If the] Crown … could make up its mind to 
adopt a really revolutionary and national attitude; and become a social, 
revolutionary and popular monarchy instead of a monarchy of the privileged 
classes. (Lassalle in Footman, p 179) 
 
At the same time, though, Lassalle remained committed, as in a letter to Bismarck, to 
“universal suffrage” and an “alliance [of the Crown] with the people” (Footman, p 
179). Lassalle wrote later, on 11 June, to the Countess Sophie von Hatzfeldt, whom he 
had represented in the legal contest in 1848: 
 
It is easy to guess Bismarck’s real intention. As I told you last year he has 
always wanted to put through the social part of our workers’ programme, but 
not the political part. (Lassalle in Footman, p 201) 
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Evidently, Lassalle assumed that by providing support to Bismarck against the 
liberals, and by supporting Prussian expansion into Schleswig-Holstein he could 
secure free, equal and universal suffrage (Lassalle in Footman, p 212). 
 
Reflecting many decades later Eduard Bernstein made his opinion of Lassalle’s 
strategy clear: 
 
He was playing with the reaction; believed he was using it for his own ends, and 
that at a given moment he could shake it off with one wrench … [But there was] 
a logic of facts which is stronger than even the strongest individual will … [In 
reality Bismarck could] command the greatest number of really powerful 
factors; [and hence] in the long run Lassalle should become Bismarck’s 
‘delegate’ rather than Bismarck his (Bernstein, n.d., pp 204-205). 
 
Yet, Lassallean Jakob Altmaier attempted to uphold Lassalle’s revolutionary 
credentials. He observed that it was Lassalle, indeed, who: “After the delivery of a 
speech at Frankfurt” had argued: ‘Whenever I say “general suffrage right” you must 
understand me as meaning “revolution” and “revolution” and again “revolution”!’ 
(Lassalle, pp 16-17). 
 
Even though Lassalle became somewhat disillusioned with his lack of substantial 
progress regarding universal suffrage and his other core goals, there can be no 
denying that his movement was gaining momentum. Footman notes an association 
meeting on 23 May 1864, held in the Rhineland with Lassalle as the speaker: “He had 
established himself with the Rhineland workers as a local hero. For every ten men 
willing to become paying members there were hundreds, if not thousands, ready to 
attend his meetings” (Footman, pp 201-203). Yet, Lassalle was increasingly frustrated 
by his slow progress. In a letter that proved revealing of his mindset at the time, 
Lassalle had written to his confidant, Countess Hatzfeld of politics: 
 
Truly I would burn as passionately for them as ever if there were anything 
serious to be done, or if I had the power, or saw the means to bring it about … 
for without supreme power nothing can be done. (Lassalle in Bernstein, n.d., p 
220) 
 
Fellow revolutionary Johann Phillip Becker had written that Lassalle’s problem was 
his impatience, his desire for immediate success rather than a struggle that would 
“take decades” (Bernstein, n.d., p 221). Moreover, Eduard Bernstein concluded in 
1891 that Lassalle’s socialist agitation was a “doubly two-edged weapon”. While his 
works “won over hundreds of thousands to Socialism”, those who claimed to follow 
in Lassalle’s tradition exploited his legacy to turn the masses against republicanism: 
as if all republics were somehow essentially bourgeois republics (Bernstein, n.d., pp 
224-225). 
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Hence, it is popular sentiment in favour of Lassalle as the “good socialist” – the 
“patriotic” socialist – that Bernstein sets out to root out in his work. ‘Ferdinand 
Lassalle as a Social Reformer’). (Bernstein (1891), pp 7-8), Most likely Bernstein 
decided upon this position both to prevent the misuse of the Lassalle legend in 
rationalising the reaction, but also to consolidate the orthodox Marxist hegemony on 
the German Left. 
 
Lassalle’s Urgent, Pragmatic Idealism 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, here we will mainly concern ourselves with Lassalle’s 
‘The Workers’ Program’, otherwise known as the ‘Working Class Programme’ and 
‘The Open Answer’, otherwise known as ‘The Open Reply’. 
 
Momentarily it is worthwhile considering the meaning of Lassalle’s other works, 
including Bernstein’s opinion on their relevance. Engaging in a reading of Lassalle’s 
‘The Philosophy of Heraclitus the Obscure of Ephesus’, Bernstein asserts that from 
‘Hegel’s cult of the idea of the State’ Lassalle thus derived his preference for state-
centred solutions to the social problem. Further, and from this, there is the idea of the 
state as representing the universal: whereas for Marx the state was based upon a 
foundation of particular class interests. Bernstein also suggests such a concept of the 
state is at odds with democracy, which for Danish historian G. Brandes expresses the 
rule of “the formal will of the individual”. Indeed Brandes held that this is a 
contradiction that “no one can harbour without taint” (Bernstein, n.d., pp 46-47). 
 
In considering the early Lassalle we begin to gain an appreciation of the clashing 
theoretical foundations of himself, and of Marx and Bernstein. Importantly, Lassalle’s 
ideas and the movement that followed him comprised one of the first relative socialist 
Third Ways: A left alternative to both the bourgeois ideology and the Marxist 
doctrine. The movement was strong enough that years after Lassalle’s own death the 
Marxist Eisenachers felt compelled to compromise with the Lassalleans in the 
framing of the first German social-democratic programme at Gotha in 1875. The 
programme included reference to the “iron law of wages”, as well as producer co-
operatives with state aid – both Lassallean concepts. 
 
Lassalle was at odds with Marxism in several other important respects. His political 
socialism envisaged a state power that could be largely autonomous from the 
economic base. Indeed, it could be argued that in Lassalle’s view it was the political 
that was the dominant factor. This followed after Hegel himself, for whom the state 
comprised the vehicle for the mediation of particular interests, the reconciliation of 
“the subjective will with universal Reason” and the realisation of human freedom. 
Because of this, for Hegelians – including Lassalle – contra-Marx, there would always 
be a central role for the state (Kolakowski, pp 61-62). 
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Lassalle’s emphasis on the political also found expression with his language of a 
‘fourth estate’, defined as much in juridical and political terms as in those of 
economic class relations. For Lassalle, this fourth estate was the bearer of the 
universal interest, and of universal reconciliation. 
 
For Lassalle, his predicted reconciliation would do “away with all the contradictions 
in every circle of society” and this was to be achieved by “universal and direct 
suffrage”, through a democracy in which a wide basis of participation would prove 
inherently self-corrective (Lassalle in Fried and Sanders, p 379-381). This theme of 
reconciliation stands in clear contrast to Marx’s radical negation, and even if Marx 
can be read as promoting the proletariat as the bearer of the conciliation of all 
humanity upon the transition to communism. 
 
However, the precondition of revolution here was still class consciousness and class 
solidarity, the product of which would be “the development of the Idea, with the 
advances of civilisation, with the life principle of history itself, which is nothing more 
or less than the growth of freedom” (Lassalle, p 81). Through left-Hegelian glasses, 
for Lassalle the fourth estate is the necessary agent of history – the collective agent 
through which the unfolding idea becomes manifest in the world. Thus Lassalle’s 
account of the fourth estate and of the working class in The Workers’ Programme: 
 
[By striving] after the improvement of their condition as a class … instead of 
opposing the movement of history [the fourth estate] assume[s] a direction 
which thoroughly accords with the development of the whole people, with the 
victory of the Idea, with the advance of culture, with the living principle of 
history itself, which is no other than the development of freedom. (Lassalle in 
Fried and Sanders, p 385) 
 
Whereas for Marx the state usually was taken as being derived from the economic, 
Lassalle posits a state power enjoying a great degree of independence. Rather than 
being essentially an engine of bourgeois class despotism, the Lassallean state holds 
the promise of universal conciliation and liberation (both from class-based 
exploitation and oppression as well as from material deprivation and ignorance). This 
view of the state is of central importance in distinguishing Lassalle’s state philosophy 
from the perspective of Marx, for whom true liberation would finally arise with the 
dismantling of the state as state. That is, where the state is seen not as an enabling 
power, but simply as the guarantor of class power, exploitation, and interest. 
 
Like Marx, Lassalle viewed the existing state as the representative of class interests. 
Yet, his aim was a political revolution so as to transform the state in order to comprise 
the embodiment and the representative of ‘the universal interest’, a vehicle for 
conciliation and for freedom from want. 
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Again, in Lassalle’s vision, true equality would be achieved in the shape of producer 
co-operatives, formed with the assistance of state aid. In his famous condemnation of 
a minimalist state; otherwise a night watchman’s state: 
 
the bourgeoisie conceives the moral purpose of the State as consisting only in 
the duty to protect the personal liberty of the individual and his property. ... This 
is a policeman’s idea, gentlemen … whose sole function consists … in 
preventing theft.(Lassalle, p 83) 
 
This is effectively posited as the only reason for the bourgeois state’s existence. But 
by contrast with such a minimalist vision, a state built, 
 
under the dominion of the idea of the working class … would … bring about an 
elevation of the spirit, the production of a sum total of happiness, culture, well-
being and liberty that have had no parallel in the world’s history. (Lassalle, p 
84) 
 
Lassalle’s concept of freedom is, therefore, intricately tied to his treatment of the 
state. For Lassalle the state is the political form adopted by collective humanity in its 
struggle with nature (and not only as a product of the class struggle). Lassalle depicts 
this struggle with nature as being one with the “misery, the ignorance, the poverty and 
consequently slavery” that characterised human existence since the earliest times. As 
against the bourgeois view of the state, Lassalle insists that, “something must be 
added to this in a morally ordered community”; that is: “Solidarity of interests, 
community and reciprocity in development” (Lassalle in Fried and Sanders, pp 386-
387). 
 
The state for Lassalle thus arises as the vehicle of collective organisation which 
makes it possible for the associated individuals to achieve otherwise unreachable 
levels of “education, power and freedom” in the struggle for positive liberty as against 
the limitations imposed by nature (Lassalle in Fried and Sanders, p 387). 
 
Later, Lassalle was to develop his vision for the state more fully, when he wrote of the 
bottom “96 ¼ per cent” of the German population: 
 
To them, gentlemen, to the suffering classes does the State belong, not to us, the 
upper classes, for of them it is composed! What is the State? ... Yours, the 
poorer classes’ great association – that is the state. (Bernstein, n.d., pp 151-152) 
 
Furthermore and most crucially, it was through equal, universal and direct suffrage 
that Lassalle supposed the state could be compelled to take on this role (Bernstein, 
n.d., pp 151-152). Hence, the working class is destined to become the “ruling class” 
and “is called upon the principle of its class as the principle of the generation in which 
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it lives, to make its Idea the dominant Idea of the entire society and in turn to 
reconstruct society in its own image” (Lassalle, p 84). 
 
Crucially for our evaluation of Lassalle, while he was an idealist and believed in the 
power of the political, he also observed the importance of class interest in providing 
the basis and driving force for any revolution. He understood well that revolution 
would not occur without a social basis, indeed a class basis, driving it and providing 
its precondition. Lassalle argued that in contrast to the French revolutions in 1789 and 
1830, the Prussian bourgeoisie had been compromised by the granting of social – i.e., 
economic – rights from above by the absolutist Prussian monarchy. 
Hence for Lassalle: 
 
In part at least, they introduced the social phase of the Revolution of 1789 long 
ago, and a merely political liberty will not arouse the enthusiasm of the 
bourgeoisie. (Lassalle, p 67) 
 
By Lassalle’s reckoning, then, the bourgeoisie was concerned mainly with “its trade 
and its habits, its industry and production” and, therefore: 
 
would much rather dispense with political freedom than jeopardise the public peace, 
and thereby its material interests, by resorting to a serious struggle for freedom.’ 
 
And because of this Lassalle asserted that, 
 
a merely political freedom can now no longer be successfully achieved, because 
no material interest, because no class interest, stands behind this demand. 
(Lassalle, pp 64-67) 
 
The Prospects of Revolution, and the Sources of Real Power 
 
In order to understand the nature and premises of the Lassallean Third Way it is 
important to note the similarities of Lassalle’s position in comparison with Marx, as 
well as their differences. This has consequences for the tension between reform and 
revolution. While some questioned Lassalle’s revolutionary credentials on account of 
his position on the state and his dealings with Bismarck, Lassalle’s specific desire to 
radically transform the state marked him out as a revolutionary. Again: The premises 
of Lassalle’s agenda were that the existing state represented particular (absolutist and 
bourgeois) interests; and that a political revolution was necessary to transform the 
state apparatus into a vehicle for the universal interest. This would take the form of 
universal suffrage; backed by reform of the state apparatus of force itself. 
 
From a speech in Berlin, 6 April 1867, Lassalle also expounded his view on the nature 
of political power and of constitutions. He distinguished between mere written 
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constitutions as opposed to “the true constitution, the real alignment of forces that 
obtains in the country”. Noting the power of the absolutist state, of its powers of 
violence and coercion, and crucially, its organisation and hence its capacity “to take 
up the struggle” whenever it was demanded of it, Lassalle saw the unreformed state as 
an instrument of oppression. Hence: “Constitutional questions are not fundamentally 
questions of right, but questions of might’ (Lassalle, p 32, p 40). 
 
This absolutist state and specifically, the Prussian state could afford to buy time by 
granting relatively liberal constitutional concessions on paper and withdraw these 
reforms from under the people once the balance of forces had shifted. However, 
Lassalle also believed that were the people to organise, they would form the superior 
power. Lassalle’s solution was the direct election of officers from the rank and file 
soldiers themselves, so that they are not “hostile to the people”; a “blind instrument of 
monarchical power” (Lassalle, pp 33-35). 
 
Elsewhere Lassalle identified pseudo-constitutionalism as nothing but a ploy to 
prolong absolutist power; where the participation and compromise of liberal elements 
with regard the diet (i.e., the parliament) was a betrayal; a source of demobilisation, 
and a sure path to defeat. Participation, Lassalle insisted, simply enabled the 
government to “maintain an appearance of respectability, as if [the written] 
constitution still applied” (Lassalle, pp 44-53). (Though imaginably we can conceive 
of a parliament under such circumstances acting as a pole of legitimacy in an attempt 
to win the loyalty of the apparatus of legitimate force under circumstances of dual 
power. These were not the circumstances in Lassalle’s Prussia.) 
 
Lassalle’s scepticism with regard to limited constitutional reform needs to be 
considered in light of Eley’s observations. That is, that limited constitutional reform 
in the 1860s provided the conditions assisting the rise of mass social-democratic 
parties (Eley, pp 5-6, pp 33-34, 39). 
 
Lassalle’s response to the failure of the 1848 revolutions – the victory of real state 
power over a merely written constitution – was his argument to alter “the real, actual 
relation of forces within the country”, “to intervene in the executive arm, and to 
intervene so thoroughly and remodel it so completely as to make it impossible for it to 
ever again effectively to oppose the will of the nation” (Lassalle, p 36 ) Apparently 
Lassalle underestimated the problems concerned with arming the people, as well as 
the superior training and discipline of the standing armed forces, and if the standing 
armed forces remained loyal to the absolutist monarchy, perhaps intervention at the 
level of the executive might not succeed either. 
 
Bernstein’s Response to Lassalle 
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Bernstein remained unimpressed by Lassalle’s theoretical schema and developed a 
line of criticism in his important work, Ferdinand Lassalle as a Social Reformer. At 
this point, writing in 1891, around the time of the Erfurt Programme, Bernstein still 
represents the perspective of Marxist orthodoxy. In this book, Bernstein is seeking to 
relegate the Lassallean position to the relative margins; for Marxism to be seen as the 
hegemonic left discourse – the Second Way. 
 
To begin, in Chapter Five of that book Bernstein criticises Lassalle’s notion of a 
“working-class estate” (Arbeiterstand). Hence: 
 
[Lassalle derives] the concept of the bourgeois not from the actual power which 
the possession of capital confers, and which is due solely to its economic effects 
and forces, but from the juridical and political privileges which the bourgeois 
enjoys or claims on the strength of his property. (Bernstein, n.d., pp 124-125) 
 
Bernstein’s answer to Lassalle is a classical Marxist response privileging the 
economic as the base upon which the attendant cultural and political superstructure is 
dependent. It may be said, however, that the Prussian bourgeoisie did hold a degree of 
political power in Lassalle’s time – political power crystallized through the three-class 
electoral system. Bernstein’s point, it appears, is that this power arose only as a 
consequence of concessions from the old feudal classes in response to the rising 
preponderance of the bourgeoisie and bourgeois wealth. However, while political and 
economic power complemented and helped consolidate each other, that is not to say 
that political power was thoroughly reducible to and dependent upon the economic 
foundation. Hence the danger within such currents in Marxism, of reverting to 
economism. Indeed in the constitutional struggle that was to follow it was Bismarck 
who defied the liberal bourgeoisie, ultimately co-opting them to the political designs 
of the royalist state, such that the parliament became a rubber stamp in return for the 
defence of bourgeois economic interests. 
 
Bernstein was also unimpressed with Lassalle’s reverence for the state. Instead 
Bernstein supposes that the modern state raises the prospect of “state slavery”, and 
regardless of Lassalle’s “democratic and socialist views” any “cult of the State”, and, 
indeed, “all theory built upon preconceived concepts” can degenerate into the 
glorification of “existing, or of past institutions” (Bernstein, n.d., pp 128-129). Thus 
Bernstein alleges that Lassalle derived from Hegel “a semi-mystical reverence for the 
state at a time when, above all, it behoved [the workers] to shake off the police State” 
(Bernstein, n.d., pp 148-149). 
 
The subsequent history has shown the potential for state apparatus based both on the 
principle of repression and/or the defence of rights and liberties, and also on the 
principle of the helping hand. While Lassalle’s language of unifying all society into a 
single “ethical whole” perhaps leans too far towards extreme collectivism; movements 
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for liberation need to start by assuming both individual and collective rights and 
needs.  
 
Potentially, Lassalle’s envisaged state would be too extensive: all-pervasive. By this I 
mean that there need to be checks and balances in order to preserve freedoms; and 
Lassalle’s envisaged state would perhaps be too strong as against civil society. Yet, 
the most advanced welfare states have achieved a greater balance between the realms 
of state and civil society – and even in the context of deeply embedded corporatism – 
while nonetheless providing the social assistance and enabling liberty envisaged both 
by Lassalle and subsequent Social Democrats. It is unhelpful, therefore, to conceive 
only of two extremes when it comes to the state. 
 
Lassalle’s further Theoretical Achievements 
 
Bernstein observes that Lassalle was indebted to Marx for a great part of his critique 
of capitalism. Yet one of Lassalle’s most marked departures from the assumptions and 
goals of Marx was in his scheme for producers co-operative associations supported 
with state aid (Bernstein, n.d., pp 8, 11-12, 22-23). There were potential 
complications with the co-operativist approach. Lassalle was later to argue in what 
Bernstein calls the time of his socialist agitation that strategies of “self-help” were an 
exercise in “futility”. This was so, he supposed, on the basis of an “iron law of 
wages”: 
 
[The] iron and inexorable law, according to which, under the domination of 
supply and demand, the average wages of labour remain always reduced to the 
bare subsistence which, according to the standard of living of a nation, is 
necessary for the maintenance of life and the reproduction of the species. 
(Bernstein, n.d., p 150) 
 
As Bernstein further elaborates on Lassalle’s theory: 
 
If wages periodically rose above this average, the greater number of marriages 
and births caused an increase of the working-class population, and with it, the 
supply of labour, in consequence of which, wages again sank to their former 
level. If they fell below this level, emigration, greater mortality among the 
workers, abstinence from marriage, and fewer births, caused a diminution in the 
supply of labour, in consequence of which wages again went up. (Bernstein, 
n.d., p 150) 
 
Marx had thought Lassalle’s position was “gross-oversimplification”, instead seeing 
“boom and slump, the state of world markets, technical progress, the 
proletarianisation of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie, and finally the effect of 
working-class pressure on wages” – all of which “might collectively press wages up 
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or down”. Notably, Lassalle conceded that “the minimum” wages necessary “is not 
merely a physiological but also a social and cultural one’ (Kolakowski, p 197-198). 
 
Nevertheless, furthering Bernstein’s critique: Isolated co-operatives may provide 
temporary advantages but once applied generally, “the workers would, as producers, 
again lose in wages what, as consumers, they had gained in the purchase of their 
goods”. However, as Bernstein notes, in Lassalle’s position: “the condition of the 
working-class could only be permanently freed from the pressure of this economic 
law, if the wages of labour were replaced by the possession of the products of 
[labour]”; that is, “if the working class became its own employer”. But this extension 
of the co-operative principle was only possible (Bernstein) “on a vast scale”, if “the 
means to do this – the necessary capital, i.e., the necessary credit – [is] provided by 
the State” (Bernstein, n.d., pp 150-151). 
 
Toni Offermann makes the additional observation that as a consequence, Lassalle’s 
theory, if true, would mean inflexible limits upon the gains achievable by purely 
trade-union activity (Offermann in Barclay and Weitz, p 88). However, Bernstein 
responds that Lassalle’s “iron law of wages” had “been outlived in the society of 
modern industry, with its increased faculties of communication, its accelerated cycle 
of crises, stagnation and prosperity, its rapid advance in the productivity of labour 
etc”. In any case: 
 
[Lassalle’s] theory presupposes an absolutely free movement of supply and 
demand on the labour market. [This] free movement is at once interfered with as 
soon as the working class, as an organised body, faces the employers, or as soon 
as the state, by its legislation, interferes with the regulation of the conditions of 
labour. (Bernstein, n.d., p 161) 
 
The other conundrums identified by Bernstein in response to Lassalle are very similar 
to those faced by socialist writers today. Co-operatives, Bernstein thinks, would 
compete against each other; and “differences of interest would arise”. Every 
association would try and “force up profits” at the expense of each other and of “other 
categories of labour” (Bernstein, n.d., p 163). 
 
Bernstein further concludes that Lassalle’s proposed “national insurance associations” 
would break up because of overproduction, and Lassalle’s associations would be 
subject to the usual capitalist laws of competition and, therefore, they would be 
subject to risk. Thus, and following Marx”s own analysis, Bernstein supposes real 
workers’ control is only “possible in proportion as competition is done away with … 
is only attainable by means of monopoly”. Yet, here there is also a dilemma, with 
Bernstein observing the protections against “fraud” provided through competition. 
Today we could add to these observations that competition drives innovation, 
product-quality, and efficient resource allocation. In conclusion Bernstein states: 
“Transplanted into the midst of our capitalist society … co-operation must, in one 
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way or another, always assume a capitalistic character” (Bernstein, n.d., pp 164-165; 
Kolakowski, pp 198-199). 
 
Meanwhile, Kolakowski relates Marx’s position that full recompense for workers in 
the context of producer’s co-operatives could not work because “part of that value 
must be devoted to public needs, necessary unproductive work, reserves, etc.” 
(Kolakowski, pp 198-199). 
 
Lassalle had anticipated such criticisms, and his plans for co-operatives in a 
competitive context were merely provisional. Thus, responding to such criticism in a 
letter to Rodbertus: : 
 
My product of labour would be the share in the common socialised production, 
which is determined by the relations in which my quantum of labour stands to 
the quantum of labour of the whole of Society. (Lassalle in Bernstein, n.d., p 
169) 
 
To this end Lassalle anticipates a land tax that would “supply the State with [the] 
means for defraying the costs of education, science, art and public expenditure of all 
kinds” (Bernstein, n.d., p 170). Ultimately, Lassalle envisaged, “equalisation” would 
be brought about in every “branch of trade” by combination in “one great association, 
abandoning all private middle man business” with “salerooms provided by the State” 
(Bernstein, n.d., p 170). This, in turn, would neutralise overproduction and cyclical 
crises. 
 
For Bernstein this is, in fact, “the Communist idea, which takes the total social 
product of labour, and not the product of labour of an individual or a group” 
(Bernstein, n.d., p 169). However, Bernstein also alleges that Lassalle held back on 
revealing his final intent for fear that the existing political and social forces were not 
ready. 
 
In some ways, then, Lassalle was ahead of his time, and in some ways he repeated the 
errors that were to trouble the Left long after his passing. His idea of a land tax was 
suggestive of later social-democratic strategies to iron out the inequalities of the 
labour market through social wage provision. Yet, the idea of monopolistic great 
associations in every national branch of industry was problematic. For instance, the 
removal of competition and market signals which drive resource allocation, quality 
and innovation. Even co-operative monopoly could lead to the abuse of market power, 
although such great associations competing in a global market context may, indeed, 
remain subject to such corrective competitive forces. So, in fact, Lassalle’s 
provisional solution seems more attractive on several points.  
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Responding to Oppositional Themes 
 
Assessed on the basis of a selection of oppositional themes it is interesting to consider 
the multi-faceted nature of Lassalle’s project. In the larger picture, Lassalleanism 
looms as a Third Way by providing a distinctive revolutionary discourse in contrast 
with Marxism. 
 
Lassalle envisages greater freedom, for what he calls the “fourth estate” as being key 
to the freedom of all humanity. Defining the struggle as such, he privileges the 
political over economic class as addressed by Marx. Lassalle seeks a future beyond 
the domination of one class over another, and yet, his means was one of personal 
dictatorship over the organisation that was to herald this change (the General German 
Worker’s Association). Thus, Lassalle seeks the personal freedom of all individuals 
from the hardships imposed by nature, but suggests an authoritarian collectivism as 
the means of achieving this. While the members of his association maintain a 
collectivist discipline, Lassalle himself, as leader, maintains his personal initiative. 
 
Social movements arguably require a deal of discipline in order to succeed. Swedish 
social democracy was to succeed in delivering much in the way of social and 
industrial rights, on the basis of disciplined corporatist structures and channels of 
negotiation. Even considering this scenario, looking back, the idea of endowing all 
authority in one person seems extreme, and discipline taken too far crushes authentic 
initiative and corrective self-criticism from below. 
 
In his theoretical approach, Lassalle was a devoted Hegelian and, so, both a 
determinist and an idealist. The evolving Idea by this reckoning was guided by a kind 
of providence where everything was purposeful in the plan of the universe. Guided by 
this kind of mentality, for Lassalle socialism was an idea whose time had come. On 
the other hand, his limited success was suggestive of an early over-optimism. 
 
Later, it was Marxists such as Kautsky who urged on the basis of historical 
materialism – as opposed to idealism – the need for patience through the drawn-out 
process of maturing economic conditions. The irony here is that Lassalle’s personal 
influence suggests a potential individual influence beyond that entertained by either 
Hegelian or Marxist determinism (Though this is not an endorsement of that narrow 
notion of history as predominately the work of great men). Still, arguably, Lassalle’s 
personal influence upon Bismarck impacted upon the Iron Chancellor’s decision to 
implement a kind of “practical Christianity” emphasizing a welfare state that was 
extensive for its time. Hence, the question of voluntarism and determinism arises once 
more. 
 
As to the matter of liberty, Lassalle’s conception is one of liberation from want; to 
elevation of all to a point of cultural participation and the improvement of humanity’s 
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material lot through the domination of nature; through the development of “morality, 
culture and science” (Lassalle in Fried and Sanders, p 385), but in The Workers’ 
Programme, at least, Lassalle seems ambiguous about political and civic liberty. 
Certainly, Lassalle’s was a statist socialism, and while I do not want to stigmatise the 
potentially progressive role for the state, at the same time a state that is absolute and 
does not have ‘checks and balances’ in the realm of civil society is potentially open to 
abuse; by the same rationale, the dominance of monopoly capital in alliance with the 
state power is also abused. 
 
Indeed, today Lassalle would be accused of a unpalatable pragmatism in his dealings 
with authority and in his inclination to outflank the liberal bourgeoisie through 
alliance with the forces of absolutism. As such, the liberal bourgeoisie was largely 
excluded from Lassalle’s movement as a matter of political strategy. Arguably 
Lassalle was willing, to some extent, to sacrifice political liberalism for the sake of 
expedience in forging an alliance with the forces of Prussian absolutism (though, 
importantly, it was the bourgeois progressivists who themselves had rejected a 
programme endorsing universal suffrage). In Lassalle’s schema the liberal bourgeoisie 
did not first lead a liberal bourgeois revolution in Prussia; rather, their exploitation of 
the workers and denial of proletarian political rights gave rise to the social forces that 
would coalesce to usher in a specific kind of socialism based on an alliance between 
the workers and the German Crown. Therefore, there was to be a class struggle 
between workers and the bourgeoisie; however, conciliation between workers and the 
Prussian monarchy was to skip over the liberal revolution. While many have 
identified a crucial synergy between liberalism and socialism, Lassalle’s position was 
perhaps ambiguous with regard political liberalism. 
 
Quite possibly Lassalle took this route as a wider agenda; one of overcoming Roman 
Catholic and absolutist Austria-Hungary. Arguably, he saw Prussian leadership of 
Germany as a counter-balance against Austrian power. Certainly, though, Marx, and 
later Bernstein found Lassalle’s appeal to the likes of Bismarck hard to stomach, and 
almost of a betrayal of history by denying the liberal bourgeoisie its historic mission, 
a mission whose realisation was seen by them as a necessary precondition for 
socialism. 
 
However, by promoting the first serious working-class organisation in Germany – the 
kernel of the future German Social Democratic Party – Lassalle promoted working-
class solidarity in a real, practical and historically important way. His was a vision 
both of conflict between classes and of conflict between nations. In a conspiratorial 
fashion he sought alliance with the likes of Garibaldi, and sought to play one great 
power off against the other, with the long-term aim of undermining what he saw as 
the most reactionary powers. This conspiratorial element stands in contrast with 
Marx’s emphasis on open political and industrial organisation. 
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Yet, at home such manoeuvrings dovetailed with his personal appeals to Bismarck to 
undermine the liberal bourgeoisie in return for free and equal universal suffrage and 
state aid for workers’ co-operatives. The General German Workers’ Association was 
to act as his personal instrument – the solidarity of its members providing the electoral 
and social base with which to overwhelm the liberal bourgeoisie – to deliver the 
goods to Bismarck. Yet, precisely in its comprising the kernel of future social 
democracy, Lassalle’s work was to have greater consequences than the disillusioned 
agitator and conspirator supposed in his final months. However, the idea of a 
nationalist socialism – as associated with Lassalle – also was to be perverted in the 
coming decades, first to legitimise a German ethno-nationalism and participation in 
the Great War, and more diabolically, with twentieth-century German fascism. 
 
Importantly, though, it should be emphasized Lassalle over the long term was 
nonetheless entertaining “the Communist idea, which takes the total social product of 
labour, and not the product of labour of an individual or a group” (Bernstein, n.d., p 
169). Monarchist-corporatism was not Lassalle’s envisaged final destination; nor was 
the fascism so fundamentally destructive of personal liberty. 
 
Regarding nationalism and internationalism, again there is Bernstein’s 
characterisation of German sentiment regarding Lassalle, and the pointed, rhetorical 
question: ‘Was he not a national patriot, in contrast to the unpatriotic nationalists, 
destitute of “fatherland”?’ (Bernstein, n.d., pp 7-8). However, arguably, despite his 
avowed German nationalism, for Lassalle Germany was instrumental as part of a 
deeper and broader internationalist outlook. Hence, observing the tension between 
nationalism and internationalism it is unfair simply to view Lassalle as being of the 
nationalist mould. Just as Lassalle saw Prussia as instrumental in the eclipse of 
Austria-Hungary, even under the leadership of Louis Napoleon III, arguably, France 
could be regarded once again as the potential vehicle for displacing the crowned 
heads of Europe. For Lassalle nationalism was simply instrumental in the pursuit of 
an internationalist vision to change Europe, and to change the world. 
 
To conclude on comparing Marx with Lassalle: Lassalleanism and Marxism contest 
themes in tension in different ways. Both are effectively determinist in their 
theoretical outlook – Marx in a materialist manner and Lassalle in the mould of 
political Hegelian idealism. Both are open to the possible need for politically 
authoritarian strategies and, yet, look forward to a future of freedom (though it should 
be noted that Marx, Engels, Kautsky all considered the possibility of peaceful 
transition as well). Lassalle is open to intrigues and class collaboration behind the 
scenes to achieve his aims, while for Marx and his later adherents, the class struggle 
must be pressed continually, openly and with little compromise. 
 
For Lassalle, the dialectic takes place in the political and the ideal domain in a fashion 
not dependent in the last instance upon the economic. Indeed, the political state is 
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seen as the key to freedom, an idea of freedom understood as positive freedom from 
want through the collective domination of nature. 
 
Conclusion: Lassalle’s Legacy 
 
Lassalle left both a practical and organisational legacy as well as a theoretical legacy. 
For a brief period in the early 1860s, Ferdinand Lassalle emerged as a pivotal 
advocate of the socialist cause in Germany. At a practical level, he was responsible 
for the formation of the General German Workers’ Association – the first German 
working-class political party, which flourished even after his death, and ultimately, 
formed a key component of the future German Social Democratic Party (SPD). The 
specifically-Lassallean movement within the SPD only declined decades later after 
the SPD’s Erfurt Programme and the posthumous release of Marx’s ‘Critique of the 
Gotha Programme’. Lassalle and those who followed him also did much to put 
universal suffrage on the agenda in Prussia and later Germany. On the other hand, 
Lassalle introduced the potentially volatile mixture of socialism and German 
nationalism. 
 
As for Lassalle’s theoretical legacy, he formulated a theoretical framework quite 
distinct from that of Marx. His was a political and idealist Hegelian perspective, 
which supposed that the socialist idea’s time had come. Unlike Marx, Lassalle 
rejected materialism. Lassalle envisaged the realm of the political dominating the 
economy, and not the other way around – as presented in the orthodox Marxist 
schema of base determining superstructure. However, again, given Lassalle’s 
Hegelian framework, the young radical was a determinist rather than a radical 
voluntarist. This theoretical framework was among Lassalle’s legacies, and it can be 
viewed as a predecessor to later political socialisms. 
 
The tension between Lassalle’s political socialism and Marx’s historical materialist 
socialism was to be resolved for a time with the rise of Marxism to a position of 
theoretical hegemony on the radical Left. Marxism saw off the challenge both from 
the Lassalleans, and from the neo-Kantians. In the decades that follow, however, new 
challenges emerge in German social democracy in particular. There is the revisionist 
controversy around Eduard Bernstein, for whom key Marxist tenets are questionable, 
but there also arises a style of social-democratic pragmatism within which uncritical 
nationalism becomes a condition for the collapse of internationalist solidarity in the 
face of the First World War. 
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Chapter Three: 
 
Eduard Bernstein—‘Father of Revisionism’ 
 
 
 
 
It is necessary to consider the revisionist controversy thoroughly if we are to 
meaningfully explore the question of progressive Third Roads and Third Ways during 
the period 1848-1934. The discussion spans two chapters: here, on the contributions 
of Eduard Bernstein, and the other on the contributions of Rosa Luxemburg in 
Chapter Four. Many accounts of Bernstein downplay his preservation of so much 
from Marx, while critiques of Luxemburg tend to vulgarise her account of 
spontaneity. Both discussions are concerned with correctives: Karl Kautsky’s 
interpretation of Marxism was the dominant revolutionary discourse from 1880 to 
1906, and Bernstein in his revisionist theory breaks with Marx and Kautsky at a range 
of levels. The views of Kautsky will be treated separately, in Chapter Five. 
 
This chapter first provides historical and biographical background for the period in 
question and for Bernstein. Thereafter, the chapter accounts for how and why 
Bernstein’s contribution may be thought of as a socialist Third Way. In this context 
we will consider the nature and content of the Bernsteinian revisionist Third Way as 
compared with the First Way of capitalism and the Second Way that was orthodox 
Marxism in the 1880-1906 period. Following this is detailed analysis of Bernstein’s 
canonical work, Evolutionary Socialism. Important themes are elaborated here, 
including an analysis of conflicting interpretations of scientific socialism or historical 
materialism, and Bernstein’s sceptical empiricism and eclecticism as distinct from the 
orthodoxies of dialectical materialism. 
 
In brief, Bernstein questions the interpretation of scientific socialism founded on an 
all-encompassing theorization of totality. More specifically, he rejects Marx’s 
dialectical materialism, suggesting in its place a somewhat-competing definition of 
historical materialism. Usually dialectical materialism and historical materialism are 
taken as synonymous. Bernstein has his own vision of material circumstance driving 
history, and with no dialectical framework. 
 
The rejection of the dialectical schema has other consequences. Necessity – namely, 
socialism necessarily developing as the consequence of capitalist contradictions – is 
down played in exchange for contingency. Sceptical empiricism, involving a focus on 
that which can be verified via the senses, takes the place of, as Bernstein sees it, 
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(unverifiable) dialectical speculation. Bernstein’s approach also involves a practical 
eclecticism in place of notions of totality that are said to be grasped by an overarching 
dialectical materialist approach. 
 
Accompanying his interpretation of historical materialism, Bernstein maintains a 
sense of teleology; he sees history leading forward with the gradual, perhaps 
unstoppable progress of socialist evolution/reform. Without the dialectic this sense of 
necessary progress is harder to justify, though, and certainly it was entirely 
unacceptable to Kautsky, for whom there were no guarantees outside the orthodoxy. 
 
Also important for this tension between orthodoxy and revisionism, Bernstein rejected 
a seeming tendency towards economism in Marxism, that is, reducing everything to 
determination by the economic base. Instead, there is a supposition of greater 
potential autonomy for the political sphere. 
 
This chapter also concerns the theme of Marxist economic orthodoxy the tensions that 
arose between it and (specifically ‘Bernsteinian’) revisionist economics. Within this 
frame are a number of sub-themes. Marx’s labour theory of value is interrogated by 
Bernstein with the incorporation of elements of subjectivism. Assumptions of class 
bifurcation and working-class immiseration are questioned, and in favour of the 
assumption of intermediary classes and steady material gains for the working-class. 
The assumption of ultimate capitalist collapse is opposed to the alternative 
assumption of capitalist adaptability and resilience. Important here is Bernstein’s 
emphasis on consumer co-operatives as distinct from producers’ co-operatives. 
 
Bernstein raised the prospect of qualitative social change without revolution. This, it 
seems, was interpreted by Bernstein also as comprising a qualitative shift in the social 
and economic order – but through violent, illegal and ruptural means. Hence, there is 
the theme of reform/revolution, and the very closely connected theme of 
liberalism/socialism – with Bernstein posing a distinctive reconciliation or synthesis 
between them. 
 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a consideration of Bernstein’s formidable legacy, 
and the content of his revisionism – the components of his thought that retain force to 
this day; those which have been disproven; and those that are open to constructive 
criticism. Bernstein’s multitude of theoretical insights comprises his greatest legacy, a 
this is testament both to socialism and to freedom; and to the fruitful union of 
liberalism and socialism, as distinct from their uncompromising opposition to each 
other. 
 
Bernstein’s Life and Times 
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Eduard Bernstein was born in 1850 to Jewish parents, not long after the momentous 
European revolutionary upheavals of 1848. He grew up during the period when 
Lassalle was expounding his socialist philosophy. Adopting a more radically 
revolutionary outlook, like Kautsky he became involved with the Eisenacher 
movement (the Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Eisenacher Programms). Peter 
Gay observes that despite their divisions on issues like the Franco-Prussian War the 
Lassalleans and Eisenachers found common cause, uniting into a single party at the 
1875 Gotha Conference (Gay, pp 19-34). Bismarck had co-opted or otherwise crushed 
the liberal bourgeoisie. According to Gay he had erased “all traces of liberalism from 
the army”, and “for these reasons thoughtful socialists were anxious that the two 
radical parties should establish a common front before the government took even 
more repressive measures” (Gay, pp 28-37). 
 
In any case, the compromise programme agreed to at the 1875 Conference mixed the 
principles of the Eisenachers and the Lassalleans somewhat eclectically, calling (in a 
Lassallean vein) for the establishment, “with all legal means”, of a “free state and of 
the socialist society”, “breaking … the iron law of wages through the abolition of the 
wage system”, and the end of “exploitation in all forms”; with “the removal of all 
social and political inequalities” (Gay, p 37); but Gay also observes that: 
 
The specific demands were taken largely from the Eisenach programme of 
1869: universal, equal, direct suffrage, abolition of all combination and press 
laws, general and equal public education, a progressive income tax, a normal 
working day, abolition of child labour, and the ubiquitous producers’ co-
operatives’. (Gay, p 37) 
 
In May of the same year, 1875, a unity conference was again called for Gotha, and a 
united Sozialistische Arbeiter-Partei Deutschlands emerged. 
 
In 1878, however, Bismarck used two attempts on the life of Emperor William I as a 
pretext to ban socialist agitation, and: “Socialist meetings and congresses were 
outlawed, newspapers confiscated, members arrested”. The anti-socialist bill became 
law on 19 October 1878, remaining in force for twelve years (Gay, pp 40-41). 
Thereafter, Bernstein and other socialists were driven into exile in Zurich, 
Switzerland. 
 
At around this time in Germany a range of social legislation was passed, including a 
sickness insurance act (1883), accident insurance acts (1884 and 1885) and an old-age 
insurance act (1889). As Gay has it, Bismarck “was going to weaken the working 
class by doing for the proletariat what he would not permit it to do for itself” (Gay, p 
52). Many socialists who remained in Germany found themselves co-opted to 
nationalism and the designs of the existing state for the sake of practical social reform 
that ameliorated the lot of the working class. The very nature of the Social 
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Democratic Party was changing, a fateful trend that later to contribute to a collapse of 
international working-class solidarity in the face of World War I. 
 
Even when Bismarck’s anti-socialist laws lapsed in 1888, Bernstein was forced for a 
time to remain in London in exile for fear of indictment for sedition (Gay, p 60). 
Manfred Steger contends that Bernstein’s experience of Britain left an indelible 
impression upon him such that ‘his political outlook became increasingly “British”’; 
including “admiration for England’s basic liberties, its parliamentarianism, and its 
inclination towards piecemeal social reformism”. Bernstein’s time in exile in Britain 
also had him exposed to that nation’s own liberal-left traditions (Steger, pp 66-68). 
 
Steger further contends that it was “Bernstein’s twelve years of British exile [that] 
helped him to perceive the possible theoretical compatibility of a left-liberalism and 
(Marxist) socialist conceptions” (Steger, p 69). Even when in exile Bernstein was 
called on to develop the tactical substance of the Erfurt Programme of 1891. Erfurt 
eliminated much of the previous Lassallean content from the Gotha Programme. 
Bernstein specifically developed a policy orientation that included equal suffrage in 
Prussia, a graduated income tax, the eight-hour day and the right to free burial. Now – 
in the 1890s – Bernstein “developed his theory of Revisionism in detail” (Gay, p 63; 
pp 66-68; Bronner p 585). 
 
The revisionist controversy did not spell the end of Bernstein’s political career. 
Bernstein agitated strongly for a separate peace throughout most of the Great War 
period. Before the War, he had advocated a Western liberal entente, including 
Germany, France and Britain, to exert diplomatic pressure for reform within the more 
conservative regimes such as Russia, the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary; it 
was also to provide a framework for mutual disarmament (Morgan, pp 526-527; 
Fletcher, 1983a, pp 85-88). 
 
With the onset of the War in 1914, the possibility of a general collapse loomed. As 
Fletcher explains, for Marxists such as Luxemburg war was a systemic imperative of 
imperialist capitalism. However, Bernstein believed open (and democratic) diplomacy 
could prevent war; or once war had begun, provide the basis of a separate peace 
(Fletcher, 1983b, p 577; Fletcher, 1983a, pp 81-82). 
 
Fletcher also observes that Bernstein developed an ethical and political commitment 
to free trade, based not only on the assumption of greater efficiency and prosperity but 
also so that cultural exchange, freer trade and mutual dependence could secure peace. 
Yet, Bernstein’s interest in free trade and pacifism was admittedly not shared by most 
German revisionists, and the leaders of imperial Germany arguably saw co-
dependence as a threat to their own security (Fletcher 1983b, pp 562-564, pp 568-569, 
pp 576-577). 
 
75 
 
Overall, the basic building blocks of Bernstein’s world view are manifold. It would be 
a neat formulation to oppose Bernstein’s liberal socialism to the scientific socialism of 
Marx and Engels. The reality is more complex, however. First, Bernstein maintained 
his own idea of a scientific socialism, and it could be conceived as a historical, but not 
dialectical materialism. The influence of the means of production and of their 
development were to be considered in depth alongside other influences. Yet, this was 
a materialism that accepted a relative autonomy of politics and culture, but which 
impacted upon one another. 
 
Further, Bernstein maintained an element of teleology, of history progressing towards 
a better and more just social order. At the same time, he seems to propose an outlook 
that recognises contingency – a more open sense of history and its possibilities, as 
distinct from a Marxian dialectic, which saw both the breakdown of capitalism and 
the dawning of socialism as inevitable. Finally, Bernstein returns to a Kantian 
(sceptical) epistemology, as well as the pursuit of ethics and ideals as essential to why 
we struggle. 
 
Bernstein’s Revisionism as a Relative Third Way 
 
Eduard Bernstein clearly qualifies as one of the first protagonists of a socialist Third 
Way, arguing in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for a reformist and 
evolutionary socialism that reconciled socialism and liberalism. The characterisation 
of Bernstein’s position as a Third Way can be established in the contrasting ways it 
stands in relation to those opportunist currents of social democracy thoroughly co-
opted to the First Way of hegemonic capitalist ideology. Bernstein remained true to 
his convictions, opposing not only militarism, but also envisaging an evolutionary 
path to qualitative change. 
 
Bernstein suggested socialist goals of a more open conception, assuming those goals 
to be in a state of constant evolution, shifting in relation to economic and to cultural 
circumstances. Thus he was uncomfortable with the idea of a final goal. This further 
reinforces the conceptualization of Bernstein’s position as a socialist Third Way as 
opposed to a socialist Third Road. Samuel Bernstein (a different individual) wrote of 
Eduard Bernstein that the rejection of any final aim would leave nothing but “the 
chops and changes of petty politics”. Arguably there is some truth in this; even more 
so as relates to contemporary self-proclaimed social democracy and its typical 
pragmatism. Though with his ethical compassion and insistence on some march of 
progress, Eduard Bernstein’s was resistant to the worst extremes of political 
opportunism (S. Bernstein, 1940, pp 131-132). 
 
Bernstein’s preference for reform over revolution pitted him against the Marxist 
orthodoxy of his time: He was opposed both to the Marxist orthodoxy and to the 
capitalist framework. Post-Marxist scholars Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau have 
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made the crucial assertion that it is mistaken to sweepingly identify “reformism with 
revisionism”, and that “what is essential in a reformist practice is political quietism 
and the corporatist confinement of the working class”. Their suggestion is that 
Bernstein can be interpreted in a revisionist/revolutionary manner. And that this puts 
him at odds with modern ‘reformism without reforms’ and its focus on the short term, 
and on state power as the end in and of itself. 
 
Yet, Mouffe and Laclau also contend that Bernstein’s progressive teleology, or “a law 
of progress” assuming an ongoing accumulation of “democratic advances” (including 
working-class organisation) can encourage such a “quietism” in the face of 
“corporative confinement.” They do not conflate the two but suggest “a coincidence 
between theoretical revisionism and practical reformism” where “the broadening of 
political initiative to a number of democratic fronts never comes in to contradiction 
with the quietism and corporatism of the working class. Therefore, as Mouffe and 
Laclau argue, “if every advance is irreversible … its consolidation no longer depends 
upon an unstable articulation of forces and ceases to be a political problem” (Mouffe 
and Laclau, pp 29-35). 
 
Although much later in Sweden, for instance, apparent corporatist arrangements were 
seen by some writers such as Korpi as a “democratic class struggle”. (Korpi, 1983, pp 
21-25) Bernstein is without doubt the best known of the socialist revisionists. Though 
claiming to revise Marx rather than replace him, Bernstein abandoned core pillars of 
the Marxist doctrine, such that his ultimate status as a Marxist was called into 
question. Bernstein was hailed by many as the “father of revisionism”, and was to 
oppose revolution – taken to infer some kind of political rupture, probably in the form 
of an illegal, violent and insurrectionary seizure of power – as compared to the 
competing interpretation of qualitative change regardless of means. 
 
Bernstein came to argue that capitalism was becoming both more resilient and more 
flexible. He envisaged credit, cartels and trusts as comprising vehicles for the 
expansion of the world market, and with greater responsiveness to crises. He further 
rejected Marxist assumptions of class bifurcation and immiseration as well as the 
presumption that monopolisation would be taken to the utmost extreme (Steger, pp 
79-82; Joll, pp 60-61). 
 
Eduard Bernstein’s contribution to the socialist tradition and the broader Left in his 
work Evolutionary Socialism was crucial in providing a theoretical framework for 
democratic socialist reformism, and in so doing, advancing an agenda that was at once 
distinct from thoroughly opportunist social democracy, and from orthodox Marxism – 
which insisted that substantial change was difficult if not impossible within the 
framework of capitalist pressures and capitalist contradictions. For Luxemburg and 
Kautsky, in contrast, it was those contradictions that made socialism inevitable and 
necessary. Here we have the opposition between orthodox Marxist necessity in the 
context of the materialist dialectic, and Bernstein’s contingency (and yet with the 
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teleological assumption of progress; cumulative reforms building upon one another 
such that, in time, essentially capitalism is reformed out of existence). Bernstein’s 
perspective threatened the Marxist economic worldview of a necessary dialectical 
movement of contradictions with a different perspective that assumed capitalist 
flexibility and adaptability. 
 
Competing Interpretations of Historical Materialism 
 
This section concerns the ways in which Bernstein negotiated a historical materialist – 
and thereby according to his own reasoning, scientific – outlook, apparently in 
harmony with a liberal socialism grounded in values and practical-minded 
eclecticism. There is the opposition here between Bernstein’s empirical scientific 
socialism and the orthodox Marxist scientific socialism constructed on the basis of 
both historical materialism and dialectics as applied to an evolving mode of 
production. 
 
Also arising in this context is the opposition between the theme of a hard 
philosophical materialism and a practical and sociological materialism advanced by 
Bernstein (and arguably by Marx, in contradistinction with Kautsky). Political 
scientist Sheri Berman, in her work, The Primacy of Politics argues that Bernstein 
attacked historical materialism and class struggle (Berman, pp 14-15). This claim is 
further underscored by Berman’s insistence that at around 1900 socialists posed the 
question: 
 
Would socialism be the result of inevitable economic development and class 
struggle, or would it be the consequence of democratic, political action and 
cross-class co-operation? (Berman, pp 47-48) 
 
However, this presents a false dichotomy between democratic political action versus 
class struggle. Berman’s understanding of Bernstein’s position is debatable; arguably, 
Bernstein simply wished to transpose the class struggle to the level of the parliament 
while maintaining a role for active unions in the struggle for an erosion in the rate of 
exploitation and the absolutism of capital. Bernstein also foresaw circumstances 
where defensive mass strike action could be necessary. 
 
Bernstein himself writes in a manner suggestive of class struggle: 
 
This new vision [of the transition to socialism] takes place in the daily life of 
the working class. It shows the proletariat growing in numbers and in social 
power – not merely pushing forward, but upward as well, elevating its 
economic, ethical, and political standards. (Bernstein in Steger, 1996 p 7, 
1996) 
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Also with Bernstein’s particular materialism, instead of insisting on hard 
(philosophical) determinism, the emphasis was on the central influence of material 
factors (Berman, pp 14-15). 
 
To establish their distinctiveness, it is useful to consider Bernstein’s version of 
scientific socialism alongside the Marxian orthodoxy of the time. This is best taken in 
the context of an exposition of his underlying sociological and economic materialism, 
which in fact rejected absolute philosophical materialism. In denying the scientific 
character of the materialist dialectic – indeed, of all dialectical approaches embracing 
the totality of social relations or ideas – Bernstein was challenging one of the core 
pillars of Marxist orthodoxy. For Bernstein there existed in orthodox Marxism the 
fault of metaphysical speculation – the supposition of a total ensemble of social 
relations moving necessarily in a particular progressive and evolutionary motion, 
which was based on speculation and not upon a rigorous and sceptical empirical 
scientific method. For Bernstein the hypothesised dialectical process supposed by 
Marx was simply too broad and all-encompassing to be proven on an empirical basis. 
 
Indeed, he rejected the reduction of history to a single abstract principle (including the 
class-struggle dialectic), and of change to a single, final redemptive struggle which 
would deliver humanity from oppression, exploitation and alienation. There could be 
no categorical denial of such a total ensemble as assumed by Marx and others 
attempting to grasp the movement of totality; but nor could such be proven 
conclusively (Bernstein, 1961, p 5, Kolakowski, pp 436-438, 448-443). 
 
Yet, Bernstein believed very strongly that with his evolutionary socialism he was 
revising Marx “without dragging down the other parts [of the Marxian historical 
materialist method] in sympathy” (Bernstein, 1961, p 5). Bernstein preserves the 
sense of a socialist social science even beyond the Marxist dialectical materialist 
orthodoxy. 
 
While he rejects the crude determinist position, Bernstein nonetheless echoes his 
mentor Engels in observing social and economic tendencies that manifest at a broader 
(societal) level – beyond the individual will. In Engels’s words there existed “an 
endless group of parallelograms of forces”; “thwarting one another”, where “what 
every single man wills is hindered by every other man, and the result of the struggle is 
something which no one had intended” (Engels in Bernstein, 1961, p 11). This lends 
further weight to arguments that a simple dialectic, based solely on economic 
evolution as a consequence of class struggle, is not sufficient to grasp totality. 
 
Thrown into question here, for Bernstein as surely as Engels, is the supposition that 
the political/cultural superstructure is crudely and in a uni-directional way determined 
by the economic base. Culture and polity rest upon an economic base but can acquire 
relative autonomy, variously acting upon one another. 
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Thus, in a statement with critical ramifications for socialist ideology and the socialist 
movement, Bernstein allows for national/cultural specificity and prefigures those 
relatively autonomous cultural (ideological) forces, as well as: “Sciences, arts, a 
whole series of social relations”. (Bernstein, n.d., p 14) And some of these have 
thwarted socialism with their increasing strength, and with the decline of the objective 
social conditions which had once led to revolutionary and class consciousness on the 
part of the industrial working class. Even when these conditions were favourable 
Bernstein makes the very important observation that: 
 
The purely economic forces create[d] … only a disposition for the reception of 
certain ideas, but how these then arise and spread and what form they take, 
depend on the co-operation of a whole series of influences. (Bernstein, 1961, pp 
13-14) 
 
Bernstein was to be charged with eclecticism, which stood against attempts to grasp 
the totality of social forces taken as an entire ensemble rather than as isolated 
phenomena. Bernstein responded: 
 
Eclecticism … is often only the natural reaction from the doctrinaire desire to 
deduce everything from one thing and to treat everything according to one and 
the same method … It is the rebellion of sober reason against the tendency 
inherent in every doctrine to fetter thought. (Bernstein, 1961, pp 13-14) 
 
Teleology and Totality versus Contingency 
 
Despite his critique of metaphysical speculation, Bernstein retained a belief that 
humanity was moving forward (and upward) to something better. Many years after 
abandoning the Hegelian/Marxist dialectic his worldview remains one of progress, 
driven by evolution rather than violent rupture. Here we have the opposition between 
pre-given teleology and contingency. 
 
Arguably, Bernstein negotiates these ideological themes in tension arriving at a 
perspective that presumes both a telos of progress and such contingency that there is 
room to choose different futures. By this reckoning, the socialist future is no longer 
rendered inevitable and necessary by fundamental capitalist contradictions at the level 
of the economic base. The co-existence, here, of teleology and contingency 
admittedly appears contradictory. 
 
In the 1909 preface to the English edition of his 1889 work Evolutionary Socialism, 
Eduard Bernstein made a statement considered to be seminal in the history of 
democratic socialism: 
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Unable to believe in finalities at all, I cannot believe in a final aim of socialism. 
But I strongly believe in the socialist movement, in the march forward of the 
working classes … who step by step must work out their emancipation by 
changing society from the domain of the commercial land-holding oligarchy to 
a real democracy which in all its departments is guided by the interests of those 
who work and create. (Bernstein, n.d., 1909, p xxii) 
 
So, again we find Bernstein’s teleological outlook, his sense that reforms were 
building constructively and cumulatively one upon another. Though such essential 
teleological assumptions are more widely questioned on the Left today, with the 
rescission of labour market regulation and industrial liberties that Bernstein held as 
standards of progress (Bernstein, 1961, pp xxv-xxvi).  
 
It was this appreciation, of cumulative reforms, that Bernstein was to emphasize, as 
distinct from radical negation. Nonetheless, he was to retain a sense that class conflict 
animated this process, with the clear delineation of working-class interests from 
bourgeois interests. Oligarchy, and hence plutocracy, are contrasted with their 
opposite – democracy. The ideal of a classless future remains. The conquest of 
political power, by degrees, remains in the form of the pursuit of rights of citizenship 
(Bernstein, 1961, pp xxix-xxx). Today we could separate these into the struggles for 
political, social and finally economic rights of citizenship. 
 
Perhaps there is something both in Bernstein’s position and in the Marxist response. 
The conflict here can be summed up as one between, as commonly described, 
generalising theory (not at all the same as totalitarianism) and eclecticism. 
 
Isolated phenomena can, indeed, be located within a totality of social phenomena, a 
total ensemble, but perhaps even Marx’s great design was a simplification in its 
attempts to grasp this. Perhaps there is a total ensemble, but one that does not by its 
very essential nature move incessantly forward. The contradictions identified by Marx 
remain, but barbarism is possible as well as socialism, and with technological 
progress capitalism develops ever-new ways to sustain and preserve itself. This 
includes innovation in the field of ideology and social control as well. Capitalism as 
much as socialism can lapse into totalitarian forms: which not only oppress but also 
deny historic choice. 
 
As the democratic revisionist socialist theorist, Sheri Berman, argues: “Bernstein’s 
loss of belief in the inevitability of socialism led him to appreciate the potential for 
human will and political action”. By comparison, Berman argues that Marx’s and 
Kautsky’s historical materialism “bred a dangerous political passivity”. Berman 
suggests, and apparently after the manner of Bernstein, “the primacy of politics” 
(Berman, pp 14-15). Arguably, this is an unfair criticism, especially of Marx. 
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An eclectic approach enables us to take what we need from whatever theoretical 
framework, and apply what we take practically in the pursuit of social change. Indeed, 
not only can we take what we need but we can interpret it and reshape it in 
accordance with those needs. Hence, in Bernstein’s time the fusion of Marx and Kant 
by certain neo-Kantians – the complementing of Marx with Kant – which Kautsky 
refuted so emphatically. 
 
The Marxist base-superstructure schema itself may well provide too much of a 
simplification and a reduction, by which everything hinges finally upon the movement 
and evolution of the means and mode of production, largely driven by the engine of 
class struggle. However, arguably there are social and economic forces operating at 
the level of totality – cultural, political, ideological forces all impacting upon one 
another – on an international and finally, a global scale. Again, for Bernstein these 
influences are too great and diverse to fully encompass in an economic theory, but 
just as Bernstein could not categorically refute the existence of such forces, neither 
should we assume their non-existence. To tar all theories that wrestle with the theme 
of totality as totalitarian is to vacate the field of global political economy, stigmatising 
all but token resistance and relegating that resistance to the margins of society. 
Perhaps rather we should wrestle with totality, but on the basis of a certain modesty, 
in recognition that in so doing we rely on reductions and abstractions. 
 
Labour Theory of Value: Objectivist versus Subjectivist 
Perspectives 
 
Bernstein’s critique of Marxian economics was extensive, including a revision of 
Marx’s labour theory of value, a rejection of class bifurcation and a rejection of 
necessary capitalist collapse. Bernstein made an important contribution to the socialist 
tradition with a sympathetic critique of Marx’s labour theory of value. Here again, 
some might accuse Bernstein of eclecticism in his blending of objectivist and 
subjectivist approaches on the question of economic value. Arguably, though, his 
position comprises a rational synthesis; comprising a Third Way on the theme of 
theories of value. That is, his position differs both from orthodox Marxism and from 
mainstream bourgeois economics. 
 
In Evolutionary Socialism, Bernstein critiques Marx’s assumption that value of 
commodities can be measured according to the labour embedded in them measured 
according to average socially necessary labour time given the level of human ability 
and technological development, and with all forms of labour considered equal in this 
respect with regards to measurement. Bernstein is wary of “abstractions and 
reductions” in Marx’s concept of value, and even goes so far as to argue this approach 
ignores the specific use values of commodities. He also questions the supposition that 
all forms of labour should be considered equal, there being differences in “diligence, 
activity, equipment of the individual workers”. Kolakowski suggests that Bernstein 
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believed that Marx’s definition of value was “an expository device” “and not a real 
social phenomena” (Bernstein, 1961, pp 28-29, Kolakowski, pp 223-225; 438-443). 
 
The consequence of this is that Marx’s labour theory of value is perceived to be a 
defective measure of concrete exploitation, and one which does not take into account 
the relative privilege of the labour aristocracy as opposed to those suffering from the 
most intense exploitation and the most degrading and ruinous working conditions 
(Bernstein, 1961, pp 33, 39). However, despite his questioning of the abstractions 
involved in Marx’s labour theory of value, Bernstein emphasizes the continuing 
validity of the category of surplus value. This – the secret of capitalism discovered by 
Marx – comprises his analysis of the system of wage labour that “obscures the 
division of the working day into the work necessary to reproduce labour-power, and 
the extra, unpaid labour that creates surplus value” (Kolakowski, p 230). 
 
Hence the substance of Bernstein’s Third Way between the Marxist view of 
exploitation, which identified the mechanism of exploitation but held labour to be of 
an effective equal abstract value, and the capitalist view, which rationalised 
exploitation on the basis that capitalists created wealth. 
 
Bernstein proposes to overcome the limitations of Marx’s schema by taking the 
“value of the total production of society” where the “excess of this value over the total 
amount of wages of the working classes – that is, not the individual, but the total 
surplus value” (Bernstein, 1961, p 33). By this reckoning, all kinds of labour are not 
considered equal. A comprehensive measure of the degree of surplus extraction is 
impossible in individual cases as there is no prior objective determinant of labour 
value itself; but nonetheless the mechanism and the reality of surplus-value extraction 
is observed. The consequence of this is that a measure of the total level of surplus 
extraction can be established, however. 
 
Bernstein also questions Marx’s emphasis on the sphere of production as distribution 
and exchange are equally necessary and: “Like division of labour generally, [they 
raise] the productivity of industrial capital, relatively to the labour directly employed 
in industry” (Bernstein, 1961, pp 36-37). The consequence of Bernstein’s 
investigations, here, is a hybrid conception of value: one (as Steger notes) 
incorporating the objectivist elements of Marx’s labour theory with the subjectivist 
marginal utility theories of British and Austrian economists such as Stanley Jevons, 
Carl Menger, and Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk (Steger, p 120). 
 
Again, and most important, in this process Bernstein in no way refutes Marx’s 
critique of social relations of exploitation. The measure of exploitation is questioned 
even though reaffirmed at the universal level; but the mechanism remains, both for 
orthodoxy and for the revisionists. The consequence is an enduring moral case against 
exploitation as realised through the mechanism of surplus-value extraction, but also a 
critique of the exploitation of the most ground-down workers, whose exploitation can 
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be grasped not only by a measurement of the surplus extracted but also by the 
undervaluing of their work on the labour market. This is the consequence of demand 
and supply, as well as a lack of labour market regulation and suppression of industrial 
liberties.  
 
Also remaining is the discovery of “capitalism’s secret” by Marx: The fact that 
capitalism rests upon the extraction of surplus value from workers. Workers produce 
the wealth of society, transforming the bounties of nature, but the relationship of 
capital reproduces itself through the mechanism of exploitation, a portion of the 
surplus being diverted to dividends to sustain the capitalists’ lifestyles. But a portion 
is also reinjected in the enterprises concerned – sustaining the economic system and 
providing the basis for capitalistic economic (and hence political) power.  
 
Class Bifurcation versus Middle-Class Resilience 
 
In another famous quote from Evolutionary Socialism Bernstein challenges the 
Marxist thesis of class bifurcation, instead proposing the continued existence of 
intermediary classes. Yet, he maintains several crucial Marxist economic/analytic 
categories that strengthen his case as retaining grounding in the Marxist tradition.  
 
Hence: 
 
Greater centralisation of capital, greater concentration of enterprises, increased 
rate of exploitation. Now is all that right? Yes and no. It is true above all as a 
tendency. (Bernstein, 1961, pp 41-42) 
 
And in relation to class bi-furcation specifically: 
 
If the working classes wait till ‘Capital’ has put the middle classes out of the 
world it might really have a long nap. ‘Capital’ would expropriate these classes 
in one form and then bring them to life again in another. (Bernstein, 1961, pp 
50-51) 
 
So, while the middle classes potentially broaden the socio-economic support base of 
the capitalist class and its preferred mode of production, there is also the imperative 
for the capitalist classes to nurture and preserve markets for their products in the 
context of increasing productivity. If the consumption power of the working classes 
does not increase, then the fruits of increased productivity must be “caught up” in the 
middle classes (Bernstein, 1961, p 50). Notably, in the future mass production would 
also demand an ever-increasing level of mass consumption on the part of the working 
class. 
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However, Bernstein also remains faithful to many core assumptions and analytical 
categories of Marxism. Thus: 
 
The fall of the profit rate is a fact, the advent of over-production and crises is a 
fact, periodic diminution of capital is a fact, the concentration and centralisation 
of industrial capital is a fact, the increase of the rate of surplus value is a fact. 
(Bernstein, 1961, pp 41-42) 
 
According to these very arguments, while capitalist contradictions may not be so 
severe as to render socialism inevitable; certainly socialism is still desirable in the 
face of said contradictions. Socialism remains the rational choice in the face of over-
productive waste, cyclical crises, and a tendency towards monopoly. It is crucial to 
observe, therefore, that Bernstein’s negotiation of these themes embodied the conflict 
between principles economic determinism, and of contingency and (literally in the 
context of free choice) the power of ideals. What is more, his assumption of social 
gradation of various degrees is negotiated in opposition to the Marxist assumption of 
class bifurcation providing capitalism – via the working class that it had called into 
being – with “its own gravediggers”. (Marx and Engels, Vol I, p 124) 
 
To clarify this we will consider the way in which Bernstein works to substantiate his 
position. In the preface to Evolutionary Socialism Bernstein had provided a succinct 
rejection of class bifurcation: 
 
The enormous increase of social wealth is not accompanied by a decreasing 
number of large capitalists but by an increasing number of capitalists of all 
degrees. The middle classes change their character but they do not disappear 
from the social scale. (Bernstein, 1961, p xxv) 
 
Bernstein strengthens his case on the resilience of the middle classes by drawing on 
statistics for Britain and Germany. Although “not all shareholders deserved the name 
of capitalists”, the British statistics demonstrated an increase in the number of 
families with high incomes (150 to 1,000 pounds), from 300,000 in 1851 to 990,000 
in 1881 (Bernstein, 1961, pp 44-46). Meanwhile, “The British Factory Inspector’s 
Report for 1896” showed “5 ½ millions of persons engaged in medium and small 
businesses”, where “at least two-thirds of the businesses registered as factories 
[belonged] to the category of medium-sized businesses with six to fifty workers” 
(Bernstein, 1961, pp 54-55). Hence, there existed a variety of tendencies resulting in 
the resilience of the petty bourgeoisie, though many of them only on “proletarian 
incomes” (Bernstein, 1961, p 61). 
 
Thus it is that Bernstein made an important contribution to the socialist thought of the 
time, interrogating the core Marxist assumption of simple class bifurcation. This also 
has relevance for the tension between positing capitalist collapse or capitalist 
adaptation. Writing in the 1890s Bernstein supposes that for the time being at least 
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(perhaps decades), the world market had been so extended by the advance of 
communications and transport technology that capitalism was better placed to ward 
away the ever-worsening crises as supposed in the scenarios of orthodox Marxism.  
 
He also marvels at dramatically increased productivity under capitalism, and notes 
that with “the elasticity of the modern credit system and the rise of industrial 
cartels…general commercial crises similar to the earlier ones are to be regarded as 
improbable”. Although cartels are also taken as being the potential “means of 
monopolist exploitation”; while nonetheless [remedying] overproduction, removing 
gluts in the market, regulating production with less risk, etc.” And rather than serving 
as a mechanism to intensify crises, Bernstein supposes with the expanding credit 
system a new ‘capacity for establishing and creating” (Bernstein, 1961, pp 80-82, p 
90). 
 
Producers’ Co-operatives versus Consumer Co-operatives 
 
Bernstein held to the validity of various interpretations of socialism: The “juridical 
notions” (of equality and justice); “characterisation as a social science”; 
“identification with the class struggle”; “co-operative economics”. Here juridical 
interpretations are also held to be as important as socialism’s “economic nature” 
(Bernstein, 1961, pp 95-96). Bernstein was sceptical of producers’ co-operatives as a 
route to socialism, however. Indeed, he saw co-operative monopolies as providing a 
potential obstacle to its realisation. With Marx, Bernstein saw co-operative enterprise 
within the capitalist context as being affected by those same contradictions as private 
enterprise (although Marx nonetheless recognised their potential to attack the very 
roots of capitalist exploitation), and with the Fabian activist and intellectual Beatrice 
Webb, Bernstein supposed that as a consequence of evolving hierarchies within co-
operative enterprises – developing in the context of a necessary division of labour – 
solidarity and the egalitarian spirit would break down (Bernstein, 1961, pp 109-116). 
 
So, in contrast Bernstein supports co-operative stores and trade unions as a means of 
attacking the absolutism of capital. With regard trade unions, this deepening of 
democracy was ultimately supposed to extend to direct influence in management, and 
not to be contained only to wages and conditions. For Bernstein, therefore, the 
solidarity of proletarians in their capacity as consumers was as necessary as their 
solidarity in their capacity as producers. Associated consumers, here, (like trade 
unions) could contain profit rates. (Bernstein, 1961, pp 135-139) 
 
Also important were co-operative producer associations, which, according to 
Bernstein, had the harmful potential of developing into corporate interests that 
actually stood in contrast with the interests of the broader community. Wage rises that 
did not reduce the profit rate but, rather, passed on the costs to the broader community 
were to be scrutinised. Hence, Bernstein argued that as the “mistress of a whole 
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branch of production”, unions could become “a monopolist productive association … 
antagonistic to socialism and democracy’. Here: “Associations against the community 
are as little socialism as the oligarchic government of the state” (Bernstein, 1961, pp 
114-119, 138-141). 
 
A further condition of Bernstein’s analysis here was the presumption of natural public 
monopolies. This he considered as existing at the municipal level, but as history 
shows, natural public monopolies were later to arise widely at the national level. 
While the right of combination remained legitimate for workers in these fields, to 
have such areas of universal service obligation under a private monopoly (even a co-
operative monopoly) could provide unusual privilege and result in a “corruption and a 
weakening of public spirit” (Bernstein, 1961, pp 192-193). 
 
Thus it is that Bernstein negotiates a perceived conflict between the extension of 
economic democracy via producers’ co-operatives, and an approach which prefers the 
mechanism of consumer co-operatives. While he is right to fear the dangers inherent 
in any monopolistic (worker) productive association, arguably he is too critical and 
dismissive of producers’ democracy (via producers’ co-operatives or other measures). 
Producers’ co-operatives need not be monopolistic. This might well mean that there 
remains competition in the context of producers’ democracy, but in fact this could 
have the positive implication for continued market signals and discipline driving 
resource allocation and innovation, but in a context where alienation is reduced, the 
mechanism of exploitation negated, and productive democracy extended through 
mechanisms of workers’ control. Also, while there remains the risk of hierarchies in 
producers’ co-operatives as there is no perfect solution to the division of labour that 
inevitably arises in any large-scale economic context, democratic mechanisms of 
accountability could greatly ameliorate these influences. 
 
Therefore, while Bernstein opposes consumers’ co-operatives to producers’ co-
operatives it is not necessary to choose one or the other. In the scenario of consumers’ 
co-operatives alone, in any case there is the threat that employers will respond to such 
market pressures by simply lifting the rate of exploitation. The answer may be 
democratic organisation at both the level of production and the level of consumers’ 
associations. Indeed, it is reasonable to suppose overlap between the two forms, with 
citizens providing checks and balances against one another in their capacities, both as 
consumers and producers. 
 
Reform versus Revolution and Liberalism versus Socialism 
 
Bernstein, Kautsky and Luxemburg held diverging viewpoints on the themes of 
revolution and citizenship – hence the conflicting themes of reform/revolution, and 
universal citizenship versus working class majoritarianism. Some of these themes 
could well be considered a subset of the broader theme of socialism/liberalism. Yet 
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importantly there is also the prospect of synthesis/conciliation between socialism and 
liberalism. 
 
Both Kautsky and Bernstein feared provocations that could have resulted in a violent 
and repressive reaction by the state and, as Kautsky supposed, a temporary setback for 
socialism. The age of barricades was apparently over with the modernisation of the 
world’s militaries and the massive escalation of their destructiveness. Nonetheless, for 
Kautsky and Luxemburg political revolution, especially in Germany, remained the 
precondition of socialism and democracy. Arguably, revolution is more complex and 
substantial than violent and insurrectionary change, though indeed, in the case of a 
vacuum – of a collapse in the existing state and social order as occurred in Russia 
1917 – “wars of movement” (Gramsci’s term; see Pierson (1986) pp 89-91, p 101) 
remained possible. 
 
Perhaps rather these circumstances embodied necessary alterations in the processes of 
social change. Revolution was not off the table. Despite the noted military 
modernisation, Kautsky did not forsake the principle of revolution, and for Rosa 
Luxemburg the mass strike opened new possibilities. Certainly there developed here 
an opposition between insurrection and legalism, and later, and opposition between 
pro-active views of revolution (e.g., the Bolsheviks, Luxemburg), and the perspective 
of ripening conditions (Kautsky). 
 
Long before the Bolsheviks rose to power in 1917, Bernstein – in contradistinction 
from Kautsky – so feared any reaction against attempted political revolution derailing 
the process of gradual democratic evolution that he abandoned revolution itself. 
Crucially, though, and as earlier observed, Bernstein’s characterisation of revolution 
is one of a decisive and violent break, of seizure of state power via “unlawful” 
insurgency (Bernstein; 1961, pp 100-101). Yet, arguably, the substance of revolution 
is not the means of achieving it, but the actuality of qualitative change. Further, 
another core point of difference between Bernstein and Kautsky is, in Steenson’s 
words, that the social question “could not be solved within existing society” (Kautsky 
cited Steenson, p 78).  But Bernstein does not appear to address the question of where 
a new constitution would come from in the context of his evolutionary schema. 
Perhaps he simply assumes a series of less fundamental constitutional breaks 
gradually leading to a substantially transformed constitution, and hence a qualitatively 
transformed social foundation. 
 
Of central importance in this schema is the development of the proletariat itself. 
Whereas the modern proletariat was undeveloped and weak during the French 
Revolution – with the consequence that it held power only briefly in the context of 
political terror – in the time of Kautsky and Bernstein it appeared to be on a trajectory 
of becoming the dominant class, numerically and organisationally. This was 
regardless of the resilience of the middle classes as supposed by Bernstein. 
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So, Kautsky and Bernstein both supposed the growing preponderance of the working 
class: A series of advances and political conquests resulting in free speech and 
association, resulting in growing class consciousness and organisational strength with 
the workers’ organisation in trade unions. But also, as Marx foreshadowed, as a party 
(Bernstein; pp 102-103). However, the differentiation within the working class 
supposed by Bernstein held the potential of undermining the solidarity presumed by 
Kautsky. 
 
Generalizing this, Bernstein writes that, “with respect to liberalism as a great 
historical movement, socialism is its legitimate heir, not only in chronological 
sequence, but also in its spiritual qualities” (Bernstein, n.d., pp 149-150). Thus for 
Bernstein the pure majoritarianism supposed by Marx’s formulation “found its limits” 
with “an equality of rights for all members of the community”; this position 
embodying his liberal instincts, in the ways in which they complemented – rather than 
negated – his socialist outlook. By this reckoning, true democracy comprised the 
“absence of class government”; “a social condition where political privilege belongs 
to no class as opposed to the whole community” (Bernstein, 1961, p 142). Here, 
suppression of the dominance of the capitalist class, whether through grass-roots 
action on the part of the working class, or through legislation, need not mean the 
suspension of the citizenship rights and civil liberties of any individual. 
 
Thus the crucial insistence, that social democracy “labours … incessantly at raising 
the worker from the social position of a proletarian to that of a citizen, and thus to 
make citizenship universal”. Here Mouffe and Laclau make a telling observation, that 
for Bernstein “workers can become subjects as citizens, consumers, etc.”, and hence 
“the relations between them become an open articulation which offers no a priori 
guarantee that it will adopt a given form”, although collective identity was (and 
remains) less precarious than Mouffe and Laclau suppose. For instance, Fordist work 
practices were (and in some places still are) concrete and lead to specific forms of 
association and consciousness (Mouffe and Laclau, pp 35-36), even though 
diversification of experience and thus consciousness was to result (over many 
decades) in the fragmentation of the working class. 
 
Notably, in the German language there was “no special word for the idea of the 
citizen with equal civic rights separate from the idea of privileged citizens”. So, this 
considered, Bernstein’s emphasis on universal citizenship is suggestive of raising 
proletarians to the level of privilege enjoyed by the upper classes, which is suggestive 
of economic and social equality as opposed to purely formal political equality. 
Absence of class government, therefore, also means abolishing the economic 
privileges of the bourgeoisie that provide it the means of indirectly dominating the 
political sphere. However, in progressing to said goal, Bernstein aims for a 
“transition”, “free from convulsive outbursts” “of the modern social order into a 
higher one” Bernstein, 1961, pp 142-148; Mouffe and Laclau, pp 35-36). Just how 
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realistic this was is open to question, especially in light of the First World War and 
the Depression that was to follow. 
 
Does Reformist Democratic Socialism leave the Door open 
for Revolution? 
 
In this final section we will consider Bernstein’s stance on the questions and themes 
of reform and revolution. In essence, Bernstein argues for a return to Kantian 
epistemological scepticism when it comes to the presumption of phenomena he 
considers the realm of metaphysical speculation. Again – and hence perhaps his most 
severe rupture with Marxism – we see the abandonment of the Marxian dialectic. For 
Kautsky, Bernstein’s rejection of escalating class bifurcation assumes conditions that 
would be fatal for socialism; but Bernstein holds bifurcation and immiseration only as 
being crucial for the realisation of socialism if one accepts the grand dialectical 
scheme of things (Bernstein, 1961, pp 201-202, 210-212). 
 
Also, while recognising tendencies such as monopolisation, overproduction, 
intensifying exploitation, cyclic destruction of capital, and of the rate of profit to fall, 
Bernstein writes of Marx’s arguments in Capital Volume I, that – and with regard to 
“the chapter on the historical tendency of capitalist accumulation” – that it is not in 
reality “driven to the critical point of the antagonism there depicted” (Bernstein, 
1961, pp 41-42, 207-208 [my emphasis]). 
 
Despite his reservations, his proclamation that “actual evolution is really always 
bringing forth new arrangements, forces, facts”, Bernstein does not rule out the 
possibility of antagonisms reaching a critical point significantly into the future. He 
speculates that perhaps: All these “improvements … only create temporary remedies 
against the oppressive tendencies of capitalism”, remedies “that cannot in the long run 
effect anything substantially against the critical point of antagonisms laid down by 
Marx” leading to “catastrophic change by violence”. Hence (Bernstein): “it is 
impossible simply to declare the one conception right and the other absolutely wrong” 
(Bernstein; 1961, pp 208-209). 
 
For Kleene, a contemporary of Bernstein writing in 1901, Bernstein remained an 
advocate of class conflict – even if now only through “legal means”, and he perceived 
Bernstein’s approach as “democratic rather than … purely proletarian” and without 
“violence and hatred” (Kleene, pp 25-29). Yet for all this talk about violence and 
hatred, it was capitalism, capitalists, and the surviving elements of the old order that 
brought to the world most brutal and costly conflict known at that point in human 
history. 
 
Indeed, the prospect of catastrophic change, while relished by some is feared by 
Bernstein, who realises the possibility that it might result, not in socialism but 
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barbarism. By contrast, Bernstein’s is a constructive socialism who sees a socialist 
future not in a descent into chaos and crisis as the necessary prelude to change, but in 
the social development of the means of production, and the growing education and 
consciousness of the working class. Bernstein perceives obstacles to this progress and 
to that education of the working class. However, the very development he assumes is 
grounded in the presumption of a progressive accumulation of working-class victories 
– for example the reduction of the working week, providing the time and means 
necessary to partake in culture and develop critical perspectives (Bernstein, 1961, pp 
212-213, pp 220-221). 
 
Bernstein considered democracy as “not only the means but also the substance” of 
socialism. The consequence for him was that in order to achieve real socialism it was 
a precondition to “build up a nation of democrats” with “the formation of political and 
social organs of the democracy”. In other words, it was necessary to entrench social-
democratic consciousness among the majority working class (Bernstein, 1961, pp 
163-165). 
 
Conclusion: Bernstein’s Legacy 
 
Bernstein prefers a sceptical empiricism instead of a dialectical materialism that 
wrestles with totality. He seems to reject hard philosophical materialism in favour of a 
historical materialism, which takes into account material circumstances but assumes a 
role for free will within this framework. One consequence of this is a shift from 
determinist fatalism to a view of socialism as an ethical choice. Further, Bernstein 
questions the status of the economic base in determining politics and culture, posing 
the alternative of significant relative autonomy. 
 
Morgan observes that Bernstein’s practical eclecticism was such that the “father of 
revisionism” never embraced “the final systematising impulse” and in consequence, 
his reconstruction of Marx’s theory “was in fact never carried through” (Morgan, p 
531). Indeed, Bernstein’s emphasis on practical politics often overshadowed or 
compromised his theoretical output. For instance, his early equivocation in the face of 
imperialism and colonialism can be read both as an acknowledgement of the 
progressive and modernising role played by global capitalism, but also as a practical 
concession to gain political influence and acceptance. Importantly, though, he did 
become increasingly critical as World War I loomed closer and the likely 
consequences of imperialist rivalry became more apparent (Fletcher, 1983a, pp 79, 
83-84). 
 
Bernstein’s teleological and evolutionary outlook assumes steady and unrelenting 
progress even amidst the conflicting assumption of contingency. That is he sees 
reform leading forward as a kind of ‘one way street’. But at the same time Bernstein 
rejects Marx’s dialectical materialism – which had been the underlying justification 
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for that assumption. Yet, Bernstein does not entirely deny totality; merely the 
possibility of grasping it empirically. Amidst this uncertainty, he abandons the final 
goal of socialism even amidst an assumption that the class struggle is somehow 
leading forward. More particularly, Bernstein’s work suggests a reconstruction and re-
conceptualization of socialism into an endless series of provisional goals animated by 
enduring underlying principles. So, Bernstein had also written: 
 
A movement without a goal would drift chaotically, for it would be a movement 
without direction. No goal, no direction! The movement needs a compass, but 
this goal is not the realisation of a social plan so much as the implementation of 
a social principle. (Bernstein in Beilharz, p 112) 
 
In the field of economics, Bernstein is truly innovative, developing a synthesis of 
labour theory of value and utility theory of value. He provides statistical evidence 
against the class-bifurcation hypothesis, and suggests capitalist adaptation via credit 
and cartels. Yet, he nonetheless observes continuing tendencies towards monopoly, 
periodic crisis and destruction of capital, and intensifying rates of exploitation. He 
does not deny these will reach the critical point at some time far distant, but does not 
see this happening in the foreseeable future. Thus, he is dismissive of Luxemburg’s 
protestations. (Yet, again, imperialist tensions were to explode in 1914; there was the 
Depression from 1929; and the economic crises in the present century.) 
 
As discussed in this chapter, regarding economic democracy, Bernstein preferred 
consumer co-operatives as the most effective means of securing a fairer economic 
share for the working class, seeing producers’ co-operatives, by comparison, 
potentially leading to a reversion to hierarchy, and possibly the abuse of co-operativist 
monopolies. 
 
Finally, revolution is denied as a violent, ruptural and illegal break, but Bernstein does 
not deny qualitative change as the ultimate consequence of a culmination of reforms 
(perhaps even – as Mouffe and Laclau argue – a rapid succession of reforms). 
 
Crucially, modern interpretations of Bernstein often underplay the great extent of the 
content he retrieved from the Marxist orthodoxy. His retrieval of so much from Marx 
– the falling rate of profit; overproduction; cyclical crises and periodic diminution of 
capital; the concentration and centralization of industrial capital; the increase of the 
rate of surplus value – should not be glossed over. The retrieval of so much that is 
useful in Marx is a highly valuable legacy, in its unearthing of a variety of Marxist 
concepts that reformist democratic socialists would otherwise have rejected out of 
hand, or perhaps not ever engaged with at all. 
 
However, Bernstein’s apparent assumption of unyielding progress seems naïve in 
light of the developments of more recent decades. Mouffe and Laclau have subjected 
him to searching criticism on exactly this point. Hence their criticism of his 
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perspective on “the progressive and ascending character of human history”, coupled 
with his notion of “evolution” (a progressive teleology), but they further observe that 
unlike Marxian orthodoxy, progress for Bernstein is based on harmonious processes 
as well as antagonism (Mouffe and Laclau, p 34). 
 
All of this must be understood in light of the spirit of Bernstein’s age – the influence 
of confident Marxism, apparently having uncovered the internal dynamics that would 
lead irresistibly to socialism. Indeed, if nothing else, this very confidence held the 
prospect of encouraging a self-fulfilling prophecy of socialist transition. Meanwhile, 
his abandonment of a single final goal for socialism upholds the idea of a moral or 
political compass, and suggests adaptation to changing circumstances in pursuit of 
socialist principles. 
 
Bernstein’s economic innovations with regard to the labour theory of value remain of 
theoretical interest, maintaining the objective fact of surplus value with the resulting 
moral implications. This remains a valuable legacy in providing a moral foundation 
for socialism today. 
 
However, Bernstein’s scepticism with regard to the potential of producers co-
operatives is disappointing, and regardless of the fact that his treatment of consumer 
co-operatives charted important terrain neglected by some Marxists (though not all) – 
who have been constrained by a narrow productivism. As noted, there is the 
alternative prospect, of new forms of democratic economic organisation based on the 
importance of ‘the people’ both in their capacity as consumers and as producers and, 
indeed, in their capacity as citizens. 
 
Bernstein’s legacy is thus valuable in a number of respects: providing an alternative 
theoretical framework for (reformist) democratic socialism, and imagining greater 
contingency, and greater autonomy for politics. In the words of Mouffe and Laclau, 
this “represented a real effort to break with the corporative isolation of the working 
class.” In so doing, Bernstein averted the tendency to see social evolution as a closed 
system, and even despite his assumption that progress was a one-way street (Mouffe 
and Laclau, pp 30-35). He does not deny totality, but merely the capacity to grasp it 
comprehensively and empirically through Marx’s theory. It is a perspective that may 
be relevant in responding to postmodern scepticism today, providing the basis for 
acting upon meta-narratives and grasping large-scale social phenomena even in the 
face of a sceptical epistemology. 
 
Most important, the legacies of Bernstein include his provision of a theoretical lens 
through which to grasp the social debates and social phenomena of his age. A more 
radical reading of Bernstein may even be important for modern-day socialists 
searching for a theoretical foundation to bridge the gap between reform and 
revolution. The substance of the meaning of revolution is contested: Does it mean 
violent, illegal and insurrectionary seizure of state power? Or is it the substance of 
93 
 
qualitative change no matter how it is arrived at? In this sense, Bernstein provides a 
meaningful Third Way, a powerful legacy in itself. The consequence of a more 
nuanced view with regard to the question of reform versus revolution is the prospect 
of a revolutionary reformism. This can be interpreted in a number of ways. First, it 
could be considered that non-exploitative and democratic economic forms (perhaps 
through a mix of co-operative, democratic and public enterprise) rise to a dominant 
position in a given national economy. Second, it could be considered in the sense of 
political reform of the state – a struggle within to the point at which the state itself no 
longer poses an active obstacle to democratic change. 
 
It is clear that while Luxemburg saw revolution as a necessity in order to avoid 
barbarism, the Bernsteinian perspective, by prioritising reforms to ameliorate class 
tensions, may prevent Marx’s scenario (and one that rarely is talked about) of the 
“mutual ruin of the contending classes” (Ferguson, p 531). Rosa Luxemburg, it seems, 
had no doubt when it came to the opposition between reform and revolution, and she 
made it her views on Bernstein’s evolutionary outlook quite clear. It is to her that the 
discussion now turns, and especially her response to revisionism with her famous 
Reform or Revolution. 
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Chapter Four: 
 
Rosa Luxemburg – Reform or Revolution? 
 
 
 
This chapter analyses the historic, theoretical contribution of Rosa Luxemburg to 
Marxism and social democracy, especially her response to the revisionist controversy, 
and her theorization of the place of spontaneity in revolution. The chapter begins with 
a brief biographical background followed by an analysis of how and why her 
contribution can be considered a relative Third Road. Thereafter, is the analysis of 
two of her major works: Reform or Revolution and The Mass Strike. 
 
Reform or Revolution is one of the seminal texts of the ‘revisionist controversy’, 
which entailed a split from the Marxian orthodoxy by Eduard Bernstein, with his 
positing of a reformist and evolutionary alternative; and Luxemburg’s response, a 
scathing defence of a revolutionary viewpoint. A number of important themes arise 
within Luxemburg’s work, including: 
 
 Idealism versus scientific socialism or dialectical materialism; 
 Socialism conceived as a moral ought in a world marked by voluntarism and 
contingency versus the objective necessity of socialism; 
 Supposed capitalist adaptation versus the orthodox Marxist supposition of 
capitalist breakdown and collapse; and 
 Gradual accumulation of reforms versus ruptural displacement of capitalism. 
 
This discussion is followed by further elaboration on the theme of necessity as 
embodied in capitalist contradictions identified by Marx, and additional factors 
observed by Luxemburg herself: specifically, her reference to the credit system, 
overproduction, monopolisation and the consequent exhaustion of capitalism’s 
progressive economic role. Thereafter, the key theme of reform/revolution is explored 
in depth; including an analysis of Luxemburg’s refutation of Bernstein’s reformism 
(and reformism generally); and the author’s own proposal of a synthesis of the two 
concepts in theory and practice. Following this analysis of the question of reform and 
revolution, discussion moves to other works during the period in question that were 
seminal contributions to the Luxemburgian school of thought. Finally, are the 
valuable legacies Rosa Luxemburg has left in the form of her works during the period 
1880-1906. These including her libertarian variant on Marxism, and her defence of 
revolutionary Marxism against Bernstein’s revisionism. In concluding, the chapter 
also considered fruitful syntheses that may be applied when considering the works of 
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Luxemburg and Bernstein. Rosa Luxemburg’s steadfast opposition to revisionism and 
her libertarian critique of Bolshevist centralism – these establish her as one of the 
most original, insightful and passionate Marxist thinkers. 
 
Luxemburg’s Politics 
 
Born in 1871 to a Jewish family, Luxemburg originally participated in the Polish 
socialist movement and swiftly moved to involve herself in the Second International. 
She spent time in Switzerland, France and ultimately Germany, and was involved 
with other exiles including Lenin, Plekanov, and Axelrod. Luxemburg relocated to 
Germany in 1898 to take part in the world socialist movement through activism in the 
SPD. Indeed, she became one of the most prominent teachers at the SPD school. From 
the beginning, hers was an uncompromising internationalism: which put her at odds 
with Polish socialists who prioritised the national liberation struggle (Hudis and 
Anderson, pp 8-9; Wolfe, pp 212-213; Rousseas, p 12). 
 
Luxemburg recounted that the political general strike of January 1905 was outwardly 
“a political act of the revolutionary declaration of war on absolutism”. Ultimately, that 
conflict splintered into a mass of local economic struggles. Here Luxemburg 
challenged the accepted social-democratic wisdom that ‘the decay of the great 
political general strike of January 1905 into a number of economic struggles was 
probably “a great mistake”’ (Luxemburg in Hudis and Andersen, pp 180-181). These 
strikes, Luxemburg recalled, were kindled in response to a number of issues. There 
was a fight for better wages, against working in one’s home, for an eight-hour day, 
and against cruel labour discipline in the workplace. Most important, Luxemburg 
insisted, the movement had a spontaneous element. Rather than the economic struggle 
excluding the political struggle, Luxemburg declares: “Between the two there is the 
most complete reciprocal action” (Luxemburg in Hudis and Andersen, pp 194-195). 
 
In summary, hers was a life bound up with the politics of her time. In 1906 she 
penned The Mass Strike, a book that was to stand the test of time as a Marxist classic. 
There she proposes a spontaneous element to working-class revolutionary action, not 
“arising without cause”, but nonetheless unpredictably from underlying class struggle. 
This work involved conflicting themes of relative spontaneity as distinct from 
deliberate, methodical, organised action. Luxemburg’s analysis of the struggles 
involved in the 1905 Russian Revolution and the strikes of 1903 and 1904 have been 
summed up by other Marxists as Luxemburg’s theory of the “spontaneity of the 
masses” (Geras, pp 111-112). 
 
Luxemburg’s ‘Libertarian Marxism’ as a Third Road 
 
Luxemburg’s response to these themes can be considered a Third Road on a number 
of grounds. Though the Luxemburgian Third Road was only to emerge fully in the 
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context of her controversies with the Bolsheviks, even at this early stage – the time of 
the revisionist controversy and the 1906 Russian Revolution – her position was 
distinctive. 
 
Her concept of revolution was such that it can be thought of as a Third Road rather 
than a Third Way at the time of writing Social Reform or Revolution (1898-1899) and 
The Mass Strike (1906). She was in sympathy with the Second Way final goals of 
orthodox Marxism, while at the same time embracing methods that innovatively 
envisaged political leadership in the form of constant adaptation by Social Democrats 
to spontaneous working-class initiative. However, with the later rise of Stalinism and 
socialism in one country, the Second Way itself shifted. After her death, Luxemburg’s 
position became a beacon for a libertarian socialism in contrast with Stalinist practice. 
Stalinism claimed its continuing adherence to the final communist goal of Marxism, 
and in that sense – in definitional terms – Luxemburg’s position may still be 
favourably interpreted as having comprised a Third Road after her death in 
comparison with its brutality. Others might even argue that Stalinism so distorted 
Marxism, and that in comparison, Luxemburg’s libertarian Marxism loomed rather 
more as a Third Way. That is, it diverged radically on account of Stalinism’s effective 
abandonment of the authentic communism of Marx. Either view arguably can be 
considered legitimate on the grounds of its own internally consistent assumptions. 
 
Regarding necessity: Marxism, in the same vein as Hegelianism, has been accused of 
posing a closed vision of the future. Bernstein’s scepticism about the possibility of 
grasping, perceiving and expressing totality is met by Luxemburg with an affirmation 
of dialectical materialism, and the expressive capacity of Marx’s theory in pointing to 
the driving force throughout history – again, the evolving mode of production, driven 
by class struggle and technological innovation. For Luxemburg, Bernstein’s 
revisionism neglected the movement of capitalism as an organic whole. 
 
In turn, this leads to the conflicting themes of scientific socialism and idealism. Marx 
sought to affirm his approach’s scientific status on a number of grounds, but most 
significantly in his theory of (dialectical) historical materialism. In this approach and 
by analysis of the material/economic contradictions of capitalism, Marx felt he had 
established the necessity of socialism. Bernstein had posited socialism as a moral and 
possible ‘ought’ (ie: a choice, or a possibility – rather than an inevitability) in the face 
of a future that was contingent (though again Bernstein still believed it was possible 
that capitalism’s contradictions could grow extreme so as to render socialism 
objectively necessary at some time in the future, and he also assumed a progressive 
teleology). In the face of Bernstein’s assertions, Luxemburg was to contend firstly 
that there was the potential for cartels and monopolies to exploit and gouge 
consumers; and secondly, that contradictions would develop between nation-based 
cartels and the interests of the world market. She also saw credit as exacerbating, 
transmitting and magnifying capitalist crises rather than solving them, even though 
credit was essential to the next step in the expansion of world trade. 
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In the treatment of Luxemburg intended, the conflicting themes of reform and 
revolution are paramount. Rosa Luxemburg could not accept concepts such as slow 
revolution such as the Austro-Marxists later adopted, which envisaged such 
interpenetration between reform and revolution that they merged as one overarching 
process. The bottom line – that is, the prime imperative -for Luxemburg was the 
suppression of the wage system as the substance of revolution. This entailed the full 
negation of capitalist expropriation of surplus value from workers, not merely the 
“diminution” of exploitation (Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, p 157). To achieve 
this, Luxemburg perceived the need for a new constitution, as had been the case with 
prior revolutions such as in France 1789 . Piecemeal parliamentary reform would not 
deliver this political revolution. A decisive political break required the laying of new 
foundations for political economy. 
 
An analysis of Reform of Revolution is revealing of the substance of Luxemburg’s 
arguments; thereafter the examine turns to those other critical aspects of her thought 
as developed in The Mass Strike, which at the time further consolidated the status of 
her perspective as those of a genuine Third Road writer. 
 
Objective Necessity versus Contingency and ‘Moral Ought’ 
 
Luxemburg begins Social Reform or Revolution, published 1899, with an attack on 
Bernstein’s abandonment of socialism’s final aim. For Luxemburg, Bernstein had 
abandoned the only thing distinguishing social democracy from bourgeois liberalism 
(Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, pp 8-10, 128-129, 167). Her   case hinges 
heavily on the argument that it is objective economic necessity that will drive the 
transition to socialism, rather than “the victorious violence of a minority”, or even 
“through [the] … numerical superiority” of the proletariat”(Luxemburg in Hudis and 
Anderson, p 133, 149). In this are discernible the origins of her later conflict with 
Lenin. 
 
Luxemburg’s position also puts her at odds with modern post-Marxism, which is 
interesting to consider in light of the usefulness her legacy – her analysis for the 
modern day. Mouffe and Laclau observe of her “spontaneism” that “movements … 
emerged at un-preconceived points and tended to expand beyond the capacity of 
regulation and organisation of any political or trade union leadership”. Hence while 
the working class is often fragmented, “this movement of feedback and interaction” is 
meant to guarantee “the unity of the working class” in the process of revolution 
(Mouffe and Laclau, pp 8-9). 
 
However, in refuting Luxemburg’s assumptions, Mouffe and Laclau argue that 
“Spontaneism has an element of contingency – but necessity excludes contingency” 
(Mouffe and Laclau, p 12). Thus, although Luxemburg accepts uncertainty on the 
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question, “socialism or barbarism?” they argue that there are irreconcilable 
contradictions in her theory. Contra-Luxemburg, Mouffe and Laclau also deny that 
the working class will achieve a unified subjecthood, even in the midst of revolution. 
They propose a perspective whereby the “the class nature of political subjects loses its 
necessary character.” To substantiate this they observe “the rise of fascism, which 
would brutally dispel the illusion of the necessary character of certain class 
articulations” (Mouffe and Laclau, p 13; My emphasis). 
 
Yet, there is a positive side to this equation: If subject positions can be constructed by 
the radical Right, so, too, can they be constructed by an amalgam of left/progressive 
forces. Therefore, “new forms of struggle in the advanced capitalist world” with the 
“emergence of new forms of political subjectivity cutting across the categories of the 
social and economic structure” (Mouffe and Laclau, p 13). Against Mouffe and 
Laclau, such doubts can also be responded to by recourse to the old distinction 
between “class in itself” and “class for itself”. While Mouffe and Laclau reject 
essential interests, it is difficult not to perceive clear interests in the distributive 
struggle under capitalism. 
 
Luxemburg accuses Bernstein of analysing isolated phenomena and thereby failing to 
grasp the historical movement involved in the totality of social and economic forces. 
Specifically, Luxemburg accuses Bernstein of being eclectic and thus abandoning 
“the class standpoint”, “the proud and admirable symmetric construction of the 
Marxist system” from which it is possible to grasp this historic movement 
(Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, p 161). (Again, there is a stark contrast between 
Marxism and post-structuralist post-Marxism. The latter rejects necessary teleology 
and closure, where no single variable is central to the movement of history. Here there 
is always an element of doubt given the general acceptance of radical contingency and 
voluntarism.) 
 
Radically distinct from Bernstein’s assumptions of capitalist adaptation through 
technological and organisational advancement, Luxemburg sees the internal logic of 
capitalism and the daily struggles of the working class as necessarily leading to 
capitalist breakdown and socialist transition through the democratic suppression of 
those contradictions. Without such a breakdown, Luxemburg considered 
expropriation of the capitalists impossible – thus providing an unambiguous rationale 
for her objection to Bernstein’s hypotheses on capitalist adaptation (Luxemburg in 
Hudis and Anderson, p 160). 
 
Yet, while she sees socialism as necessary, this does not mark her as a fatalist 
(Ferguson, pp 526-527). For her, the total movement of social relations makes 
socialism necessary, as the substance of human liberation, but there is still the element 
of choice and uncertainty, and barbarism is also a possible consequence of capitalist 
contradictions, and of the attempts of rival capitalists to incessantly expand and 
dominate the world market. 
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Luxemburg concedes that revisionism (especially Bernstein’s) does not “defend 
capitalist relations” or deny “the existence of the contradictions of capitalism”. 
However, it denies this very process of necessary development and revolutionary 
suppression/transition. Without any objective necessity, Luxemburg sees socialism as 
reduced to an ideal and a utopia (Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, pp 134, 141-
142). While Bernstein himself rejects utopian final goals, his provisional and evolving 
objectives are presumed to be realisable through a gradual accumulation of reforms: 
Reducing the scale of exploitation, extending social control, and ultimately removing 
from capitalist society its very capitalist character. By contrast, Luxemburg thinks that 
the practice of reformism sees immediate practical results completely overshadowing 
the real seizure of power, the class perspective and the transition to a qualitatively 
different (socialist) order. Indeed, the revolutionary perspective is seen as obstructing 
and inhibiting the achievement of immediate, practical reforms. (Luxemburg in Hudis 
and Anderson, pp 140-142) 
 
Thus it was that Luxemburg held to a firm-line on the role of the state under 
capitalism, where, as “an organ of the capitalist class” it could not but represent that 
class interest. Reforms would be granted only in so far as they protected that interest; 
and hence, “no amount of reform” would lead to socialism (Kolakowski, p 417). 
 
Here she was at odds with the Austro-Marxist, Otto Bauer, who later considered the 
possibility of slow revolution and an equilibrium of class power in economy and civil 
society providing a window of opportunity for change. Here, reform and revolution 
were not necessarily exclusive of each other, especially if reforms mobilised the 
confidence of the working class, in the context of a discourse of slow revolution. Here 
a transitional economy could conceivably comprise some kind of hybrid (Gruber, pp 
37-41). As with Kautsky, Luxemburg could not accept this abandonment of the notion 
that history and necessity were on the side of socialism, with the consequent 
demoralisation of the socialist movement. For her, socialism could not be a mere 
choice – that would be to see it as an ideal to aspire to in a present where the future 
was open and contingent – but a necessity uncovered by the scientific realisation of 
the contradictions and tendencies inherent in capitalism. 
 
In refuting Bernstein, Luxemburg mentions three tendencies in capitalism as “the 
scientific basis of socialism”: 
 
 “growing anarchy of the capitalist economy”; 
  “the progressive socialisation of the process of production, which creates the 
germs of the future social order”; and 
 “the growing organisation and class consciousness of the proletariat, which 
constitutes the active factor in the coming revolution”. 
(Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, p 132) 
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Crucially, while accepting the last two of these tendencies, Bernstein questions the 
first, and with it the objective necessity of socialism. Without the assumption of some 
general collapse through economic catastrophe or war – with socialists “stepping into 
the breach” – Luxemburg asserts that all that remains for Bernstein is the gradual 
improvement and amelioration of the condition of the working class through the 
trade-union struggle, parliamentary work and the establishment of consumers’ co-
operatives (Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, p 131). 
 
This seems to have Luxemburg putting her hopes on a determinist vision of socialist 
transition. For her, without assumed capitalist breakdown there is the loss of socialist 
hope. Socialism for Luxemburg is predicated on the negation of capitalism; and not 
simply the affirmation of a series of reforms (Ferguson, p 511). 
 
The Means and Processes of Capitalist Breakdown 
 
How exactly was capitalism meant to break down in Rosa Luxemburg’s vision of 
necessary socialist transition? She returns to Marx but makes a number of alterations. 
Marx had argued that the value of commodities consisted of three parts: constant 
capital (the value of the actual means of production), variable capital (that is, wages), 
and surplus value – ”the increase of value due to the unremunerated portion of wage 
labour.” That is: “Value = C+V+S”. In Capital Marx divided the capitalist economy 
into two departments: Department I being production of the means of production and 
Department II being production of consumer goods. Here there exists a relationship of 
interdependence where “they must remain in a specific proportion so that the process 
of production may continue harmoniously” (Kolakowski, pp 408-409). Arguably, 
capitalist crisis emerges when the cost of the modernisation of constant capital 
(Department I) reaches disproportionate levels, though that is ameliorated by the 
tendency towards monopoly, with greater economies of scale. 
 
However, as Kolakowski argues, capitalism needs to expand to fuel the accumulation 
process: “Industry cannot go on creating its own market [forever]; [and] what is 
produced must be consumed.” Further, he expresses Luxemburg’s interpretation of 
world capitalism, where “all countries are an internal market” (Kolakowski, p 409).  
For Luxemburg, this problem was also fuelled by an impoverished working class and 
unproductive stratum, for example, landowners, civil servants and soldiers, from 
whom a surplus is not extracted in any case. Therefore, Luxemburg suggests there is 
an objective limit to capitalist accumulation. Accumulation “hits a brick wall” 
(Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, pp 60-61; Geras, N p 15) ; in the form of the 
limits to consumption. Kolakowski explains how in this scenario of Luxemburg’s 
there is the need for a market external to both Department I and Department II, and 
the objective limits to accumulation and consumption spell the end for capitalism.  
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This raises questions pertaining to the capitalist system’s very survival. For a time at 
least capitalistic systemic reproduction is delivered through markets external to 
capitalism itself, for example, pre-capitalist economies, and hyper-exploitation of pre-
capitalist classes. Although Marx insisted that capitalism was rapacious in 
transforming the whole world after its own image, even considering this, capitalism 
has found a way.  
 
Importantly, at times during the twentieth century, fascist regimes have buoyed their 
economies with labour conscription, state consumption through armament, and 
organised economies in the context of war. This has fulfilled capitalism’s systemic 
imperatives even while depriving people of use values, in effect ruining the life-world 
(Habermas). (In other words, human needs go beyond the mere expansion of 
production; especially under circumstances of terrible human cost) Yet, capitalism has 
survived without fascism as well. Luxemburg was correct to identify the problem of 
limits to consumption, though for a long time this problem has been overcome by the 
structuring/stratification of internal (national) markets and also the global market. 
This resonates with her argument regarding the exploitation of non-capitalist 
economies by capitalists from her work, ‘The Accumulation of Capital’. (Luxemburg 
in Hudis and Anderson, pp 60-63) The Third World, as it came to be called – and now 
the Global South – is plundered for its human and material resources. In advanced 
core economies, meanwhile, the living standards of the middle classes often rest 
partly upon intense exploitation of the working poor. 
 
Capitalism has truly globalized, but in so doing the core capitalist economies have 
structurally externalised various national economies and within themselves have 
externalised their own dispossessed and working poor. In other words impoverished 
countries are ruthlessly exploited for their resources and their labour – and this 
intensified exploitation provides for such material living standards that maintain 
prosperity – and hence stability – in the ‘core’ capitalist countries.  
 
Further, in some countries (the United States being perhaps the most striking 
example) the living standards of the middle classes, and even of parts of the working 
class, are maintained by the thorough and quite extreme exploitation of the working 
poor. Further pertaining to the United States the most threadbare regime of social 
welfare contributes to a scenario where labour is disciplined; and resources are ‘freed 
up’ to be diverted to ‘the prosperous classes’ and provide for the further accumulation 
of capital. The ‘prosperous’ classes, here, provide the social base of political stability. 
But even amongst of the working poor ‘white ghettoes’ (Bageant considers in the US 
these number some 19 million) those same people are often propagandised by right-
wing ideology, (Bageant, pp 8-9) This lends force to arguments that class identities 
are not ‘essential’ but must be articulated through political strategy. 
 
But again, in the United States and elsewhere technology and productivity have also 
helped to preserve the system. Here, on the one hand Luxemburg grasped the 
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underlying tendencies, part of an enduring legacy. On the other hand she did not 
anticipate the ways and means of capitalist adaptation in the decades that followed. 
 
Resuming consideration of Rosa Luxemburg’s prognosis for capitalism: With the 
onset of the Great War in 1914 and with the accelerating descent into barbarism in the 
ensuing years, the possibility of a general collapse finally loomed. For Marxists such 
as Luxemburg, the dominance of markets through imperialist policy was more than a 
choice – it was a systemic imperative. This placed Bernstein in opposition to 
Luxemburg on the grounds that he believed open (and democratic) diplomacy could 
prevent war, or once war had began, it could provide the basis for a separate peace 
(Fletcher, 1983b, p 577; 1983a, pp 81-82). 
 
Importantly, though, Luxemburg arguably diverged from Lenin in her understanding 
of class consciousness and socialist consciousness. Kathy Ferguson (Currently a 
Hawaii based progressive Feminist academic) discusses “true consciousness” as the 
grasping of the total movement of social relations (presumably towards socialism). 
More specifically she portrays Luxemburg as striving for “a higher dialectical 
synthesis” and in that process, overcoming both Bernstein’s rejection of the idea of a 
consciousness of some movement of social totality on the one hand and also of 
Lenin’s counter-supposition that such consciousness could exist but had to be 
introduced to the proletariat from without. So, by contrast Luxemburg is held by 
Ferguson to see socialist consciousness as “a kind of moral force”, “with objectively 
correct content”, but “not the property of an elite”; instead, “available to all” – 
developing through the course of class struggle. In recent decades, however, the 
decline of socialism and of labour movements has also led to the decline of critical 
consciousness parallel to the ebbing away of class struggle. In any case the historical 
contestation between competing socialists movements (Menshevist, left social 
democratic; Leninist; anarchist and anarcho-syndicalist) suggests “true 
consciousness” may be difficult to pinpoint, and attempts to enforce a correct line 
have resulted in repression (Ferguson, pp 506-509, p 517, p 525). 
 
Objective Necessity versus Contingency and ‘Moral Ought’  
 
Luxemburg responds to Bernstein’s claims regarding capitalist adaptation by 
emphasizing capitalism’s anarchic tendencies, and consequently, socialism’s enduring 
objective necessity. With regard to the credit system, for example, Luxemburg 
acknowledges that credit can help “increase the capacity to expand production and to 
facilitate exchange”. Indeed, it is crucial for the ongoing expansion of the world 
market in exactly this sense – breaking through “the barrier” provided by “the limited 
size of private capital”. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
continuance of capitalism. Elaborating in eloquent fashion, Luxemburg argues: 
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Speaking very generally, the specific function of credit is nothing but the 
elimination of the remaining rigidity of capitalist relationships … It renders all 
forces extendable, relative, and sensitive to the highest degree ... Hence it 
facilitates and aggravates crises. (Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, p 135) 
 
Thence Luxemburg asserts that after having provoked overproduction, during crises, 
“credit (as mediator of the process of exchange) destroys … the very productive 
forces it … created.” With stagnation “credit melts away”; “it reduces the 
consumption capacity of the market to a minimum.” What is more, credit can also 
lead to “reckless speculation” utilising “the property of others”, and “it also helps to 
bring on and extend the crisis by transforming all exchange into an extremely 
complex and artificial mechanism … [which is] easily disarranged at the slightest 
occasion”(Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, pp 134-135). 
 
Meanwhile, in a similar manner to Bernstein she perceives a clash between consumer 
and producer interests, presumably with the potential for profit-gouging by cartels. 
Increased employer organisation meanwhile strengthens the hand of capital against 
labour. Crucially Luxemburg perceives a contradiction between the interests of the 
world market and the interests of national-capitalist states, with the consequence of 
tariff wars, which are damaging to that world market (Luxemburg in Hudis and 
Anderson, pp 137-138). Further, the same cartels maintain their rates of profit in 
internal markets by clearing/selling their excess product on international markets at a 
discount. Luxemburg concludes: 
 
The result is the sharpening of competition abroad and an increased anarchy on 
the world market – the very opposite of what is intended. (Luxemburg in Hudis 
and Anderson, p 138) 
 
Finally, regarding Bernstein’s emphasis on the survival of small and medium 
enterprises, Luxemburg focuses upon a perceived dialectical movement involving 
complex contradictions; hence “two antagonistic tendencies, one ascendant and the 
other descendent”. (Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, pp 138-139). With the 
descendent tendency there is an ongoing expansion of “the … scale of production 
which periodically overflows the dimensions of average-size capital and removes it 
repeatedly from the competitive terrain.” The ascendant tendency involves a “periodic 
depreciation of existing capital” lowering “for a certain time, the scale of production 
in proportion to the value of the necessary minimum amount of capital.” In other 
words, there is a “periodic mowing down of small capital, which rapidly grows up 
again only to be mowed down once more by large industry” (Luxemburg in Hudis and 
Anderson, pp 138-139). We can perceive these same movements today in the constant 
process by which monopolies and oligopolies are reinforced by the swallowing up of 
new competitors. 
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However, the consequence of this process need not be an absolute decline in the 
number of the middle-sized capitalists. Small and middle-sized enterprises continue to 
arise in new branches of production. The modern example of information technology 
and the social networking market is instructive on the point. Facebook, for instance, 
captured a relatively new market – before that market had ossified into monopoly. In 
Luxemburg’s terms, an increasing amount of capital investment is needed to maintain 
and initiate enterprises in the established branches of production (Luxemburg in 
Hudis and Anderson, p 139). Take, for instance, the necessary modern economies of 
scale, including for research and development associated with the automobile industry 
or with microprocessors and other technological hardware. 
 
Presumably, because of accelerated technological change, Luxemburg perceived an 
ever-shortening window of opportunity for small capitalists to develop in new 
branches of industry. The result is the prevalence of the descendent tendency, and as 
scale and concentration increases, competition declines. Hence, in Luxemburg’s 
world view, ultimately there is stagnation with regards innovation (Luxemburg in 
Hudis and Anderson, p 139). (Although again, in relation to Luxemburg’s theory and 
its relevance as an enduring legacy, it should be noted that in the modern day – with 
the utmost extension of the world market – there are instances of competition 
prevailing even amidst a global oligopoly (for instance in the IT market; with Apple, 
Samsung, Google, and Microsoft, etc.). 
 
Bernstein hopes for a gradual amelioration of capitalist contradictions leading to 
socialism, but for Luxemburg it is those very contradictions that drive capitalist 
development – they are inseparable from capitalism. According to the Marxist schema 
those crises must ever grow in their proportion to mobilise the working class and 
provoke the suppression of the contradictions involved through a democratic 
proletarian class dictatorship, and with an ensuing socialist transition. More 
specifically, however, within the bounds of capitalism it is those very crises which 
“periodically [solve] the conflict between the unlimited extension of production and 
the narrow limits of the market” (Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, 144-145). 
Again, the objective necessity of socialism is in permanently resolving such crises. 
 
Reform versus Revolution 
 
As opposed to Bernstein, Luxemburg is insistent that the proletariat must conquer 
power. Universal suffrage might well be a step forward, but unless the state power – 
indeed, the state apparatus – is conquered, any electoral majority could well be for 
nought. Norman Geras writes: 
The question of the conquest of power, of the dictatorship of the proletariat, had 
therefore to be posed independently … rather than being assumed to be the 
organic product of the daily struggle for minimum demands and reforms. 
(Geras, p 116) 
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In Geras’s worldview, the historic division into minimum and maximum social-
democratic programmes led ultimately to the reduction of actual transition; actual 
conquest of power, to “mere phraseology”, with the minimum programme forming 
the substance – merely ameliorative reforms. It was a dualism he personally believed 
Luxemburg had overcome (Geras, p 117). 
 
Luxemburg is scathing of any blurring of the lines between reform and revolution. 
She argues: 
 
Legal reform and revolution are not different methods of historical progress that 
can be picked out at pleasure from the counter of history, just as one chooses 
hot or cold sausages … They are different moments in the development of class 
society which condition and complement each other, and at the same time 
exclude each other reciprocally … In effect every legal constitution is the 
product of a revolution … During every historical period, work for reforms … 
is carried on only in the framework of the social form created by the last 
revolution. (Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, pp 155-156) 
 
Therefore: 
 
It is absolutely false and totally unhistorical to represent work for reforms as a 
drawn-out-revolution, and revolution as a condensed series of reforms 
(Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, p 156).  
 
According to Luxemburg, therefore, reforms and revolution differ in their “essence” 
(Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, pp 156-157). Thus it is that Luxemburg accuses 
the “father of revisionism” of a monism, which is “the unity of the eternalised 
capitalist order” (Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, p 151). In this context, 
Luxemburg constructs liberalism as the ideology of the bourgeoisie (which is 
interesting given her libertarian approach to socialism). Hence, she supposes that the 
Bernsteinian conflation of liberalism with socialism denies a qualitative break – 
instead suggesting a “reconciliation” with “the transfer of hope to the beyond of an 
ethical-ideal world” (Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, p 162). 
 
In conclusion, Luxemburg reaffirms her notion of socialism as a fundamentally 
different socio-economic order, founded not through the piecemeal reform of 
capitalism (as she characterises Bernstein), but through a qualitative revolutionary 
break. Hence socialism for Luxemburg involves “the suppression of the wage system” 
and not merely “the diminution of exploitation” (Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, 
p 157); but, again, the conditions necessary for the inferred expropriation of the 
capitalists suggested here arise through capitalist contradictions, and are overcome via 
the democratic suppression of those contradictions. Thereby the working class 
organised democratically as a party wrests the means of production, by degrees, from 
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the bourgeoisie and implements a qualitatively different – planned and democratic – 
economic order.  
 
Methodical Organisation versus Spontaneity 
 
At the heart of Luxemburg’s analysis in The Mass Strike is her vision of the school of 
life-experience, where militant workers gained confidence, class consciousness, social 
awareness and understanding through the process of real struggle. Here even defeats 
are valuable in preparing the workers for future action. Rather than directing and 
initiating the revolutionary upheaval through organisation and discipline as Karl 
Kautsky envisaged as the ultimate case in Germany, events in Russia often ran ahead 
of the revolutionary cadres. 
 
Not that Luxemburg rejected organisation as such. She just denied the idea that 
revolutions could be neat and tidy. This enhances her position as comprising a Third 
Road for her time – in contradistinction to the Kautskyan Marxist orthodoxy, which 
proposed methodical organisational work, building one stronghold after another until 
working-class organisation was overwhelming. For Rosa Luxemburg such deliberate 
organisational work may yield brief political strike action, or maybe a mass protest, 
but revolutions were a different creature entirely (Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, 
pp 196-197). 
 
Another theme detectable by comparing Luxemburg and other Marxists and socialists 
is her willingness to accept, for the sake of turning class relations on their head, what 
others would depict as chaos. Echoing Lassalle, Luxemburg supposed if revolution 
meant a new constitution, then the old order would need to be torn down or would 
collapse in a more or less rapid fashion. Amidst this chaos, Luxemburg sees the 
struggle as becoming the focus for new organisation among the workers. 
 
For Luxemburg the mass strike ought not to be taken in isolation, but ought be located 
in the broader class struggle, and specifically a “period of revolution”. The underlying 
causes of the revolution here are the class struggle itself, called into being by 
capitalist contradictions and the brutal, alienating nature of capitalism at this stage of 
its development. Revolutionary “explosions”, as Luxemburg describes them, are 
unpredictable. Instead of leading the movement as a field marshal directs their troops, 
social-democratic cadres are called upon by Luxemburg to exercise “the most adroit 
adaptability to the given situation, and the closest possible contact with the mood of 
the masses”. It is in this fashion that she calls upon social-democratic parties to 
exercise political leadership; not searching in vain for a “mechanism” but helping to 
harness the spontaneous risings among the working class; to provide a focus for new 
organisation amidst the confusion of the battle; the “crumbling of the social 
foundation.” Here for Luxemburg, firm leadership and initiative gives rise to 
confidence, but vacillating weakness and lack of faith in the working class “has a 
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crippling and confusing effect.” The mass strike is “the form of the revolutionary 
struggle” (Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, pp 92, 198-199). Hence, hers is not a 
faith in spontaneism taken outside of the context of the necessary revolutionary 
leadership and the mobilising influence of underlying capitalist contradictions. 
 
A couple of quotes from Luxemburg demonstrate this view and how she applied it to 
the 1905 Russian Revolution. These quotes also underscore her interpretation of 
dialectics as applied to this struggle. Hence Luxemburg’s graphic rhetorical language, 
depicting the struggles in Russia from 1903-1905: 
 
It flows now like a broad billow over the whole kingdom, and now divides into 
a gigantic network of narrow streams; now it bubbles forth from under the 
ground like a fresh spring and now is completely lost under the earth. Political 
and economic strikes, mass strikes and partial strikes, demonstrative strikes and 
fighting strikes, general strikes of individual branches of industry and general 
strikes [in] individual towns, peaceful wage struggles and street massacres, 
barricade fighting – all these run through one another, run side by side, cross 
one another, flow into one another – it is [a] ceaselessly moving, and changing 
sea of phenomenon. (Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, pp 191) 
 
In a further rendition of the dialectical approach, partly echoing Engels from Anti-
Duhring: 
 
In a word, the economic struggle is the transmitter from one political center to 
another; the political struggle is the periodic fertilisation of the soil for the 
economic struggle. Cause and effect here continually change places; 
(Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, p 195) 
 
Luxemburg contends that social-democratic theorists’ attempts to isolate and develop 
a purely political struggle, by this very dissection would “not perceive the 
phenomenon in its living essence, but will kill it altogether.” This is similar to her 
critique of Bernstein’s empiricist eclecticism – taking the parts in isolation rather than 
the living whole ensemble of social and economic forces. Amidst all this, Luxemburg 
perceives an organic totality (Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, p 195). Rather than 
a naïve faith in spontaneity, Luxemburg’s position is nuanced and complex, tracing 
the manner in which cause and effect are constantly switching places. 
 
In response to Luxemburg and in surmising her defensible legacy, a number of 
observations spring to mind. Spontaneous action is a fact – not in the sense of having 
no cause, but in the sense of erupting or being triggered suddenly as a consequence of 
underlying contradictions and tensions. Whether more recently in Egypt or in Paris in 
1968, or with the spread of struggle like wildfire in Russia 1905, revolution is not a 
simple thing. It is not something that can easily be produced, at will, by political 
parties. Indeed, her insights here remain as an important legacy because of their 
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potential modern-day applications. The internet and modern social networking 
technology, if anything, enhance the prospect of spontaneous social movements 
developing organically, again with cause and effect constantly switching places in 
dialectical fashion. Luxemburg’s nuanced dialectical approach comprises a substantial 
legacy for the Marxian movement. 
 
Norman Geras makes a telling reading of Luxemburg where he argues that: 
 
[She] was the very first to draw the lessons of 1905 for advanced capitalist 
countries and to begin to pose the question of power there in a serious and no 
longer purely propagandist way. She was the first to challenge the facile 
optimism of peaceful linear growth implicit in the tactics of German Social 
Democracy. (Geras, p 124) 
 
These are not simple questions, therefore. It is clear that there are arguments that can 
be marshalled in defence of the Bolsheviks and, indeed, in defence of Luxemburg’s 
position. It should also be observed that at times social collapse and catastrophe are 
not choices, but sometimes they are simply facts that must be dealt with. 
 
In contrast to the example of Russia in 1917, arguably there can also be a degree of 
collapse, and to the point where a new constitution becomes possible, but nonetheless 
the practical state apparatus of everyday administration remains in place. Further, 
there is the prospect of progressive revolution by degrees, with one stronghold 
captured after another. Also there are other manifestations or models of revolution as 
qualitative change than the example of Russia in 1917.  
 
In summary, it is not a choice between long-term organisational work and 
consciousness-raising as against spontaneous action. One potentially complements 
the other, as Luxemburg herself realised. Finally, it is also important to note that 
spontaneity can mean that the revolutionaries themselves lose control. There is, again, 
the case of Russia, 1917 and the civil war that followed, with the splintering of the 
Left leading the revolutionaries themselves to engage one another in a deadly fight for 
control. There is the Kronstadt rebellion, and the attempted assassination of Lenin 
himself by a left social revolutionary. 
 
Conclusion: Luxemburg’s Legacy 
 
For Bernstein, dialectical materialism comprised “metaphysical speculation” in the 
final instance. It could not be proven or disproven. Luxemburg’s response to 
Bernstein comprised a reaffirmation of the dialectic and of the very possibility of 
grasping totality. Bernstein and Luxemburg contest this ground of “totalising theory” 
as distinct from “eclecticism”, and an underlying scepticism with regard the 
limitations of Marxian epistemology. Their negotiation of these underlying theoretical 
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themes remains important for theorists grappling with the limits of human knowledge, 
and the imperative of grasping large-scale social and economic phenomena. Even 
though attempts to grasp totality may be flawed and limited, arguably we need at the 
least, to strive to grasp increasingly global social and economic phenomena in order to 
consciously shape them and overcome their contradictions. The common postmodern 
rejection of meta-narratives simply vacates the field to neo-liberal capitalist ideology. 
Thereafter, there is the matter of Luxemburg’s defence of the necessity of general 
capitalist collapse. Luxemburg’s thesis is borne out in part by history, and in part is 
refuted by it, and this may qualify the extent to which her unmodified work remains a 
valuable legacy. Therefore, we will consider the extent and nature of that legacy by 
considering its applicability in the decades following her passing. 
 
The First and Second World Wars demonstrated a potential for organised capitalism. 
Yet, the Great Depression brought capitalism to the precipice, with recovery only 
coming in the form of the wartime economy, wartime innovation and post-war 
reconstruction. The post-war period was also marked by the further economic 
subjugation of the periphery to the core (Wallerstein, 2007, pp 11-12). Core living 
standards in the capitalist world were maintained, in short, by imperialism, by ruthless 
exploitation of economic spheres of interest. However, Keynes also changed the 
debate on necessary capitalist anarchy, developing theories of counter-cyclical 
demand management; and socialisation of credit, which when applied added to 
capitalism’s survivability. Rosa Luxemburg’s analysis of capitalism’s more chaotic 
and destructive driving tendencies remain as a defensible legacy, warning as to where 
laissez-faire capitalism can lead. 
 
Relating Luxemburg’s insights to the present day is important in establishing the 
extent to which her legacies are enduring. Some of those contradictions remain even 
in the face of attempts at regulation, not least of all periodic destruction of existing 
capital brought on by overproduction (often in the context of speculation), and the 
imperialist impulse with great powers striving violently to shape the world economic 
order and various spheres of influence in their own interest. Luxemburg was 
vindicated in her analysis whereby the extension of the world market via credit simply 
globalized the economic cycle with its periodic crises. 
 
While periodic bursts of innovation enhance capitalist productivity (and the internet 
has expanded the world market once more), that world market is again being pressed 
to its limits. And it is maintained only by externalisation and hyper-exploitation of the 
global economic periphery. Further, rising powers such as China will increasingly 
demand their portion of global trade and their position in the global economic order. 
In the advanced capitalist countries, meanwhile, the rate of exploitation has been 
intensifying for decades with an ever-declining wage share and also greater labour 
intensity (hours, conditions, length of the working lifetime, etc.) and corporate 
welfare (redistribution in favour of capital with cuts in the social wage and welfare; 
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privatisation; user pays; restructure of the tax system; and decline of public 
infrastructure and services, etc.). 
 
Nonetheless, amelioration remains possible through the partial realisation of socialist 
principles – natural and strategic monopolies reducing cost structures across entire 
economies; other strategic public sector interventions providing for all on the basis of 
need while negating collusive practices; Keynesian counter-cyclical demand 
management stepping into the breach in times of panic, crisis and disinvestment, 
sometimes brought on by overproduction. Imaginably these could still comprise 
stepping stones to a different social and economic order. 
 
The following may be concluded from an examination of conflicting themes of 
adaptation and evolution/convulsion, crisis and a presumptions of a ruptural 
revolutionary break: While with Bernstein we might hope such a socialist 
transformation could possibly occur via peaceful evolution and adaptation, the reality 
has been capitalist adaptation only in the context of periodic and violent economic 
and political convulsions. Contra-Luxemburg capitalism survived and adapted, and 
contra to Bernstein’s hopes, this has involved a terrible human toll. 
 
Despite Luxemburg’s warnings, capitalism did survive. For her there was no 
resolution until the capitalists were expropriated, the system of wage labour brought 
to an end (Kolakowski, pp 443-446). However, later historical examples show that 
under favourable economic conditions the working class and other social interests can 
make real gains through reform. The Nordics especially demonstrate this – given the 
longevity and resilience of their welfare states, though the defeat of the Meidner 
wage-earner funds demonstrates that even in Sweden expropriation could only go so 
far without dogged resistance. 
 
Nevertheless, there is a defensible legacy here, from both Bernstein’s Evolutionary 
Socialism and Luxemburg’s Reform or Revolution and it remains with us today. There 
is more than a stark choice between reform and revolution, or between ideals and 
science. Whether one calls it slow revolution or something else, an approach is 
possible based both on ideals and objective class struggle, class interest, and verifiable 
capitalist contradictions. Luxemburg’s analysis of the underlying mechanics and 
tendencies inherent in capitalism provided a remedy for Bernstein’s over-optimism 
regarding capitalist adaptability. Her dialectical rendition of the tendency towards 
monopoly, and the weaker counter-tendency of new capital in emerging branches of 
industry is especially nuanced, as is her appreciation that crisis itself is inherent in the 
irresistible inner logic of capitalism. 
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Chapter Five: 
 
Karl Kautsky—The Development of 
‘Orthodoxy’ and ‘Revolutionary Centrism’ 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five principally concerns the years 1907 to 1914, and with a backwards 
glance at earlier works by Karl Kautsky in order to consider Kautsky’s thought, 
focussing on his The Road to Power (1909), The Erfurt Programme (1891) and other 
important texts. The chapter first provides an overview of Kautsky’s politics, his 
perspectives on revolution, materialism, determinism, will and free will, and cross-
class alliances, and a brief account of his personal and intellectual origins. Finally, the 
early Kautskyan Marxist orthodoxy is explored in the context of The Erfurt 
Programme (as distributed in 1892), the first German social-democratic platform, and 
that sought to establish a purely Marxist interpretation of capitalism and socialist 
transition. 
 
To clarify, Kautsky’s perspective could not reasonably be considered a ‘Third Way’ 
or ‘Third Road’ in any sense before 1914. Indeed his perspective comprised the 
‘Second Way orthodoxy’ of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
However, the perspective he developed during that time, of Marxist orthodoxy and 
then Marxist Centrism was later to be effectively recast as a ‘third road’ with the rise 
of Bolshevism – which arguably comprised the dominant revolutionary/socialist 
discourse beginning from 1917. Yet, the doctrines of orthodoxy and Centrism had 
been developed during their ‘heyday’ of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. So, to understand the perspectives of orthodox and Centrist Marxist radical 
social democracy it is necessary to look back, to consider the texts of ‘classical 
Marxism’ whose status was radically altered as a consequence of the World War, 
ascendant Bolshevism and the branding of Kautsky by Lenin as a ‘Renegade’. It is 
important to engage with those texts as contributing to a ‘Kautskyan Third Road’ 
from 1914 onwards, even though written in preceding decades. 
 
To the end of engaging with Kautsky’s theoretical legacy, consideration of his 
important and most radical work The Road to Power is warranted, as well as aspects 
of his other works, The Social Revolution and On the Morrow of the Social 
Revolution. Here will be explored a number of tensions: 
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 Kautsky’s insistence on the need for both political and social revolution; 
 Kautsky’s idea of open and wilful working-class organisation on a massive 
scale providing the context for great (revolutionary) convulsions and higher 
forms of the class war, as opposed to conspiratorial or vanguardist 
approaches to revolution such as Bolshevism, Blanquism; and also in 
contrast with Luxemburgian notions of ‘spontaneity’; 
 Kautsky’s emphasis on maturing material circumstances as opposed to 
Bolshevist voluntarism, but with these circumstances necessarily intensifying 
class struggle rather than leading to conciliation, and capitalism bound to 
break down rather than adapt; 
 Kautsky’s emphasis on political and social revolution as opposed to purely 
trade-union methods, with social-democratic and class consciousness seen as 
necessary for the working class to fulfil its historic mission; 
 Kautsky’s position of neither revolution not legality at any price, as opposed 
to pure reformism on one hand, and as Beilharz names it, ‘Faustian pacts’ 
(Beilharz, 1994, pp 60, 63); 
 Kautsky’s appreciation of the potential for state violence as opposed to naïve 
liberal suppositions of a neutral state; and 
 Kautsky’s speculation as to the concrete form transition could take 
immediately in the wake of revolution relevant to the tension between 
scientific socialism and utopianism. 
 
These factors establish the Kautskyan Third Road in contrast with the Bolshevism 
which came to eclipse it as the dominant Second Way. They establish Centrism and 
orthodoxy as distinct positions from Bolshevism. That is, positions that emphasise 
revolution (as peaceful as possible), materialism, stage-based social change and 
socialist ‘necessity’. Crucially, the Kautskyan approach avoids the kind of ‘extreme 
ends and means calculations’ that tore the nexus between socialism, liberty and 
democracy (Steger, originally describing Bernstein’s disposition). These tensions 
empitomise the character of the Kautskyan Third Road in contrast with Bolshevism. 
 
Those seeing themselves as the successors to the Bolshevik tradition are wont to 
dismiss Karl Kautsky as a renegade for his critique of the Bolsheviks and his apparent 
centrism on the question of revolution. Given his demonization following Lenin’s 
withering The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, Karl Kautsky has 
been seen by many on the Left as “a purely theoretical figure”’, even as an “anti-hero” 
(Salvadori, p 9). Indeed, that very centrism which Kautsky adopted makes him 
interesting to us today. For his critics Kautsky’s position developed into a rhetorical 
homage to revolution combined with, in effect, reformism. Yet, a closer inspection of 
Kautsky reveals a thinker still committed to qualitative political and economic 
change, and a thinker who retained the conviction that capitalism’s contradictions 
could not be overcome from within capitalism (Steenson, p 78). 
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Massimo Salvadori in particular rejects accusations that Kautsky was responsible for 
integration of social democracy into capitalism. Rather Salvadori argues that under 
conditions of a “powerful and conservative state apparatus, based on an alliance of 
aristocratic militarism and elite bureaucracy, and an unprecedented industrial 
development dominated by a brutal finance capital”; the ‘the real “motor force” of 
integration was the trade union movement’ (Salvadori, pp 18-19). While the trade-
union movement continued to expand in Germany, reaching 887,698 members in 
1903 and 1,500,000 members in 1905, the bourgeoisie managed to convince many 
unionists to narrow their focus to ‘their own “corporate interests”’, for example, wage 
struggles. The rise of economism within the union movement, as well as the rise of a 
self-interested “labour aristocracy” saw the industrial wing of the social-democratic 
movement, where the real power of industrial leverage existed, increasingly divorced 
from the political wing. Hence, while the SPD was radicalised in response to the 1905 
Russian Revolution, with many calling for a general strike to achieve universal 
suffrage and free association, the unions by and large rejected this. Their leadership 
moved motions against the use of the mass strike as a strategy against the reaction, or 
to defend or extend democratic and liberal rights. Prior victories against revisionism 
proved chimerical (Salvadori, pp 73-75, 91-95, 109-113). 
 
Much of the substance of Kautsky’s position was presented in 1909 with The Road to 
Power. Therein Kautsky developed his theories on revolution, free will and the will to 
live, revisionism, and the role of the trade unions. Already Kautsky was in conflict 
with the Bolsheviks with regards his scepticism concerning the prospects for 
revolution in Russia. The Road to Power contains much of the substance of the later 
revolutionary centrist Third Road, even though Kautsky was later to make additional 
breaks. This was a transitional time for social democracy more broadly. Kautsky’s 
authority within the SPD was under sustained attack. Indeed, the SPD executive went 
so far as to attempt to block the publishing of The Road to Power as it was deemed 
too radical. 
 
Kautsky negotiates a number of oppositions in The Road to Power through which he 
develops his own distinctive Third Road. This position was not seen to be such in 
1909. However, looking back from after rise to hegemony by Bolshevism after 1917, 
revolutionary centrism came to be distinct from that emerging dominant revolutionary 
discourse. In many ways, Kautsky’s centrism was close to Austro-Marxism. Kautsky 
claims the mantle of revolutionary struggle and, yet, is uncomfortable with – as 
Gramsci was later to refer to it – “wars of movement” and sees change more likely to 
come through peaceful mass action as opposed to violent insurgency, though he does 
suggest the possibility of a “catalytic event” such as a famine or war (Steenson, p 68). 
 
Importantly, parliamentarianism based on existing German political institutions was 
not sufficient. A political revolution was necessary to democratise the executive wing 
of government. Until such a time the German Reichstag was limited to control of 
taxation, and the amendment or rejection of legislative proposals. Without control of 
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the executive wing of government, the armed forces themselves were not 
democratically accountable (and the example of Chile in 1973 also shows that even 
under conditions of outwardly liberal democracy, still the armed forces can prove 
unreliable). This was the final trump card of imperial German absolutism (Joll, p 59). 
 
Another theme Kautsky addresses is that of deliberate, wilful organisation as opposed 
to spontaneity, bringing him in to opposition with the perspective of Luxemburg. 
Further, Kautsky addresses the issue of voluntarism versus materialism and 
determinism, deciding firmly in favour of the materialist determinist camp. These 
themes then flow on to questions of teleology versus contingency, a prominent factor 
here being Kautsky’s materialist/determinist/teleological outlook. Here he is at odds 
with some Austro-Marxists such as Max Adler. 
 
Kautsky leaves an important legacy for the socialist movement. Today his optimism 
may seem misplaced but nonetheless he provides a genuinely revolutionary 
perspective, and one that avoids the trappings of extreme voluntarism. At the same 
time, Kautsky was correct to emphasize the self-belief of the working class in its own 
strength and in the just nature of its cause. While the extremes of both voluntarism 
and determinism are best avoided, Kautsky provides a vision of social change through 
massive working-class organisation and discipline, and potentially over decades of 
struggle, which appears relevant for social democracy and the organised working 
class today. 
 
The Development of Kautsky’s thought 
 
Kautsky’s biographer Gary Steenson observes that the young Kautsky was influenced, 
like many others, by the rising trends of scientific positivism and materialism, and the 
critique of religion. Kautsky was an early enthusiast for Darwin, which would appear 
in keeping with his usual characterisation as having “scientific” or “deterministic” 
leanings (Steenson, pp 19-24, 27). Indeed, Kautsky was influenced by Ernst Haeckel, 
a writer who contended that: 
 
the soul of man, just as the soul of animals, is a purely mechanical activity … 
that ... is transmitted by inheritance … just as every other quality of the body is 
materially transmitted by propagation. (Haekel cited in Steenson, pp 24-26) 
 
Here Kautsky stood in opposition to the Cartesian dualism, which assumes 
transcendent properties of spirit and mind (Steenson, p 27). 
 
Kautsky’s first overtly Marxist article from 1878 rejects the notion that the end of 
private property – the end of struggle between human beings as natural law – would 
mean “the decline of humanity” (Seidlitz). Instead, Kautsky insisted: “Instinctive 
solidarity rules as a weapon in the struggle for existence in society”, and this was 
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often on the basis of ideals and group identity and interest, not merely personal 
material interest. However, Kautsky also thought that capitalism destroys these social 
bonds, turning people against each other (Steenson, pp 31-32). For Steenson, there 
was an apparent contradiction in Kautsky’s thought, between assumptions of class 
struggle and natural co-operation (Steenson, pp 65-66). 
 
In ‘The Class Struggle’ (Erfurt Programme) Kautsky contends that history is not 
caused by “ideas” but “as Marx and Engels showed”, “by an economic development 
which progresses irresistibly, obedient to certain underlying laws”. This is based on 
“new wants among men which compel them to reflect upon their social condition”. 
This change thus is dependent on human consciousness; “without ideas, there is no 
progress”. Nonetheless “the first impulse” derives “from economic conditions”. This 
in itself seems to suggest limited powers of the human imagination to extend beyond 
existing conditions and their apparent potential (Kautsky, 1971, p 119). It is a position 
Kautsky develops further in The Road to Power (1909). As Ashton and Vollraft 
argue, orthodox Marxism suggests the political realm is thus “secondary and 
derivative” (Ashton and Vollraft, pp 86-87). 
 
Both Kautsky and Bernstein were drawn into the radical (Eisenacher) wing of the 
movement and became close friends, working together on the socialist journal Die 
Neue Zeit (‘The New Age’), which emerged from 1883 as the main platform in 
Germany for orthodox Marxism. Kautsky had been converted to Marxism via “intense 
study” of Anti-Duhring as the protégé of Engels, making good use of the then-
unparalleled resources of the Museum of London. By 1885, his “overt appeals to 
biological or naturalistic explanations were replaced by an emphasis on historical, 
social and economic determinants”. By 1887, his Economic Doctrines of Karl Marx 
was published, providing a lucid account of such concepts as “commodity, profit, 
surplus value, socially necessary labour, and constant and variable capital” (Steenson, 
pp 41, 63, 66-67). Kautsky was to emerge, and for many decades, as Marxism’s most 
authoritative proponent. 
 
However, to understand how Kautsky’s position becomes a Third Road entails 
consideration of the history of his thought and commentary from the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. It is also necessary to trace the decline of orthodoxy and 
Centrism as well as the rise of ‘pragmatic’ right-wing revisionism, and clarify how, 
against this backdrop, ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘Centrism’ lost their status as the perspectives 
of the relative ‘Second Way’ of radical Marxist social democracy. In this chapter the 
concern is with the content of ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘Centrism’ (Chapter Seven concerns 
the catastrophe of World War, radical social democratic collapse, and the subsequent 
rise of Bolshevism.). As there is a consistency between the early Kautsky and the late 
Kautsky, an analysis of his early works is relevant in the context of its later relegation 
as a ‘Third Road’ or ‘Third Way’ as well.  
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Erfurt and Onwards 
 
By 1891, Kautsky was seen to be in such an authoritative position that he was asked 
to write the theoretical section of the landmark SPD party programme of that year 
(‘The Erfurt Programme’). Also published as ‘The Class Struggle’ it was distributed 
in 1892 and comprised a statement of Marxist orthodoxy, and, so, a rejection of the 
prior accommodation with the Lassalleans. ‘The Erfurt Programme’ begins with an 
assertion of the passing of small production and the process of proletarianisation and 
class bifurcation and class struggle seen to be inherent in capitalism. Kautsky explains 
how these forces are accompanied by centralization and monopolisation in 
production, and the immiseration and alienation experienced by the working class 
(Kautsky, 1971, pp 7-9). Here, the content of the emerging orthodox Marxism related 
to such maxims as overproduction, cyclical crises, the falling rate of profit, overall 
class bifurcation, and the analytical method of dialectical/historical materialism. 
 
Notably, it is in the methods of struggle that the Kautskyan Third Road is evident 
here. Kautsky is an internationalist, contending that the proletariat is driven to adopt 
international forms of organisation, consciousness and solidarity, in recognition of the 
“development of world-commerce and production for the world market” (Kautsky, 
1971, pp 159-160). This early globalization had the irony of encouraging at the same 
time global interdependence, but also the rivalries that would lead to protectionism, 
imperialism, and catastrophic war. 
 
In the spirit of Marx, and as opposed to the method of political conspiracy, Kautsky 
proposes an open struggle for suffrage, free association, free assembly and free 
speech. Therefore, Kautsky adopts parliamentarianism as a strategy at the same time 
as observing its limitations. So, at the same time, Kautsky was sceptical of the 
possibility of “laying ahold of the existing state machinery” as Lenin was later to 
frame the argument (Kautsky, 1971, pp 185-186). Through the late 1890s and into the 
early 1900s (the time of the revisionist controversy), as opposed to Bernstein Kautsky 
fought against cross-class alliances and class compromises on the basis of a people’s 
party (with other “oppressed layers” such as the liberal bourgeoisie, petty-bourgeoisie 
and peasantry). He was faithful to the idea that history was on the side of the 
proletariat, and to its increasing organisation and consciousness (Salvadori, pp 62-67). 
 
Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau summarise ‘The Class Struggle’ as “a typical 
Kautskian text which puts forward an indissociable unity of history, theory and 
strategy”. Further elaborating, they contend: “The paradigm is simple, in a primary 
and literal sense that Kautsky quite explicitly presents a theory of the increasing 
simplification of the social structure and the antagonisms within it”. Hence, they see 
his view of the state as one of “the most crass instrumentalism”. Further, they allege: 
“Kautsky … simplified the meaning of every social antagonism or element by 
reducing it to a specific structural location, already fixed by the capitalist mode of 
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production”. They conclude: “The Class Struggle” is marked by the “internal 
rationality and intelligibility of a closed paradigm” (Mouffe and Laclau, pp 14-15, 
16). 
 
Briefly in response, it is notable that for Kautsky theory was a tool for the 
construction of a new order. His intention from the outset in ‘The Class Struggle’ was 
to make Marxism intelligible to a mass audience. With regard the state, pure 
instrumentalism must be rejected in that the state itself is marked by internal 
contradiction (yet state neutrality is a false ideology also; and there are some levels at 
which an instrumentalist thesis conforms to reality). Further, Kautsky’s later idea of 
an “energetic shifting of power relations in the state”, while vague tends to suggest 
something more than instrumentalism (Kautsky, 1996, pp 16, 71-72). 
 
Laclau and Mouffe observe that: “Here the logic of necessity is not limited by 
anything: this is what makes “The Class Struggle” a pre-crisis (pre-Revisionism) 
text.” (Mouffe and Laclau, pp 15-16). Therefore, Marxist orthodoxy was not a simple 
continuation of earlier nineteenth-century Marxism. It arose in response to the failure 
of capitalism and the class struggle to proceed in the way that was predicted. 
 
For the early Kautsky (pre-revisionism), “proletarianisation and impoverishment, and 
simplification” are considered “empirically observable realities in the first two cases, 
and of a short-term transition in the third”. By the time of writing The Road to Power 
(1909), Mouffe and Laclau argue, Kautsky had embraced “a new role for theory” in 
guaranteeing that the historical tendencies perceived by Marxism would ”eventually 
coincide with the type of social articulation proposed by the Marxist paradigm”. 
Hence the rise of a theoretical Marxist orthodoxy that responded to, and attempted to 
heal the fragmentation of the working class (that fragmentation being the consequence 
of labour aristocracy, division between organised and unorganised workers, and 
‘Catholic “church populism”’). This might also explain the constant re-emphasis on 
the category of necessity (guaranteed by Marxist science) upon which Kautsky and 
other Marxists had staked so much. Therefore there was an emphasis on the end 
objective and “the subordination of economic struggle to political struggle, and thus 
of the trade unions to the party”. As Mouffe and Laclau explain, the resulting 
presumption of “a privileged role for intellectuals” influenced Lenin (Mouffe and 
Laclau, pp 15-20). 
 
Mouffe and Laclau further turn to Labriola as a response to Kautsky’s “simple” 
theorization. In short, Labriola argued for “morphological” “historical laws”; that is, 
“their area of validity was restricted to certain fundamental tendencies”. Mouffe and 
Laclau conclude that, 
 
since the life of society is ever-more complex than the morphological categories 
of Marxist discourse – and this complexity was Labriola’s starting point – the 
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only possible consequence is that theory becomes an increasingly irrelevant tool 
for the understanding of concrete social processes. (Mouffe and Laclau, P 26) 
 
They write of Marxism and of Kautsky in particular that, “the concrete is reduced to 
the abstract”, with politics conceived as a “superstructure” and “diverse subject 
positions … reduced to manifestations of a single position” (i.e., class). Further, “the 
sense of the present is revealed through its location in an a priori succession of stages” 
(Mouffe and Laclau, pp 21-22). 
 
In response, however, theory usually needs simplification in order to be useful. That 
does not mean it does not grasp something real, even if in a reduced and simplified 
form. The theory of class struggle cannot fully grasp totality as totality is too 
complex. Nonetheless ‘the total ensemble of social relations’ is of course real. While 
we should confront our limitations, attempting to think at this level has a practical 
usefulness. If structure and agency condition each other, this allows for systems and 
sub-systems that involve their own internal logics, but also impact upon one another. 
Allowing for agency, there is also the potential for collective free-will mobilisation to 
intervene in this process and to alter the outcomes. 
 
Marxism grasped much of the internal logic of capitalism, even though at first it did 
not perceive the ways in which capitalism could adapt. Also, there are identities and 
forms of oppression that exist externally to the logic of capitalism, or at least in a 
partially external fashion, (i.e., their nature cannot be distilled purely as the 
consequences of capitalism) and Mouffe and Laclau are right to call into question the 
constant privileging of class above all else. Yet, today the opposite is the case. Class 
struggle and socialism are relegated to a ‘too-hard’ basket.  
 
Kautsky found himself fighting on two fronts against both revisionism and the radical 
social-democratic Left led by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. While Kautsky 
won these debates overwhelmingly in purely formal terms, the reality of SPD day-to-
day operations was increasingly one of reformism. Steenson notes the warning given 
to Kautsky by Victor Adler, that old positions were increasingly relegated to the status 
of mere “slogans” (Steenson, pp 116-123). 
 
Kautsky’s The Road to Power (1909) 
 
In the introduction to the 1996 edition of The Road to Power there appears a narrative 
by Karl Kautskys grandson, John H. Kautsky, emphasizing Karl Kautsky’s preference 
for the parliamentary road. He produces an apparently unequivocal statement by Karl 
Kautsky in a letter to Bernstein: 
 
I completely agree with you that in England the road to the development of a 
socialist society is open without a revolution … Things are different in 
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Germany; political revolution is needed to get where the English are (Kautsky 
cited in J.H. Kautsky, p x). 
 
However, elsewhere Karl Kautsky appears to take a different line than one of naïve 
liberal parliamentarianism. Kautsky elaborated in an important pamphlet, The Social 
Revolution (1903): 
 
I will openly confess that I, too, formerly had laid great hopes on England … 
[and that] Socialism would proceed not by means of a social revolution, but 
peacefully by a series of progressive concessions to the proletariat on the part of 
the ruling class … [But the] experience of the last few years has destroyed my 
hope for England, too. (Kautsky, 1903, p 31) 
 
Thus while Kautsky is in favour of reforms, he sees himself as a revolutionary in 
terms of the reformist/revolutionary divide. Important, though, is the meaning of 
revolution for Kautsky. Certainly, in The Road to Power he rejects the 
characterisation of revolution as simply comprising violent social change. On the 
other hand he does pose the question of transforming the state so it is no longer “an 
instrument of class rule” (i.e., he is in favour of political revolution). He also proposes 
“a change in the mode of production”, that is, not mere tinkering around the edges but 
the forceful suppression of capitalist contradictions with the transition to a socialist 
economy and society (Kautsky, 1996, p 1). 
 
Kautsky admitted that he was uncertain whether the revolution he presumes as a 
matter of necessity will be violent, or whether “they will be fought exclusively with 
the means of economic, legislative, and moral pressure”. The overwhelming nature of 
modern military power had him doubting the efficacy of a path of violence, but the 
supposition of strategies involving economic pressure such as mass strike action 
placed him beyond the boundaries of mere bourgeois, liberal-democratic channels 
(Kautsky, 1996, p 35). 
 
As Gary Steenson relates in his biographical work on Kautsky, the so-called “Red 
Pope” held that social democracy was revolutionary ‘not because it relied on violence, 
but because it held that the “social question” could not be solved within existing 
society’ (Steenson, p 78; this author’s emphasis). Again, this establishes the 
Kautskyan approach a socialist (and Marxist) Third Road rather than a Third Way. 
However, as with Luxemburg his position could alternatively be construed as a Third 
Way compared with Stalinism later on; because for all intents and purposes, Stalin 
abandoned communism in the authentic Marxist sense. 
 
Importantly, though, for Kautsky the conquest of democratic institutions need not 
mean the end of the proletariat as a revolutionary force. Rejecting interpretations of 
democracy as a ‘safety valve’ through which revolutionary energies are diverted and 
dissipated, he instead insists that: “Democracy cannot eliminate the … antagonisms of 
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class society, nor can it stop their necessary final result, the overthrow of this society” 
(Kautsky, 1996, p 36). 
 
However, Kautsky does view democratic institutions as providing a measure of the 
balance of class forces, preventing “premature” and “futile attempts at revolution”. By 
Kautsky’s reckoning, therefore, the bourgeoisie will not refuse concessions it knows it 
is no longer strong enough to refuse. The consequence of this was supposedly a more 
“tranquil” and “boring” struggle than the spectacular revolutionary upheavals of the 
liberal bourgeoisie, but one that “requires … fewer sacrifices” (Kautsky, 1996, p 36). 
 
Also characteristic of Kautsky is his preference for open organisation and open class 
struggle on a massive scale. This was to be driven in part by the irresistible growth of 
the proletariat, which was swiftly becoming the dominant class in Germany in terms 
of numbers, and throughout Europe was increasingly organised in trade unions and 
social-democratic parties. The presumption, here, was that in preceding years and 
perhaps prior decades, (for instance, he argued this in 1909 at the time of writing ‘The 
Road to Power’) would provide a preparatory phase culminating where the proletariat, 
 
has drawn from the existing governmental framework as much strength as could 
be drawn from it, when a transformation of this framework has become a 
condition for its further advancement. (Kautsky, 1996, pp xvii, 42, 47-51, 59) 
 
Kautsky’s approach thus could be well-described as a process of political and 
economic siege against capitalism and absolutism, consolidating one stronghold after 
another through overwhelming organisation. This was to continue until the process 
arrived at a critical mass with effective political revolution and a shift within the state, 
from one of medium for capitalist rule to one of proletarian transitional rule. In his 
own words Kautsky discerned between “the strategy of annihilation and the strategy 
of attrition”, “which corresponded to two different phases of a relationship of forces 
and could not be abstractly counter-posed” (Kautsky in Salvadori, p 140). Though 
Kautsky did not completely rule out a strategy of annihilation under the right 
circumstances, for example, 
 
if the enemy became extremely weak or if it threatened the freedom of action 
already won by the proletariat and therewith its possibilities of political and 
organisational development. (Salvadori, pp 140-141) 
 
At the same time he did little to prepare for that contingency. 
 
Mouffe and Laclau contend that Kautsky’s apparently ‘radical’ position is in fact 
‘conservative’ as “his radicalism relied on a process which did not require political 
initiatives, [and so] it could only lead to quietism and waiting”. “Propaganda and 
organisation were … in fact the only … tasks of the party” (Mouffe and Laclau, p 22). 
Yet, regardless of the growth in trade unions Kautsky was also adamant that trade-
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union methods alone were not sufficient. While unions could wage defensive 
struggles against “complete pauperisation”, going onto a political footing for instance, 
struggling for the suffrage in the context of mass strike action could possibly 
comprise a more fruitful strategy (Kautsky, 1996, p 67). Further, political action was 
also crucial to prevent the winding back of industrial liberties. 
 
Kautsky’s fears about the limits of purely trade-union methods were to be used as a 
wedge against him by right-wing trade-union leaders. The integrating power of 
nationalism neutralised the German trade unions as a source of resistance to world 
war in 1914 (Salvadori, pp 124-125, 134-136). Mouffe and Laclau depict industrial 
successes as leading to greater autonomy of the German trade unions from the SPD, 
leading to a “steady tension” where unity could only be achieved via “unstable and 
complex forms of rearticulation”. Hence, “it became ever-more difficult to reduce 
social relations to structural moments internal to those categories”. As they conclude, 
 
from then on, the problem of Marxism has been to think those discontinuities 
and, at the same time, to find forms reconstituting the unity of scattered and 
heterogeneous elements. (Mouffe and Laclau, pp 18, 25) 
 
Kautsky, rejecting the methods of the anarchists whose propaganda of the deed had in 
the past prompted sweeping repression of the Left, decrees in a manner typical of his 
centrism, that: 
 
We are neither men of legality at any price, nor are we revolutionaries at any 
price. We know that we cannot create historical situations as we would like to 
have them, that our tactics must be adapted to them. (Kautsky, 1996, p 42) 
 
His vision of powerful, disciplined mass organisations is at odds with Luxemburg’s 
vision of relative working-class spontaneity where, instead, the revolutionary cadres 
found themselves in a position of constant adaptation to proletarian initiative. These 
developments as foreseen by Kautsky also required the fullest development of social-
democratic and class consciousness on the part of the proletariat. A consequence of 
this is that Kautsky is also at odds with Luxemburg on the theme of the possibility of 
an early socialist revolution, even in Russia. He is even critical of Marx and Engels, 
who, he argues, expected revolution “too soon” (Kautsky, 1996, pp 1-2). 
 
By contrast, the radical Marxist theoretician Anton Pannekoek, writing in 1910, 
believed that revolution would be achieved with mass assemblies, protests, but 
ultimately and most effectively, via mass strike action. Rather than with real workers’ 
power at the grass roots, Pannekoek believed the parliamentary road to be one of 
“impotence”. Old gains could only be held and new gains conquered through struggle 
(Salvadori, pp 153-155). As Salvadori explains: 
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In a phase of accelerating workers’ power, organisation and consciousness 
[become] two internal movements of the same dynamic of the movement in 
struggle, dialectically related in an ascending spiral. (Salvadori, p 157) 
 
This bears a close resemblance to the ideas of Rosa Luxemburg as she explained in 
The Mass Strike, as discussed in Chapter Four. Yet, as against the optimism of 
Luxemburg and Pannekoek, Kautsky rejected spontaneism, fearing that: “The 
indiscriminate use of struggle led not to ever-greater strength but to exhaustion and 
decomposition” (and especially if one underestimated one’s adversary) (Salvadori, p 
159). Kautsky was also wary of Pannekoek’s prescriptions to smash the state power, 
and long before Lenin’s The State and Revolution, given enduring “technical 
problems of social management” (Salvadori, pp 159-162). 
 
A useful indication of the importance Kautsky placed on class consciousness and 
social-democratic consciousness in the methodical, deliberate and organised 
application of revolutionary proletarian will can be found in The Road to Power: 
 
Only the recognition and understanding of the social process, of its tendencies 
and goals, can … concentrate the forces of the proletariat and join them together 
in large organisations that are united by great goals, and that methodically 
subordinate individual actions and actions of the moment to enduring class 
interests, which for their part, subserve the whole social development. … 
Theory … increases not only the proletariat’s effective strength, but also its 
belief in its strength. And that is no less necessary. (Kautsky, 1996, p 28) 
 
Therein Kautsky also rejected revisionist and liberal suggestions of a future social 
peace based upon the organisation of the social classes and reconciliation. While 
Kautsky acknowledged that concentration of capital prepares the way for socialism, 
this does not mean socialism will be achieved imperceptibly without struggle. 
 
Kautsky observed the growth of trade unions and workers’ co-operatives “[imposing] 
limits on the absolutism of employers”, as well as gains via “representative bodies” 
(Kautsky, 1996, pp 16-18, 71-72). Yet, earlier in his 1903 work The Social Revolution 
he had also observed that the re-investment of dividends by co-operatives could not 
keep pace with the accumulation of private capital; nor had the municipalities the tax 
levers to sustain social investments. Further, he had observed advancements in 
employer organisation and monopolisation providing a match for working-class 
organisation, and with state sanctions against industrial rights and liberties. Finally, in 
the context of partial suffrage at best, and even among remnants of monarchical 
absolutism, the ‘ruling class’ “condemn[ed] the Parliaments … to fruitlessness” 
(Kautsky, 1903, pp 33-35, 39). 
 
Despite all this, Kautsky maintained that democratic processes, rights and institutions 
were like “what light and air are [to] the organism; without them it cannot develop its 
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strength”. Kautsky was confident that with the political (i.e., democratic) revolution 
there was the prospect of “higher forms of the class war”, “a fight of organised, 
enlightened masses, steady and deliberate” (Kautsky, 1903, pp 39-40). 
 
Instead, Kautsky poses the scenario whereby: 
 
the antagonism between capital and labour, which began as an antagonism 
between a number of individuals constituting a small minority within the state, 
is now growing into a struggle of gigantic, tight-knit organisations, which 
condition the whole life of society and state. Thus growing into socialism means 
growing into great struggles that will convulse the entire political system … 
[that] can end only with the defeat and expropriation of the capitalist class. 
(Kautsky, 1996, pp 16-18) 
 
Indeed, as Salvadori notes: “Kautsky had no fear that democracy could become a 
means of integrating the proletariat into the ruling system since” (in Kautsky’s words) 
it “could not abolish the class contradictions of capitalist society and prevent their 
necessary result” (Salvadori, p 41). Decades later, that is exactly how events unfolded. 
Contributing factors included relative abundance and the rise of post-industrial 
conditions as well as a deceptive and sometimes-subtle, omnipresent variant of 
bourgeois liberal democratic ideology. The point of all this is simply that mass 
organisation and even mass social-democratic consciousness on their own are not 
necessarily sufficient, though certainly they are helpful, and worth working for. For 
instance, social democracy was a state within a state in Germany according to 
Bronner, but without socialist and internationalist consciousness in the labour 
movement, German social democracy was powerless in the face of world war and the 
imperial German state (Bronner, p 584).  Yet by contrast the Meidner wage-earner 
fund struggle in Sweden during the 1970s and 1980s was very close to successful, and 
suggestive of the potential of social democracy in alliance with a truly radicalised and 
politicised labour movement. 
 
In The Road to Power Kautsky further elaborates his understanding of revolution. He 
argues the need for a “political revolution”; that is, not just an accumulation of 
reforms within the framework of the existing constitutional order but “an energetic 
shifting of power relations in the state”; this requiring “a great, decisive struggle” 
(Kautsky, 1996, p 16). Elsewhere he argues for the need of “change … [in] the 
relations of political power and of political institutions” whereby “[The] proletariat 
must grow immensely” and through democracy attain “a dominant position in the 
state” (Kautsky, 1996, pp 71-72). Notably, achieving “a dominant position in the 
state” is a far more ambitious goal than a mere parliamentary majority. Kautsky is not 
specific regarding how this is supposed to occur, however. 
 
For Kautsky the political revolution was a necessary prerequisite to the achievement 
of socialism, but the social revolution was also protracted and deep in his grand 
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schema, perhaps more so than the political revolution. (Bronner, pp 585-586). 
Bronner makes the penetrating observation that Kautsky does not provide a total 
viewpoint bringing together the political and social revolution: “transition demands 
and immediate needs, nationalism and internationalism … reform and revolution”. 
Further, Kautsky’s and Bernstein’s perspectives are more defensive than the offensive 
posture of Luxemburg. 
 
Kautsky, following Marx, elaborates on the political revolution as,  
 
the more or less rapid transformation of the vast juridical and political 
superstructure of society which results from the transformation of its economic 
foundations’. 
 
In other words, a new socialist constitution, requires a political and economic break. 
However, he also insists that this need not mean chaos or violence – barricades or 
guillotines. (Kautsky, 1902, p 1). Indeed, in view of modern military firepower: 
“Militarism can only be overcome through the military themselves proving 
untrustworthy, not through their being defeated by the revolted people” (as in Russia 
1917, and to a degree 1905) (Kautsky, 1902, p 43). 
 
Gary Steenson observes that as “Kaiser Wilhelm delighted in pointing out, if he 
ordered the army to shoot all the Reichstag representatives, it would”. This was the 
reality in Germany at the time, and similarly even in some ostensibly democratic 
regimes thereafter (For example, Chile in 1973) (Steenson pp 118-119). The question 
of the state, taken for granted by Western liberals for so long, perhaps ought not be 
taken for granted. However, Leninist assumptions are equally questionable: the reality 
being closer, perhaps, to Poulantzas’s conception of the state as “a contested field” 
(Poulantzas, pp 138-140). 
 
In the face of the superfluity of the bourgeoisie which increasingly played no direct 
role in production but delegated these functions, Kautsky contends that “the 
relationship between the wage worker and the capitalist changes more and more into a 
mere power relationship, maintained by the power of the state” (Kautsky, 1996, pp 
28-29). The more glaring these power relations became, meanwhile, and the more 
blatant the repression, the more antagonistic the class relations would become, and the 
more radical and decisive the ultimate revolutionary break. These antagonisms were 
further exacerbated by distributive injustices, for instance the decline of the wage 
share of the economy in Britain from 47 per cent to 43.5 per cent from 1860 to 1891 
(Kautsky, 1902, pp 14, 17-18). Discontent would gradually swell in relation to 
capitalist contradictions and injustices – unemployment, poverty, war, intense 
exploitation, alienation involving the ruination of body and mind; cyclical crises and 
general economic collapse (Steenson, p 78; Kautsky, 1971, pp 71-79). 
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Kautsky singled out the political strike as potentially a very effective weapon of 
struggle at the disposal of the organised working class. Even this, he insisted, must be 
used strategically as capitalism would not collapse as the consequence of a single 
blow via the mass strike; and the proletariat itself would suffer in the process 
(Kautsky, 1902, p 44). 
 
Proletarian self-belief and self-awareness was also vital. Thus he emphasizes the 
importance of “May Day celebrations”, “electoral campaigns ”, and “struggles for the 
suffrage” in raising awareness (Kautsky, 1996, pp 28-29). For Kautsky such is the 
preparation for a day of reckoning that, 
 
the strength of a class that has been handed down from the past continues to be 
operative on both sides for a long time until a test of strength takes place, for 
example, a war, that reveals all the weakness of the ruling class. Now the 
dominated class suddenly becomes aware of its strength, the point is reached 
when a revolution, a sudden collapse, occurs. (Kautsky, 1996, p 28) 
 
Probably fearing the kind of bourgeois reaction outlined by Marx in ‘The Eighteenth 
Brumaire’, Kautsky (like Bernstein) is eager to assert that revolution would actually 
prevent chaos, and insofar as the revolution would prove disruptive Kautsky is eager 
to depict it as inevitable; a vehicle not chosen by the Social Democrats but rendered 
necessary by history. Thus, the party would not “organise the revolution” but 
“organise for the revolution” (Steenson, p 78). 
 
Will and Free Will 
 
Another theme that Kautsky regularly revisited in his career as a Marxist scholar was 
that of free will or the tension between determinism and voluntarism. He, like 
Luxemburg, saw socialism as a matter of necessity. The revisionist German trade-
union leader, Friedrich Naumann had criticised the prospects of revolution as being 
unnecessarily destructive, employing the supposition of free will to deny the need for 
a ruptural break. Kautsky’s response was telling: 
 
[The] theory of peaceful “growth into” socialism has a gaping hole, which is to 
be plugged up by the enormous creative power of the living human personality 
and its free will. … If Naumann is right that the will is free and “shapes things 
this way or that”; then it is absolutely incomprehensible what guarantee we have 
that we are growing into socialism and not into something else. … Then it is 
altogether impossible to recognise any direction of social development; then no 
social scientific knowledge is possible. (Kautsky, 1996, p 21) 
 
We may well question Kautsky’s assumption that the very possibility of any social 
science hinges upon materialism/determinism/teleology. To support his arguments 
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Kautsky theorizes the existence of human will and of the importance of human 
personality, even if not free human will. Presuming the same assumption as Marx, he 
refutes the criticism of Marxism that it supposes the processes of economic 
development to be automatic, “without willing human individuals” (Kautsky, 1996, p 
22). 
 
By contrast, the human will is essential for Kautsky, comprising a “determinate 
volition” which can be reduced ultimately to “the will to live”, which “underlies all 
economy” (Kautsky, 1996, p 23). Here there is only the illusion of free will because 
of differences of sense perception, contextual interpretation and consciousness. Thus, 
 
consciousness guides the will, and the forms of the latter are dependent on the 
manner in which and the degree to which consciousness recognises the living 
conditions. (Kautsky, 1996, p 26) 
 
Depending on life circumstances, education – a host of factors – people perceive the 
world in different ways. 
 
The invention of new technology, he says, also 
 
creates the possibility of living better than before, of obtaining more abundant 
food, more leisure, more safety, or, finally, satisfying new needs and desires that 
until then were unknown. 
 
Further, “The more technology is developed, the more does the will to live become 
the will to live better” (Kautsky, 1996, p 24). Finding expression in the social context 
it is this will to live, which Kautsky presumes as the driving force behind capitalist 
exploitation, and behind the resistance to that exploitation. Therefore: 
 
Class antagonisms are antagonisms of volition … [The] workers’ will to live 
drives [them] to rebel against the capitalists’ will. Hence the class struggle. 
(Kautsky, 1996, p 25) 
 
By this reckoning, relative abundance can ameliorate the conditions that give rise to 
the class struggle, thus dissipating revolutionary energies. It is the creation of new 
needs made possible by advances in health, nutrition, material productivity and 
culture, which provide foci for evolving human aspiration, but such innovations have 
not put an end to imperialism and war, or to the subversion of culture and democracy 
by wealth. Though material satisfaction is an important part of the picture, human 
aspiration runs deeper than the desire for material abundance. 
 
Kautsky’s assumption of the creation of new needs, therefore – presumably cultural 
needs, and the need for human dignity – grounded his notion of the ‘will to live’ on 
broader territory than mere material necessity. However, that is not the problem with 
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Kautsky’s perspective on free will and necessity. Kautsky as much as Luxemburg had 
based his entire perspective on the theorized inevitability and necessity of socialist 
revolution, and as the result of exploitation, bifurcation, immiseration – a choice 
between socialism or barbarism (Kautsky, 1971, pp 116-119). A consequence of his 
perspective, however, was that suppositions of voluntarism and contingency 
threatened the whole theoretical edifice. 
 
Kautsky did not foresee the extent of material abundance that would develop within 
capitalism but in a way he was right in posing the question as one of socialism or 
barbarism, as the failure of a liberal and democratic socialism to take root through 
much of the twentieth century saw two world wars, the Depression and fascism. 
Regarding free will, Engels’s words are once more instructive, 
 
an endless group of parallelograms of forces … thwarting one another … 
[where] … what every single man wills is hindered by every other man, and the 
result of the struggle is something which no one had intended. (Engels, Letter of 
1890 cited in Bernstein, n.d., p 11) 
 
And from Marx’s ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’: 
 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do 
not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves but under circumstances 
directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. (Marx and Engels, 
Vol. I, p 413) 
 
By this reckoning, and according to Marx in particular, the reality is somewhere 
between hard determinism and radical voluntarism. Certainly, capitalism has its own 
logic, and until humanity collectively resolves to organise economies on a different 
basis, that logic is beyond humanity’s ability to thoroughly transform on the basis of 
individual volition. 
 
Scientific Socialism meets Utopianism 
 
Kautsky envisaged the future “social or co-operative production for the satisfaction of 
the wants of a commonwealth” rather than production of commodities for sale 
(Kautsky, 1996, pp 95-96). For a time, even under socialism, “distribution” may occur 
“under forms that are essentially developments of the existing system of wage-
payment” (Kautsky, 1996, p 141). As to the ultimate nature of this future socialist 
order Kautsky was vague but optimistic: 
 
We must not think of the socialist society as something rigid and uniform, but 
rather as an organism, constantly developing, rich in possibilities of change, an 
organism that is to develop naturally from increasing the division of labour, 
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commercial exchange, and the dominance of society by science and art. 
(Kautsky, 1996, p 141) 
 
He further refutes conservative and economic liberal arguments, that under socialism 
“everyone will work as little as possible”, and “knowledge, having ceased to be 
appreciated, will cease to be cultivated”, and that there will be “relapse” to 
“barbarism”. For Kautsky absolute equality of incomes is not the necessary form of 
socialism. In any case he also holds that individual economic activity is not based on 
“remuneration” alone but also “[his] duty, his ambition, his dignity, his pride etc.” 
(Kautsky, 1996, pp 141-142). 
 
Here Kautsky develops the argument that industrialisation leads to a greater division 
of labour on a greater scale, making small-scale communism impossible as a general 
model, while also bringing an end to small production. There is even production for 
the global market, “production for the whole world”, such that “one must almost 
question whether the limits of the state are sufficiently inclusive to contain the Co-
operative Commonwealth”. However, Kautsky does not suppose such 
interdependence need pose a problem for the “economic independence” of states so 
long as nations “produce all that is actually necessary and exchange with another 
superfluities” (Kautsky, 1996, pp 100-102, 147-148). 
 
Also of note during this period was Kautsky’s opposition to “state socialism” 
(Staatssozialismys). He had raised this issue much earlier, in the 1890s in his 
controversy with Von Vollmar, arguing that although nationalisation could serve the 
proletariat’s interests under conditions of a democratic republic, under the 
authoritarian German Reich it would serve the interests of the ruling classes 
(Salvadori, p 42). Yet that term, ‘state socialism’, came to be associated with an 
indiscriminate stigma against nationalisation as a strategy. This perspective continues 
to hold sway on much of the Left to this day. However, by Kautsky’s own reckoning, 
a democratic republic in which the proletariat held sway could utilise nationalisation 
to further its own interests. Indeed, a diverse array of social-democratic experiences, 
sometimes with widespread socialisation even in the context of bourgeois liberal 
democracy tends to suggest more room to move than Kautsky supposed. His 
hypothesis here stands in contrast to his other assumption of a gradual economic 
transition. 
 
Thus, somewhat at odds with his usual claims to reject blueprints for the future, 
Kautsky provided a quite vivid picture of the initial substance of socialist transition. 
Universal suffrage, freedom of association and expression, separation of church and 
state, abolition of hereditary privilege – all feature in his vision. So, too, does the 
armament of the people and the abolition of militarism “for the safety of democracy”. 
Also crucial is the abolition of indirect (i.e., regressive taxation) and its replacement 
with progressive forms of taxation on income and wealth. In 1903 Kautsky was 
practical about the immediate prospects of radically extending public education, and 
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emphasized making education accessible to the proletariat and improving conditions 
for teachers. 
 
He flags his intention to end unemployment, or if some unemployment persists, to 
maintain a varied system of social security, removing “the whip of hunger” and 
markedly improving the bargaining position of the organised working class (Kautsky, 
On the Morrow of the Social Revolution, 1903, pp 3-6, 17-18). As for socialisation, 
some factories were to become co-operative enterprises; others taken over by state 
bodies – municipal, regional or national. Monopolies, especially, would be socialised, 
as with production of raw materials (“mines, forests, iron-works, engineering works”, 
etc.) and essential infrastructure such as electric lighting, power transmission, and 
hydro-electric facilities (Kautsky, On the Morrow of the Social Revolution, 1903, pp 
6-7). 
 
Socialisation of economic ownership, meanwhile, would be a drawn-out process, 
facilitated perhaps over decades through progressive taxation. Even assuming some 
form of compensation, Kautsky was optimistic that: “Every further increase of the 
social wealth would henceforth be for the benefit of society”. However, importantly, 
Kautsky had anticipated the threat of capital flight, but notes that many industries are 
captive to domestic markets. It seems he did concede that the consequence that in a 
global market socialisation carried out by individual nation-states cannot foreseeably 
be utterly comprehensive (Kautsky, On the Morrow of the Social Revolution, 1903, pp 
8-10). 
 
Kautsky rejected the organisation of production in a barracks-like fashion – as was to 
occur for some time in the Soviet Union under war communism and Stalin’s forced 
industrialisation. Again he opposed both the “hunger whip” and “still less physical 
compulsion” (Kautsky, On the Morrow of the Social Revolution, 1903, p 12). Instead, 
Kautsky supposed generous wages and better working conditions (including reduced 
hours) would provide more than enough in the way of positive incentives to ensure the 
continuance of production (Kautsky, On the Morrow of the Social Revolution, 1903, 
pp 12-13). Productivity, meanwhile, would flow from the elimination of inefficient 
small producers and the implementation of multiple shifts for the large factories that 
remained. Planning would achieve the same ends as competition, but more efficiently 
and quickly. Thereafter, redistribution wages would be higher and hours shorter, and 
Kautsky also envisages a boost in productivity from satisfied workers. Full 
employment would also be of benefit to all (Kautsky, 1903, On the Morrow of the 
Social Revolution, pp 18-23). 
 
In short, Kautsky envisaged better economies of scale and greater efficiency through 
mass production and elimination of wasteful duplication and administration costs, 
while reducing working hours for individual workers, but better utilising existing 
means of production through additional shifts. Prophetically, though, Kautsky 
supposed the threat for socialism would be underproduction – the opposite of 
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overproduction under capitalism. Responding to this very question, Kautsky ventured 
that: 
 
Steadiness in the production of the means of production will bring with it 
steadiness in the demand for articles of consumption, which it will then be 
easily possible to fix statistically without compulsorily regulating the 
consumption. (Kautsky, On the Morrow of the Social Revolution, 1903, p 27) 
 
To evaluate Kautsky’s enduring legacy we need to consider the importance of historic 
changes in advanced economies since his time. In light of the historic experience of 
Soviet communism, Kautsky’s apparent enthusiasm (at times) for extensively 
centralised and regulated production is to be questioned despite his support for 
unregulated consumption. Crucially, compared with Kautsky’s time, today are 
conditions of relative abundance; there is a potential trade-off between conflicting 
efficiencies of planning and centralization on the one hand, and innovation and 
responsiveness and choice on the other. Where choice is trivial and, or wasteful, for 
example in consumption of energy and water and accessing essential communications 
and transport infrastructure, preaching that very choice seems misguided, or 
ideological. Further, in the context of environmental sustainability, stopping 
overproduction is not just desirable to improve material living standards by ending 
unnecessary overwork – but also to attenuate the impact of overproduction on the 
environment. 
 
 Economic Freedom? Markets versus Planning 
 
Writing in 1891 Kautsky asserted that reservations against socialism pertaining to 
economic freedom were nonsensical given the context of nineteenth-century wage-
slavery. Yet there are problems with Kautsky’s view of Marxian production for use 
(as opposed to production for sale; e.g., use value versus exchange value). As Feher, 
Heller and Markus were to observe many decades later, blanket central economic 
planning can comprise a dictatorship over needs, as opposed to independent 
determination of needs-structures via market mediated consumption. Top-down 
economic management in Eastern bloc nations could involve similar conditions of 
alienation as under capitalism (Fehr, Heller, Markus, pp 45-54). Arguably, Kautsky 
would have abhorred Eastern bloc communism, though market choice is a problem 
that only arises for most with relative abundance. 
 
Kautsky contended in the late-nineteenth century that the increasing division of labour 
meant that “producers lost the capacity to comprehend phenomena as organic 
wholes”. By contrast, he promotes for all humanity: 
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A harmonious, well-rounded development of physical and mental powers, a 
deep concern in the problems of nature and society, a philosophical bent of 
mind, that is, a searching for the highest truth for its own sake. 
 
Once these could be found only “among those classes who remained free from the 
necessity of toil”, and under modern capitalism even for the middle classes only those 
aptitudes considered of ‘economic utility’ are thought worthwhile. However, under 
socialism – including a reduction of the working week – such cultural development 
might become possible for everyone (Kautsky, 1971, pp 152-153). Hence socialism 
would provide the way for ameliorating and ultimately overcoming the alienation that 
resulted from capitalist modernity and its division of labour. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Many themes are apparent in Karl Kautsky’s work, from his original orthodoxy to the 
development of centrism: Violence/non-violence, reform/revolution, legalism/non-
legalism, revisionism/ orthodoxy/ leftism. Also pertinent are themes of 
determinism/materialism versus voluntarism/Cartesian dualism; order/chaos; 
economic planning/spontaneous equilibrium; and revolutionary centrism versus 
radicalism on one side, and reformism on the other. While claiming the mantle of 
revolution in promoting political revolution and qualitative social change, his 
supposition that social revolution would be gradual suggests sympathy with attempts 
to bridge the reform-revolution divide. This is akin to the revolutionary reforms for 
the Eurocommunists or slow revolution for the Austro-Marxists. 
 
Yet, Kautsky denies pure legalism at any cost while at the same time rejecting 
unnecessary violence. In this respect his position tends towards centrism. 
Nonetheless, his insistence on political revolution placed him at odds with Eduard 
Bernstein, and his emphasis on the transformation of the apparatus of state points to a 
more radical viewpoint rather than one of caricature, of mechanistic 
parliamentarianism. 
 
The theme of order versus chaos re-emerges with Kautsky also. The revolution rather 
than causing chaos, prevents it by ordering economic life. Production for use replaces 
exchange value; potential underproduction is seen as less of a problem than 
overproduction in a context where the proletariat reaps the advantage from economic 
efficiencies, including a fair share of the ‘economic pie’. Indeed, while even under 
socialism the division of labour cannot simply be overcome – increasing abundance, 
health and safety provisions, voluntary and democratic economic discipline, and 
increased free time provide the means of greatly ameliorating alienation – enabling 
the development of well-rounded personalities through the enjoyment and 
comprehension of science and art. 
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Markets remain as a distributive mechanism, but the place for competition is more 
ambiguous. Kautsky does not anticipate the future importance of 
competition/innovation in capitalism under modern conditions of abundance but 
suggests quality can conceivably be driven by other factors such as pride, altruism and 
social conscience. 
 
There are many other themes addressed in Kautsky’s work that provide the basis for a 
defensible legacy, and others that are, perhaps, less defensible. Materialism and 
determinism are still widely considered respectable philosophical positions, and 
Kautsky is quite radical and unyielding in his adherence to such perspectives. Yet, 
intuitively, that position remains problematic, as how could consciousness and will 
arise out of a purely material (i.e., mechanical) process? Herbert Marcuse had dared to 
posit a great refusal of the most marginal and oppressed as creating a new historic 
agent for revolution (Marcuse, 1968, pp 9-15). The idea that such minorities could 
lead a revolution is suggestive of a radical voluntarism. Perhaps the reality is 
somewhere between the extremes of voluntarism and materialist determinism. 
 
It is possible to argue from a Marxist perspective that something has changed in the 
evolution of capitalism, such that the system evolved in a way that neutralised the 
very critical elements it had given rise to: the enlightened and revolutionary working 
class who, according to Marx and Kautsky were supposed to be the system’s “grave 
diggers”. The question here is whether Kautskyan determinism and materialism are 
helps or hindrances under such circumstances. Critical theorists such as Theodore 
Adorno and Herbert Marcuse would have it that a “purely affirmative” capitalist 
culture industry lulls and deceives us into passivity, and decades since he made such 
observations psychological manipulation via mass culture appears more pervasive and 
powerful than ever. (Crozier in Beilharz (Ed), 1991 , pp 93-97) In addition, the 
decline of mass factory labour – the phenomenon of post-industrialism – also 
contributes to the demobilisation of the working class and the decline of a distinct 
class consciousness. 
 
A Kautskyan, pure materialist outlook might hold the position to be hopeless. Again, 
this might begin to look like “a bad totality with no way out” (Beilharz, Adorno), and 
yet again, perhaps the new information technology provides the material basis for 
somewhat levelling the ground in the contest of ideas. A moderate voluntarism might 
hold some prospect for the human imagination and for the mobilisation of free 
collective human will. Kautsky would reject suppositions of free will and unbound 
human imagination. But perhaps he would appreciate the new technology as a 
material basis for hope, and for asymmetrical political struggle. 
 
It is also notable that relative abundance creates new (i.e., relative) needs, and the 
relevance of Kautsky’s legacy today must be measured not only in light of enduring 
insights but also in light of developments Kautsky did not and perhaps could not 
anticipate. While he foresaw limits to social education in his own time, today there are 
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the material means to provide education not only for the labour market but for active 
and critical citizenship and for well-rounded human beings. The question of whether 
workers and citizens can be mobilised around the defence of newer established rights 
(pensions, leave, education, health) or even inspired to fight for new social conquests 
(e.g., a standard 32-hour week) is an open one. Kautsky found it difficult wrestling 
with the prospect of uncertainty in response to revisionism. Today, radicals face the 
imperative of fostering hope without the teleological certainties of the old Marxism. 
 
The question of economism versus political socialism is also interesting to consider in 
light of Kautsky’s work. Often he is accused of economism for his insistence – 
following Engels – that the economic base determines the cultural and political 
superstructure in the last instance, even if with relative autonomy in the interim. 
Perhaps this important qualification, of relative autonomy, makes the Kautskyan 
position more nuanced than is commonly supposed. Kautsky maintains, for example, 
the distinction between trade union and social-democratic consciousness precisely 
because the struggle over wages and conditions alone is not enough to resolve 
capitalist contradictions. Insofar as the state provides an obstacle, the precondition for 
transforming the economy is the political transformation of the state, and hence 
economic and the political struggles are necessarily intertwined. Undoubtedly, 
Kautsky underplayed the importance of political, religious and cultural motives 
driving great struggles, and largely reduced those struggles to the context of the class 
struggle and evolving mode of production. 
 
Antagonism was a recurring theme for Kautsky in the context of a presumed class 
struggle, placing him in stark relief against modern social-democratic ideologies that 
seek social peace based upon social amelioration. Revolution for Kautsky did not 
necessarily mean violence, chaos, insurrection but simply qualitative change; the 
achievement of a new constitution one way of another (preferably through non-violent 
class struggle) with the consequence of a democratic state and a democratic economy 
(According to Marxist orthodoxy this state would be a ‘proletarian’ state; defending 
proletarian interests). In Kautskyan terms it could be considered democratic in a 
broader sense as well; as Kautsky comes to defend the liberal and democratic rights of 
the bourgeoisie itself – these issues are considered in Chapter Seven). Kautsky 
allowed for the possibility of gradualism in the social revolution, as also supposed by 
the reformists (though elsewhere he considered revolution as potentially being a 
relative rapid process; hence arguably he is inconsistent) (Kautsky, 1902, pp 1-4). 
However, he stood firm on the qualitative nature of the change he pursued for the 
state and the economy. Given his assumption of the state’s class nature, he saw 
political revolution as the necessary prerequisite for such qualitative change, though 
we might suppose that the very process of the working class achieving a dominant 
position in the state could also comprise a struggle lasting decades (or contrary to 
Kautsky’s optimism, we may now question whether that goal will be reached). 
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However, the modern Third Way of Giddens does not even seriously engage with 
questions of revolution. Indeed, given Giddens’ emphasis on a narrow “redistribution 
of possibilities” based on a kind of modern day social democratic “centrism”, it 
appears Giddens and those who follow him would consider the very idea absurd. 
Largely they abandon any radical redistributive agenda, arguing for social and 
economic inclusion as the means of conciliation. (Pierson, C, 2001, pp 12-14) Indeed, 
for Giddens we are “after” socialism. (Giddens, A, 1998, p 1) Hence, in ‘The Third 
Way’, a definitive text in social democracy’s “self-liquidation” from the 1990s 
onward, Giddens asserts that communism and socialism have “dissolved” and perhaps 
“mean nothing” following the Soviet collapse. (Giddens, 1998, p 24) In practice, all 
that is left is amelioration for the most marginal and oppressed. Although indeed, the 
corresponding policies of amelioration do matter a great deal to the excluded, the 
impoverished, and the marginalised themselves. 
 
However, the logic of capitalism is generally towards greater intensity of exploitation, 
and conciliation must also mean lasting peace, if it is to be substantial. Kautsky looks 
towards a socialist future where there is universal conciliation and social peace, and 
not on the basis of a compromise settlement but on the grounds of the elimination of 
the antagonisms caused by exploitation, capitalist contradictions and imperialism. 
 
Kautsky’s confidence for the future seems to have been misplaced. Also questionable 
given the subsequent history was Bernstein’s apparent belief that partial conciliation 
based on universal citizenship and social as well as liberal rights would form a 
bulwark against violent ideologies (e.g., fascism). Yet, citizenship does not end the 
class struggle. Rather, it establishes a framework and a foothold for that struggle, 
which can prevent an escalation into ever-greater violence and repression and hence 
the corruption of the very emancipatory ambitions that drive socialist movements. 
 
Nonetheless, this does not exclude great struggles between great social forces. The 
corporatist structures that ultimately developed in Sweden are notable as they 
effectively transposed the class struggle to a different, institutional level. This has 
been theorized at length by Swedish sociologist, Walter Korpi in his ‘Power 
Resources’ approach (Korpi, 1983, pp 33-46): Kautsky’s vision of such great 
struggles seems well adaptable to a Gramscian vision of wars of position as waged 
over the course of decades through the various strongholds of civil society. In this 
way Kautsky’s insights remain a valuable legacy. 
 
Although the promise of social peace has great appeal for many, and can provide the 
vehicle for reform agendas, albeit agendas which do not involve the definitive 
resolution of capitalist contradictions. Provisional settlements are important in the 
context of such organised class struggle spanning decades, but in a world where the 
teleological guarantees of the old Marxism appear discredited, a historic compromise 
that provides dignity and security and environmental sustainability would certainly be 
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a step forward. Discussing such a compromise at length falls outside the scope of this 
thesis. 
 
This brings us to the theme of immiseration and class bifurcation. Here Bernstein 
largely appears vindicated. Exploitation in the sense of surplus extraction has become 
more and more intense, and technological and productive advances have created 
relative abundance even amidst gross and unnecessary waste. The issue of 
environmental sustainability throws this state of affairs into question but nonetheless, 
there is now the scenario of relative material prosperity even amidst more and more 
intense exploitation, and the rescission of past labour and welfare rights. 
 
Shifts in the world economic order may worsen conditions further in so far as the 
West is concerned. Class bifurcation remains a tendency operating alongside other 
tendencies towards social differentiation, and the re-emergence of middle or 
intermediary classes in different forms as capitalism revolutionises and modernises 
itself constantly. Here Bronner has considered both the virtues and limits of a 
“structural” conception of class for the modern-day, also pointing to the role of inter-
mediatory elements in maintaining social control, and complementary “political” 
notions of class (Bronner, 2011, pp 162-163). Further, Piketty has suggested a 
diversity of interpretations of the composition of the middle class, positing the 
centrality of degrees of income and wealth, but not only the relationship of capital to 
labour (Piketty, pp 251-255). Piketty also notes that differences in capital ownership 
specifically still involve extreme inequality. For instance, he notes, for 2010-2011 in 
the United States, “the top decile own 72 percent of America’s wealth, while the 
bottom half claim just 2 per cent”. (Piketty, p 257) 
 
Though he failed to predict the rise of fascism, Kautsky’s supposition of ever-greater 
economic crises appears to vindicated, beginning with the Great Depression. 
Tendencies towards monopoly – in practice manifesting as oligopoly – intensified 
exploitation, alienation, crises of overproduction and the correspondingly desperate 
attempts to expand the world market, class struggle – all remain with us today as by-
products of modern capitalism. Marx’s ‘unearthed secret’ of surplus value, 
popularised by Kautsky, still implies in its functioning a devastating moral critique of 
capitalism; while also comprising the means of capitalist self-reproduction. (Bronner, 
pp 155-158; Aarons, 2008, pp 31-37; Aarons, 2009, pp 12-13, pp 15-16, 82-83; Hirst 
and Thompson, pp 59-61) 
 
For all of this, Kautsky remained a figure bound by his time. When revolution did 
arrive – in Germany 1919 – Kautsky acquiesced to a relatively modest reform 
programme. Bronner observes how there was no expropriation of “the great industrial 
firms and the Junker estates”, and there was no purging of “the reactionary 
bureaucracy”. Against Kautsky’s ambitions, Bronner notes the reality of an emerging 
regime with “no new social values, symbols or ideals to inspire the young republic”. 
Kautsky wished to avoid the Bolshevist path with its terror and centralism, its 
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militarisation of labour, and the horrors of civil war. Hence, the lack of any 
inspirational narrative saw Germany emerge as a reluctant republic with an embittered 
population, parts of which later on, amidst the German inflation, the French 
occupation of the Ruhr and the Depression were all too ready to abandon a democracy 
that for them was the embodiment of betrayal and humiliation. Moreover, influenced 
by wartime ideology and the pre-war ideological climate, the German proletariat was 
divided from within by ideologies of “racism, militarism [and] nationalism” (Bronner, 
p 588, pp 596-597). Further, the remnant German armed forces, though small in size – 
some 100,000 strong (Craig, p 429)– remained un-revolutionised and uncontested.  
 
Kautsky remained wedded to the highest principles, even though his middle path in 
1919 ought have been more ambitious, more radically distinct from both Bolshevism 
and the right-dominated SPD. Writing in opposition to “the violence of Austrian 
anarchists” (and we observe here the philosophy of the propaganda of the deed, the 
policy of assassinations, etc.) Kautsky wrote: 
 
Social Democracy is a Party of human love, and it must always remain 
conscious of its character even in the midst of the most frenzied political fights. 
(Kautsky in Steenson, p 80) 
 
Steenson in his biography of Kautsky depicts a man, “very sensitive to human 
suffering”. Kautsky’s concern for human suffering was not merely abstract. Steenson 
relates that Kautsky’s disposition was later to “cause him to baulk in the face of the 
apparent necessity for revolutionary violence” (Steenson, p 80). Kautsky’s position on 
violence is especially important in relation to the theme of Chapter Seven, ‘Of War 
and Revolution, 1914-1925 
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Chapter Six: 
 
Austro-Marxism during the pre-War period 
 
 
 
The period covered by this chapter, 1906-1914, immediately follows the height of the 
revisionist controversy but come before the historic split of social democracy into two 
camps – reformist social democracy and communism (Bolshevism). During this 
period, the movement that came to be known as ‘Austro-Marxism’ was an early 
example of what might be termed a Third Road movement. The Austro-Marxists 
shared the goal of democratic socialism with the pre-World War I Second 
International-affiliated parties that largely remained true to the orthodoxy as 
disseminated by Kautsky. However in comparison with the Kautskyan relative 
Second Way of this period, the Austro-Marxists provided a number of innovations. 
Importantly, this was the period in which Kautsky shifted towards ‘centrism’, and 
where that ‘centrism’ and those adhering to the old ‘orthodoxy’ remained dominant at 
a purely formal, theoretical level. Importantly this was the period in which Kautsky 
shifted towards ‘centrism’ - and where that ‘centrism’ and those adhering to the old 
‘orthodoxy’ remained dominant at a ‘purely formal’ (ie: theoretical) level) 
 
Gruber traces the first signs of the Austro-Marxist movement to 1895 as founders of 
the Independent Association of Socialist Students and Academicians (Gruber, p 31). 
Those who came to be associated with that term were significant in that they 
effectively attempted to stake out a middle road between Bolshevism and reformist 
social democracy, both in theory and in practice. Gruber argues that in fact “there 
were two” Austro-Marxisms. First, a “small group of Marxist theoreticians and 
intellectuals active in the decade before World War I: Karl Renner, Rudolf Hilferding, 
Max Adler, Otto Bauer, and Friedrich Adler”. Second, the later movement comprised 
the: 
 
SDAP oligarchy of doers and reformers during the First Republic from 1918, 
including the leading figures in the Viennese municipal and provincial 
government, party leaders, and those responsible for the party’s educational, 
cultural, and publication activities. (Gruber, pp 31-32) 
 
Gruber struggles to find a “common intellectual denominator”. He observes that 
Bauer and Hilferding “shared an interest in imperialism”; and Renner and Bauer 
“shared an interest in the state in relation to nationalism”, while: Max Adler and 
Friedrich Adler “sought to return the subjective ingredient into the calculation of the 
course and progress of human events”. With regard their formative influences – “for 
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Renner it was John Stuart Mill; for Hilferding, Karl Kautsky; for Max Adler, Kant; 
and for Bauer and Friedrich Adler, Ernst Mach” (Gruber, p 31). 
 
The opposing themes of relevance for our consideration here include 
unity/conciliation versus division on the left, and also “revolutionary enthusiasm” 
reconciled with “realpolitik” – though by no means an exhaustive representation of 
the themes and oppositions explored by the Austro-Marxists. Also relevant are themes 
of: Reform and revolution, with slow revolution posited as a compromise synthesis; 
the prospect of nationalism and internationalism, reconciled in Austria-Hungary via a 
state of nationalities; the co-existence of science with ethics/aesthetics; and finally, 
determinism/materialism versus voluntarism/Cartesian dualism. 
 
Otto Bauer expressed both the theoretical and the practical-political spirit of Austro-
Marxism succinctly, that, 
 
where the working class is divided, one workers’ party embodies sober, day-to-
day Realpolitik, while the other embodies the revolutionary will to attain the 
ultimate goal. [But] … Only where a split is avoided are sober Realpolitik and 
revolutionary enthusiasm united in one spirit. (Bauer in Bottomore, pp 46-47) 
 
Later to coin the term “slow revolution”, the Austro-Marxists notably attempted to 
reconcile revolutionary and reformist viewpoints – and real-world movements – 
together into a cohesive perspective. Tom Bottomore has noted that the focus of the 
Austro-Marxists was usually practical, rather than in the realms of pure or abstract 
theory, as evidenced by their party-political activism, their educational work and their 
holding elected offices in the Austrian Republic at various times (Bottomore, pp 3-4, 
37). It is also notable that even before the Bolshevist/reformist schism with the 1917 
Russian Revolution, the Austro-Marxists provided commentary and analysis on 
themes as broad as socialist culture, the further development of modern capitalism 
and imperialism, the development of guild socialism in Britain, changes in class 
structure, as well as nationalities and nationalism, and thereafter into the 1930s 
(Bottomore pp 3-4). They provided a rigorous analysis of the post-World War I 
revolutions, especially the revolution in their homeland, Austria, in which they were 
active participants, and they provided a comprehensive analysis of the rise of fascism, 
accompanied by a plea for unity on the Left to meet the fascist threat. 
 
The Austro-Marxists’ work on the national question was especially relevant during 
the 1906-1914 time frame under discussion in this chapter, wherein national and 
ethnic tensions over Austria-Hungary served as one catalyst for the war that was to 
divide social democracy. Before considering their work in this field, attention will be 
given to Austro-Marxists in comparison with Kautsky, especially in the field of 
materialism and ethics. 
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Materialism and Human Thought 
 
The Austro-Marxists shared a degree of practical common ground with Karl Kautsky, 
especially during the immediate post-World War I period, but there were crucial 
differences between some Austro-Marxists and Kautsky.  
 
As Tom Bottomore argues, 
 
they were critical of Kautsky’s somewhat dogmatic and unsophisticated 
materialism and determinism; they wanted to take account of new conceptions 
in epistemology and the philosophy of science, and to engage in empirical 
investigations of new social phenomena. (Bottomore and Goode, p 12) 
 
So, instead, the Austro-Marxists, most notably Max Adler, propagated a version of 
Marxism conceived as sociology, as social science, whose aim was to discern the 
forces of causation. These included the horizon provided by experience – more 
specifically the so-called economic base, including the means of production, 
distribution and exchange – but also the transcendent phenomena of free will, 
consciousness and of the mind. Consciousness and mind enjoyed transcendent 
properties that could not be reproduced through physical motion (Bottomore and 
Goode, p 20, Kolakowski, pp 560-563, 572). 
 
In contradistinction to Kautsky, Adler’s supposition is that an autonomy of ideas is 
not inconceivable: 
 
A deduction of this kind from the inner logic of the object (as it is customarily 
called) is admittedly not entirely incorrect because all these areas of intellectual 
creation … rest upon a formal lawfulness of the mind which is self-confirming. 
(Adler in Bottomore and Goode, p 257) 
 
At the same time, and with regard to the base/superstructure Adler holds that even 
‘economic phenomena themselves are never “material” in the materialist sense, but 
have precisely a “mental” character’, in the sense they involve conscious, willing 
human beings (Adler in Bottomore and Goode, p 254). Reflecting upon these debates, 
Carl Grunberg, the professor who taught and inspired Renner, Hilferding and Adler at 
the University of Vienna was to say of Max Adler that ‘he made the necessary 
distinction between “historical materialism” as a systematic, empirical, historical 
discipline, and “philosophical materialism” as a metaphysical doctrine’ (Grunberg in 
Bottomore and Goode, pp 9-10). Thus Adler attempts to bridge the divide between 
Marxism and idealism. 
 
Adler’s epistemology is suggestive of the limits of Marxist dialectical thinking. As 
Kolakowski argues: 
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According to Adler, dialectical thought is its own object. In the dialectical 
movement every concept is understood in relation to its opposite – not by the 
ordinary comparison of one content with another, but by reason of the tendency 
of each towards self-cancellation. Our thought never embraces the whole of 
Being, but singles out particular aspects or qualities; consciousness, however, is 
aware of its own limitations and strives to overcome them by relating its own 
content to the concrete whole (Totalitat), which is itself inexpressible. 
(Kolakowski, p 574) 
 
By this reckoning it is impossible to truly grasp totality. Marx’s attempt to grasp the 
entirety of social movement through the class struggle and evolving means of 
production cannot help but be limited by the constraints of human thinking and 
perception. Feeding into debates over causation, the mental sphere, determinism and 
free will, meanwhile, Max Adler explained his position as: 
 
[Insisting] upon … diverse types of causality and that the form which the causal 
relation takes in social life is not “mechanical causality”, but one that is 
mediated by human consciousness. (Adler in Bottomore and Goode, p 20) 
 
Therefore: 
 
All the phenomena of social life, including those of the economic sphere, are 
mental, not material, phenomena … [And so finally] in some sense … the 
relations of causality among them are … relations between individual human 
minds … [This] involves treating motives as causes … [but not in the context 
of] individual psychological phenomena but as forces which are at work in 
“socialised humanity”. (Adler in Bottomore and Goode, p 20) 
 
There are potential arguments here to the effect that human will is not entirely free in 
that it is conditioned by the social totality, including an a priori social disposition 
existing in humanity’ we need to take account also of the motives that arise in that 
wide context. This does not negate arguments to the effect that consciousness itself as 
well as free will cannot be explained merely as more complex consequences of purely 
physical motion (i.e., there is the question of quality and not merely complexity). 
 
The consequence of all this for Adler was that “historical materialism” was not any 
kind of “objective science”, if interpreted after the fashion of philosophical 
materialism and/or metaphysics. For Adler, philosophical materialism could not 
account for the mind or, indeed, the soul. As for Marxism – as a science it was 
“ontologically neutral”. There was no essential nexus between philosophical 
materialism and science (Kolakowski, p 565). 
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The notion of transcendence was to appear again in Adler’s work with his supposition 
a priori social consciousness: the notion that human beings were ‘hard-wired’ as 
social beings. Here the object of Marxism was to again realise our individuality in 
community with other human beings, and overcome the depersonalising, atomising 
effects of capitalism (Kolakowski, pp 565-572). 
 
What is, and what should be 
 
At the time the Austro-Marxists were writing there was a very substantial debate 
occurring about neo-Kantianism, as it came to be known, led in part by Hermann 
Cohen. Max Adler explained Cohen’s position in 1925, in his work Kant und der 
Marxismus: 
 
The requirement that no man should be regarded merely as means, but that 
every man should be treated at the same time as an end, is an idea which 
excludes all exploitation … The idea of a realm of ends, which makes all social 
unreason and oppression impossible, as inexpedient, is the idea of solidaristic 
society which no longer permits class conflict (Adler in Bottomore and Goode, 
pp 62-63). 
 
In some ways at variance with Alder, Otto Bauer held that, “science must come first, 
before we can successfully pose the moral question”. In other words, he contested that 
socialists ought to begin with “the materialist conception of history” and “the social 
conditions of existence of the proletariat” that inform “class ideology” (Bauer in 
Bottomore and Goode, pp 81-83).  
 
Nonetheless, Bauer conceded that Kant’s doctrine, 
 
is the final bastion to which we can retreat whenever ethical scepticism 
obstructs the naïve moral judgements of class maxims discovered by science 
(Bottomore and Goode, pp 81-82). 
 
Further, he concluded, 
 
if we regard socialism no longer as a question of science, but of life, and if we 
also seek an answer for the waverer … [then] we do need Kant’s ethics. [But 
even here] discovery of the tendencies of capitalist development must precede 
the practical attitude to capitalism. (Bottomore and Goode, 83) 
 
In this sense, of reserving an important role for Kantian ethics, even as a last appeal 
for waverers, Adler and Bauer were set apart from Karl Kautsky as he rejected 
unequivocally the “ethical-aesthetic method” (Bottomore and Goode, p 84). In order 
to educate socialists, Bauer is at one with Kautsky: 
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We should not preach morality but investigate the tendencies of development of 
the capitalist mode of production and diffuse knowledge about this process. 
(Bottomore and Goode, p 84) 
 
Therefore, in the manner derived in Marxism from Hegelianism, the difference 
between ‘what is’ and ‘what should be’ was uncertain as there was an underlying 
assumption that capitalism and its development were somehow part of a necessary 
and inevitable telos. The neo-Kantian Karl Vorlander, for instance, urged Marxists to 
explicitly endorse a philosophy based on the values implicit in Marx’s work and 
especially his critique of alienation, and in that context, the need for human dignity 
and freedom and a richness to every human life (Kolakowski, pp 557-559). These are 
the kind of issues explored by the neo-Kantians, and following them, some of the 
Austro-Marxists. 
 
Otto Bauer concluded as follows: “[The] recognition that socialism will come into 
existence does not yet lead me to fight for it”. Regarding this not as a “scientific” 
question but, “one involving a practical attitude”, “it is certainly a moral question” 
(Bauer in Bottomore and Goode, p 81). 
 
The Austro-Marxists on the National Question 
 
The Austro-Marxist perspective on the national question was unique in the context of 
its development against a backdrop of an effectively multinational, multi-cultural 
Austria-Hungarian Empire. Before the First World War especially, the question was 
perhaps more pressing for the Austrian Social Democrats than for any other social-
democratic party, with their attempts to mediate between and promote working-class 
unity among various nationalities. 
 
Loew accuses the Austro-Marxists of opportunism on the nationalities question, 
pointing to discrimination against non-German workers on the matter of the 
conditions of labour and provision of social amenities. However it can be reasonably 
argued that the Austro-Marxists’ state-preserving impulses were related more directly 
to the economic and political viability of any future socialist federation emerging 
from the old Habsburg Empire. Also for the Austro-Marxists, and for many on the 
Left, nationalism was seen as a potentially divisive factor in attempts to build a truly 
internationalist outlook. Given the multi-national, multi-cultural nature of Austria-
Hungary, the nationalities question was not one they could afford to ignore (Loew, pp 
19-21; Lesor, p 118; Rabinbach, p 13). 
 
As early as 1899, the Austrian Social Democrats at their Brno Congress promoted the 
solution of transforming Austria into a democratic multinational state, to be divided 
into, “autonomous national regions of self-administration, adapted as closely as 
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possible to linguistic boundaries” (Loew, p 20) and, hence, they promoted “the 
recognition of the territorial and cultural claims of the nationalities within the 
framework of a liberalised and federal state” (Rabinbach, p 14). 
 
For Karl Renner in particular, the reconciliation of nationalist impulses in Austria-
Hungary could provide a model for a future socialist federation, a democratic and 
federal “state of nationalities” (Nationalitatenstaat) where nationalities could find 
self-expression but at the same time be reconciled (Renner in Bottomore and Goode, 
pp 31-32). Probably Renner would have seen the modern-day European Union as 
progressing towards this goal. 
 
It is important, however, to note that Otto Bauer rejected a “national conception of 
history”, as he termed it, which “strives for a mechanics of nations”. Instead, “the 
nationality of the individual is only one aspect of his determination by the history of 
society, by the development of the conditions and techniques of labour” (Bauer in 
Bottomore, p 109). Bauer also considered the nationalities question extensively in Die 
Nationalitatenfrage und Sozialdemokratie in 1907 (Bottomore and Goode, p 102), 
developingd a “systematic conception” of nationhood, with, 
 
a common history as the effective cause, common culture and common descent 
as the means by which it produces its effects, a common language as the 
mediator of the common culture, both as its product and its producer. 
(Bottomore and Goode, p 103) 
 
Bauer’s analysis of nationality also considered the impact of class through the 
centuries, with modern nationalism only a relatively recent phenomenon. Reminiscent 
of Marx, Bauer traces the “unitary nation as a community of descent” that existed 
under “primitive communism”; conditions that altered with “settled agriculture and 
the development of private property” (Bottomore and Goode, p 108). At this point, he 
contended, national-consciousness became fixed among the “medieval knights, and 
the educated classes” bound together by “close economic, political and social 
intercourse” including a common language. Thus ruling classes were bound “to a 
particular nation”, but it was a national culture that excluded the “peasants and small 
farmers” (Bottomore and Goode, pp 106-108). 
 
However, capitalism saw the extension of this culture to the bourgeoisie; thus the era 
of nationalist liberal bourgeois revolutions. Bauer further noted how: “Modern 
capitalism [also] begins gradually to distinguish the lower classes in each nation more 
sharply from each other” (Bauer in Bottomore and Goode, pp 106-107). This is 
notable as such tendencies became manifest in the very worst way soon thereafter, 
with the First World War, and the deployment of nationalist ideology to justify the 
greatest slaughter in the history of humanity to that point. 
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Bauer concluded, “only socialism will give the whole people a share in the national 
culture” (Notably Bauer wrote at a time where much culture was inaccessible to the 
working classes). He thus envisaged “the development of the nation into a 
homogenous community of education, labour, and culture” where according to “the 
nationality principle … the external power should consolidate and serve the internal 
community” (Bauer in Bottomore and Goode, pp 110-112). Further, “if the masses 
see the free national community as their goal, socialism also shows them the way to 
this goal; for socialism is necessarily based on democracy” (Bauer in Bottomore and 
Goode, p 112-116). 
 
Furthermore, in a new international socialist economic community, small nations 
would become viable by specialising in the international division of labour, and with 
co-dependence between nations and states in itself a force for reconciliation (Bauer in 
Bottomore and Goode, p 112-116). Ultimately, in a further elaboration of the Austro-
Marxists’ conception of national-cultural self-determination, Bauer wrote: 
 
[The] socialist mode of production leads … to the organisation of humanity into 
national communities … [But] The international division of labour leads 
necessarily to the unification of the national communities in a social structure of 
a higher order. All nations will be united for the common domination of nature, 
but the totality will be organised in national communities which will be 
encouraged to develop autonomously and enjoy freely their national culture – 
that is the socialist principle of nationality. (Bauer in Bottomore and Goode, p 
117) 
 
Bauer also envisaged that with this process being “[incorporated] … into a 
community of international law”, nations secure for themselves “power even beyond 
the limits of [their] territory” (Bauer in Bottomore and Goode, p 117). Hence Bauer 
anticipates the League of Nations and ultimately the United Nations – though these 
did not adopt a socialist character, except, say, for Soviet influence on the content of 
the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
 
Bauer’s propositions seemed viable under the assumption of some future all-
embracing international socialist community. In reality, the destruction of the Austro-
Hungarian Habsburg Empire with the end of the First World War, and the relegation 
of Austria to a “rump” confined the Austro-Marxists within a relatively small local 
political milieu. Meanwhile, Karl Renner observed the consequences of the liberal 
and nationalist bourgeois revolutions of the nineteenth century. From these changed 
circumstances there arose “the principle of nationality” according to which “every 
nation should form one state, and every state should embrace only one nation!” 
(Renner in Bottomore and Goode, p 118). The liberal currents in these revolutions 
also stood against “the internal absence of rights”, but baulked at proletarian 
internationalism (Bauer in Bottomore and Goode, p 119). It was nationalism that was 
to provide the ideological justification for the imperialist First World War. 
145 
 
 
Indeed, even before the onset of the War, the Austro-Marxists found they could not 
maintain their own little ‘Austrian International’, with the splintering of the trade-
union movement on national lines in 1912 and the splintering of the parliamentary 
party in that year. The failure of the Austro-Marxists to maintain their own 
International within the bounds of the Austro-Hungarian Empire bode poorly for the 
future, and for the ability of international socialism to contain national tensions within 
a multinational movement wherein common humanity and class were to be of greater 
import than national impulses, which might be exploited to rationalise imperialist war 
(Loew, pp 15-23). 
 
Rabinbach explains how Austrian socialism held an “optimistic view of history as the 
rational development of humanity” providing reconciliation with regard “the problem 
of ethnic particularism”. When war came in 1914 Victor Adler was convinced the 
socialist movement could not prevent the conflict. Adler came to an agreement with 
the Kaiser for a “civil peace” for the war’s duration. A rift emerged between Victor 
Alder, Renner and “the younger and more radical generation of Friedrich Adler, and 
Otto Bauer” on the question of how to respond to the war. Organised peace-making 
efforts were to emerge only later in 1915 at Zimmerwald (Rabinbach, p 17-19). 
 
Conclusion: The Legacy of the Austro-Marxists 
 
From the pre-World War I period, the Austro-Marxists have left us an important and 
defensible legacy. They attempted to practically and theoretically reconcile 
nationalisms with Marxism and socialist practice in the form of a kind of socialist 
federalism. In their efforts to seek such a response to the nationalities question, they 
understood the dynamics and tensions from which world war was to emerge; and as 
such their ideas and their example remain relevant for the modern day, where national 
and cultural divisions are still deployed to justify violent conflict. 
 
Their engagement with neo-Kantianism and such themes as free will, materialism, 
ethics, social science and idealism provided a source of theoretical innovation that 
addressed questions also of pertinence in the modern day. In particular, these 
innovations amidst otherwise orthodox Marxist conceptions of capitalist crisis, 
internationalism and class struggle suggest a potential meeting of the ways between 
Marxism and, as Sheri Berman has more recently proclaimed it – democratic 
revisionism. (Berman, pp 14-16, pp 204-209) As the early Austro-Marxists seemed to 
understand well, the political and the economic, and the subjective and the objective 
condition each other. 
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Chapter Seven: 
 
Of War and Revolution, 1914-1925 
 
 
 
 
The aim in this chapter is to consider the centrist and leftist Third Roads that arose in 
the context of war and revolution during the period 1914-1925. Discussion begins 
with a brief historical overview of the period, including an assessment of Kautsky’s 
role at the outset of the First World War, followed by a consideration of three key 
texts of Bolshevism during the time frame: Lenin’s The State and Revolution (1917); 
his The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky (1918); and Trotsky’s 
Terrorism and Communism (1920). This milieu is important to establishing the 
content of the emergent Second Way, with Bolshevism coming to replace ‘classical’ 
Marxist social democracy as the dominant revolutionary discourse on the Left. Some 
of the Bolshevist arguments are, indeed, in response to Kautsky’s criticisms, but it is 
easier and clearer to first establish their position as the emerging Second Way and 
thereafter explore Kautsky’s differences with the new, dominant left-revolutionary 
discourse. 
 
The chapter also considers: The content of the Kautskyan Third Road – as signified in 
his important work The Dictatorship of the Proletariat (1919); the Bolsheviks’ 
critique of Kautsky; the ways in which Marxist centrism emerged as a Third Road; as 
well as Kautsky’s response to various contested ideological themes. In this we will 
also consider Rosa Luxemburg’s response to Bolshevism. Finally, the chapter will 
discuss Rosa Luxemburg’s seminal (leftist) response to the 1917 October Russian 
Revolution, and the actions of the Austro-Marxists during these years of war and 
revolution. 
 
War and Political Debate 
 
Arguably, World War I was sparked by European militarist rivalries and secret 
diplomacy amidst a complex array of alliances between the European great powers 
(Joll, pp 180-182). Though most Marxists attempted to trace the conflict more deeply 
to colonialism and imperialism, militarist rivalries saw a European arms race funded 
in part by the big trusts, monopolies and finance capitalism, and to the benefit of the 
armament firms, shipping companies and “metallurgical, mining, construction and 
electrical industries” et al. Others have argued that this imperialism was also driven 
by a race for captive markets to “absorb the products which the underpaid workers at 
home could not consume” (S. Bernstein, pp 127-128, 157-158). The economic 
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argument had it that capitalism demanded progressive expansion into new markets in 
order to maintain profitability. This was a perspective developed by Lenin in his 
Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism.  (where Lenin drew significantly from 
the radical British radical thinker, John.A.Hobson) 
 
The 1907 Conference of the Second International at Stuggart declared that war was 
inherent in capitalism, that, 
 
it is the duty of the working class … fortified by the unifying activity of the 
International Bureau, to do everything to prevent the outbreak of war by 
whatever means seem to them most effective. (Joll, pp 76-77) 
 
Yet, the International was light on details of specific measures and strategies. Joll 
contends that the Social Democrats were sincere but cowed into submission. In 
France in particular, there was the threat of a revocation of the suffrage; and in 
Germany, the threat of reviving anti-socialist laws after the fashion of Bismarck (Joll, 
pp 76-77). 
 
Kautsky had accurately predicted war a few years beforehand but international social 
democracy as expressed in the Second International collapsed in terms of its 
opposition to the war. In Germany, The SPD parliamentary caucus voted 78 to 14 in 
favour of war credits. With war looming, prominent liberal humanist French socialist, 
Jean Jaures, was assassinated after making a stand for peace. His position had long 
been one of upholding an ethos of internationalism as a bulwark against any such 
conflict. Samuel Bernstein says of Jaures that he blended materialism and idealism in 
his own theory of justice, and that for him, socialism was “more the doctrine of 
humanity itself than that of a class”, with Jaures holding the prospect of socialism 
through altruism and conciliation, and not just class struggle. His words from as early 
as 1904 were prophetic of the position of German social democracy (Joll, pp 5, 64-65; 
S. Bernstein, pp 135-141): “Behind the inflexibility of theoretical formulas … you 
concealed from your own proletariat your inability to act.” (Joll, p 5, 64-65; S. 
Bernstein, pp 135-141) 
 
Jaure’s observation was similar to one by Engels in his later years: 
 
What can the consequence of all this be, except that the party will suddenly, at 
the moment of decision, not know what to do, that there is unclarity and 
uncertainty about the most decisive points because these points have never been 
discussed? (Engels in Hobsbawm, 2011, p 69) 
 
Jaures also predicted, barely two days before his assassination, that the war would 
lead to revolution in Europe, with the masses “sobered” (and presumably enraged) by 
all the “disease, poverty and death” (Jaures in S. Bernstein, p 160). 
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Most other leading Social Democrats devolved into “social chauvinism”, as Lenin 
was to call it, adopting all kinds of theoretical and practical contortions to reconcile 
the impending bloodbath with social democracy. While Joll contends it would have 
proved “impossible” to prevent the conflict through a general strike, the fact remains 
that this was no excuse for the enthusiasm of many right-wing Social Democrats in 
embracing war (Joll, p 75). In Germany, for instance, much of the social-democratic 
movement – the right wing – and trade unions had acceded to the authority of the 
imperial German state, abandoning revolution, and in return for the relatively modest 
promise of “civil liberties”, “labour legislation”, representative government, welfare 
provision and the like (O’Boyle, pp 825, 828-829). As Armstrong explains, the 
workers and their unions largely adopted a nationalism, the threat of which did not 
really dawn on the social-democratic centre and left until it was “far too late”, leaving 
their internationalism “secondary and remote” (Armstrong, pp 255-257). 
 
Figures such as Bernstein and Kautsky were later to agitate relentlessly behind the 
scenes for peace, but in the crucial year of 1914 social democracy was 
overwhelmingly caught off-guard (Salvadori, pp 115-121, 128, 148, 181-182). 
Crucially, the unions had already been co-opted, and Kautsky feared social-
democratic organisation could be smashed if it promoted resolute but, to his mind, 
futile action, such as a mass strike, to prevent the conflict. In Kautskyan terms the 
German proletariat was not sufficiently mature to successfully fight against the war 
(Salvadori, pp 73-75, 91-95, 109-113, 115-121, 130-131, 147; Joll p 55; Bernstein, 
Samuel, pp 130-131). The social-democratic co-option was itself to provide an object 
lesson that was to benefit the (Bolshevist) communists following the split on the Left; 
and for many was to discredit even radical social democracy) 
 
Kautsky had already stated in 1907 that in the event of a war he would not necessarily 
be able to tell “aggression” from “defence”. He nonetheless promoted international 
solidarity at this stage to prevent a “massacre and slaughter” (Salvadori, pp 122-123). 
At the crucial moment, however, Kautsky was at best confused, promoting abstention 
on the matter of war credits. Importantly, the SPD parliamentary caucus position 
included a statement that it would oppose the war once it “assumed a character of 
conquest on Germany’s part”. Most damningly of all, this somewhat redeeming 
sentence was deleted “at the specific demand of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg” 
(Salvadori, pp 181-185). 
 
Amidst this, Kautsky maintained an “intermediary position”. He longed most of all 
for an end to the war and a resumption of normalcy, that is, peaceful and steady 
growth in the strength and maturity of the working class. He consistently argued for 
“a peace without annexations on any side”: a position of “conciliationism” (Salvadori, 
pp 183-185). For this he was increasingly isolated by the party’s now-dominant right 
wing. As the war progressed the SPD right wing became less and less tolerant. Theory 
in general, especially Marxist theory, was shunned in favour of a ‘practical’ approach 
(O’Boyle, p 825). In February 1915 Kautsky had made the observation: 
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The people grouped around David and the trade-union leaders believe that the 
time has come to purge the party of any “Marxism” … Naturally what they 
want is not a split but their domination over the entire apparatus of the party and 
our reduction to the position of mere figureheads … We must be prepared for 
the harshest internal struggles. (Kautsky in Salvadori, pp 206) 
 
The Spartacists and the social-democratic centre met in a general conference in 
Berlin, calling for an end to the war, for peace “without victors and vanquished”; a 
peace “of the peoples”, “who alone were capable of checking the belligerent 
ambitions of the great powers”. Further, they called for “self-determination of 
peoples’; “disarmament”; and “peace to be guaranteed in future by the proletariat”. In 
March 1916 the leader of the socialist parliamentary group, Hugo Hasse, came out in 
opposition to the war. The majority Social Democrats responded by immediately 
expelling the Opposition. Indeed, by now their own perspective had shifted more 
clearly to one of conquest as opposed to national defence. The consequence was the 
formation of the USPD, the Independent Social Democratic Party. Later, in 1917, the 
Reichstag itself came out in support of “permanent reconciliation of peoples”, but the 
power to make peace was not theirs (Salvadori, p 210, Joll, pp 216-217). 
 
An international socialist peace movement against the war also arose during these 
years, beginning in Zimmerwald, Switzerland in 1915. Lenin was notable on the Left 
of this movement, urging that the imperialist war be turned to revolution, and that a 
clean break be made with the formation of a Third International. Others such as the 
left internationalist Russian Menshevik, Julius Martov were more cautious, supposing 
a liberal bourgeois revolution was necessary to create the preconditions for socialism; 
and urging a negotiated peace (Joll, pp 224-225; Meldolesi, pp 1836-1838). 
 
During this period, Kautsky also came out in favour of the notion of a democratic 
“confederation of European states” (perhaps complemented by his supposition of 
some future ultra-imperialism.) This was to involve, in Kautsky’s words: “An end to 
policies of conquest” as well as “disarmament, complete freedom of trade, closer ties 
between nations, and democracy”, though without giving up the fight against 
capitalism (Meldolesi, pp 1838-1839). 
 
As Joll observes, in the wake of the bloodbath of the Somme, with some 1.35 million 
slaughtered, the German war machine collapsed in 1918. Lacking reserves of men, 
they had no answer to an effective allied advance and its innovative use of tank 
warfare. The Germans sought an armistice on 3 October 1918 and peace was finally 
agreed on 11 November 1918. With the legitimacy of the warring powers also 
exhausted revolution soon spread to Germany and Austria-Hungary. Indeed, it had 
already erupted in Russia in 1917. Whereas “the old organs of administration 
remained intact”, in Germany and with its old guard of the armed forces ultimately 
limiting that country to a kind of half-hearted bourgeois liberal revolution, it is events 
in Russia that the following discussion turns (Joll pp 207, 236-245). 
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Revolution in Russia 
 
After years of horrific warfare on the Eastern Front, the Russian Tsar was over thrown 
in the revolution of February 1917. The provisional government that arose from this 
revolution did not provide the peace and the radical redistribution of land that many 
demanded, however. For many months a situation of dual power persisted, with the 
Russian Duma existing alongside the workers’ and soldiers’ Soviets. During this 
period discontent simmered in light of the ongoing war, amidst Bolshevik slogans in 
favour of land, bread and peace. When the Bolsheviks effectively prevented an 
attempted coup by the White General Kornilov during this period their prestige 
immensely improved (Joll, pp 230-231). 
 
The Bolsheviks were well-placed to take advantage of the turns of events. Disciplined 
organisation and centralized leadership positioned them to rapidly adapt and provide 
the lead amidst collapsing Tsarism, and for the same reasons they were in a good 
position to respond as the provisional government floundered in the context of a 
collapsing state. The Bolshevist professional revolutionaries had preferred to split 
with their social-democratic rivals rather than have to compromise, a strategy 
confirmed by the efforts of the Russian secret police to infiltrate the left and “[turn] 
the energies of the proletariat into harmless activities or at least activities which [they] 
could control”. The Bolsheviks embraced an insurrectionist revolutionary approach at 
odds with both reformism and parliamentarianism, and perhaps reminiscent of 
Blanquism. (Joll, pp 72-73). 
 
In October 1917 the Bolsheviks moved to replace the elected provisional government, 
seizing power first in Petrograd and then in Moscow. This they justified on the basis 
of the rapidly shifting mood of the Russian people, as reflected in the ever-greater 
representation of the Bolsheviks in the workers and soldiers Soviets. At the same time 
several White armies were formed, backed by the direct intervention of the Entente 
powers. The consequence of this intervention was a terrible civil war spanning 1917 
to 1922, and forcing the hand of the Bolsheviks, to introduce emergency measures 
that later on were to provide a foundation for the horrors of Stalinism. 
 
Hobsbawm observes of Bolshevik thinking during this period that: ‘The experience of 
Jacobinism … threw light on the problem of the transitional revolutionary state, 
including the “dictatorship of the proletariat”’. Hobsbawm also points out that neither 
Marx nor Engels proposed some universal blueprint for revolution. So it is 
questionable whether they would have supported subsequent efforts by the Comintern 
to propose just that (Hobsbawm, 2011, pp 55-56). 
 
Marx himself held that the working class “had to secure itself [even] against its own 
representatives and officials” in order to avoid “the transformation of the state and 
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state organs from servants of society into its masters” as had happened in all previous 
states (Hobsbawm, 2011, p 57). 
 
Such observations resonate very strongly with democratic left critiques of Bolshevism 
and even more so Stalinism in view of the consolidation of Stalinism in the years 
following Lenin’s death. 
 
Lenin’s The State and Revolution 
 
Lenin’s The State and Revolution (1917) is a clear statement of his rationale for 
revolution, though his radical suppositions of the ultimate withering away of the state 
were disproved by history. It is notable that here he was in tandem both with Marx, 
and, indeed, with Kautsky and the orthodox or centrist Marxists, the state being seen 
as being derivative of productive/class relations, and repressive in enforcing those 
relations (Ashton and Vollraft, pp 86-87). The State and Revolution is representative 
of Bolshevism’s sharp break with previous social democracy. This break occurred 
amidst the backdrop of two crucial developments: the First World War, and the 
October Russian Revolution. 
 
A number of elements stand out in Lenin’s interpretation of Marxism as expressed in 
The State and Revolution. The core of Lenin’s teaching, as with previous Marxism, is 
the irreconcilability of class antagonisms and the manifestation of those irreconcilable 
antagonisms with regards to the state apparatus. For Lenin, the state is an instrument 
of class rule and an instrument of class oppression, as opposed to a means of class 
reconciliation (Lenin, Vol 2, pp 306-307). 
 
Marx had seen the capitalist state’s character as comprising a “national power of 
capital over labour, of a public force organised for social enslavement, of an engine of 
class despotism” (Marx in Lenin, Vol. 2, p 334). Administrative complexity was seen 
as an inevitable function of modern societies. However, for Lenin, following Engels, 
were the state to move beyond its repressive role as the instrument of one class 
against another, “the end of the state as state” would result (i.e., as a “special 
repressive force”) (Engels in Lenin Vol. 2, pp 313-314). Hence, Marx’s famous 
withering away of the state – the replacement of politics by the administration of 
things which can only go with the liquidation of class tensions – achieved specifically 
by the elimination of class distinctions (Lenin, Vol. 2, pp 313-315). 
 
However, because it is assumed the existing bourgeois state power would inevitably 
be deployed to repress the working class and the socialist movement if left intact 
Lenin is adamant that: 
 
Every revolution … [destroys] the state apparatus [and this] clearly 
demonstrates to us how the ruling class strives to restore the special bodies of 
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armed men which serve it, and how the oppressed class strives to create a new 
organisation of this kind, capable of serving not the exploiters but the exploited. 
(Lenin, Vol. 2, p 309) 
 
Lenin observes that: “Marx’s idea is that the working class must break up, smash “the 
ready made state machinery” and not confine itself to merely laying ahold of it.” 
Lenin’s rhetoric can be contrasted with Kautsky’s vaguer idea of an “energetic 
shifting of power relations in the State” (Lenin, Vol. 2, p 331; Evans, p 5, Kautsky, 
1996, pp 16, 71-72). Lenin is sceptical of Kautsky’s position, accusing him of 
reducing the conquest of state power to “a simple acquisition of a [parliamentary] 
majority”.  (though Kautsky is arguably more complex than this) Without confronting 
the question of the state as he suggests, Lenin believes that the matter of revolution 
simply vanishes (Lenin, Vol. 2, p 394-395). 
 
Yet, the elimination of class distinctions that Lenin strives for is no easy feat. He 
ridiculed the “Proudhonists” (liberal anarchists) and other “anti-authoritarians” for 
denying the use of the state to repress the enemies of the revolution. He observes that 
the bourgeoisie would have no such scruples, and that the “anti-authoritarians” are 
unrealistic and irresponsible (Lenin, Vol. 2, p 350). 
 
Kautsky might also be considered an anti-authoritarian but not in the sense of 
imagining that the state can be abolished at one stroke. (Rather in the sense of 
apparently harbouring universalist liberal values.) 
 
Hence the emphasis of Lenin, following Marx on “the dictatorship of the proletariat”: 
The period of transition from capitalist to socialist society where the proletarian state 
represses the bourgeoisie in order to overcome its resistance. As we will see, it was in 
response to this theme that the divisions between the Bolsheviks and Karl Kautsky 
became most apparent (Lenin, Vol. 2, p 315). Later, Lenin clarifies, that “the 
subordination, however, must be to the armed vanguard of all the exploited and 
working people”. Hence the suggestion made later by both Kautsky and Luxemburg 
that with the Russian Revolution there was the danger of the democratic proletarian 
dictatorship morphing into the dictatorship of the Bolshevik Party (Lenin, Vol. 2, p 
341). 
 
But instead of the entire working class exercising its democratic dictatorship, Lenin 
came to be accused of substituting the vanguard party for the very class the Bolshevist 
communists aimed to liberate. Such criticisms arose both from the relative Right and 
Left – from Kautsky and from Luxemburg. In time, Bolshevist centralization would 
narrow the active element even within the party itself: and even if this was intended 
only as an emergency measure, the conditions were created which were conducive 
later on to the subsequent rise of Stalinism. 
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Indeed, Lenin even considered democracy itself as a form of state and, so, an 
instrument for the oppression of one class by another. This is consistent with his idea 
of a proletarian democratic state as part of a transitional order. Lenin held that such a 
state is both democratic and dictatorial in a new way. So, he was in favour of 
proletarian democracy but with no illusions as to the possibility of “pure democracy” 
(i.e., based on universal rights of citizenship), as Trotsky later called it. By contrast, 
under communism Lenin supposed that “people will become accustomed to observing 
the elemental conditions of social life without violence and without subordination”. 
This is the expressed rationale for the historic split between communism and social 
democracy (Lenin, Vol. 2, p 329, pp 366-368). 
 
As against Kautsky, who saw civil liberties and universal suffrage as the guarantors of 
future socialism, Lenin truly did suppose existing bourgeois democratic institutions 
act as a mere safety valve, where formal democracy veils the corruption of those same 
institutions by wealth. Governments come and go but capital rules; and though there 
is the semblance of change by virtue of universal suffrage, the reality of that rule by 
capital remains (Lenin, Vol. 2, pp 311-312). 
 
Defenders of the Bolsheviks pointed to Lenin’s theoretical and practical adaptation to 
‘concrete’ or real-world scenarios (e.g., hunger and war), instead of defending 
principles of freedom that – while appealing in the abstract – would undoubtedly be 
difficult to maintain under the circumstances they faced. At the same time critics of 
the Bolsheviks pointed to the great chasm between socialist principles in abstract 
theory (e.g., The Bolsheviks’ proclamation of proletarian democracy); and the reality, 
which, despite an early commitment to working-class participation, was soon to 
develop into a centralism that severed the consistency between theory and practice 
(Shandro, pp 218-221, Evans p 11). 
 
Worryingly, Lenin often has stood doubly condemned in the eyes of his critics. The 
State and Revolution is often portrayed as a utopian or even quasi-anarchistic text. 
Yet, at the same time Lenin is depicted as a cynical, manipulative practitioner of ‘real-
politick’. Indeed Lenin was soon to refute any notion that coercion could be done 
away with in the near future, placing him in stark relief against the anarchists. The 
critics of Lenin are often so strident and unequivocal in their condemnation of him, as 
if, somehow, generations of political and even allegedly democratic leaders were not 
also, somehow, also guilty of manipulation amidst the rationalisations for war and 
exploitation. In short, criticisms of Lenin sometimes find the mark but the double 
standards are often blatantly disgraceful. (Evans, p 1, 8, 17-18). 
 
For Leninism, hegemony involves political leadership within a class alliance, but 
Mouffe and Laclau contend with regard Leninism – and the specific example of the 
Russian Revolution – that the class alliance would break down once its common 
objectives were achieved, that is, because the “identity is constituted around interests 
which are in the end strictly incompatible” (Mouffe and Laclau, p 55). Hence, they 
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suggest a non-essentialist critique of the idea of bourgeois tasks, proletarian tasks, 
etc., with the alternative of articulations that mobilise and reconcile a broader base in 
the struggle for hegemony. 
 
Kautsky, a Renegade? 
 
Towards the end of 1918, Lenin penned The Proletarian Revolution and the 
Renegade Kautsky. Any semblance of respect for Kautsky was jettisoned in this new 
work. With Lenin pitching for the loyalty of the world socialist movement, he had to 
discredit the critic who had previously been widely recognised as the most important 
authority on Marxism (Lenin, Vol. 3, pp 76-77). 
 
Lenin accused Kautsky of recognising “everything in Marxism except revolutionary 
methods of struggle”. He accused Kautsky of substituting for Marxism a bourgeois 
liberalism that accommodates only a limited class struggle, while harbouring a 
universalist liberal rights discourse at odds with the notion of proletarian dictatorship. 
Hence Kautsky’s democracy was held to have universalist pretensions while failing to 
recognise the bourgeois character of existing democracies. Kautsky also stands 
accused of weakness in the face of “social chauvinism” (social-democratic support for 
the imperialist world war), and “loyalty to Marxism in words and subordination to 
opportunism in deeds” (Lenin, Vol. 3, pp 75-77, pp 87-88). Kautsky, by insisting on a 
peace, but only without “annexations and [with] no indemnities” was accused of 
compromising in the face of the logic of imperialism, and hence abandoning the 
internationalist principle. For Lenin even a purely defensive war can be complicit in 
the logic of imperialism (Lenin, Vol. 3, pp 121-127). 
 
The dictatorship of the proletariat is once more the key theme that makes Lenin’s 
position distinct from Kautsky’s position. Lenin threw Marx’s own words against 
Kautsky, accusing him of deceit in his opposition to the proletarian dictatorship, for 
Kautsky knew Marx “almost by heart”. (Lenin, Vol 3, p 79) The quote Lenin deploys 
is uncompromising and was found in Marx’s 1875 work, the ‘Critique of the Gotha 
Programme’, published after Marx’s death. Hence: 
 
Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary 
transformation of the one into the other. There corresponds to this also a 
political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary 
dictatorship of the proletariat. (Marx in Lenin, Vol. 3, p 79) 
 
On this basis Lenin defended the Bolshevik position in the Russian Revolution as 
furthering this class dictatorship, that is, proletarian democracy; as against Kautsky 
who opposed democracy to dictatorship as distinct forms of social organisation. 
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For Lenin this proletarian state was necessary over the long term as bourgeois 
resistance is not broken easily. Even with the socialisation of property Lenin observed 
certain residual advantages held by the class. Hence: “money”, “moveable property”,  
various connections, habits of organisation and management, knowledge of all the 
“secrets” (customs, methods, means and possibilities) of management, superior 
education, close connections with the high technical personnel … incomparably 
greater experience in the art of war … and so forth. (Lenin, Vol. 3, pp 96-97) 
 
Here for Lenin, ‘the suppression of a class means … its exclusion from “democracy”’ 
(Lenin, Vol. 3, p 94). For Lenin the idea of a pure liberal democracy was ludicrous. In 
Russia 1918, the time of writing, the Bolsheviks were caught in a civil war, with 
bourgeois elements calling upon foreign military intervention to preserve their 
interests – a life and death struggle where calls for universal liberal rights appeared to 
the Bolsheviks to be absurd (Shandro, pp 221-224). 
 
In conclusion, Lenin had observed Kautsky’s admission from The Road to Power that 
“Europe [was] heading for decisive battles between capital and labour” and the “old 
methods” (i.e., bourgeois democracy) were not “sufficient”. Lenin responds by posing 
the question: “It therefore follows? ...” And in response to his own question: “But 
Kautsky is afraid to think of what follows …” This failure to face facts, according to 
Lenin, “means becoming a renegade” (Lenin, Vol. 3, p 104). 
 
Trotsky and the Logic of the Russian Revolution 
 
In his 1920 work Terrorism and Communism, written amidst the Russian Civil War, 
Trotsky defends the methods and actions of the Bolsheviks, including terror and 
militarisation of labour as the product of extreme circumstances. Trotsky refers to 
“the imperialist slaughter, the civil war and the blockade” as well as the consequent 
economic disorder, with Soviet Russia having “found itself deprived of coal, oil, 
metal and cotton” (Trotsky, p 121). 
 
Thus the terror was justified alongside restrictions on the press, and on suffrage, to 
prevent “conspiracies, sabotage, insurrections, or the calling-in of foreign troops.” For 
Trotsky these were not abstract concerns or intellectual constructs but a life and death 
struggle. He also made it his task to refute the centrist position of Kautsky and like-
minds such as the Austro-Marxists and the Russian left internationalist Menshevik, 
Martov, whom he sees as obstacles that prevented the crossing-over of the social-
democratic parties of Europe to the Bolshevist/communist camp, and as causing 
vacillation at a critical conjuncture in history. (Trotsky, pp 13, 19, 20-21, 25). 
 
Mouffe and Laclau argue of Trotsky and the Russian Revolution that it “had to justify 
its strategy by broadening to the maximum the space of indeterminacy characteristic 
of the struggle for hegemony”, and that Trotsky, as evident in Terrorism and 
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Communism, employed this approach “to a maximum”. While themselves rejecting 
essentialist notions of bourgeois and proletarian tasks, they further observe that with a 
weak and undeveloped Russian bourgeoisie, “the working class [was seen by the 
Bolsheviks as having] to come out of itself and to take on tasks that were not its own” 
– so, “a historical terrain where contingency arose from the structural weakness of the 
bourgeoisie to assume its own tasks” with this becoming “a stepping stone for the 
seizure of political power by the proletariat”. From this arose Trotsky’s narrative of 
“permanent revolution” (Mouffe and Laclau , pp 49-50). 
 
Trotsky was sceptical in the face of the strategic conservatism and pessimism of 
social democracy elsewhere in Europe. In response to Austro-Marxist fears of 
isolation, starvation and entente intervention, he responded that had a working-class 
dictatorship been established in Austria “before the maturing of the Hungarian crisis, 
the overthrow of the Soviet regime in Budapest would have been an infinitely more 
difficult task”. He also insisted that in the face of intervention the Bolsheviks had 
“stood firm” (Trotsky, p 17). The implication is that the door to a broader European 
revolution had been open; but at the crucial moment, the Social Democrats lost their 
nerve. 
 
By a similar logic, Trotsky held that the Russian army was collapsing anyway and 
that this justified Brest-Litovsk (the Soviet treaty with Germany that ceded great 
swathes of land). Hence, he concluded: 
 
In such conditions we had only one way out: to take our stand on the platform 
of peace, and the inevitable conclusion from the military powerlessness of the 
revolution, and to transform that watchword into the weapon of revolutionary 
influence on all the peoples of Europe,.(Trotsky, pp 116) 
 
Like Lenin, the dictatorship of the proletariat was also a crucial theme for Trotsky. 
Trotsky referred to this as “the transitional period of an exceptional regime”, guided 
not by “general principles” but “by considerations of revolutionary policy” (i.e., 
Trotsky believes that the extreme situation demands flexibility in the application of 
force without the hindrances of a premature or liberal constitution) (Trotsky, p 23). If 
anything, Trotsky was more openly sceptical of democracy than Lenin. He observed 
the scenario which he held to be commonplace in existing (bourgeois) democracies: 
 
The capitalist bourgeois calculates: While I have in my hands lands, factories, 
workshops, banks; while I possess newspapers, universities, schools; while – 
and this most important of all – I retain control of the army: the apparatus of 
democracy, however, you reconstruct it, will remain obedient to my will. 
(Trotsky, p 38) 
 
Therefore, Trotsky concluded that were there really a proletarian parliamentary 
majority, 
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the fundamental resistance of the bourgeoisie would ultimately be decided by 
such facts as the attitude of the army, the degree to which the workers were 
armed, the situation in the neighbouring states; and the civil war would develop 
under the pressure of these most real circumstances, and not be the noble 
arithmetic of parliamentarism. (Trotsky, p 44) 
 
In response to criticism, Trotsky also repudiated Karl Kautsky’s idea of “milder” 
forms of class struggle and revolution, including use of the general strike. Trotsky 
responded that such strategies comprised no answer; they “[exhaust] the forces of the 
proletariat sooner than those of its enemies, and this, sooner or later, forces the 
workers to return to the factories”. Therefore, Trotsky concluded: 
 
Only by breaking the will of the armies forced against it can the revolutionary 
class solve the problem of power – the root problem of every revolution. 
[Therefore to consolidate power] the proletariat will have not only to be killed, 
but also to kill. (Trotsky, pp 26-27) 
 
Furthermore, circumstances left little room to move. Hence Trotsky: “Once having 
taken power, it is impossible to accept one set of consequences at will and refuse to 
accept others” (Trotsky, pp 97-98). Having seized power and proceeded to “smash” 
the bourgeois state the only option was to begin again from the ground up. 
 
There is also the matter of militarisation of labour. Trotsky observed that 
militarisation “is only an analogy”; but then there were attempts to justify the use of 
compulsion in the formation of industrial armies with military-style discipline. 
Capitalist economies, he argued, also involve “very powerful elements of state 
regulation and material compulsion” (Trotsky, p 133). And indeed, the Soviet 
economy, under pressure from war, blockades, and sabotage verged on collapse. 
However, Trotsky admitted the emphasis in Marxian theory of the negation of labour 
compulsion, “that under socialism we shall be moved by the feeling of duty, the habit 
of working, the attractiveness of labour etc.” Certainly, this is as Kautsky had argued 
in earlier works, as opposed to a barracks-like form of labour regimentation. Trotsky 
even reaffirmed the withering away of the state, but qualified this by insisting that 
“the road to socialism lies through a period of the highest possible intensification of 
the principle of the State” (Trotsky, pp 157-159, my emphasis). Under Stalin, this 
“highest possible intensification” was to become permanent. 
 
Menshevik critic, Raphael Abramovitch regarded Trotsky’s militarisation of labour as 
another form of slavery. In response to the Menshevik line of criticism that 
militarisation reduces productivity, Trotsky simply responded, “that is the most pitiful 
and worthless liberal prejudice.” Further: “The whole question is: Who applies the 
principle of compulsion, over whom, and for what purpose?” (Trotsky, p 135, 157-
159), 
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For many workers the question of in whose name they performed back-breaking and 
alienating daily labour would be less important than the ordeal of that labour itself. 
 
Trotsky levelled some parting shots at Kautsky and the Austro-Marxists, whom he 
held effectively to be one and the same school. The Austro-Marxists had suggested 
specifically, “the gradual development of the soviets into the social revolution, 
without an armed rising and a seizure of power”, and that by controlling the 
repressive apparatus of state, though not going as far as civil war, they could have the 
benefits of the revolution, without “political storms and economic destruction” (Max 
Adler in Trotsky, p 170) Trotsky concluded: 
 
Kautskianism as a bourgeois attitude, as a tradition of passivity, as political 
cowardice, still plays an enormous part in the upper ranks of the working class 
organisations of the world. (Trotsky, p 175) 
 
Yet Trotsky was driven to concede in June 1921: 
 
Now for the first time we see and feel that we are not so immediately near to the 
goal, to the conquest of power, to the world revolution. At that time, in 1919, 
we said to ourselves, “It is a question of months”. Now we say “It is perhaps a 
question of years”. (Trotsky in Joll, p 261) 
 
The consequence of this isolation and of the brutal struggle for survival that followed 
was that permanent revolution became permanent terror. Stalin’s terror was to see 
eight million sent to labour camps and over a million killed (Joll, pp 355-356). Even 
before this, the terror was to be turned inward against the Bolshevik cadres and 
leaders themselves. In retrospect, the course of history appears to vindicate Kautsky. 
 
Kautsky’s The Dictatorship of the Proletariat 
 
In The Dictatorship of the Proletariat (1918) Karl Kautsky provided one of the most 
important Marxian social-democratic critiques of Bolshevism. His perspective on 
Russia specifically was one strongly influenced by the Russian Mensheviks and by his 
friend, Pavel Borisovich Axelrod who, according to Ascher, was “gentle by nature” 
and inclined “to avoid conflict if at all possible.” For Axelrod there was a struggle in 
Russia between “elitist” (Bolshevist) and “democratic” organisation (Ascher, pp 94-
97). On the Russian Left this was nothing new, and could be traced to the old 
Menshevist/Bolshevist split in Russian social democracy of 1904. 
 
Kautsky jettisoned the idea of a democratic class dictatorship, instead adopting a more 
liberal notion of dictatorship as arbitrary rule involving the forcible suppression of 
rival viewpoints. In opposition to earlier writings in 1899, the way Kautsky posed the 
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question, democracy and the Bolshevist dictatorship are irreconcilably opposed. That 
position is given weight by the Bolshevist dismissal of democracy as a form of state 
(with the assumption that all states are instruments of class repression and class rule). 
What is more, he had contrasted “class dictatorship” with the (democratic) “class rule 
of the proletariat”; of which he was in favour of the latter (Kautsky, pp 1-3, Salvadori, 
p 66). While Kautsky recognised the core position of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
in Marx’s thought, he held that Marx did not mean dictatorship “in a literal sense”, of 
rule by “a single person, who is bound by no laws” (Kautsky, 1964, pp 42-43). 
Indeed, Mouffe and Laclau claim with quite some justification that in the Russian 
Revolution ‘the relations between “vanguard” and “masses” [could not] but have a 
predominantly external and manipulative character’ (Mouffe and Laclau, p 56). 
 
More specifically, Kautsky made the argument that secret organisation, as opposed to 
open mass organisation, has the tendency to produce “the dictatorship of a single man, 
or of a small knot of leaders” (Kautsky, 1964, pp 19-20). Kautsky further raised the 
cases of Blanqui and Weitling, who saw socialism coming through the rule of “an 
educated elite”. Kautsky himself held that the organisation and enlightenment of the 
working class “cannot be adequately done by secret methods”. Secret meetings, for 
instance, “cannot be a substitute for an extensive Daily Press” (Kautsky, 1964, pp 17-
20). 
 
Of note, Kautsky also alluded to the Revolutionary Terror of France in 1783. Hence, 
he conceded, “dictatorship is better able to wage war than democracy”. However, he 
also issued a warning: ultimately this terror ended “all proletarian and lower middle-
class politics”. This sort of dictatorship, “would necessarily end in the arbitrary rule of 
a Cromwell or a Napoleon” (Kautsky, 1964, pp 57-58). These words appear prophetic 
in light of later events. The Russian 1917 October Revolution with its extreme 
centralization depended of the virtue of the small knot of revolutionaries at the top, in 
a similar manner to Robespierre and the 1789 French Revolution. However, when the 
backroom fighter Stalin rose to the top there were not the democratic safeguards 
against a regime whose oppressiveness would make previous comparable regimes 
pale in comparison.  
 
Dictatorship in Kautsky’s and Luxemburg’s view also means lack of scrutiny for 
public policy. Hence Kautsky: “the weaknesses of laws come to light” in a 
democracy, but “vote by occupation has a tendency to narrow the outlook of the 
electors” , that is, it nurtures a localised productivist outlook, as opposed to a broad 
civic outlook) (Kautsky, 1964, pp 77-78). 
 
Lenin and Trotsky were right that Kautsky does not speak specifically of bourgeois 
democracy in The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, but Kautsky did see democracy as a 
necessary precondition for socialism. For Kautsky, democracy and socialism were 
both means to the same end of human liberation, whether that be on the basis of class, 
gender or race. Indeed, liberty and democracy were ends in themselves and not 
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merely instrumental in the pursuit of a final goal. Yet, while democracy was possible 
without industrialisation (he mentions rural peasant communities), industrialisation 
also formed the necessary material condition for socialism. Hence Marx’s own 
concept of “revolutionary combination due to association” – from Manifesto- (Marx 
in McLellan, 1988, p 28), arising from the process of industrialisation unleashed by 
capitalism. Kautsky and his Menshevist correspondents were thus convinced that the 
will to power of the Bolsheviks was not sufficient to overcome the objectively 
unfavourable conditions of an industrially backward Russia (Kautsky, 1964, pp 12-
13) 
 
While Kautsky did not deny the possibility of the bourgeois state turning against its 
own democracy should it lose control, this was not enough for him to dismiss 
democracy as worthless. Democracy developed in the proletariat an attachment to its 
liberal and democratic rights, and even if those rights were limited, they marked 
forward steps and inroads into class despotism. Thinking ahead over the long term, 
over the course of decades, Kautsky apparently assumed that the dependence of 
bourgeois democracy for its legitimacy on a universal liberal and democratic rights 
discourse provided a point of leverage for social democracy from which to influence 
policy; but over the long term to contest even the state itself (Kautsky, 1964, pp 7-9). 
 
Regardless of the limits of bourgeois democracy, as Lenin would call it, Kautsky 
contended that civil liberties – of press, association, suffrage etc., – also “throw a 
light” “on the relative strength of parties and classes, and on the mental energy which 
vitalises them” (Kautsky, 1964, p 35). By preventing premature attempts at 
revolution, making clear the relative strength of the contending classes, Kautsky 
argued that the result was more “even and steady” progress towards socialism 
(Kautsky, 1964, pp 35-36). 
 
Furthermore, Kautsky reaffirmed his distaste for industrial organisation along the 
lines of a barracks. That, he thought, was not the freedom promised by socialism. 
Instead, supposing freedom of press, association and suffrage, Kautsky assumed these 
factors would be conducive to socialist organisation, in which he imagined the “broad 
masses” of the working class would become involved (Kautsky, 1964, p 51). 
 
Under conditions of liberal democracy, Kautsky suggested: “Parliamentarism, strikes, 
demonstrations, the Press” with the consequence of “political and economic 
enlightenment” comprised the means of achieving revolution “by peaceful economic, 
legal and moral means, instead of by physical force, in all places where democracy 
has been established” (Kautsky, 1964, pp 37-38). 
 
Kautsky was concerned with the object lesson the Bolshevik revolution would 
provide for the future; the discrediting of socialism; the conclusion from the 
revolution’s failure – not that that failure was due to premature conditions, but that no 
161 
 
socialism is possible. Hence Kautsky elaborated further on the object lesson provided 
by the Bolshevist strategy: 
 
Hitherto Social Democracy did represent to the masses of the people the object 
lesson of being the most tireless champion of the freedom of all who are 
oppressed, not merely the wage-earner, but also of women, persecuted religions 
and races, the Jews, Negroes and Chinese. By this object lesson it has won 
adherents quite outside the circle of wage-earners. [But] Now as soon as Social 
Democracy attains to power, this object lesson is to be replaced by one of an 
opposite character. (Kautsky, 1964, p 90) 
 
It appears that for Kautsky such an object lesson held dire consequences for social 
democracy, discrediting the social-democratic struggle for suffrage, and civil and 
industrial liberties, and also more radical goals such as ending exploitation. In the 
process fuel would be provided for reactionaries who would deny civic rights to 
social-democratic and communist organisations. Moreover, many workers, and the 
intelligentsia were increasingly alienated from and disillusioned with the socialist 
Left, who appeared to them increasingly not to be harbingers of progress and 
freedom, but of repression and terror. 
 
Contested Themes in the Kautskyan Third Road 
 
The most obvious theme in the emerging Kautskyan Third Road is, again, that of 
dictatorship versus democracy. As already observed, for Kautsky the Bolshevist 
revolution marked not the dictatorship of a class but of an ever-narrowing base of 
Bolshevist leaders. Whereas Lenin held the revolution as heralding the democratic 
dictatorship of the working class and poor peasants, Kautsky saw dictatorship in a 
more literal sense. Lenin held true to Marx’s formulations on the dictatorship of the 
proletariat as expressed in his ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme’ in theory. In 
practice he helped to lay the groundwork for the dictatorship of the party, culminating 
later in the dictatorship of Stalin. For Lenin and Trotsky such measures were intended 
to be temporary, arising from desperate circumstances. Under Stalin the terror became 
permanent. 
 
Kautsky held such developments to be symptomatic of secret, as opposed to open 
political and industrial organisation, with the Bolsheviks having, admittedly, been 
driven underground during the world war. While Lenin saw the supposed proletarian 
dictatorship as a higher form of democracy, Kautsky anticipated the degeneration of 
the revolution as the leading base became narrower, the decisions and the repression 
more arbitrary. Whereas Trotsky looked to the Jacobins in the French Revolution as 
exemplars, Kautsky was correct in gesturing towards the ultimate consequence of the 
Jacobin strategy: Self-destruction and Napoleonic despotism. 
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As opposed to the conspiratorial Bolshevist mode of organisation, Kautsky’s 
teleological outlook supposed inevitable progress to ever higher forms of liberal and 
finally what we could reasonably call ‘liberal social democracy’. This would, he 
imagined, under conditions of industrial ripeness provide the basis for entrenched 
working-class organisation and ever-growing social-democratic consciousness among 
the workers. The increasing education of the proletariat was supposed to herald the 
possibility of proletarian administrators in the state apparatus, as opposed to 
dependence on a hostile bourgeois state bureaucracy (Salvadori, pp 93). 
 
The following, also from his The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, is revealing of his 
‘schematic’ view of the process of socialist transition: 
 
The more a State is capitalistic on the one side and democratic on the other, the 
nearer it is to Socialism. The more its capitalist industry is developed, the higher 
is its productive power, the greater its riches, the more socially organised its 
labour, the more numerous its proletariat; and the more democratic a State is; 
the better trained and organised is its proletariat. (Salvadori, p 96) 
 
Mouffe and Laclau argue that Leninism, 
 
evidently makes no attempt to construct, through struggle, a mass identity not 
predetermined by any necessary law of history. On the contrary, it holds that 
there is a “for itself” of the class accessible only to the enlightened vanguard … 
[And hence there is an] epistemological … privilege granted to the party. [But]: 
The difference between Kautskyism and Leninism is that for the former the split 
is purely temporary. (Mouffe and Laclau, pp 58-60) 
 
In response to this, looking back upon history there is something in the idea that a 
certain kind of social-democratic consciousness was external, at least to much of the 
European working classes whose everyday experiences led to a trade-union 
consciousness but not a systemic understanding of capitalism, imperialism and the 
like. Workers enduring twelve-hour days or worse had little time or opportunity for 
deep social reflection. The idea that this needed to be remedied with practical, 
external intervention really was not so outrageous after all. 
 
The consequence of this was that the necessity of this kind of intervention left the 
realisation of socialism a matter of contingency, not necessity. Left on its own the 
working class would not realise socialism, and the alternative of barbarism – 
delivered by capitalism’s internal contradictions and antagonisms – was much more 
likely, hence two world wars and the Great Depression. 
 
While the Marxism of the time had achieved important and accurate insights, that is 
not to say that the insights provided by other traditions such as social liberalism, for 
example, were any less valid. Indeed, Marxism’s confidence in its scientific 
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infallibility resulted in several blind spots, particularly to the rise of fascism, which 
was not anticipated in the schema of ‘socialist necessity’. Another consequence was 
wasted opportunities, including by the Kautskyites. For instance there was neglect of 
the peasantry as a “disintegrating sector”, and hence of the opportunity to build a 
historic bloc. While Kautsky (and Marx) correctly anticipated capitalism’s trajectory 
– with the gradual, historic dissolution of the peasantry – the Swedish example later 
demonstrated that amelioration of their circumstances was also a political 
opportunity. 
 
Lenin and Kautsky also had radically different ideas on the matter of imperialism. 
Lenin insisted that violent imperialism – as marked by colonialism and world war for 
the conquest and exploitation of markets – was “the highest stage of capitalism”. For 
Lenin this self-destructive process would usher in an epoch of revolutions. However, 
Kautsky held out the possibility that capitalists unite against these potentially self-
destructive tendencies. He even predicted the rise of a “league of states” (like the 
League of Nations that followed), which would: 
 
[Constitute] the shape of the great empires needed by capitalism to realise its 
ultimate, highest form, within which the proletariat can assume power. (Kautsky 
cited in Salvadori, pp 197-199) 
 
Kautsky supposed possible capitalist longevity, in retaining its legitimacy by putting 
an end to the old ways of imperialism and war, and hence the prospect of global 
bourgeois “co-ordination” and “an accord between states”, and with “unified 
international finance capital” organising for “a joint exploitation of the world”. He 
referred to this potential new phenomenon as “ultra-imperialism” (Meldolesi, pp 
1833-1836; Salvadori, pp 189-192). On the other hand, ultra-imperialism would only 
be possible if the proletariat “helped to defeat the imperialist tendencies” and to defeat 
“the bloc of national finance capital and militarism within the bourgeoisie” 
(Salvadori, pp 193). 
 
Almost one hundred years later, though, much of Kautsky’s schema here looks 
doubtful. Thus, his assumption of peaceful transition – as opposed to the path of 
insurrection or civil war: Many attempts to achieve peaceful transition have been met 
with slaughter, and of many thousands in Chile (1973). Austro-Marxism also was to 
be crushed under the iron heel of fascism. Kautsky himself lived to witness the rise of 
fascism but had passed away by the time his wife was interned and murdered in a 
Nazi death camp. 
 
Kautsky’s theory of ultra-imperialism is partly vindicated and partly refuted. The 
United Nations has arisen as a medium through which great powers attempt to resolve 
conflicts. War certainly has not stopped but arguably, without multilateral institutions 
such as the United Nations the threat would be more constant. Further, conflict 
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usually occurs between proxies, perhaps because the great powers grasp how self-
destructive a direct confrontation could be for them. 
 
Further, extensive social-democratic reform was achieved in the course of the 
twentieth century in Europe, and especially by the Nordic nations. This suggests that 
one size does not fit all. Kautsky does not provide us with a general schematic that is 
applicable to all situations, although in his time he thought he had – and so did the 
Bolsheviks! – but he does point to tendencies and openings under liberal democracy 
that make change possible, one stronghold at a time. From the perspective of the 
present there are no teleological guarantees. Kautsky understood the bind of liberal 
democratic capitalism, and both its virtues and hypocrisies, and also its need for 
legitimation. Nonetheless, there has been the danger throughout the twentieth and 
now the twenty-first century of liberal capitalism reverting to either fascism (Nazi 
Germany) or an authoritarian neo-liberalism no better than fascism (Pinochet). 
 
It is within the realm of reasonable speculation, also, to pose the question of whether 
Kautsky’s original equivocation in the face of world war was from fear of the iron fist 
of the imperial German state, not just his fear for self, but for the painstaking 
construction of social-democratic organisation. Kautsky believed that the German 
state compared with the Russian state was strong. He was particularly aware of the 
military and the officer class of Junkers, as well as a “disciplined” state bureaucracy. 
Hence Kautsky also believed in authoritarian Germany, political strike action would 
swiftly “become a decisive struggle”, and hence the reservation of this measure for 
the right time (Salvadori, pp 86-90). Salvadori also notes Kautsky’s perceived 
“retreat” into a “passive attentisme” (i.e., a wait and see policy) with a “sort of no-
mans land between strategy and tactics that could never be crossed in practice” 
(Salvadori, p 90). 
 
Still, the deeper the traditions of liberty and democracy were entrenched in civil 
society, and the more necessary they were for purposes of legitimation, the harder 
they would be to uproot. Crucial here are the traditions, morale, public standing, 
leadership and consciousness of the armed forces. 
 
The discussion now turns to the contested theme of “pure democracy” versus 
“proletarian democracy”. The Bolsheviks asked: Democracy for which class? They 
argued that regardless of who is in government – who governs, under capitalism – the 
capitalist class rules. This, despite the preferred scenario of growing working-class 
organisation progressively imposing greater and great limits upon this “absolutism of 
capital” (Bernstein). This remains so today, and whether through the threat of capital 
flight and destabilisation; or more directly through the corruption of officials and so 
forth. However, for Kautsky the bourgeoisie was too small demographically for it to 
pose any threat by virtue of inclusion in the franchise alone. They perhaps were in the 
tens of thousands, as against millions. However, Lenin had correctly pointed to 
enduring bourgeois power as a consequence of networks, education and so forth. 
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Lenin and Trotsky did not believe in “pure democracy” in any case; but in the midst 
of a civil war, with foreign intervention and invasion surely such a belief would prove 
difficult. By contrast, Kautsky appears to have adopted a universal liberal rights 
discourse. 
 
With Marx, the Bolsheviks rejected the idea of a free people’s state. Hence we have 
the notion of a free state as against the state as an engine of class despotism (Marx). 
Yet despite his view that the state comprised an instrument of bourgeois rule and 
repression, Marx had also considered the possibility of relative state autonomy in his 
‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’; and totalitarian states consolidated 
themselves thoroughly under fascism and Stalinism. 
 
In assessing Kautsky’s enduring legacy it is worthwhile considering the applicability 
of his analysis in the following decades, and the purpose is to address his position in 
relation to Lenin’s contention that the state was a bourgeois instrument that had to be 
smashed. 
 
Across the globe, many variants of capitalist state have emerged, legitimised by 
liberal, democratic, nationalist and sometimes even religious discourse. This is not 
necessarily an entirely cynical state of affairs, and can speak to genuine values held 
by various national bourgeois elites. Although Marx had insisted in Manifesto that the 
ideas of every epoch are the values of the ruling class (Ideology), these ideas differ 
from nation to nation. Sometimes they are also held deeply by various working-class 
elements, and reflect social compromises forged over decades of class struggle (take 
the examples of Sweden and France) or as in the example of America, as a 
consequence of founding values and their role in ongoing legitimation and identity. 
Where liberal, democratic and social rights are crucial for purposes of legitimation, 
serious inroads can be made into capitalist absolutism, though it is a constant struggle, 
as the widespread de-coupling of industrial rights from other liberal rights shows. The 
example of Austro-Marxism has shown that under certain circumstances fascism can 
gradually cement itself even amidst deep social-democratic consciousness and 
tradition, and especially where rightist forces hold effective state power. 
 
As against discourses of irreconcilable antagonism, discourses of class compromise 
and conciliation can also provide the basis of concessions, but in certain guises such 
an approach can also legitimise the demobilisation of the working class, and 
accommodate stigma against industrial freedoms. Yet the modern state is itself often 
contested, and not merely in the form of parliamentarism. While there are problems 
with the orthodox structuralist framework of Nicos Poulantzas, he touched upon 
something truly crucial when he described the modern state as a contested field; itself 
rent through with contradiction (Poulantzas, pp 138-140). Were this not the case, 
Chavez in Venezuela, for instance, whatever his faults, would never have been able to 
assume power. 
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It is worth reconsidering Kautsky in this light. For Kautsky, class antagonisms could 
not be dissolved but, imaginably, historic compromises one after the other could form 
a “slow revolution”, as the Austro-Marxists came to call it (Even if Kautsky seems to 
contradict himself occasionally, arguing sometimes for a relatively rapid shift of 
power within the stat (the political revolution), for the most part he foresees various 
instalments of change with great struggles, a process spanning decades.). As opposed 
to Lenin’s frank call to smash the state apparatus, Kautsky’s idea of an energetic 
shifting of class relations may appear worryingly vague. Whether through conspiracy 
(not Kautsky’s or Marx’s chosen path) or through the penetration of liberal and 
democratic ideology into the apparatus of force itself, the state itself can be marked 
by internal contradictions, providing openings for change, though a parliamentary 
majority on its own is not enough to secure qualitative change without penetration 
and/or transformation of the state apparatus, as well as deeper and broader 
mobilisation at the level of civil society. Importantly, a parliamentary regime suggests 
a broader focus than the productivism of a purely Soviet mode of government, and 
one potentially more conducive to an emphasis on civic rights and responsibilities. 
 
Lenin dismissed parliamentary/representative democracy as little more than “talking 
shops” (Evans, p 11), but the success of representative democracy depends at least as 
much on it being complemented by a robust and participatory public sphere and civil 
society as it does on the specific institutional form it takes. Through a strong and 
participatory public sphere arises the possibility of social reflection upon the 
limitations of representative democracy under capitalism, and what might be done to 
overcome those limitations. All this tends in Kautsky’s favour: That the state need not 
simply be a class instrument, the totality of which must be utterly smashed to achieve 
qualitative change. 
 
However, favourable conditions did not exist in revolutionary Russia at the time of 
the civil war. As noted, Trotsky had pointed to the threat of economic collapse and 
starvation. In that context of foreign intervention and civil war, and sabotage behind 
the lines costing scores of lives, desperate circumstances bred desperate measures. As 
Luxemburg also recognised, the communist movement that followed generally “made 
a virtue out of [apparent] necessity” (Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, pp 308-
309). They took the Russian Soviet experience and attempted to apply it as a general 
model, even to developed liberal bourgeois democracies. Almost wherever ostensibly 
communist governments arose in the Eastern bloc, the “intensification of the principle 
of the State” (Trotsky, pp 157-159), which Trotsky had spoken of became seen as a 
permanent and not merely a transitional affair (though the Stalinists themselves could 
never bring themselves to rehabilitate Trotsky; and there was some improvement 
following Stalin’s death). By the time Gorbachev attempted to decisively right the 
wrongs of Stalinism in the 1980s, it was already too late: There was no independent 
civil society to provide the basis for resistance to the new oligarchy that established 
itself in the wake of capitalist restoration, and there was little resistance to the 
effective capitalist/oligarchic expropriation of the economic infrastructure, which the 
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Soviet peoples themselves had built up without capitalist involvement over the better 
part of a century. 
 
For Kautsky the democratic and parliamentary path to socialism was the alternative to 
founding attempts at socialist transition on violence, terror and conspiracy. For him 
democracy and socialism were inseparable – they were of the same essence. As 
Salvadori concludes, Kautsky left “the possibility of a desperate resort to violence to 
the adversary”. But Salvadori also concludes that because of the very real threat of 
violent repression, not least of all within imperial Germany itself, that Kautsky held a 
“pacifist-humanist illusion” (Salvdori, p 39). 
 
Again: Kautsky’s legacy is best assessed in light of the historic lessons that have risen 
out of experience since his time. Kautsky did not plan for the event of violent 
oppression, and his faith in the supposedly inevitable triumph of democracy may well 
have been misplaced. The twentieth century is remarkable precisely in that the 
totalitarian governments came so close to global domination. Perhaps it is but a 
historical accident that liberal democracy survived at all. Indeed, perhaps democracy 
remains resilient only in that it has been so thoroughly integrated (and hence 
contained) by capitalism. We suppose freedom and popular sovereignty, yet at the 
same time we recognise the effective veto on public policy by monopoly finance 
capital. Democratic ideology – when extended beyond the usual narrow confines – is 
in its essence antagonistic to global monopoly capitalism. Yet democratic ideology is 
presented as a source of legitimation for capitalist societies amidst an effective 
‘double-think’. That is; where few will dare speak the truth that capitalism and 
democracy are antagonistic towards one another.  
 
However, in response to Salvadori’s conclusions it might also be asserted that 
Kautsky in his critique of Bolshevism was correct in predicting that extreme methods 
of terror and labour militarisation were object lessons, which saw socialism 
discredited in the eyes of millions for generations, and even to the current day. 
O’Boyle makes the compelling contention that the democratic (Marxist) Left of the 
turn of the nineteenth century (including Kautsky and the USPD) was remarkable for 
eschewing authoritarianism and nationalism. He argues that they “would have 
destroyed the old army and the old governing class” had they enjoyed that power, and 
that their kind of politics was perhaps the only hope for the Weimar Republic 
(O’Boyle, p 831). However, extreme punitive reparations and other humiliations 
enforced upon Germany, including the French occupation of the Ruhr simply 
entrenched bitterness and resentment amidst its populace. 
 
Kautsky’s reputation never recovered from the Leninist assault. Kolakowski levels the 
same charge against Kautsky and Lenin, that they were both “professional politicians” 
and thus manipulative of the working class, partly on account of their shared 
supposition that socialist consciousness can and should be brought to workers “from 
the outside” (Kolakowski, p 388). Yet Kolakowski says little about the manipulation 
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of workers, citizens and their organisations by right-wing forces on the basis of fear, 
racism and nationalism, and the associated strategies to dissipate class consciousness 
and internationalism. Robert Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy” is useful to understand 
the politics of the time in question, and can be applied to the world polity today more 
than ever (Vandenberg, p 19). 
 
Luxemburg’s Response to the Russian Revolution 
 
Rosa Luxemburg’s essay, ‘The Russian Revolution’, written in the wake of the 1917 
Bolshevik October Revolution was a seminal work of criticism, praising the 
Bolsheviks for their boldness in seizing power and rejecting Kautskyan and 
Menshevist cries of unripeness, but also championing democracy and civil liberties. 
Luxemburg’s perspective on the Russian Revolution comprised a relative Third Road 
in many respects. Again, the crucial themes at stake were those of dictatorship and 
democracy, and the proper form of government, and of the state, though Luxemburg 
differed markedly from the Bolsheviks on the nationalities question, and with regards 
to their land redistribution policy. 
 
While Kautsky criticised the Bolsheviks from the relative right, breaking with his past 
uncompromising perspective to ultimately advocate alliance with the liberal 
bourgeoisie, Luxemburg maintained her libertarian left socialist perspective. While 
supposing the need for a proletarian dictatorship of some form, it is also notable that 
Luxemburg did not entertain illusions that the state could be dismantled at a single 
blow. This, including her appreciation of the conditions of civil war and foreign 
intervention, distinguished her position from that of other libertarians. (Luxemburg in 
Hudis and Anderson, pp 308-309) 
 
Notably Luxemburg’s proletarian dictatorship is interpreted as a “manner of applying 
democracy”, “the dictatorship of the class, not of a party or of a clique” (Luxemburg 
in Hudis and Anderson, p 298). Unlike the Bolsheviks, Luxemburg seems to perceive 
more in democracy than a form of state; rather, a broader package including civil 
liberties, majority rule and even protection of minorities. Here she has common 
ground with Kautsky and the Mensheviks, whom she otherwise criticises unsparingly. 
Although she had abandoned the mantle of social democracy in the wake of the 
Noskes, Eberts and Scheidemanns, with their slavish support for the world war she 
remained both a democrat and a socialist. Hence Luxemburg summarises the faults in 
the Bolsheviks’ formulations: 
 
The basic error of the Lenin-Trotsky camp is that they too, just like Kautsky, 
oppose dictatorship to democracy … [Kautsky] decides in favour of 
“democracy”, that is, bourgeois democracy … But [Lenin and Trotsky] decide 
in favour of dictatorship in contradistinction to democracy”. (Luxemburg in 
Hudis and Anderson, p 307) 
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So: 
 
We have always distinguished the social kernel from the political form of 
bourgeois democracy; we have always revealed the hard kernel of social 
inequality and lack of freedom hidden under the sweet shell of formal equality 
and freedom – not in order to reject the latter but to spur the working class into 
not being satisfied with the shell, but rather, by conquering political power, to 
create a socialist democracy to replace bourgeois democracy – not to eliminate 
democracy altogether. (Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, p 308) 
 
Luxemburg’s Third Road differs markedly from Kautsky in that she always refused 
alliance with the liberal bourgeoisie, and rejected suggestions that Russia was unripe 
for revolution by virtue of its limited degree of industrialisation. Yet, while Trotsky 
supposed the Russian Revolution had to provide impetus to a broader European 
revolution, despite her earnest desire for peace, Luxemburg feared that a peace treaty 
between Russia and Germany would actually strengthen German imperialism and thus 
postpone revolution in Germany (Schurer, pp 356-360). Thus if socialist revolution 
failed in the European lynchpin of Germany, it would likely – and did – fail in Europe 
more broadly. 
 
Luxemburg began by recognising the nature of the Bolshevist gambit; the fact the 
Bolsheviks had staked everything on the international revolution. Furthermore, 
Luxemburg recognised the extraordinarily unfavourable conditions of imperialist war 
and civil war, of shortages of basic materials, the failure of like-revolutions to emerge 
strongly elsewhere in the Continent, of pursuing revolution while “caught in the coils 
of the most reactionary military power in Europe”. (Luxemburg in Hudis and 
Anderson, p 283) 
 
She also viewed the split within the revolutionary ranks as having been inevitable – 
for the liberal bourgeoisie in Russia had never felt comfortable with calls for “peace 
and land”, and by Luxemburg’s reckoning were already “[seeking] a base of support 
in the rear and silently to organise a counter-revolution”. The consequence of this was 
Luxemburg’s consideration of Menshevist aspirations for alliance with the liberal 
bourgeoisie as “utopian” (Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, pp 283-286). Hence 
she argued in a fashion that Lenin and Trotsky would probably approve, 
 
either the revolution must advance at a rapid, stormy and resolute tempo, break 
down all barriers with an iron hand and place its goals even farther ahead, or it 
is quite soon thrown backward behind its feeble point of departure and 
suppressed by counter-revolution. 
 
Further: 
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Only a party which knows how to lead, that is, to advance things, wins support 
in stormy times. (Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, p 287) 
 
Thus it was that the Mensheviks, including the resolutely anti-war left 
internationalists led by Julius Martov were left behind by the Bolsheviks with the 
assumption of power by the Bolsheviks via the Petrograd Soviet in October 1917. 
This was not taken by Luxemburg as a legitimate rationale for dissolving the 
constituent assembly. On the question of parliamentary democracy, Luxemburg 
acknowledged the arguments of Lenin and Trotsky, that the existing constituent 
assembly no longer represented the mood of the Russian workers and peasants. 
Indeed, while the Social Revolutionaries had split not long after the elections, their 
right wing dominated the assembly. Yet, the “elimination of democracy as such” is 
not the answer, she argued. 
 
The obvious question was why the Bolsheviks did not simply arrange new elections. 
Luxemburg also raises the problem of productivism, which was seen all the more so 
as a flaw in a context of economic collapse that left many former workers without 
work (Hudis and Anderson, pp 302-304). The reason, it can be reasonably surmised, 
was that the Bolsheviks dominated the workers’ and soldiers’ Soviets and saw the 
Soviet path as the surest way of consolidating their hold on state power, indeed, of 
using the Soviets as the nucleus of a new state. 
 
In opposition to this, Luxemburg contended in a fashion comparable to Kautsky 
(again, whom she otherwise criticised) that civil liberties are essential in a democracy 
for purposes of self-correction and scrutiny, which cannot prevail in a context of 
indiscriminate terror. Thus, 
 
the cumbersome mechanism of democratic institutions…possesses a powerful 
corrective – namely the living movement of the masses, their unending pressure. 
And the more democratic the institutions, the livelier and stronger the pulse-beat 
of the political life of the masses, the more direct and complete is their influence 
– despite rigid party banners, outgrown tickets etc… . (Luxemburg in Hudis and 
Anderson, p 302) 
Further: 
 
Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, 
without a free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution, 
becomes a mere semblance of life, in which only bureaucracy remains the active 
element. Public life gradually falls asleep, a few dozen party leaders of 
inexhaustible energy and boundless experience direct and rule … [And hence] a 
dictatorship to be sure, not the dictatorship of the proletariat, but only the 
dictatorship of a handful of politicians, that is a dictatorship in the bourgeois 
sense, in the sense of the rule of the Jacobins. (Luxemburg in Hudis and 
Anderson, p 307) 
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Just as under the Jacobins in revolutionary France: 
 
Such conditions must inevitably cause a brutalisation of public life: attempted 
assassinations, shooting of hostages [and so on] … Decree, dictatorial force of 
the factory overseer, draconic penalties, rule by terror – all these things are but 
palliatives … It is rule by terror which demoralises. (Luxemburg in Hudis and 
Anderson, pp 306-307) 
 
Luxemburg (writing in 1918) saw these Bolshevist tactics as traditionally being 
“weapons in the hands of the ruling classes” as opposed to a proletariat that 
“abominate[s] murder”, and which “fights institutions, not individuals”. For her the 
revolution was not “a desperate attempt of a minority to shape the world by violence 
according to its own ideals”, but a mass movement of the great majority which in the 
end could not fail but to “make historical necessity into historical reality” (Luxemburg 
in Schurer, pp 368-369). 
 
While Trotsky came to suppose people’s inherent laziness (that “as a general rule, 
man strives to avoid labour” (Trotsky, pp 125-127), arguing thus for the militarisation 
of labour (which Kautsky would have condemned as “barracks socialism”), 
Luxemburg looked forward to a change in the root motivations of humanity. On this 
issue she was like Kautsky, in rejecting authoritarianism in factory management 
(Schurer, p 369). For her state power was the means to something greater, not the end 
in itself (which arguably it became under Stalin, unrecognisable as a socialist project 
in the spirit of Marx to set humanity free, not burden it under a regime of relentless 
and all-pervasive terror). Hence, in ‘The Russian Revolution’ Luxemburg argued: 
 
Socialism in life demands a complete spiritual transformation in the masses 
degraded by centuries of bourgeois class rule. Social instincts in place of 
egotistical ones, mass initiative in place of inertia, idealism which conquers all 
suffering… . (Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, pp 306-307) 
 
In summary, in ‘The Russian Revolution’ a number of themes were made apparent. 
There are conflicting interpretations (between Luxemburg and the Bolsheviks) on the 
nature of the state, and of democracy and of dictatorship. As against Lenin, 
Luxemburg appears to posit democracy as a practice rather than a form of state; and 
also seems to reject the notion of the state as necessarily, exclusively and narrowly 
comprising an instrument of class rule. Hence, Luxemburg’s democracy is 
participatory, and not only narrowly representative, and by virtue of that broad 
participation hers is no intolerant majoritarianism either. Here there is room for both 
representative institutions, including a backbone of Soviets (workers’ councils), but 
this must be edified by a vibrant and participatory democratic sphere (Ashton and 
Vollraft, pp 102-107). 
 
172 
 
That said, she was under no illusions as to the nature of the bourgeois state, or of the 
limits of bourgeois democracy. At the same time, for Luxemburg liberty and 
democracy were more than legitimising slogans beyond which lay the absolutism of 
capital. Liberty and democracy were valuable in of themselves, especially when 
extended beyond the framework of bourgeois democracy, and especially with the 
prospect of the masses themselves partaking deeply of public life. 
 
Her accusation that the Bolsheviks were adopting the dictatorship in the bourgeois 
sense – in the tradition of the bourgeois Jacobins – is very telling. Much as the 
Jacobins turned on their own, and Robespierre himself was sent to the guillotine, the 
Bolsheviks’ tactics led ultimately to their own destruction, with the cynical backroom 
infighter, Stalin, rising to absolute power over the corpses of his former comrades. 
Indeed, Kathy Ferguson accuses Lenin (contra-Luxemburg) of not recognising the 
difference between education and manipulation; here, “class consciousness [is 
reduced to] willingness … to follow the commands of the Party” (Ferguson, p 528). 
 
Bertram Wolfe, an authority on Luxemburg, notes that she was anything but naïve. A 
temporary dictatorship might be necessary to defend the “new order” as it struggled 
against external and internal threats, but at best a selectively repressive proletarian 
dictatorship was a “necessary evil” (but an evil nonetheless). It was to be dispensed 
with as swiftly as was practicably possible, and ought to comprise the democratic 
dictatorship of the organised working class (i.e., not the dictatorship of a clique; 
maintained by terror and ultimately turning inwards on itself as well as broader 
society). For this reason, Wolfe questions the adoption of Rosa Luxemburg by 
Leninists (Wolfe, pp 214, 218, 224-225). 
 
As Luxemburg also understood, attempts to universalise the Leninist model of tactics, 
forced upon the Bolsheviks “by disastrous conditions” would comprise a retrograde 
step. Even she did not really foresee the extent of the degeneration that would occur 
under Stalin and the tragic destruction of the nexus between socialism, democracy and 
freedom in the eyes of much of the proletariat in the Western world (Luxemburg in 
Schurer, pp 370-371). 
 
Despite his obvious dislike for the Bolsheviks, Kolakowski accused Luxemburg of 
being unrealistic when compared with them, the consequence of her “mythical, 
unshakeable” belief that the masses would fulfil their historic mission (Kolakowski, p 
424). In response, again, there was the option of sustained dual power, of Soviets and 
a Red Army – as an insurance policy – co-existing with the constituent assembly. 
That might have been a risk, but Kautsky and Martov were also correct in anticipating 
the damage done to the cause of socialism through desperate, authoritarian and 
terroristic strategies. 
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Austro-Marxism in Practice through Peace, Revolution and 
War 
 
The Austro-Marxist experience during this time of revolutionary upheaval is also 
important in considering its place as a Third Road or relative Third Way. From 1914 
the Austro-Marxists were divided on the question of World War I. While an 
Independents faction opposed the war steadfastly, Renner was accused of “social 
patriotism” for his insistence on support the war effort to “maintain Austria’s 
territorial integrity and multi-national structure” (Lesor, p 119). In 1915 elements of 
the socialist parties of Europe gathered together at the Zimmerwald Conference in 
Switzerland to discuss ways and means to peace. Lesor observes that: 
 
While the entire Zimmerwald Congress was united in its repudiation of “social 
patriotism” and the various party leaderships support the war, its right wing, to 
which Friedrich Adler and the other left-wing Austro-Marxists belonged, 
dissociated itself from the Bolsheviks whom under Lenin’s leadership, had 
begun to use the congress as a slipway for the launching of a communist 
international. [They were] … branded as Kautskyist and consequently rejected. 
(Lesor, p 121) 
 
Further peace conferences were organised by the European Left as the war 
progressed, but these were failures in the sense they had no impact on the policies of 
the warring parties. To illustrate the degree of the anti-war activists’ initial isolation, it 
is well to note Anson Rabinbach’s observation that the Austrian anti-war group only 
comprised some 120 party members in 1915. In desperation on 16 October 1916 
Austro-Marxist Friedrich Adler assassinated Count Sturgkh, the imperial minister-
president, but by the time of his trial in 1917, what Rabinbach refers to as “war 
euphoria” was subsiding, and the reality of the war was sinking in. Hence by 1917 
Adler had “enormous support”. Rather than facing execution, ultimately Adler was to 
be released with the Austrian revolution (Rabinbach, pp 18-19). 
 
Through 1918, Austria-Hungary edged ever closer to collapse under the pressure of 
the war. In that context, the socialists attempted to promote a compromise based on 
their Brunn programme, which had promoted a federalist solution to reconciling the 
country’s various nationalities, but by October it was too late. The monarchy 
collapsed and a much-diminished Austrian Republic emerged in November 1918 
(Rabinbach, p 20). Loew argues that at this point, “the Social-Democrat Party was the 
only relevant political force in the residual regions that called itself German Austria.” 
Hence their assumption of power (Loew, p 25). 
 
Eric Hobsbawm makes the observation that during the revolution: 
 
174 
 
the Social Democrats were radical, militant, anxious to provide a link between 
the Second and Third Internationals, and any case rejected the sort of social 
democracy which defined itself essentially as an anti-Bolshevik force. They saw 
themselves as revolutionaries (Hobsbawm in Duczynska, p 23). 
 
Despite this, the response of the Austrian socialists was clearly defined as against the 
Bolshevik strategy. Fearing Entente military intervention, as well as starvation in the 
context of a civil war where fortified Conservative forces controlled the countryside, 
the Austro-Marxist response was to restrain and discipline the revolutionary 
movement from premature and risky strategies, while consolidating their own power 
in the socialist-dominated Volkswehr (the new republican people’s army, comprised 
of war veterans). In any case, the Austrian socialists presumed that the unviable new 
Austrian state could not survive with a population of only 6.5 million, and lacking key 
resources and industry. Hence, there was the optimistic assumption of a political 
union with a stronger democratic socialist Germany. Instead, the German Social 
Democrats chose the path of collaboration with the militarist old guard. Moreover, the 
path to German-Austrian unification was blocked under the peace terms demanded by 
the victorious Entente powers (Rabinbach, pp 20-22, 25). 
 
Rabinbach further observes (importantly, in light of Bauer’s position): “The German-
Austrian provinces were not economically self-sufficient since crucial resources were 
located in the successor states”, and “agricultural production was less than 50 per cent 
of 1913 levels” (Rabinbach, p 21). Yet despite the Austro-Marxists’ intent, ‘to keep 
the masses away from “revolutionary adventures”’, Loew argues that “the 500,000 
agricultural labourers … were extremely radicalised … and numerically the second 
largest proletarian group” (Loew, p 29). This suggests a stronger proletariat in the 
countryside than Bauer supposed and perhaps greater leverage in negotiations with 
the forces of Austrian conservatism. 
 
Workers councils had been formed and Austria-Hungary stood at the crossroads, but 
the Austrian Social Democrats chose the path of strategic conservatism. Arguably 
these councils could have confronted the existing order head-on. However, fearing 
that such confrontation could lead to civil war the mainstream Austrian Social 
Democrats sought to lead these emerging bodies in order to defuse the councils’ 
immediate revolutionary potential (Duczynska, pp 28-29). 
 
During the revolutionary period, though, various strategies emerged within the 
socialist camp for the democratic socialisation of industry. As Rabinbach explains 
Otto Bauer’s programme envisaged “step by step” socialisation, beginning with “the 
large coal, iron and steel plants”. Increasingly there would emerge “co-operative 
venture[s] divided between labour, capital, consumers, and the state”. It was assumed 
that the entire process would take decades. 
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Max Adler was more radical, seeing a greater role for the factory councils, with 
“democratisation of the administration from below, as well as an institution parallel to 
parliament” (i.e., dual power). The workers’ councils specifically would enjoy a right 
of veto; would help appoint the government in conjunction with a two-chamber 
parliament elected under conditions of universal suffrage; and would act as an organ 
for socialisation of the economy. The councils would also play a leading role in 
socialist education. In this way, Adler supposed a compromise could be reached that 
would avoid civil war; but which would develop into a popular and democratic 
proletarian dictatorship during a process of transition. Under such circumstances, the 
breaking up of the old bourgeois state was also assumed. However, the “passing of the 
revolutionary crisis” and consolidation of conservative hegemony outside Vienna 
meant these plans came almost to nothing. Hence, the democratic political revolution 
was never completed, setting the stage for the social-democratic retreat and the failed 
insurrection (in defence of democracy) in the years 1927-1934 (Rabinbach, pp 24-25; 
Loew, pp 31-34). 
 
The Austro-Marxists faced heavy criticism from the Bolshevists for their apparently 
passive and conservative management of the post-World War I revolution in their 
own country. The Bolsheviks went so far as to suggest the failure of the Austro-
Marxists to seize power properly contributed to the fall of the communist government 
in Hungary, further isolating the revolutionaries in Russia and Germany. The position 
of social democracy in post-war revolutionary Austria was further complicated by a 
hostile peasantry, which was opposed to requisitioning of their harvest. Without 
compromise, the agrarian and industrial regions would be pitted against each other. 
Without the support of the kind of international socialist community proposed by 
Bauer, where the position of a small nation-state could be made viable by specialising 
in the international division of labour, Austria was fatally weakened. 
 
It can be noted that the Austro-Marxists were strategically conservative at the time of 
the Russian Revolution, even if they were not so in their final aims and their values. 
The Bolsheviks may have stood firm, but the desperate nature of the struggle lead to 
increasingly indiscriminate terror, the demoralisation of the working class, and 
consequently with the rise of Stalinism. The fate of Hungary demonstrated that the 
threat of invasion was real, even though the victorious entente powers were fearful 
that in suppressing proletarian revolutions they could spark dissent and perhaps even 
revolution at home, and France and Italy opposed any such intervention at Versailles 
(Loew, pp 25-27). 
 
Ilona Duczynska contends that “the formation of a block of revolutionary states might 
have been possible” and,  
 
German-Austria, with its very considerable stocks of armaments, could have 
been the bridge between the two Councils’ Republics: the Barvarian and the 
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Hungarian, which were struggling valiantly at the very borders of Austria, but in 
isolation. (Duczynska, pp 40-41) 
 
Perhaps the Austro-Marxists could have striven for a more robust ongoing strategy of 
dual power. Here the councils could play a constructive and empowering role. Yet the 
crucial question was that of who held the state power, and that entailed much more 
than a merely settling a parliamentary majority. 
 
With the ultimate rise of fascism in Austria, in the end social-democratic paramilitary 
organisations were not strong enough to see off the threat. There were many reasons 
for this, which we will consider later, but had the Austro-Marxists’ maintained a 
stronger foothold in the armed forces during the revolutionary period and afterwards 
that could well have altered the course of European history. Loew writes of the 
Austrian armed forces during this period that: 
 
The backbone of the Volkswehr … was provided by the Social-Democratic 
soldiers representatives in the Habsburg Army … Its social composition was 
proletarian through and through, and the soldiers were socialist or communist in 
their politics. (Loew, p 30) 
 
Later years saw a purging of the republican army, “of its Social Democratic founders” 
“and the occupation of all key positions by conservative elements”. Hence, the army 
turned against the Social Democrats in 1934. Arguably, from their initial position of 
strength the Social Democrats should never have allowed this to happen. Even though 
they surrendered control of parliament to the Christian Socials with the 1920 
elections, assuming that a parliamentary majority was but a matter of time – 
widespread and ongoing representation in the republic’s armed forces should have 
been the “bottom line” underscoring that compromise (Loew, p 35). Guarantees of 
constitutional and liberal democracy would prove empty in the face of an 
authoritarian, and ultimately, fascist state. 
 
In a 1920 pamphlet, Otto Bauer went so far as to argue “for a proletarian dictatorship” 
“and possibly even a Red Terror, should the capitalist class prevent a Social-
Democratic parliamentary majority from governing”. Hence, Bauer argued: “The 
working class … must remain armed.” This position was adopted “systematically” at 
the “Linz congress of 1926”. The programme also called for “ensuring the republican 
character of the armed forces”. Again, failure to uphold this principle would later 
prove costly (Loew, pp 38-39). 
 
During the revolutionary period, the Austro-Marxists pursued a strategy of alliance – 
for the sake of national unity and civic peace – with the conservative ‘Christian 
Socials’. Yet the Austrian Conservatives were later to turn on their social-democratic 
partners; forming their own paramilitary organisations; suppressing the social-
democratic paramilitary Schutzbund, and backing the rise of a pro-clerical fascist 
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regime under Dolfuss (Lesor, pp 121-129; Loew, pp 25-27, 30). Lesor observes that 
the compromise agreed to by the Austrian Social Democrats carried the seeds of this 
outcome as it excluded their presence in the army, the police and various ministries 
(Lesor, p 128). The intervention of the Austrian army in the later civil war, on the side 
of the right-wing Heimwehr, was to prove decisive. There were gains from the 
compromise, however, including, 
 
the eight-hour day, paid holidays for workers, the banning or drastic reduction 
of child labour and night work for women, new enlightened regulations 
concerning outworkers, the extension of the scope and authority of the factory 
inspectorate, as well as the passing of fundamental social legislation 
establishing a comprehensive system of health and unemployment insurance. 
(Lesor, p 124) 
 
Crucial in the development of an Austro-Marxist Third Road, Bauer explains how 
Austrian social democracy, confronted with limited options, instead sought for the 
proletariat ‘strong and permanent positions in the state and in the factories, in the 
barracks and in the schools: a “functional democracy” in addition to “merely political 
democracy” (Bauer in Bottomore, pp 163, 167). In substance “functional democracy” 
required that “the government in each branch of its activity should remain in constant 
touch with the citizens directly affected by this branch of government, organised 
according to their work places or their social and economic function” (Bauer in 
Bottomore, p 167). This sat well with the Austro-Marxist view of transition; 
specifically, Otto Bauer”s conception of the “slow revolution”, according to which the 
conquest of power by the working class had to be accompanied by a gradual, patient 
construction of socialist institutions; effectively “revolutionary reforms”, but 
animated by an underlying class struggle (Bottomore, pp 39, 42). 
 
While Bottomore sees Austro-Marxists as opposing any “dictatorship of the 
proletariat” (Bottomore, p 39), this appears to follow from the Kautskyan 
interpretation in his polemic with Lenin, and in the sense employed by Otto Bauer 
who argued in 1936 that the term had come to mean “something entirely different 
from what was originally conceived” (Bauer in Bottomore, p 201). 
 
Lesor notes how most of the socialist parties not falling into the Bolshevik camp 
resolved to resume the Second International, and yet Austrian social democracy did 
not agree with the preconditions for Comintern membership. Nor could it support a 
position of “social patriotism”. Therefore, they formed their own International in 
1920, the ‘Arbeitsgemeinschaft Sozialistischer Parteien’ ‘for which Karl Radek 
coined the irreverent appellation “Two and a Half International”’. At one time this 
body included “the French Partei Socialiste, the German USPD, the British 
Independent Labour Party (ILP), the Russian Mensheviks and the Swiss Social 
Democratic Party”. (Loew, pp 47-48)  
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To summarise, the Two and a Half International and Austro-Marxists sought re-
unification of social-democratic and communist forces in a “higher synthesis” (Loew, 
pp 50-51): 
 
The right social-democrats wanted to tie the workers of the entire world to 
parliamentary methods of struggle, while the left social-democratic forces 
wanted to allow Bolshevik tactics as a method of struggle appropriate to 
particular Russian conditions. (Loew, p 48) 
 
Victor Adler declared at its founding conference: 
 
You must bear in mind all possibilities, you must not tie yourselves in sectarian 
fashion to one slogan or the other. The question of democracy or dictatorship is 
a question that is determined by the historical moment: not just by the will of 
the proletariat, but rather by the entire sum of relations that are imposed on the 
proletariat by the inherent force of development itself. (Loew, p 48) 
 
However, the Vienna International “did not prove viable” and the dissenters re-joined 
the Second International in 1923 (Lesor, p 121, Loew pp 47-48). Friedrich Adler 
specifically was associated with the formation of this so-called Two and a Half, or 
Vienna International, which attempted to mediate between and reunite what came to 
be a reformist Second International, and the communist (later Stalinist) Third 
International (Bottomore, p 1). Although in this mission they ultimately failed, their 
example helped inspire later movements such as the Eurocommunism and the New 
Left. Hence, even this early, Austrian social democracy was building a genuine Third 
Road distinct from Bolshevism and mainstream social democracy. Indeed, Austrian 
social democracy, in the form of Bauer’s slow revolution, seemed poised for the kind 
of long war of position envisaged by Gramsci. 
 
In terms of legislation, after World War I when “the balance of power between social 
classes … favoured the socialists”, the Austrian Social Democrats introduced bold 
social measures. As well as those gains already mentioned as a consequence of the 
class compromise, Austrian social-democratic legislative gains included “hours of 
work, conditions of employment, works councils, health and “education and housing”. 
In Vienna, especially, they fought for and achieved “working class housing, health 
and welfare services”, as well as “cultural facilities” and “educational reforms”. In 
Bottomore’s opinion, for a time these achievements made Vienna “a showcase of 
social democracy” (Bottomore p 38). 
 
These notable programmes and reforms were funded within Vienna via a radically 
progressive regime of taxation. There were “direct taxes on property, employers, all 
luxuries, high rents, and real estate”. In consequence, more than 61,175 new workers’ 
apartments were built, “with parks, swimming areas, schools, kindergartens, 
gymnasia, health facilities, and community centres” (Rabinbach, p 28). 
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Anson Rabinbach observes: “By 1924 the city of Vienna, which had 1.8 million 
residents, had 266,415 Socialist Party members, one of every five adults.” In 
Rabinbach’s words, the Austrian socialists “created their own public sphere”, 
involving a daily press, “party clubs and taverns”, etc., and educational reform saw 
the promotion of “democratic values” and “social mobility without regard for class or 
sex”. Meanwhile, adult education programmes were developed to supplement the 
party libraries, bookstores and other cultural agencies. Their strategy was one of 
‘gradual “hineinwachsen” (growth from within)’, which, as Rabinbach explains, 
assumed the growth of capitalism and thus of the working class, 
 
necessarily [entailing] a displacement of political considerations to the future, 
when the necessary conditions [prevailed] thus leaving to the present the task of 
the intellectual and spiritual preparation for power. (Rabinbach, pp 27-30). 
 
This was a base that the Austro-Marxists imagined they could build upon in the 
future, on the assumption that the world socialist movement would ultimately grow 
and prosper and lend support to a diminished Austria. Yet, at the end the broader 
context of geographic, economic (and hence political) containment contributed to the 
Austro-Marxists’ marginalisation; and accounted for the effective relegation for many 
in the mainstream of socialist and Marxist theory to “a footnote of history”. 
 
A reappraisal, however (which is dealt with briefly in this thesis) unearths a 
movement of historic significance and of theoretical significance even today. 
Bottomore notes how after the First World War the Austro-Marxist school, 
 
lost some of its coherence, and also its dynamism, as a distinct intellectual 
orientation, while as a political doctrine it became more clearly divided between 
right-wing and left-wing tendencies. (Bottomore, p 14) 
 
Nevertheless, Austrian social democracy was to maintain its organisational unity. The 
same practical considerations that made proletarian dictatorship unviable in post-war 
Austria also contributed to a sense that nothing could be gained in dividing the 
movement. 
 
Conflicting Themes for Austro-Marxism during the 1914-
1925 Period 
 
A number of conflicting themes negotiated by the Austro-Marxists bear on the period 
covered by this chapter. As we have seen, in the pre-revolutionary period the most 
important issues faced by the Austrian socialists were those of war and peace, 
nationalism and internationalism. This saw the movement divided along ethnic lines, 
even though before the war there was a preference for a federalist compromise for 
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Austria-Hungary. It could be argued that the dignity and soul of Austrian socialism 
was saved by the likes of Friedrich Adler and Otto Bauer, who stood for the cause of 
peace. With the revolution, however, at least within the Austrian “rump republic”, 
there was no organisational split along reformist/communist lines. The Austro-
Marxists attempted to apply this principle to the broader international movement, but 
failed. 
 
Mostly notable, therefore, is the specific Austro-Marxist negotiation of the theme of 
reform versus revolution. Under exceptionally unfavourable circumstances the 
Austrian socialists embarked on a revolutionary and, yet, strategically conservative 
strategy. While the Bolsheviks were to win total state power in an aggressive but risky 
gambit, which led to civil war, the Austrian socialists compromised, ensuring civil 
peace for many years. 
 
The Bolsheviks saw weakness and a failure of international solidarity in the Austro-
Marxists’ strategic conservatism. Their tactic of appealing to the peasants’ land-
hunger bore fruit for them. Could a similar approach have succeeded in revolutionary 
Austria? It will never be known whether or not a broader European revolution would 
have had a chance at success were its democratic socialist parties more ambitious and 
uncompromising. In any case, the Austro-Marxists were mostly untarnished by the 
kind of post-war collaboration with the militarist old guard, which included wholesale 
murder of revolutionaries, as in the case of German social democracy. Rather, the 
Austro-Marxists retained the spirit of the old Second International. Austro-Marxists 
had refuted Kautskyan philosophical materialism but they shared with Kautsky and 
the short-lived German Independent Social Democrats (USPD) a vision of qualitative, 
but gradual and relatively peaceful transition. 
 
As has been discussed, within Austro-Marxism there were also those who favoured a 
more ambitious agenda, of dual power, and including an ongoing role for the workers’ 
councils (e.g., Max Adler). Bauer, meanwhile, preferred a radical but gradualist 
strategy (i.e., over decades) of industrial socialisation. As events unfolded, it is 
reasonable to suggest a more ambitious dual-power strategy might have provided a 
bulwark against fascism. Then again, it could have also precipitated an earlier civil 
war. The gradualist Austrian socialist strategy, consolidating their base in Vienna via 
cultural institutions and a truly ambitious and radical programme of municipal reform 
bore fruit for some time, and provided an inspiration and an example for later 
generations of democratic socialists. 
 
The year 1918 had provided the opportunity for a transformed constitution and state 
apparatus conducive to social democracy and protective against any reversion to an 
authoritarian state power. Arguably, a more robust compromise – a more robust 
political revolution – could have been won, helping to block the path to fascism in 
later years. Universal suffrage on its own was not enough, was not fully secure so 
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long as the state power itself was not firmly in the hands of democratic forces. In that 
regard, at the least, the revolution was a wasted opportunity. 
 
The discussion in Chapter Eight further considers the substance of the Austro-
Marxists’ efforts. 
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Chapter Eight: 
 
Austro-Marxism, 1925-1934 
 
 
 
 
The chapter begins by extending the discussion of Austro-Marxism in the last chapter 
through to the period 1925-1934. Of interest are the cultural and social policies and 
strategies in Red Vienna, as well as the sources of crisis and decline that first emerged 
strongly from 1917 and culminated in a brief civil war in February1934. Considered 
in detail are the specific ways in which Austro-Marxism comprised a relative Third 
Road during this period. The chapter concerns some of the most important Austro-
Marxist writings, by Otto Bauer and Max Adler, on the nature of fascism and the best 
response from the organised working class. Finally, the chapter considers important 
and often conflicting themes in Austro-Marxism, which leads into an account of its 
most important legacies from the 1925-1938 period. 
 
The Historical Background to Austro-Marxism 
 
The period 1925-1934 is notable for several reasons as far as the writings and 
activism of Austrian social democrats are concerned. It saw the rise of fascism across 
Europe, especially in Italy, Germany and Austria. Soon thereafter fascism was to arise 
also in Spain with Franco, backed by Hitler, over-running the Republican 
government. The period was also notable as it heralded the Great Depression, which 
fuelled the growth of both fascist and communist movements in Europe. Much of 
Austria-Hungary’s populace had been made up of minorities: Czechs, Slovaks, 
Slovenes, Croats, Northern Italians and others who were released into states of their 
own with the close of World War I. With union with Germany forbidden after the 
war, the small rump Austrian Republic found itself in a tenuous position. 
 
Nonetheless, the Austrian social democrats must have felt themselves in a somewhat 
strong position. The Austro-Hungarian working class had been exhausted to the point 
of rebellion, a rebellion fuelled by “hunger bordering on starvation”; physical 
“exhaustion” with the extension of the working day; and with those workers “abused 
and trapped between war profiteers, black marketers” and officers who retained their 
access to luxuries even despite the general deprivation. Thus it was that in the Spring 
of 1917 a wave of mass strikes broke out (Gruber, 1983, p 55). Having maintained 
cells within the Austro-Hungarian army, when revolution came they were in a 
position to dominate the Volkswehr (people’s army) that emerged from out of the 
chaos. Otto Bauer himself noted that the survival of the trade unions also provided an 
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important kernel from which new social organisation was to emerge. (Duczynska, pp 
30-32; Bauer in Duczynska, p 35). 
 
Later, the Social Democrats maintained their own paramilitary army, the Schutzbund, 
with the consequence of effective dual power. Indeed, dual power was the Social 
Democrats’ defensive “insurance policy” to protect the democratic path to socialism 
represented in the republic. They were to make steady electoral gains, but as will 
become evident, this period was marked by crisis and a kind of slow decline as far as 
the actual force of physical power underscoring Austrian social democracy was 
concerned – including the rise of an indigenous Austrofascism and ultimately the 
Anschluss with Nazi Germany in 1938. As Ilona Dunczynska especially recalls, the 
“political advantages” of the defensive approach “were gradually whittled away, until 
the defensive utterly failed to defend” (Dunczynska, p 41).  
 
Until 1927, the Austro-Marxists felt confident that their institutional strategy would 
bear fruit for them, preparing the working class for the ultimate democratic seizure of 
power that would come with the global development of capitalism and the consequent 
socialisation of the means of production. 
 
The Austro-Marxist strategy included the development of social and cultural societies, 
associations and institutions, including extensive public-housing projects. Steeply 
progressive taxes within Vienna specifically provided for education services, child-
care, libraries, health care, playgrounds, gymnasia, swimming and wading pools, 
meeting halls, youth facilities, carpentry shops, post offices, cafes, lectures, music 
programmes, symphony orchestras, choral societies and more. Furthermore, this 
institutional strategy facilitated “an atmosphere of co-operation and solidarity” among 
the Viennese working class (Rabinbach, p 63; Gruber, 1983, pp 52-53, p 57). 
 
Max Adler, writing in 1924, had argued in favour of cultural work to prepare for the 
development of “the new socialist man”; effectively a strategy of Kulturkampf 
(culture war). The strategy was to be extended to a broad base as well, making 
scholarship available through “adult education”, “the Catholic worker youth”, “the 
high schools” the “teachers’ colleges”, and the various “cultural organisations of the 
working class movement”. One aim was to highlight the role of the underprivileged 
masses in shaping history; and thus to impart confidence to the working class (Gruber, 
1983, pp 60-62). 
 
Rabinbach importantly notes: ‘The educational structure [created by the Austro-
Marxists in Vienna] was … called upon to provide an effective antidote for the “iron 
law of oligarchy”’ (Michels); with the aim of developing a spirit of (Max Adler) 
“codetermination and responsibility” (Rabinbach, p 65). 
 
Meanwhile “proletarian rituals” such as May Day – mobilising hundreds of thousands 
– promoted a sense of “confident class self-hood”. Yet even though the public base of 
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support for Austrian social democracy was strong (indeed growing), the balance of 
power was shifting within the state apparatus of force. This, in combination with the 
weakening of the Schutzbund as a credible deterrent to protect democracy, eroded the 
position of Austrian social democracy. The Depression was to further weaken the 
strategic position of the organised working class as a consequence of a large “reserve 
army of labour” (Gruber, 1983, pp 56-57). 
 
Nonetheless, despite their passion for democracy, and for a mass party in 
contradistinction from Bolshevism, Gruber observes that in reality the Social 
Democratic Party of Austria (SDAP), as it ultimately developed, was driven from 
above. Gruber contends that in reality “a stable oligarchy dominated the pyramidical 
organisational structure and warded off factions or grass-roots initiatives which 
challenged its supremacy” (Gruber, 1991, p 7), but with the elections of 21 April 
1927, the Austrian Social Democrats must surely have felt vindicated. They won “71 
out of 165 parliamentary seats”, with an increase in their vote by 120,000 (to 600,000) 
in their Red Vienna stronghold (i.e., they managed a two-thirds majority in the Vienna 
municipal council) (Rabinbach, p 32). 
 
Austro-Marxist strategy at this time was also well represented in the party’s Linz 
Programme of 1926. Understandably, the programme called for the education of “the 
police, gendarmerie, and soldiers to loyalty to the Republic”. Under the Linz 
Programme, resorting to the Schutzbund (the social-democratic paramilitary 
organisation) was only to be used as a defensive measure. The republican Schutzbund 
had been formed in 1923 in recognition of the vulnerability of Red Vienna and the 
possibility of having to defend “the democratic path to socialism” by force 
(Rabinbach, pp 30, 46-57). To be specific, this programme held that the SDAP: 
 
must promote the closest possible community of spirit between the workers and 
the soldiers of the federal army who, together with all the other armed forces in 
the state, must be taught loyalty to the Republic … Should, however, despite 
every effort of the Social Democratic Workers’ Party, a counter-revolution 
succeed in breaking up democracy, then the working class could no longer gain 
power in the state by means other than civil war. (Duczynska, pp 68-69) 
 
Raimond Loew reflects on how only months later, Austrian social democracy was put 
on the defensive. When an invalid and a child were murdered by three “members of 
the fascist veterans’ association”, a general strike and riots broke out. The Palace of 
Justice was also set fire to, and the ensuing brutal state crackdown saw “86 deaths and 
1,100 injuries” (Loew, p 40). The social-democratic leadership, earnest in avoiding 
civil war, held back the Schutzbund paramilitaries but with a consequent 
demoralisation among the workers. Faced with rising fascist paramilitaries and an 
increasingly hostile state, Gruber views the Austro-Marxist response as a retreat into 
their cultural strategy, as “a surrogate for politics”. The year 1927, therefore, marked 
the beginning of the end, with steady dissolution of any “balance of class forces”, and 
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with reactionary elements increasingly adopting an aggressive posture (Gruber, 1991, 
p 10). 
 
Instead of fighting, the Social Democrats proposed a “government of reconciliation”. 
However, this was refused by the Conservatives who preferred to work with the 
fascist, paramilitary Heimwehr organisation. Loew concludes that the consequence of 
this was that “the bourgeoisie now knew that it could go a long way without having to 
fear the full power of the Social Democrats being brought against it” (Gruber, 1991, p 
41). Bauer thereafter decided upon another tactical retreat, backing down on the 
proclamation of a general strike, including the transport workers’ strike; once again 
for fear of civil war. Importantly, this back-down was without the later threat of 
external intervention by Nazi Germany, which arose from 1933, and also motivated 
the Austro-Marxists in their desire to avoid the trigger of a final confrontation 
(Rabinbach, p 49). 
 
During the period 1928 to 1930, though, social-democratic fortunes actually 
continued to climb in subsequent municipal and general elections, and party 
membership swelled to well over 700,000. However, Otto Bauer conceded in 1929 
that “in the same degree as our mental power has grown among the people of German 
Austria, so has the balance of physical force shifted in favour of our opponents” 
(Loew; Rabinbach, p 41). The right-wing clericals had shown their willingness to use 
violence to defend their interests (Rabinbach, p 33). In a costly blunder, the Social 
Democrats had also given up their control of the Vienna Arsenal in 1927, and 
government forces confiscated thousands of weapons. Ilona Duczynska concludes that 
ultimately, the SDAP “forfeited the credibility of its will to resist” and a series of 
offensives by the reactionaries “[were] not long in coming” (Duczynska, pp 75-77). 
 
The Great Depression further undermined the Social Democrats’ position. 
Unemployment spiralled high even in the period of recovery, 1925-1930; and the 
Depression affected one third of the labour force. By 1933, “the staggering decline of 
over 40 per cent in trade-union membership was indicative of the weakness of the 
party and the trade unions in this contested terrain”. Youth unemployment was 
particularly high and many demoralised youth turned to fascism (Gruber, p 10; 
Rabinbach, pp 65-66). 
 
The Rise of Dolfuss 
 
In 1932, the Austro-Marxists were on the verge of controlling the Austrian 
parliament. With the more moderate pan-Germans breaking away from Engelbert 
Dolfuss’ Christian Socials, there was the prospect of a coalition socialist government. 
(nb: Dolfuss was ultimately to head the ‘Austro-Fascist’ regime following the 1934 
civil war) At first Dolfuss offered the Social Democrats “a grand coalition”, but when 
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Bauer refused, Dolfuss moved to dissolve parliament and establish autocratic rule by 
decree (Rabinbach. pp 80-81). 
 
Free assembly was banned and heavy-handed state censorship imposed. The army 
broke up a political railway workers’ strike in defence of democracy. When the 
Austrian socialists attempted to convene parliament in March 1933, they were 
violently dispersed (Rabinbach pp 88-89). On 31 March Dolfuss banned the 
Schutzbund but refused a request from the Social Democrats to ban the fascist 
Heimwehr paramilitaries (Rabinbach pp 92-93). In the months that followed the 
Schutzbund was driven underground, and slowly broken down with the arrest of 
hundreds of its officers and the confiscation of many of its substantial weapons caches 
(Rabinbach, pp 166-167, pp 184-185). Concentration camps were established, capital 
punishment reinstated, and the constitutional law court was ended. Emergency 
measures also included “curtailing of press freedom, prohibition of strikes and 
demonstrations”. Preparations for guerrilla warfare had not been made. The 
Schutzbund was radically weakened by the “decapitation” of its leadership 
(Duczynska, pp 140-141). Bauer in exile was later to reflect: 
 
We could have responded on March 15th by calling a general strike. Never were 
the conditions for a successful strike so favourable as on that day. The counter-
revolution which was just then reaching its full development in Germany had 
aroused the Austrian masses. The masses of the workers were awaiting the 
signal for battle. The railwaymen were not yet so crushed as they were eleven 
months later. The government’s military organisation was far weaker than in 
February 1934. At that time we might have won. But we shrank back, dismayed, 
from the battle … we postponed the fight because we wanted to spare the 
country the disaster of a bloody civil war. (Bauer in Rabinbach, pp 90-91) 
 
Ilona Duczynska reflects in her book Workers in Arms that the Linz Programme of 
1926, which outlined the role of the Schutzbund “lacked a key sentence”, one that 
Wilhelm Ellenbogen, a leading Social Democrat of the old guard, [who] had 
pronounced back in 1894: “Whoever at the moment of decision is incapable of action 
concedes defeat” (Duczynska, pp 66-67). 
 
Dolfuss’s strategy of wearing down social democracy was perhaps empowered by 
Bauer’s counter-strategy of encouraging and participating in negotiations with right-
wing forces, with successive attempts to negotiate compromise, even to the point of 
accepting a corporatist Catholic constitution as an emergency measure (on the 
understanding that the independence of the free trade unions and the Social 
Democratic Party would be preserved). Thus, Duczynska reflects: ‘The Social 
Democratic Party’s position of power gradually crumbled, [and] its “political intent” 
had also unavoidably shrunken – to the point of hoping for hibernation under the 
protective shield of the “corporate state”’ (Duczynska, pp 134-135). In the end, mass 
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strike action was not a prospect as years of retreat and repression had led to “apathy” 
among the masses (Duczynska, pp 142-143). 
 
Importantly, though, Bauer had willing partners among the moderates in the Christian 
Social Party, even at times including suggestions of compromise from Dolfuss 
himself. Indeed, socialist negotiators might have felt emboldened after the 15 May 
encyclical by Pope Pious XI advocating “a Catholic corporatist social order” but, as 
against fascism, maintaining the “free autonomy” of social groups (Rabinbach, pp 
170). The idea of a potential “subjective element” in armed resistance might likewise 
be thought of as applying to diplomacy, though given the trajectory of events since 
1927, Schutzbund mobilisation in March 1933 looks like it would have been a 
stronger prospect. 
 
Ironically, Dolfuss had entered into negotiations with Mussolini, seeing an alliance 
with Fascist Italy as a guarantee against the intrigues and even the direct intervention 
of Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler. Otto Bauer was to reflect when in exile in 1938 
that this Austrian fascism, linked with Catholic clericalism, was “intended to suppress 
by force German-nationalist Fascism (in favour of Anschluss) and the working class 
at the same time.” Mussolini had insisted upon the dismemberment of Austrian social 
democracy as a condition of ‘protection’ (Bauer in Bottomore, pp 183-184; 
Rabinbach, pp 137). 
 
At the Social Democratic Party’s final conference in October 1933 the Right and Left 
made gains at the expense of the centre. The Left were willing to risk civil war, but 
the Right were willing to make more concessions and compromises for the sake of 
peace (Rabinbach, pp 151-153). Left dissidents in the party spoke of “the 
revolutionary will to struggle” and argued that the leaders were “incapable of 
adhering to their own program” (i.e., the Linz Programme) (Rabinbach, p 131). In 
many ways, the left Opposition’s response had simply been a reiteration of the 
already-existing Linz Programme. Thus: “If the bourgeoisie nonetheless succeeds and 
destroys the battleground of democracy, state power can only be won through a civil 
war” (Rabinbach, p 117). 
 
A compromise motion at the conference also proposed that the party take the 
offensive in re-establishing rights of association, assembly and speech, and also 
maintenance of conditions for workers and support for the unemployed (Rabinbach, 
pp 144-145). However, following the conference the repression continued, with 
arrests of activists and meetings broken up. Yet the union and party leaders held back 
on mobilising the Schutzbund and the workers, believing even at this stage that 
negotiation remained the best hope. Attempts by the socialists to negotiate a broad 
front against German fascism, with a united parliament behind Dolfuss, and the 
Schutzbund allowing itself to fall under government control also failed, arguably 
partly due to Dolfuss’ dependence on extreme right forces (eg, the ‘Heimwehr’ 
paramilitaries and Mussolini) (Rabinbach, pp 146-149).  
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At this point, much that remained of the Schutzbund leadership felt that war was 
inevitable. Bauer had warned of the futility of civil war for the sake of pride when the 
human cost would be great, but there was also the strategic importance of establishing 
the precedent: European social democracy would not capitulate to fascism without a 
fight. Ultimately, civil war was sparked with the shooting of two Schutzbund 
members in the search for weapons caches, and with the dissolution of all local and 
regional governments opposed to the Austrofascist regime. Even moderate regional 
Christian Social governments that preferred negotiation found themselves liquidated 
organisationally. Schutzbund resolve may also have been stiffened when party leader 
Richard Bernasek came into possession of a “secret decree” that “all officials of the 
Social Democratic Party are to be located and arrested at their homes” (Rabinbach, pp 
182-184, 186-187, 193). 
 
In the ensuing struggle, the Schutzbund was incapable of fully implementing its 
emergency plan for securing the capital and arming the working class. Its command 
structure was compromised by hundreds of arrests and the confiscation of arms. The 
general strike shut down power and the tramways, but the railway workers had been 
effectively broken months earlier, forcibly subsumed into Dolfuss’ corporatist 
“Fatherland Front”. This was of central importance as these workers were in a 
position to slow or prevent the flow of troops and supplies from the regions and into 
Vienna (Rabinbach, pp 196-197). Duczynska also observes that a successful general 
strike would have “deprived the government of communications and mobility” 
(Duczynska, p 179). 
 
The fascist militias, army and police had prepared for the day, were not missing their 
leadership, and had access to heavy artillery, which they employed ruthlessly even 
against civilian areas. According to Rabinbach some historians think “only 40,000 
men were available [on the socialist side] when the insurrection broke out” (of an 
original 80,000) (Rabinbach, pp 200-202). Gruber asserts that even among these, only 
“a tiny minority of workers had risen spontaneously” (Gruber, p 5). 
 
The fighters were divided with regard to tactics: “entrenchment in strongholds, or 
[engagement] in mobile street fighting …” (Duczynska, p 206). As it turned out there 
were instances of both, with mobile sharpshooters exacting significant casualties, 
heavy fighting in areas of Vienna, including the imposing and fortress-like housing 
blocks, which were symbolic of social-democratic culture and achievement. Gruber 
observes that it had likely been a deliberate policy to strategically construct these 
projects “[overlooking] municipal transportation [and] … key infrastructure”, as 
Conservative forces had long prophesised (Gruber, 1983, p 57). 
 
Arguably, preparations for a guerrilla conflict ought to have been in place much 
earlier. Though Schutzbund training was apparently good enough that if they had 
acted much earlier when morale was higher and before sweeping arrests of their 
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officers and when the general strike may have succeeded – victory may have been 
possible in 1933, as suggested by Bauer himself. The Schutzbund was not “fully 
broken until February 21 [1934], one week after the civil war began”. However, even 
after the fighting ceased the government summarily hanged several leading socialists 
as reprisals (Rabinbach, pp 208-209, Duczynska p 212). Following this defeat, the 
SDAP itself, a party Gruber suggests consisted of some 660,000, was effectively 
liquidated by an iron fist, though Duczynska observes that the Schutzbund carried on 
as an underground organisation for several years. Over one thousand of their number 
were to fight for Republican Spain and in other struggles against fascism (Gruber, p 5, 
Duczynska, pp 212-242). 
 
Thus ended the cultural experiment of Red Vienna, and with it the hopes of Austrian 
social democracy. Dolfuss himself was later assassinated, in 1934, by Nazi 
sympathisers. In 1938, Mussolini abandoned the Austrian government as part of a 
pact with Hitler, and no one else was willing at the time to protect the Austrofascist 
regime from the designs of the Nazis. Otto Bauer personally managed to flee the 
country in the early phases of the conflict, and even until the end, argued that 
negotiation remained the party’s best chance. Recriminations followed, with many 
arguing the strategically conservative measures implemented by the social-democratic 
executive had left workers and activists “ill prepared and demoralised”. Gruber refers 
to a “paralysis of will” similar to the German Social Democrats’ response to the rise 
of Hitler, a practice at odds with the content of the 1926 Linz Programme which had 
advocated defensive force to preserve democracy (Gruber, pp 4-5). 
 
Explaining the nature of Austro-Marxism as a Third Road 
 
The tightrope that the Austro-Marxists walked between reform and (Bolshevist) 
revolution also had practical implications between 1925 and 1934. Having been 
spared a major split during World War I on communist and social-democratic lines, a 
consequence was that their political outlook was similar to that of the pre-World War 
I socialist Second International. In the immediate post-war Austrian environment, the 
methods of the Bolsheviks were thought by most of the Austro-Marxists to be 
counter-productive and premature. Similarly, diluted reformism was also felt to be 
undesirable, perhaps partly as a consequence of a recent history of uncritical 
opportunism (e.g., revolutionary Germany 1918-19) and also as a consequence of an 
appreciation of the problems of naïve reformism, and a desire for an (ultimately) 
qualitative transition. 
 
As the years progressed, the Austro-Marxists believed it possible that they could 
secure a qualitative (i.e., revolutionary) socialist transition through the democratic 
state without violent confrontation, with the Schutzbund as a kind of “insurance 
policy”. Hence, they can be thought of as having taken a Third Road – refusing both 
Bolshevism and “[integration] into bourgeois politics”. Instead, they chose a 
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gradualist orientation, securing for themselves “strongholds” in the state apparatus, as 
well as in “the factories, in the barracks and in the schools”. This perspective was 
bolstered by circumstances whereby the party had not split as in other countries 
(Rabinbach, pp 28-29, p 40). At the same time, as with others discussed in this thesis, 
e.g., Luxemburg and Kautsky, Austro-Marxism might ultimately have been 
considered a Third Way compared with “left-hegemonic” Stalinism, which had 
abandoned communism in the authentic sense intended by Marx. That is, the Austro-
Marxists did not share the same goals as ‘really existing Stalinism’.  
 
Otto Bauer’s point (cited above) is representative of the outlook of the Austrian Social 
Democrats during the period in question, 
 
where the working class is divided, one workers’ party embodies sober, day-to-
day Realpolitik, while the other embodies the revolutionary will to attain the 
ultimate goal … Only where a split is avoided are sober Realpolitik and 
revolutionary enthusiasm united in one spirit. (Bauer in Bottomore, pp 46-47) 
 
This is suggestive of a practical but not necessarily pragmatic (i.e., in the sense of 
compromising core values) outlook, involving sober assessments of the balance of 
class forces; not willing to risk everything on the basis of a revolutionary will to 
power against the odds but willing to employ defensive force in the context of dual 
power; and genuinely preparing for the (presumably inevitable) revolution to come. 
The dual-power strategy, meanwhile – especially the maintenance of the Schutzbund 
– suggests an appreciation of the class nature of the existing state, with the threat of 
the Schutzbund a defence of the battleground of democracy. In a further distinction 
from opportunist social democracy, Bauer’s quote is suggestive of discipline and 
unity on the Left, of avoiding the trap-falls of sectarianism, and staving off 
degeneration into social chauvinism, as occurred in revolutionary Germany under 
Ebert, Noske and Scheidemann. 
 
Bottomore especially notes Otto Bauer’s conception of “slow revolution”, involving a 
“gradual, patient” institutional strategy of “growth from within” (Bauer in Bottomore, 
p 39). This was counter-hegemony in practice, much as suggested by Antonio 
Gramsci. The Austro-Marxist strategy envisaged a central role for cultural strategy in 
preparing for the new society even within the womb of the old. Helmut Gruber recalls 
SDAP efforts to transform workers into “self-confident actors” through radical 
educational reform, sport and cultural engagement, and to lift workers from poverty 
and squalor via an ambitious public-housing programme, comprehensive public health 
and social welfare measures, provision of workers’ libraries and public lectures 
(Gruber, pp 5-7). 
 
So it was the Austro-Marxist strategy of ongoing dual power with its emphasis on 
working-class and socialist unity and its approach of cultural growth from within 
which together distinguished the movement both from mainstream social democracy, 
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and also from Bolshevism (during this period morphing into Stalinism). And Austro-
Marxism was also distinctive on account of its preference for a democratic and liberal 
path, and with its status as a great social movement (mobilising not tens but hundreds 
of thousands in Vienna alone). 
 
The Austro-Marxist view of liberal democracy was also apparent in the work of Karl 
Renner. It provides an additional rationale for the Austro-Marxist emphasis on dual 
power. Renner wrote in 1921-22 in ‘Democracy and the Council System’: 
 
The role of a political democracy is to reveal and set free all existing 
oppositions, but also to harmonise them, and to effect this accommodation 
through the law and the courts. (Renner in Bottomore, pp 199-200) 
 
As Renner explained, these “oppositions” can “only be settled by the victory of one 
interest and the defeat of another”. “Hence there necessarily stands behind political 
democracy the use of force, an organised public power, and coercive action.” Renner 
therefore notes the danger that “democratic safeguards … collapse” when neither 
group “can or will submit” and hence, “a struggle to possess the means of coercion, 
the real power of execution.” So, historically in times of revolution: “That group 
which possesses or gains the real power, will then form its own state.” (Renner in 
Bottomore, pp 199-200). 
 
This is epitomised by the Bolshevik seizure of power, with the Soviets comprising the 
new state administrative infrastructure, and with the formation of the Red Army. The 
theory behind these developments was expressed well by Lenin in The State and 
Revolution. It is also epitomised by the experience of the French revolution; and other 
revolutions, and its substance had been grasped also by Lassalle. Yet, having 
theorized as much, it is reasonable to argue that the Austro-Marxists ought to have 
detected Conservative Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dolfuss’s intention – to form his 
own state and usurp the democratic state, to prevent the socialists assuming power – 
from the very first moment he moved against the parliament. 
 
There are many ways in which Austro-Marxism during this period can be considered 
a Third Road or Third Way. In some ways, there are parallels with the Kautskyan line, 
with a preservation of the spirit and the content of the old, pre-war Second 
International. While social democracy increasingly capitulated to revisionism and 
(purely parliamentary) reformism, the Austro-Marxists retained a revolutionary 
outlook, which might be seen even as a conciliatory synthesis, of revolutionary 
reforms. Their dual-power strategy, their often-innovative Marxist analysis and their 
“growth from within” approach distinguished the Austro-Marxists markedly from 
other Social Democrats, many of whom increasingly were integrated within the 
bounds of the first way of capitalism. This was also the case in the sense that 
socialism, in the Marxist sense, remained their ultimate goal – making it possible to 
interpret their strategy as a Third Road rather than a Third Way. Yet, their passion for 
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democracy and freedom ensured a position, an analysis, a culture – radically distinct 
from the rising Second Way of Bolshevism and later Stalinism. Their left unity 
agenda was also crucial in establishing their movement and methods as a distinct 
Third Road. Under attack from Conservatives, Bauer was to explain in 1932 that 
which distinguished him (and the Austro-Marxists) from the Bolsheviks, 
 
was something more essential than any tactical considerations, something 
fundamental, something which is based on my whole conception of the 
development of human culture: my esteem for the irreplaceable value of the 
individual, for spiritual freedom. (Bauer in Rabinbach, p 82) 
 
The Austro-Marxists’ effective dual-power strategy, though, was unique for the 
European Left in the 1920s and early 1930s; it was the consequence of an analysis 
that grasped the usual class nature of the state, with any equilibrium in the state 
apparatus assumed to be a temporary state of affairs. The strategy arose from 
specifically Austrian circumstances, especially socialist leadership during the 
revolution, and the arms the socialists came to possess, partly because of their early 
dominance of the Volkswehr during the revolutionary period of 1918-1920. 
 
Austro-Marxist Writings during the Crisis Period 
 
Austro-Marxists wrote a number of important texts during and after the crisis period 
of 1925-1934. These penetrating observations remain important today in part because 
they stand as an object lesson on the importance of left unity and working-class unity 
during times of such crisis. The Austro-Marxists’ analyses of fascism are also 
important because they provide a valuable legacy in pin-pointing the origins and 
nature of fascism. Specifically, we will look at the contributions of Otto Bauer and 
Max Adler during this period. 
 
Otto Bauer’s Analysis of Fascism 
 
Although developments in Austria must have left him feeling devastated, Otto Bauer 
was to write an insightful account of fascism while in exile in 1938. This analysis was 
a legacy Bauer left to the world: an aid in understanding the regimes of Hitler and 
Mussolini; and in understanding comparable regimes even today. In the work, entitled 
simply ‘Fascism’, Bauer traces the origins of modern fascism, observing the 
“expulsion” of “masses of participants from bourgeois life” in the post-World War I 
period, “[turning] them into ‘declasses”’, clinging “to the forms of life and ideologies 
acquired during the war”, specifically a “militaristic, anti-democratic [nationalism]”. 
Bauer explains how these layers were well-positioned to appeal to “pauperised and 
embittered” masses “of the lower middle class and peasantry”, rallying them around 
‘the militarist-nationalist “militias”’ (Bauer in Bottomore, p 168). Here Bauer referred 
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not only to Austria but also to Germany and Italy, as well as other nations set upon a 
fascist trajectory during the crisis period emerging from the Great Depression. 
 
More specifically Bauer associated the rise of fascism with deeper structural crises of 
capitalism in the post-World War I environment. Here “the capitalist class sought to 
restore [profits] by raising the level of exploitation” and reversing past working-class 
gains (Bauer in Bottomore, p 168). Bauer summarised the situation aptly when he 
wrote: “In bourgeois democracy the capitalist class rules, but it rules under the 
constant pressure of the working class” (Bauer in Bottomore, p 176). However, 
uncertain about whether it could achieve its ends under democracy, the bourgeoisie 
turned to the fascist militias. In Italy, then in Germany, at first it ignored fascist 
violence, then it armed the fascists, and finally “persuaded the state apparatus to hand 
over power to the fascists” (Bauer in Bottomore, p 168). Bauer continues, “as a result 
of the help which it had received from the bourgeoisie fascism became too strong to 
serve as a mere tool, and sought power itself” (Bauer in Bottomore, pp 173-174). 
 
Yet Bauer also noted how “the development of the [still essentially capitalist] 
economy [remained] dependent on the rate of profit” and thus “the interests of profit-
making [disguised] themselves as community interests” (Bauer in Bottomore, p 178). 
Here the class interests of fascism’s bourgeois allies ensured that fascist elites would 
ultimately turn against their petty-bourgeois base. In the German instance: “Hitler 
crushed the petty bourgeois rebellion of the S.A. which demanded a “second 
revolution” (Bauer in Bottomore, p 179). Emerging from this, therefore, was “the 
unlimited dictatorship of large capital and the large landowners”, in alliance with the 
fascist state, a “capitalist-militarist dictatorship” (Bauer in Bottomore, pp 180, 183). 
Potentially dissenting civil interests, meanwhile, were silenced “as a result of the 
incorporation of their organisations and the abolition of freedom of the press and of 
voting” (Bauer in Bottomore, p 178). 
 
Bauer was also notable for his appreciation of the appeal and nature of fascist 
propaganda in the context of the totalitarian state. Hence, he noted the power of “radio 
and films”, as well as “the techniques of mass organisation and mass demonstrations”, 
including exploitation of “youth organisation … of sport … and of children’s and 
youth organisations” (Bauer in Bottomore, pp 184-185). 
 
By the time Bauer was writing (1938), it was also apparent that aggressive fascism in 
Germany and Italy was preparing and re-arming for war. This effectively meant 
ending the Depression by fully utilising all available human and material resources. 
Even as terror descended and freedom was crushed many were impressed; the total 
fascist state imposed the will of its leading caste without need for compromise, or 
accommodation of civil rights for dissenters (Bauer in Bottomore, p 181). As Bauer 
explained, this “managed economy”, 
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retards the growth of unemployment by inflationary and super-protectionist 
economic policies. It depresses wages ruthlessly, reduces “social overheads”, 
and thus restores the level of profits. It forces the unemployed ruthlessly into 
compulsory labour, and hence can boast of great public works. (Bauer in 
Bottomore, p 181) 
 
Elements of the capitalist class, sensing the possibility of war, would recoil from 
fascism at this point. War, after all, is not good for trade; nor is total mobilisation 
amenable to the retail sector. Further, “the rentier class … fears a decline in share 
values”. Bauer explained at the time, and perhaps hopefully, that these factors “set the 
Fascist governing caste in opposition to factions of the capitalist ruling class” (Bauer 
in Bottomore, pp 181-182). The die was already cast, however. When war came, it 
would only further strengthen the hand of this Nazi “caste”. 
 
Max Adler on German Fascism 
 
Writing in 1933, before Austrian socialism’s destruction, Max Adler argued that 
internal divisions in the German proletariat had been essential to the rise of German 
fascism. Going further than the Marxist schema of working class, reserve army of 
labour, and lumpenproletariat, Adler supposed more “fundamental divisions” had rent 
the proletariat asunder, and in ways not at all anticipated by Marx (Adler in 
Bottomore, pp 224-225). Rather Adler posits the growth of a labour aristocracy, both 
the most skilled workers with the highest salaries, and professional labour movement 
functionaries who had become divorced from the experiences and consciousness of 
rank and file workers (Adler in Bottomore, p 229-230). 
 
Even at the time of the First International (in the nineteenth century) there had existed 
a fear that ‘the improvement of the workers’ position … “would leave a wholly 
impoverished fifth estate”’. Engels specifically had warned of the threat of 
embourgeoisement, “in the sense of petty bourgeois respectability and ideals” and 
abandonment of a class-struggle perspective. Here there was also the influence of 
ideas of economic/class mobility (Adler in Bottomore, pp 227-228). Referring in part 
to German social democracy, Adler held that these tendencies can lead to a “harmful 
degeneration”, a “fatal division of labour”. With “strict parliamentarianism”, “the 
well-informed parliamentary group and its view of policy was to replace the activities 
of the party as a whole” (Adler in Bottomore, pp 236-238).  
 
Hence, Adler explains: 
 
Thus there was accomplished one of the most fatal changes possible in a living 
party, its outcome being the weakening in the mass membership of the readiness 
for action and responsibility. They were almost drilled to wait first for 
commands from above, so that they did not have a view of their own; and they 
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regarded all those who formed their own judgements, or were critical, as 
destroying or splitting the party. (Adler in Bottomore, p 238) 
 
Most crucially, this orientation served to erode, 
 
the revolutionary spirit of the leading strata [with the effect of] intellectual 
disarmament … one obvious consequence of which was the neglect of any 
preparations for physical defence, thus leaving the German labour movement 
incapable of decision and action. (Adler in Bottomore, p 231) 
 
With the Depression there arose a stratum of permanently unemployed who had not 
seen work for many years. Adler contends, 
 
it is vain to … appeal to them to uphold and defend [the social and political 
achievements of the workers movement] since they do not experience, and have 
little prospect of ever enjoying, the benefits of these achievements. (Adler in 
Bottomore, p 242) 
 
Amidst this human tragedy the German Social Democrats largely supposed the crisis 
was only temporary. However, as the years went by the Depression continued. Adler 
explained how “the unemployed were driven almost entirely into the ranks of the 
Communists”, with a division between “the satisfied workers” supporting the German 
Social Democrats and the communists as “the party of the unemployed and the 
hungry” (Adler in Bottomore, pp 243-244). The fateful consequence of these 
circumstances was that while only the employed had the means to fight, for instance 
by “a general strike” but did not have the leadership, the unemployed “did appeal for 
a general strike … but had no means of carrying it out” (Adler in Bottomore, p 244). 
 
For Adler the crucial issue of the day was that of “[re-establishing] the working class 
itself as a united, harmonious community, capable of waging economic and 
ideological struggles”, this being “the real condition for that desired organisational 
united front” (Adler in Bottomore, pp 247-248). Arguably, the logic of this position 
also suggested conciliation and co-operation between Social Democrats and 
Communists, if not organisational re-integration then at least a working popular front. 
It was the tragedy of the German working-class movement that the united front so 
desired by Adler was not achieved; few had perceived the forces at work with such 
clarity as this important theorist. Adler’s analysis remains useful and instructive even 
now. It comprises a warning should such tendencies arise again and is an aid for 
historical understanding. 
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Conflicting and Mediating Themes in Austro-Marxism 
 
Austro-Marxism during the years of crisis, dissolution and exile is usefully considered 
from a number of stances: the themes of determinism and alleged passivity and 
fatalism (of which Bauer has been accused by some), and counter-posing this to the 
active perspective of Max Adler, and in addition to Adler’s effective renunciation of 
dialectical materialism. Also relevant here are conflicting or mediating themes of 
individualism and collectivism, and the very nature of the human condition. The 
themes of mediation and conciliation versus radical negation, which became 
practically manifest with a series of retreats and compromises leading, finally, to the 
dissolution and defeat of the SDAP are also relevant. Most specifically, these issues 
found expression in an effective strategy of dual power exercised by the Austro-
Marxists. 
 
Some see in Austro-Marxism during its years of decline a kind of passivity and 
fatalism, somewhat akin to similar critiques of Kautsky and centrism. Rabinbach 
argues that this perspective led to an “inheritor” outlook; that is, effectively that the 
task of socialists was to prepare ethically, patiently and practically for the future, and 
the necessary course of history and economic development would ultimately lead to 
socialist transition “with a minimum of resistance” (Rabinbach, pp 45-46, pp 60-61). 
As we have seen, their optimism was greatly mistaken. Yet, the Austro-Marxists 
theory and politics assumed a subjective dimension as well. The idea that subjective 
participation in politics, education and cultural preparation were essential and 
necessary for future transition assumed a further dimension than mere cold economic 
necessity. Nowhere is this better epitomised than in the work of Max Adler. Adler’s 
defence of free will is robust and quite distinct from Kautsky’s notion of “willing 
individuals” who nonetheless enjoy no free will of their own. Crucially, Adler writes 
of Marx in his The Sociological Meaning of Karl Marx’s Thought that, 
 
the materialist conception of history is concerned simply with the activities of 
the human mind by which it establishes and develops the conditions of life 
through social labour … Hence in this theory “man” is not “sacrificed” to 
“economic laws” with “cold inevitability”; facing these laws with “activity” 
rather than “passivity” is what “Marx called revolutionary praxis.” (Adler in 
Bottomore, p 67) 
 
In his ‘A Critique of Spann’s Sociology’, Adler contends that, 
 
besides physical causality, which itself takes various forms, there is also 
physiological and psychological causality. While physical causality proceeds 
without consciousness, physiological causality occurs only in, and 
psychological causality through consciousness. (Adler in Bottomore, p 72) 
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In an apparent compromise between collectivist and individualist outlooks: 
 
Sociology, if it wants to remain an empirical science, must seek and find society 
where all experience is alone possible, namely in the individual consciousness. 
Hence even sociology cannot start from a totality, but must begin with the 
individual. This individual, however, is socialised man, that is to say, in Marx’s 
sense, an individual who only makes his historical appearance associated with 
other men in relations of work and social intercourse. … [The] conditions of our 
experience are constituted not only by space, time, and categories, but also by 
other consciousness’s. (Adler in Bottomore, p 75) 
 
Hence, Max Adler’s position at the least begins with an effectively Kantian 
epistemological scepticism as distinct from Marxism’s traditional attempt to grasp 
totality through the dialectical method, and as a dialectical and historical process. In 
this regard, his perspective is similar to that of Bernstein. This is important as it 
suggests a potentially greater role for the individual will, and a relative openness of 
history. With Adler, the individual subject is capable both of critical reflection and 
action, but only in the context of necessarily a priori social and economic relations. 
For Adler it can be said this is the human condition. The emphasis on the individual, 
here, is also suggestive of compromise between individualism and collectivist values. 
 
Certainly Austro-Marxist leader Otto Bauer’s outlook was often one of pessimistic 
(some might simply say ‘sober’) assessment of objective material circumstances. Like 
Kautsky, Bauer baulked at violence when faced with any impasse, perhaps even 
where there was the prospect of resolving that impasse through force in socialism’s 
favour, and like Kautsky, Bauer was acutely aware of the potential human toll of civil 
war, and had a passionate aversion to violence. This was the case in 1918-20 and 
remained the case in 1927 and in 1933-34. The example of the Russian Civil War, 
perhaps was instructive. 
 
The Austro-Marxists, by virtue of an effective dual-power strategy maintaining their 
own paramilitary presence were not naïve reformists. Their strategy of defensive force 
comprised a true Third Way between purely parliamentary reform and (Bolshevist) 
revolution. Arguably, though, fear of sparking repression and civil war, or even 
foreign intervention (Italian, Hungarian, but especially German) as a consequence of 
right-wing provocations was continuously prominent in the minds of Austro-Marxist 
strategists (Rabinbach, p 38). While consistent over-restraint fed into a brazen over-
confidence among the forces of reaction – who might have accepted a real 
compromise much earlier had the threat of the Schutzbund and mobilised proletariat 
appeared more credible earlier on – this is not the whole story. 
 
In practice, Bauer and others on the Social Democratic Executive were willing to go 
to great lengths for provisional reconciliation, to avert the human cost of a civil war 
and to address the greater threat of German fascism. Further, there was the underlying 
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assumption of many Austro-Marxists that capitalist contradictions would still 
necessarily develop and resolve themselves in such a way that the ruling class itself 
would finally admit the sheer necessity of socialism, ceding power with something 
more like a whimper than some grand-final confrontation. If socialism remained 
inevitable still, and there remained hope for compromise, Austro-Marxist leaders 
preferred patience to risky initiative that would cost lives. Unfortunately, the threat of 
defensive force meant little as the bourgeoisie and fascist paramilitaries came to 
assume that the Schutzbund itself comprised “a paper tiger”. Of relevance here is 
Leon Trotsky’s telling observation: “You may not be interested in war, but war is 
interested in you” (Trotsky, L in Potgieter, T. & Liebenberg, I., p 287). 
 
Comparing the Bolshevist and Austro-Marxist responses to dual power – growth from 
within versus revolutionary will to power – shows how some of the differences 
worked in practice. Both the Bolsheviks and the Austro-Marxists pursued a dual-
power strategy at some time. For the Bolsheviks this was brief, in the early phases of 
the Russian Revolution, with the initial formation of the Soviets. The Soviets, soon 
complemented by the Red Army, were to form the embryonic workers’ state. 
However, the price of seizing state power and, indeed, of establishing a new state 
apparatus was the escalation of a brutal and costly civil war – an ‘escalation’, as the 
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly came after the formation of the White 
Russian forces, e.g., Kornilov, which were already hostile to the Russian Republic. 
Here the Bolshevist will to power was supposed to overcome all obstacles and, 
indeed, at any cost. 
 
By contrast, Austria was marked by an extensive period of dual power, initially with 
SDAP domination of the post-war Volkswehr (Peoples’ Army), and later with the 
formation of the paramilitary Schutzbund. However, this was under conditions of 
peaceful compromise and national unity government with the conservative Christian 
Socials. The coming decades in contrast with the civil war and terror in Russia were 
marked in Austria instead by the SDAP’s cultural and electoral strategies that had 
Vienna a showcase for social democracy. Meanwhile, although the Bolsheviks 
accused the Austro-Marxists of abandoning the international revolution in 1918-20; 
from the Austro-Marxists’ perspective there was merely a rejection of the Bolshevist 
path, and more particularly the conviction that it could not work in Austria. Later 
attempts to forge a Vienna International, otherwise referred to as the ‘Two and a Half 
International’, demonstrated that the Austro-Marxists were still serious about the 
principles and practice of internationalism. 
 
Austro-Marxist compromise in 1918-1920 was aimed at avoiding descent into a civil 
war, which would pitch Vienna against much of the countryside, and might have 
resulted in entente intervention. In the short-term there was a policy of conciliation, 
but the negation of capitalism remained the ultimate objective. Thereafter, gradual 
electoral gains by the Austro-Marxists raised the prospect of a coalition government 
led by the SDAP. These gains were buttressed by the Austro-Marxists’ vigorous 
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cultural strategy. By the time a working majority was achieved, the situation of dual 
power and equilibrium was passing. A parliamentary majority had been gained but 
state power itself eluded the SDAP. Having failed to press home the political 
revolution in 1918-20, and having allowed a gradual decline in the morale, prestige 
and organisation of the Schutzbund, Austro-Marxism collapsed under the iron heel of 
Austrofascism in 1934. Long before, Kautsky had been correct; there was no 
alternative to some kind of political revolution – even if peaceful and gradual. 
 
This is not to say that the Austro-Marxists ought have taken the Bolshevist path, and 
there is so much in the Austro-Marxist example that inspires when contrasted with the 
alternative of Stalinist terror. Rather, a more robust policy of dual power, including a 
fuller capitalisation on the advantage the Austro-Marxists enjoyed in 1918-20 may 
have established a democratic republic with solid foundations: With functioning 
workers’ councils in a context of institutionalised codetermination – these may have 
ensured the preconditions for a democratic socialist victory – secured via a strong 
republic and democratic state, with the ‘insurance policy’ of a committed republican 
army and a credible Schutzbund as last resort. 
 
The consequence of all this is that both the potential and the limitations of cultural 
mobilisation need to be kept in mind. Bauer probably was right, that there was a 
period of equilibrium during which neither the SDAP nor the Conservatives held total 
state power, but perhaps too eager for compromise and even temporary conciliation, 
the opportunity was spent. The Austro-Marxists may well have been correct to avoid 
the Bolshevist path and civil war but there will forever be the question: ‘What might 
have been?’ Even amidst dual power, the state gradually reverted to its role as both a 
class instrument and as the instrument of the traditional cultural-conservative 
ideology. 
 
The opportunity for more thoroughgoing revolutionary reform was there to be grasped 
in 1918-1920 – but without civil war – that is, when the SDAP enjoyed the greatest 
political leverage and bargaining power over their Conservative (later fascist) rivals. 
The conciliation of reform and social-democratic revolution, if it is to work, rests 
upon both a practical incrementalism and a readiness to press forward the reform 
programme boldly when the opportunity arises. It also demands a comprehension of 
the nature of state power, and of globally reinforcing bourgeois economic interests. 
With regard the opposition of principle and pragmatism, both the Bolsheviks and the 
Austro-Marxists may be seen as principled or pragmatic at different times and in 
different ways. The Bolsheviks embraced a mentality of ‘whatever it takes’, a 
pragmatism of sorts, and yet, would not compromise in their final goal or in their 
determination to implement the dictatorship of the proletariat as they construed it. 
They interpreted the compromises of the Mensheviks, Austro-Marxists and others as 
opportunism. In comparison, the Austro-Marxists were pragmatic in their strategic 
pursuit of national unity in order to avoid the human toll of civil war. In certain 
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respects this was to backfire on them. This strategy was based upon the principled 
position of valuing human life. 
 
Other Austro-Marxist Legacies 
 
As we have observed, the Austro-Marxist legacy arising from the 1925-1934 period 
was hardly insignificant: Apart from their practical example of cultural counter-
hegemony and dual power there were also ground-breaking critiques of: the sources 
of, and nature of fascism; of divisions on the Left; and of the phenomenon of labour 
aristocracy and the emergence of a fifth estate. 
 
From the period preceding the 1925-1934 time frame, Rudolf Hilferding’s work on 
finance capital (Finanzkapital, 1910) and the organised capitalism arising out of 
World War I are also well worthy of mention. Finanzkapital concerned the rise of 
banking capital and economic concentration, with capital seeking the areas of highest 
profitability, and with capital export and the conquest of foreign markets dependent 
on the size of domestic economies. Hilferding saw the rise of finance capital, most 
importantly with the result of centralized ownership and control, as actually 
expediting the socialisation of the means of production (Harold James, pp 847-855). 
 
Later, during the First World War and in its wake, Hilferding came to see the rise of a 
wartime general cartel, with the ensuing suggestion that “the imperialist state”, 
involving “the most concentrated form of economic power”, could be “easily 
overthrown”, and exactly on account of that narrow concentration. Indeed, the rise of 
precisely such an imperialism was seen by Hilferding as potentially expediting the 
proletarian seizure of power (Harold James, pp 856-857). It is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to engage with this material in depth, except to say that in Hilferding’s 
work in the milieu of post-World War I and the Depression era, German social 
democracy was hindered by coalition politics and the demands of the Liberal DVP 
(i.e., German People’s Party) for tax cuts, with the consequence of sharp deflation 
(Harold James, pp 862-866). 
 
Both Hilferding and his German social-democratic contemporaries had seen European 
unification as creating a larger market, delivering a decisive stimulus to the European 
economy; but as fascism reared its ugly head this was rendered politically impossible. 
Neither was the Soviet model seen as a solution, for as Hilferding had observed, under 
Stalinism “the pretty-obvious link between socialism and freedom is torn” (Harold 
James, pp 866-888). 
 
Meanwhile, Max Adler, relegated to the practical-political margins, was perhaps the 
most innovative and radical Austro-Marxist thinker. His appreciation of subjectivity 
and objectivity and their conditioning of each other, met by workers with 
revolutionary praxis (the unity of theory and practice) comprises an interpretation of 
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and variation upon Marx that holds hope for the power of free will and reflection in 
the context of an appreciation of the necessarily and essentially social nature of 
humankind. 
 
His practical critique of social-democratic hierarchy and the stifling of political 
initiative from below also strikes a chord in the modern day. Social democracy 
certainly has not been immune from Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy”. Now, as then, 
independent activity and criticism are seen as breaches of discipline or even of 
loyalty. Oligarchy and patronage are maintained in direct opposition to the doctrines 
of human liberation advanced historically by the Left. Adler was able to perceive this 
and to declare openly the nature of the problem, perhaps precisely because of his 
position on the relative margins of the party hierarchy. 
 
Austro-Marxism provides an object lesson in the need for both free initiative from 
below and at the same time for discipline when necessary. There is the need for 
restraint in the face of provocation intended to create the pretext for repression. The 
1927 riots, after all, were the beginning of the end for Austro-Marxism, but there is 
also a need for – as Adler called it – “readiness and responsibility” among the mass 
membership (Alder in Bottomore, p 238). Indeed, that is the stuff of the living, 
breathing and self-correcting proletarian democracy as envisaged by Luxemburg. The 
Austro-Marxists provide an object lesson in the potential and possible pit-falls of 
dual-power strategy, and most particularly that of a democratic-defensive, dual-power 
approach. Their strategy here also underscores the possible dangers posed by the 
capitalist state, and most particularly its fascist variant. Hence the success of their 
cultural strategy in mobilising hundreds of thousands ought to factor into left 
strategies even today; but so, too, should the ease with which the fascist state crushed 
these institutions once social democracy’s “dual power insurance policy” – the 
Schutzbund and social democratic penetration of the “Volkswehr” – was removed 
from the equation. Both for their theoretical contributions, and their practical 
cultural/counter-hegemonic examples, the Austro-Marxists have left us a valuable 
legacy in their responses to dilemmas that the Left of the early twenty-first century 
faces, whether it realises it or not. 
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Chapter Nine: 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
In this thesis I have sought to explore a number of arguments. First, I argued that there 
is a multiplicity of currents in left politics that may be considered Third Roads or 
Third Ways during the 1848-1934 period. Second, I argued that these Third Roads 
and Third Ways developed relative to the First Ways and Second Ways of capitalism 
and the dominant radical left currents that emerged at different times during the 
period in question. Third, I argued that these relative Third Roads and Third Ways 
tackled a substantial array of contested themes, and that their response to these themes 
helped to define practical and theoretical responses. Indeed, in their response to those 
contested themes, these Third Roads and Third Ways provided a defensible legacy. It 
is important to address these themes because these neglected traditions have important 
insights that otherwise may be lost, and because the democratic left traditions have a 
redeeming potential when posed alongside Stalinism, for instance, and the widespread 
view that socialism is totalitarian and to be discredited. 
 
The many and varied Third Roads and Third Ways responded in different ways to 
such oppositions as determinism/ contingency, materialism/ idealism, negation/ 
conciliation, internationalism/ nationalism, objectivism/ subjectivism, reform/ 
revolution, authoritarianism/ liberty, principle/ pragmatism, and orthodoxy/ 
revisionism, and others explored in the thesis, which are too numerous to list here. 
 
Specifically, the Third Roads during the period 1848-1934 included the following: 
 
 Luxemburgian libertarian Marxism; 
 Orthodox or centrist Marxism after 1914; and 
 Austro-Marxism. 
 
The socialist Third Ways included: 
 
 Lassalleanism; and 
 Bernsteinian revisionism. 
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Luxemburgian Marxism, Austro-Marxism and some lineages of orthodox Marxism 
were defined here as Third Roads to the extent that they maintained the final goal, the 
communist goal, of the Marxist movement, and sought to respond to contested themes 
such as reform/revolution. Luxemburg’s libertarian Marxist perspective can also be 
considered a Third Road in that it stands implacably opposed to the reality of a 
Stalinism (the Second Way of its time) that embraced “socialism in one country”, 
never-ending terror and labour militarisation, and which substituted Soviet foreign 
policy for the interests of international socialism.  
 
Marx and Engels’ scientific socialism, and the orthodox and later, centrist Marxism 
were the dominant revolutionary Second Way before 1914; so it is important to 
consider centrist Marxism given that it lost its Second Way status with the rise of 
Bolshevism. Depending on interpretation, it emerges instead as a Third Road, or even 
a Third Way when the degeneration of Stalinism is considered. By contrast, 
Bernsteinian revisionism outright rejected the notion of some final goal. Lassalle 
meanwhile proposed a different end goal. This meant a strong enabling state using its 
power to lift the masses from poverty and ignorance, while establishing universal 
suffrage and bringing about an economy on the basis of workers’ co-operatives. 
Therefore, because they reject the final goal of Marxian socialism, we define these 
perspectives as Third Ways. 
 
With Stalinism emerging as the dominant Second Way, the nexus between socialism, 
freedom and democracy is torn violently. Those currents which are truer to Marxist 
tradition – of Luxemburg, orthodoxy, Austro-Marxism – and so at odds with 
Stalinism that they can all be legitimately interpreted as Third Ways. That is, Ways 
that advance on the idea that it is not merely the means that are in question, but the 
final ends as well. 
 
Our treatment of relative Third Roads and Third Ways has not been exhaustive, for 
that task goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus, regrettably, the thesis does not 
give the attention due to Rosselli or Martov, or Swedish democratic revisionism in 
any depth. In concluding, I will summarize some legacies of the various Third Road 
and Third Way proponents, and then draw connections between the writers in relation 
to some of the most important contested themes they negotiated. 
 
Lassalle 
 
Ferdinand Lassalle forwarded a left Hegelian political socialism based on the 
principle of producers’ co-operatives with state aid, on an early notion of a positive 
(as opposed to repressive) enabling state, on the pursuit of free, universal and equal 
suffrage, and on strategies of class collaboration with the imperial Prussian state. 
Lassalle’s left Hegelian viewpoint mediated between materialist notions of class 
struggle and idealist notions of final conciliation, promoted through the development 
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of the socialist idea. Notably, as opposed to Marx, Lassalle viewed the class struggle 
in political and legal terms. Hence, he saw, as he called it, the ‘fourth estate’ as the 
bearer of the socialist idea, which heralded final conciliation. Thus, his thought can be 
seen as a mediating force between radical socialism, which under Marx adopted a 
materialist posture, and idealism, for which the spiritual was paramount. It could be 
argued that economism was embraced by much of the Left, and that Lassalle’s 
emphasis on political and legal forms as autonomous served to mediate between 
economistic and political notions of socialism. 
 
Unlike Marxists such as Kautsky, Lassalle did not assume that the liberal bourgeois 
revolution had to come first. Unlike Bernstein and Marx and others, he saw the state 
as a vehicle for freedom, including the cultural freedom to fully develop people’s 
human potential, including freedom from ignorance. This contrasted with Marx’s 
notion that the state would ultimately wither away. In contrast with Lassalle, Marx 
and Bernstein saw the state overwhelmingly and necessarily as an engine of class 
despotism. Lassalle’s strategic and theoretical insights comprised a significant legacy, 
as did his distinctness from Marxism. At a personal level, he contributed greatly to the 
formative stage of German social democracy. 
 
Eduard Bernstein 
 
Bernstein challenged the orthodoxy of his time, developing an apparently reformist 
revisionism that nonetheless adhered to much from Marx. This revisionism included a 
modification of Marx’s labour theory of value. His theoretical edifice was more 
eclectic than totalising. While retaining a sense of progressive teleology, he rejected 
the grand class-struggle dialectic as the central driving force in all history. He was 
among the first socialists to recognise the resilience of capitalism, as against theories 
of crisis, class bifurcation and collapse. He also provided useful theoretical and 
practical syntheses with regard liberalism and socialism. His theoretical legacy was 
significant, as was his practical commitment as a socialist parliamentarian and as an 
activist for the cause of peace during the First World War. 
 
There are a number of themes in tension developed by Bernstein. Much of this 
occurred in the context of the so-called revisionist controversy, through which 
Bernstein apparently rejected the revolutionary outlook, embracing instead an 
evolutionary or reformist perspective. The most basic theoretical objection from 
Bernstein to the Marxist orthodoxy was the materialist dialectic itself, which, given 
Bernstein’s sceptical epistemological outlook, could not be assumed. Abandoning the 
theoretical mission of grasping totality, Bernstein’s practical eclecticism adopts 
whatever theoretical insights and models as prove useful in the class struggle and that 
for him, even regardless of parliamentarism and gradualism, persists at a higher level. 
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Bernstein’s theoretical legacy includes his rejection of impending capitalist collapse 
or catastrophe (in the foreseeable future), and, therefore, (and as opposed to 
Luxemburg, for example) the notion of socialism as an objective necessity. Yet, at the 
same time and despite his rejection of dialectical materialism, his sense of teleology 
supposed a progressive accumulation of reforms that was a one-way street. Here 
teleology can be counter-posed to historical indeterminacy. Despite the difficulties 
involved here, given successive defeats for socialism over many decades, Bernstein’s 
revisionism still comprises a potentially useful source for the modern Left. Indeed, 
given Bernstein’s teleological assumptions, reforms could conceivably be accrued 
over many decades, with the ultimate effect of transforming quantity to quality, that 
is, a kind of slow revolution, to adopt an Austro-Marxist term. In that way Bernstein 
can either be seen as an out-and-out reformist or he can be interpreted as bridging the 
reform/revolution divide, even if unconsciously. 
 
Drawing on Mouffe, we can propose the question: Does Bernstein seek to supress 
class struggle through the corporate confinement of the working class? Or (and contra 
Berman) does he see class struggle leading forward to qualitative change? If we cast 
the question like this, Bernstein begins to appear more radical, though many would 
still resist casting him, in his revisionist phase, as a revolutionary because of his 
evolutionary and gradualist arguments and his emphasis on parliament (Mouffe and 
Laclau, pp 29-30). 
 
Bernstein’s legacy includes his synthesis of objectivist and subjectivist perspectives 
pertaining to the labour theory of value, and his rejection of class bifurcation, 
anticipated the extent to which the middle class would fade away in one form, only to 
be resurrected in another – for example, the modern middle class, which for Marxists 
could be seen as an aristocracy of labour. It also needs to be recognised and 
emphasised that Bernstein’s position was not one of sweeping refutation of all 
Marxism but, rather, an engagement with Marxism and a revision of a number of 
contested themes. Importantly, Bernstein also upholds the validity of a broad 
interpretation of socialism and not just an economistic one. We could refer to it as a 
pluralistic interpretation as opposed to an economistic interpretation. Hence his use of 
concepts such as “juridical notions” of equality and justice, “characterisation as a 
social science”, “identification with the class struggle”, and “co-operative economics” 
(Bernstein, pp 95-96). Crucially, Bernstein saw socialism as the legitimate heir to 
liberalism (Bernstein, pp 149-150). 
 
Contrary to common interpretation, Bernstein can be perceived as a bridge between 
Marxism and pragmatic reformism. His reformist approach has appeal but 
engagement with Bernstein also means engagement with many key Marxist concepts. 
Further, if we reconceive reforms after the fashion of slow revolution it is possible to 
reconcile such themes – for example, reform versus revolution. His theoretical 
insights, their influence on later social democracy, and his political activism all 
provide a valuable legacy. 
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Rosa Luxemburg 
 
Luxemburg upheld principles of necessary capitalist collapse and socialist revolution, 
as well as the spontaneity of the masses. Her theorization of spontaneity was more 
complex than often recognised by critics, involving a dialectic whereby the socialist 
party-political leadership did lead but did so also in the context of adaptation to 
proletarian initiative. This was to include strategies such as the mass strike. In perhaps 
the most important aspect of her legacy she strove to reconcile the themes of 
revolution, liberty and democracy in the face of extreme ‘ends-means calculations’ 
(Steger) made by the Bolsheviks, including the use of state terror. In this form, as a 
redemptive pole of attraction for revolutionary socialism and socialism more 
generally, that is her most significant legacy. 
 
For Luxemburg there were no grey areas between reform and revolution. One was 
exclusive of the other and, therefore, we cannot speak of Luxemburg mediating these 
themes. Her aim was the suppression and replacement of the system of wage labour 
by democratic organisation. For Luxemburg, the orthodox or centrist commitment to 
revolution became merely rhetorical; reform and revolution were mutually exclusive. 
Here reform takes place within the framework, “created by the last revolution” and we 
might extrapolate that Luxemburg is rejecting the constraints of a purely legalistic and 
constitutional approach to change, as opposed to the act of revolution, which imposes 
a new constitution by force in the context of the class struggle (Luxemburg in Hudis 
and Anderson pp 155-156). 
 
Luxemburg understood socialism as a necessity and not merely of one historical 
choice among many. In Luxemburg’s view capitalism’s Achilles heel was its 
imperative to constantly expand into new markets, in part the consequence of 
overproduction and competition. Competition for limited markets led to imperialist 
war, but moreover, even ultra-imperialism – as considered by Kautsky as the agreed 
joint exploitation of the world by the great capitalist powers – could not save 
capitalism forever. Capitalism would ultimately reach the condition where it became 
truly global and, therefore, could not externalise markets for exploitation and the 
dumping of excess produce. That was inevitable and would mean a crisis of under-
consumption, which would provoke a collapse, necessarily followed by socialism or 
by barbarism. 
 
On the other hand, Luxemburg did mediate between the themes of revolution, liberty 
and democracy. She held the substance of revolution to be democratic, as opposed to 
increasing centralism resulting in the effective dictatorship of a narrow stratum of 
Bolshevist leaders under Lenin (The Bolshevik Central Committee). For Rosa 
Luxemburg, democracy essentially involved human liberty – liberty as a value in and 
of itself – but also as the source of self-criticism and hence correction. So, again, she 
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can be interpreted as seeking to reconcile socialism, liberty and democracy in the 
wake of Bolshevism. (Even more so, her insights could be applied to later Stalinism) 
As such, she stands as an important source for the redemption of the socialist 
tradition. That is part of her legacy. 
 
Her notion of working-class spontaneity also stands in contrast to Kautsky’s 
preference for deliberate, conscious development of socialist organisation and Lenin’s 
emphasis on centralized discipline. She must not be understood as denying the need 
for leadership but, rather, as advocating a leadership that adapted to proletarian 
initiative, and in that context helped provide direction in stormy times. This specific 
dialectical understanding of the developing of class consciousness and socialist 
consciousness through the school of class struggle also contrasts with Lenin’s 
conception of consciousness, as necessarily being injected into the working class from 
outside, from the vanguard party. So, Luxemburg can be seen as mediating the themes 
of proletarian self-initiative and socialist leadership, that is, as providing a synthesis. 
 
Apart from acting as a pole of moral redemption for socialism – reconciling socialist 
revolution with liberty and democracy – there are other aspects to Luxemburg’s 
legacy. That legacy includes her critique of necessary capitalist collapse, and of the 
associated phenomena of under-consumption and globalism, as well as her 
theorization of the factor of spontaneity in revolution, and the revolutionary strategy 
of the mass strike. In this these endeavours she argued against Bernstein’s thesis of 
capitalist adaptation, as well as Kautsky’s notion of disciplined, conscious collective 
struggle. 
 
Her uncompromising stand on reform versus revolution does not concede the 
possibility of a series of democratic constitutional breaks, which might instead be 
envisaged as the substance of slow revolution – a notion that on the other hand, might 
be accommodated with Bernstein, or even Kautsky. Regardless, her legacy is 
significant. 
 
Karl Kautsky 
 
As considered in this thesis, Karl Kautsky is often regarded as something of an anti-
hero on the modern far Left as a consequence of his original equivocation with 
regards the First World War; but also crucially because of his critique of Lenin and 
the Bolsheviks. He is interesting in that he epitomises an older Marxist tradition 
harking back to the early Second International. He developed a distinct orthodox 
reading of Marx, and later, a distinct centrism in opposition to both revisionism and 
leftism, and after the rise of Bolshevism the centrism he advocated could be 
considered a kind of relative Third Road or Third Way. At a practical level no one did 
more than Kautsky to popularise Marxism after Marx’s own passing in the late 
nineteenth century. (except perhaps Engels for a time) Not only did Kautsky interpret 
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and promote Marx’s own work; Kautsky also developed such themes as, “neither 
reform nor revolution at any price”; disciplined, developed consciousness and 
organisation; and strategic and tactical conservatism, as opposed to spontaneity and a 
more aggressive use of the mass-strike strategy (vide, Luxemburg). 
 
Kautsky is worth considering today largely because of the redeeming strength of his 
criticisms of the Bolsheviks and his anticipation that socialism would be discredited 
as a consequence of desperate voluntarist strategies based on militarisation of labour, 
suppression of liberties, extreme centralization and terror (Trotsky, pp 157-159). 
 
Kautsky’s centrism had many components. He maintained the need for political and 
social revolution, including a shift of power relations in the state itself. As against 
reformism, Kautsky “retained the conviction that capitalism’s contradictions could not 
be overcome from within capitalism” (Steenson, p 78). He preferred peaceful means 
of class struggle, and even then believed that the organised working class needed to 
keep its powder dry lest it exhaust itself or provoke repression; it was not yet strong 
enough to overcome. Like Marx, Kautsky preferred open class struggle as opposed to 
conspiracy, and he believed the associated conflicts would involve great social 
convulsions that gathered pace over decades. 
 
For Kautsky, specifically there were assumed two possible strategies: “annihilation” 
or “attrition”, similar in some ways to Gramsci’s “war of movement” and “war of 
position”. The strategy of attrition may be conceived as a gradual wearing down of 
the class enemy, including through the channels of suffrage. Furthermore, because of 
his effective pacifism, this was Kautsky’s preferred strategy (Salvadori, pp 140–141). 
In this process, the working class would gain in strength and consciousness. This was 
held to be inevitable, as a consequence of irreconcilable antagonisms of class interest, 
with intensifying contradictions (overproduction, structural unemployment, periodic 
cyclical downturn, impoverishment etc.), intensified exploitation and growing social 
polarisation. This sense of inevitability also stemmed from Kautsky’s philosophical 
materialism, but as a consequence he stood accused of fatalism and of supporting a 
philosophy that provided a pretext for passivity. 
 
Hence, the conflicting themes that arise in Kautsky, including in his polemics with 
Lenin, Trotsky, Bernstein and Luxemburg include – Philosophical materialism (also 
necessity) versus voluntarism (and choice/contingency); dictatorship versus 
democracy; amelioration of alienation versus militarisation of labour; open class 
struggle versus conspiracy; orthodoxy versus revisionism and leftism 
(Luxemburg/Liebknecht); scientific socialism versus ethical socialism; permanent 
revolution versus stage-based revolution; annihilation versus attrition; and extreme 
ends and means calculations (Steger) versus neither reform nor revolution at any 
price. Also of note, Kautsky’s proposal of irreconcilable class antagonism is radically 
opposed to modern social-democratic state aspirations towards class conciliation. 
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As a philosophical materialist, Kautsky recognised human nature as being 
characterised by ‘will’, but not free will. The scientific method comprised of 
observing the social mechanics of class struggle through a series of epochs, driven – 
as Marx understood also – by a developing division of labour, and with the 
consequence also of an evolving mode of production. Another consequence of the 
scientific outlook as interpreted by Kautsky was that any formulation of an ethical 
basis for socialism was considered as of secondary importance at best. 
 
The consequence of Kautsky’s materialist determinism, as opposed to voluntarism, 
was that social democracy could not expedite revolution by virtue of will or 
imagination but had to wait for the maturing of material conditions. Accordingly, with 
the assumption of accelerating class-bifurcation, for Kautsky socialism became “the 
only thing possible” (Erfurt, pp 116-119). Hence, he faced accusations of promoting 
fatalism and passivity. The materialist/voluntarist opposition was grasped previously 
by Marx himself, for whom men make their own history but not as they choose, a 
stance suggesting a kind of mediation and conciliation of those themes in question. 
 
Kautsky’s schema also led him to endorse a theory of stage-based social revolution 
for which the bourgeois liberal revolution had to occur first. In accordance with this, it 
was assumed that Bolshevist attempts at collective will formation – including 
strategies such as state terror and labour militarisation – threatened to discredit the 
cause of socialism. To Kautsky – and others, for instance, Martov – Bolshevist 
voluntarism neglected the preconditions of industrialisation, and of the development 
of a numerically dominant, conscious and organised working class, a working class 
that would ultimately be empowered through the struggle for free, universal and equal 
suffrage. Another aspect of Kautsky’s understanding was that the bourgeois 
revolution had to come first in order to develop the means of production and hence to 
give rise to a strong working class, but also the political institutions of (bourgeois) 
liberal democracy. Here he stood in contrast with Trotsky and his variation on the 
theory of permanent revolution. 
 
Another problem not just with Kautsky, but with the old Marxist orthodoxy generally, 
is, as Mouffe and Laclau explain, its status as a closed paradigm where history had a 
pre-given telos and destination, and where interests and identities were fixed rather 
than being the consequence of contested articulations. The orthodox Marxists (such as 
Kautsky) inherited from Marx himself the essentialist notion of the proletariat as the 
universal class. Whereas today social class is neglected by social theorists in favour of 
theories of sexuality, gender and so on, during the classical years of Marxism the 
industrial working class was held to be the bearers of universal (human) 
emancipation. That is not to say the industrial working class does not have identifiable 
interests, but internal working class divisions and increased social complexity have 
put paid to notions of it as the bearer, on its own or alone in its own right, of universal 
redemption. 
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To summarise Kautsky’s legacy: In responding to those various contested themes 
discussed here Kautsky preserved the traditional nexus between democracy, freedom 
and equality. For generations he was reviled on the far Left for his criticisms of the 
Bolsheviks. However, with the benefit of hindsight we can see that he was right that 
extreme means and ends calculations (Steger) and those strategies that followed 
would backfire, discrediting the socialist cause for generations. 
 
The orthodoxy of Kautsky also had its virtues. A perspective of open class struggle is 
surely more democratic than a conspiratorial posture. However, we may never return 
to the confident Marxism of the classical years in which socialism was thought the 
only thing possible – it was a discourse very much in the spirit of the age, and fuelled 
progressive struggle in its time. Further, his notion of a strategy of attrition might be 
applicable today, having, as it does, similarities with Gramscian notions of counter-
hegemony and war of position. 
 
Despite Kautsky’s many flaws, he is a source to look to when refuting those who 
would conflate socialism with totalitarianism, or hold to the Thatcherist mantra “there 
is no alternative”. As against the common dismissals of Kautsky on the far Left, a 
balanced appraisal of his efforts acknowledges that his defence of the nexus between 
socialism, liberty and democracy provides a redeeming feature for the socialist 
tradition, and that he played a pivotal role in the popularisation of Marxism. That is 
all part of his legacy. 
 
Austro-Marxism 
 
The Austro-Marxists were the central force behind the Austrian revolution of 1918 
and used their strong position in the military as a foothold for a democratic republic. 
Thereafter, they maintained a state of dual power in defence of the democratic road to 
socialism in a sustained way that contrasted with Bolshevist strategy. This also 
dovetailed with their notions of slow revolution, and attempts to reconcile coldly 
realist and enthusiastic currents in socialism, and also, arguably, to mediate between 
and synthesise revolutionary and reformist tendencies. 
 
Following the revolution in Austria of 1918-1919, Austro-Marxism emerged as a 
movement in the tradition of pre-Bolshevik revolutionary Marxism: A movement at 
grips with the realities of state power; passionately committed to liberty and 
democracy; and willing to defend the democratic path through a strategy of dual 
power. However, in the years that immediately followed the Austrian revolution, the 
unwillingness of the Austro-Marxists to carry the revolution through was largely 
based on the isolation of the revolutionaries in Vienna itself, but also on the 
unviability of the rump Austrian state emerging from defeat in the Great War. The 
rump state seemed to have no hope of standing against Entente intervention, though as 
against this, Lenin and the Bolsheviks emphasized the war exhaustion of the Entente 
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as well. In addition, it may be supposed Bolshevist-style policies of land redistribution 
might have won over the peasantry. 
 
In this context it fell to the Austro-Marxists to attempt a mediation – and, indeed, a 
conciliation – between the themes of reform and revolution, principle and 
pragmatism, revolutionary enthusiasm and realpolitik. Practically, this took the form 
of a middle road between revisionism and right social democracy on the one hand, 
and Bolshevism on the other. In many ways, it was also a continuation of the old 
(revolutionary) social democracy. Here, notions of slow revolution arguably helped 
inspire the Eurocommunism of the 1970s and 1980s. For those seeking fundamental, 
qualitative (but gradual) change, these ideas are still instructive. 
 
The Austro-Marxists left an impressive, if neglected legacy. In the Austro-Marxists’ 
view there was a place for both ethics and the practical (i.e., scientific) disposition 
towards capitalism (Bauer in Bottomore, pp 81–84). This inclination to take ethics 
seriously addressed a blind spot in both orthodox and centrist Marxism, but even more 
so if we consider Bolshevism, and later Stalinism. Kant’s categorical imperative, to 
value every human life, and not treat any human being merely as a means, arguably 
suggested a radical critique of capitalism, and despite the resistance of Kautsky and 
others, could well be employed to complement Marx. 
 
As against the philosophical materialism common among orthodox Marxists, Max 
Adler especially was to effectively embrace a kind of Cartesian dualism for which 
there was the notion of some autonomy of ideas, where the “lawfulness of the mind” 
was “self-confirming”, through perception. At the same time, this Cartesian dualism 
involved a distinction between material and mental phenomena (Adler in Bottomore, 
pp 254, 257). Hence with regard to the base/superstructure Marxist intellectual 
construct, Adler holds that even ‘economic phenomena themselves are never 
“material” in the materialist sense, but have precisely a “mental” character’ – in the 
sense they involve conscious, willing human beings (Adler in Bottomore, p 254). 
 
Before the First World War, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner took their project of 
mediation and conciliation in other directions. They championed the reconciliation of 
nationalities in the context of a democratic socialist federation, so that the political 
shell of Austria-Hungary could in the future provide a viable basis for a multinational, 
multi-cultural federation, with equal rights of citizenship and an equal share in the 
national culture (Renner in Bottomore, pp 31–32, 112–116). Hence, a conciliation 
between nationalism and internationalism – enjoyment of national cultures and 
identity within a practical federal framework. This support from Renner and Bauer for 
multiculturalism was before its time. It also suggested a different approach from 
Leninism. That is, that there should be equality between nations and free national 
expression, but that national liberation did not have to mean internally homogenous 
nation-states. As the Austro-Marxists had explained it, here and elsewhere they 
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pursued the conciliation of realpolitik and revolutionary enthusiasm (Bauer in 
Bottomore, pp 46–47). 
 
In their attempts at reconciliation they did not have illusions in Stalinism. Arguably, 
by securing engagement between revolutionary social democrats and communists 
they could have comprised a democratic pole of attraction, and also a united front 
against the common enemy. Unfortunately, in their efforts they ultimately failed. 
However, their efforts might still inspire us today, and in that regard, ‘the book is still 
open’ on Austro-Marxism. 
 
Austro-Marxist notions of slow revolution also served as the basis of reconciling 
radical reformist and revolutionary politics, based on the quality of change over time, 
and not necessarily on a single violent rupture. Although in the context of effective 
dual power, with a firm foothold in the armed forces, and having established the 
Schutzbund paramilitary organisation, this dual-power strategy meant they were not 
naïve reformists. Bauer was to refer to the situation as one of “equilibrium” or 
“balance” of “class forces”, which during the 1918-1919 revolutionary period 
included extensive socialist penetration of the armed forces ((Duczynska, pp 30-32; 
Bauer in Duczynska, p 35; Gruber, pp 37-41). 
 
Arguably equilibrium following periods of crisis does not necessarily last. In this 
sense Otto Bauer and other Austro-Marxist leaders can be criticised for not 
consolidating a stronger position in the state when they had the opportunity during the 
immediate post-World War I revolutionary period. Nonetheless, the example of 
Austro-Marxists is inspiring. It is also a warning not to lose sight of the balance of 
power as accords to the ultimate means of execution (for us now that is infers the 
means to impose decisions through control of an apparatus of force) Hence a 
parliamentary majority and a thriving counter-culture are not necessarily protections 
against reaction, if those forces have at their disposal such a pliable apparatus of 
force. In the midst of the Depression, with high unemployment Austrian labour was 
already demoralised and weakened before the final battle in 1934. Even in a context 
of dual power, all efforts by radicals to effect change may come to nought if the 
movement’s leadership hesitates at the decisive moment, or if they adopt a policy of 
compromise and retreat enabling the reaction to consolidate, and then rout progressive 
forces. 
 
Finally, their cultural strategies and their deployment of dual power in the context of a 
relative equilibrium of class forces provide a storehouse of lessons. Their example is 
suggestive of the content of a real Third Road to socialism but one where it is possible 
to progress towards the good society in an embryonic form within the old society; 
perhaps even a state within a state. This example was achieved through strategies of 
growth from within (hineinwachsen), and the development of a thriving counter-
culture in the social-democratic stronghold of Red Vienna in preparation for future 
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transition. Here there is a legacy in the form of object lessons with regards the 
potential, but also the possible limits of cultural counter-hegemony. 
 
Complementing their counter-culture strategy, the Austro-Marxists also developed 
their stronghold of Red Vienna as the base for an unprecedented democratic socialist 
counter-culture. As noted, they provided for an impressive array of social 
infrastructure and services – through the party apparatus or via progressive taxation in 
the Vienna municipality (Bottomore, p 38, Rabinbach, p 28). 
 
That legacy concerned insights with regard to the adaptation of an organised 
capitalism during wartime and about the rise of fascism. Specifically, Bauer and Adler 
were to develop insightful critiques of fascism during the 1930s, conceding the 
success the fascists had enjoyed in dividing the working class, and playing upon 
petty-bourgeois fears and resentments following World War I. They provided an 
analysis of the social forces giving rise to fascism, and of the unity of social forces 
necessary to fight it. 
 
In summary, the legacies of Austo-Marxism were manifold. Not least of all, they 
provided object lessons regarding the strengths of, but also the dangers involved with 
growth from within, as well as dual power and counter-hegemony or war-of-attrition 
strategies. Arguably, the experience of Austro-Marxism helped inform the New Left 
and Eurocommunism and stood as a living example of strategies intended to reconcile 
the Left. Relatively early in the piece Austro-Marxism was also suggestive of 
multiculturalism as a source of conciliation and co-existence. Austro-Marxists’ 
engagement with ethics addressed a traditional blind spot of Marxism in a way that 
would be relevant for today’s would-be radicals also. Their rejection of hard 
determinism is suggestive of hope that those today who might otherwise be 
demoralised by the apparently unfavourable odds they face. At a practical level, once 
more, the achievements of Red Vienna – the counter-culture, the array of public 
infrastructure and services – were suggestive of the great potential of social 
democracy. 
 
Negotiation of Contested Themes 
 
This section moves to closer examination of some of the most important contested 
ideological themes explored in this thesis, an examination organised thematically and 
not restricted to one thinker at a time. 
 
Reform versus Revolution and Necessity versus Freedom 
 
It is a legacy of Marxists such as Kautsky, Lenin, Luxemburg, Trotsky and others to 
have fought it out over the interpretation of reform and revolution, and in the process 
to have provided valuable insights into the nature of state power, and the qualitative 
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substance of revolution. In different ways, all these figures attempted to debunk the 
notion of the state as a vehicle for reconciliation, and for the universal interest. 
However, as already observed, in that enterprise they were opposed by Lassalle, for 
whom the state instead comprised a vehicle for liberation, including liberation from 
poverty and ignorance. However, it is notable that following the 1917 Russian 
Revolution Kautsky, the Mensheviks and other Social Democrats became convinced 
of the case for universal liberal rights and, by inference, only a liberal state could have 
provided such a guarantor (though even then, in the capitalist context such a state 
might involve internal contradictions with regards its liberal nature, and its class 
nature). 
 
By contrast Lenin and Trotsky, and others remained convinced of a both political and 
epistemological privileging (Mouffe and Laclau, pp 56-57) of the vanguard party and 
its professional revolutionaries. During the transitional period power was to be 
centralized in the hands of the party and, after the Jacobin example, terror was to 
reign as a consequence of grim necessity (Trotsky, p 121). Yet, even following the 
civil war the sustained relaxation of the terror and of extreme centralization never 
came. It was to culminate with the personal dictatorship of Stalin, of purges and 
never-ending terror. 
 
In contradistinction to the ideal of pure democracy, which Lenin saw as an ideological 
veneer disguising the bourgeois nature of existing democracies, Lenin proposed a 
proletarian democracy. Luxemburg was correct to identify the threat provided by 
over-centralism and suppression of any free proletarian public sphere to democracy. 
For Luxemburg the cleverest central committee was no replacement for a genuinely 
democratic process that harnessed the energy and insights of the masses. By contrast, 
here, terror demoralises the very base whose interests it is meant to serve (Luxemburg 
in Hudis and Anderson, pp 306-307). It is this critique of the Bolshevist model that 
establishes the Luxemburgian model as a Third Road. 
 
Today we can debate the options available to Lenin and Trotsky. It is all too easy to 
condemn in retrospect when the reality was starvation, the White Terror and civil war. 
Perhaps sustained dual power, with an ongoing role for the other socialist parties and 
for a re-elected constituent assembly, could have seen a retention of a freer public 
sphere of critical enquiry, even while defending against the Tsarist White generals. 
No doubt that would have been a risk, but so, too, was the aggressive pursuit of the 
revolution in Russia in the hope that the Europe-wide revolution would follow. Lenin 
believed, at best, that Kautsky was naïve with regard to the threat provided by an 
unreconstructed state apparatus, regardless of the establishment of the constituent 
assembly. Yet, Kautsky (and the Mensheviks) were arguably correct that the object 
lesson which many even on the liberal Left derived from the general intensification of 
state repression and terror in Russia after 1917 was that socialism was the enemy of 
freedom. Hence, he was also supported by history that neither revolution nor legality 
ought have been pursued at any price. 
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Important with regard to this debate, today we can emphasize democracy itself as a 
practice and not only a form of state. Having interrogated both definitions there is a 
place for each, though the contradictions and struggles within the state itself are so 
marked and complex that to reduce the state exclusively either to a field, a collective 
actor or an instrument would be a simplification. In different ways, states can take all 
these forms, and often simultaneously. The consequence of an expansion of the 
meaning of democracy has it that the democratisation of everyday life should also be 
emphasized, not only through state mechanisms but also through co-operative and 
mutualist enterprise and practices. This can contribute to a deepening and extension of 
democracy beyond the usual confines. Democratisation of civil society is as important 
as the democratisation of the state, and the two can mutually reinforce each other. So, 
a nuanced understanding of the nature of the state, and of democracy, arises as a 
consequence, indeed, as the legacy of Third Road and Third Way discourse. 
 
Reform and Revolution in the context of Materialist Determinism versus Free Will 
 
The themes of reform and revolution took many forms in light of the differing 
assumptions of theorists such as Luxemburg, Kautsky and Bernstein. Often these 
questions were thoroughly entwined with the struggle between revisionism and 
orthodoxy. 
 
With his revisionism, Bernstein was thought by many on the Marxist Left to be 
postponing transition permanently. Luxemburg’s notions of spontaneity also 
contrasted sharply with Kautsky’s vision of conscious, disciplined organisation in the 
context of a class struggle spanning decades. Determinism (for instance with Kautsky 
in materialist form, and Lassalle in an idealist form) is also contrasted with 
perspectives adhering to assumptions of voluntarism and contingency (with 
voluntarism effectively embraced by the Bolsheviks in their efforts at realising 
permanent revolution ahead of any stage-based process of change, where the liberal 
bourgeois revolution would have come first by necessity). 
 
Therefore, with Kautsky the assumption is that the will to live is the most 
fundamental human drive, and with civilisation this becomes the will to live better. 
Important for Kautsky this will is determined by external material circumstance rather 
than being ‘free’. The struggle for socialism emerges as the modern expression of this 
will to live, and the organisational form this struggle adopts, for Kautsky, is 
organised, methodical, and deliberate. 
 
By contrast with this and with Lenin’s notion of a vanguard party leading the 
revolutionary movement, injecting socialist consciousness into it from outside, 
Luxemburg’s dialectic is more complex. For Luxemburg, at times revolutionary 
parties themselves need to adapt to working-class initiative, with working-class 
consciousness and action developing in a kind of school of class struggle. Regardless 
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of the growth in trade unions, Kautsky and Lenin were both adamant that trade-union 
methods alone could not deliver the working class from capitalism. Luxemburg 
agrees, but differs in her belief that social-democratic consciousness arises in and 
through the struggle and does not come entirely from without. 
 
In retrospect, parts of Kautsky’s vision seem overly simplistic. Though his 
methodical, deliberate approach – his emphasis on organisation and consciousness 
reinforcing each other also has appeal still – potentially framing a counter-hegemonic 
struggle over decades, as opposed to the notion revolution would be quick and 
violent, and followed by extensive terror. 
 
Meanwhile, according to Lenin the vanguard party enjoys a certain freedom in 
mobilising the collective will of the proletariat. There is even a significant degree of 
substitutionalism. The consequence of this, again, is the possibility of permanent 
revolution pressing transition by force of will rather than a predetermined and 
necessarily stage-based revolution that develops in relation to the growth of the 
productive forces and their attendant social relations. Though, in reality as 
Luxemburg grasped it, the vanguard was to replace the self-active proletariat in 
practice. Ultimately it would turn inwards against itself. 
 
Taking into account all these perspectives, there is something to be learned from each 
of them, and that contributes to their legacies. From Kautsky we assume the need for 
organisation, discipline and patience; from Luxemburg the potential for spontaneity 
even in the context of a seemingly determinist view of socialism as necessity, and also 
the ways in which consciousness arises from the struggle itself. From Lenin we can 
observe the radical potential of the political will but also its risks. 
 
Orthodoxy versus Revisionism and Leftism 
 
Enquiring into the theme of orthodoxy/revisionism is also fruitful. Conflicting and 
mediating themes that arise in the context of such an enquiry include the following: 
Objectivism and subjectivism on the labour theory of value; sceptical empiricism 
versus the dialectical comprehension of totality; contingency versus teleology; 
capitalist collapse versus capitalist resilience and adaptation; and necessity versus 
choice. 
 
As already noted, Bernstein threw into doubt the Marxian dialectic, philosophical 
materialism, theses of immiseration, class bifurcation and capitalist collapse, all the 
while recalibrating the labour theory of value and suggesting a peaceful gradualism, 
which supposedly renders a revolutionary political break redundant. Specifically, 
Bernstein’s revision of Marx’s labour theory of value involves a mixture of objectivist 
and subjectivist perspectives. The mechanism of surplus-value extraction is 
recognised, yet the various forms of labour are not considered equal. 
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Under the influence of empiricism, liberalism and eclecticism, Bernstein’s is a 
practical socialism, which leaves us an important legacy. He shows us that when 
necessary we must adapt theory to suit reality, rather than simply ignoring those facts 
that do not suit us. 
 
Bernstein’s retention of a progressive/teleological outlook is less convincing in light 
of the Left’s defeats in recent decades. Therefore, an analysis of Bernstein in light of 
modern developments leads to an appreciation of the tension between the direction 
emerging from the capitalist tendencies identified by Marx, and the relative 
uncertainty of the ultimate direction of modern political economy. Importantly, while 
writing in the late nineteenth century, Bernstein did not deny the prospect of capitalist 
collapse precipitating socialist transition into the distant future, though peaceful 
evolution was his preference and hope (Bernstein, pp 208-209). Capitalism was to 
face existential crises relatively sooner rather than later, with the ravages of world 
wars, and the onset of the Great Depression. 
 
Bernstein retains a productive engagement with the Marxian orthodoxy and, therefore, 
his outlook should be viewed as the product of a mediation between that orthodoxy, 
and the process of revision. Among that which Bernstein retains from Marx we can 
highlight the following: The falling rate of profit; overproduction; cyclical crises and 
periodic diminution of capital; the concentration and centralization of industrial 
capital; and the increase of the rate of surplus value. These things should not be 
discounted. To Bernstein, then, also fell the task of preserving so much from Marx, 
adapting it for a more gradualist and liberal democratic socialism, and that itself is a 
great and lasting legacy. By contrast, Luxemburg’s notion of the necessity of 
socialism stemming from capitalist contradictions appears more credible in light of 
the war and the Depression that was to follow, both during her own lifetime and after 
she was murdered. For Luxemburg, the capitalist system simply had not fully 
matured, but when it was fully developed it would no longer have anywhere to turn in 
its search for new markets. By contrast, Bernstein relegates capitalist collapse and 
terminal crisis “to the time when the world market has been fully developed” which is 
“a flight into the next world” (Bernstein, pp 84-87). 
 
Without the presupposition of objective necessity, Luxemburg regrets that socialism 
is reduced to an ideal and a utopia (Luxemburg in Hudis and Anderson, pp 134, 141–
142). Hence, the tension between idealist utopianism and scientific socialism, but this 
rejection of the centrality of the moral ought of socialism is a weakness in 
Luxemburg, and equally so with other Marxists such as Kautsky.  
 
For Luxemburg the consequences of capitalism were manifold. Because of the 
tendency towards monopoly, capitalism was bound to become increasingly 
undemocratic even in the context of gains such as the suffrage, and because of the 
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systemic imperative to conquer new markets to retain profitability there was the 
potential for conflict to re-emerge between great (imperialist) economic powers. 
 
Also important in grasping the scope of the orthodoxy versus revisionism and leftism 
opposition is the matter of whether or not totality can be grasped with dialectical 
materialist theory, and Marx’s dialectical materialism specifically. While Kautsky and 
Luxemburg assert that Marx had grasped the laws of motion of economy and society, 
Bernstein questions the capacity of Marxism to grasp totality via the dialectical 
materialist method. Indeed, he casts doubt on the capacity of any theory to achieve 
this. His is an empiricist perspective informed by a sceptical epistemology. That is to 
say, he believes in that which can be verified through experience, through the senses. 
He holds that there are very significant limitations to that which can thus be grasped. 
While Engels also supports the evidence of sensory perception, unlike Engels, 
Bernstein disputes the assertion that Marx’s dialectic had comprehensively grasped 
the movement of history. Specifically, Bernstein questions Marx’s 
historical/dialectical materialism as expressed through his analysis of the evolving 
mode and means of production. For Marx, this is a process driven overwhelmingly 
through the dynamic of class struggle. For Bernstein, despite the genuine role of class 
struggle, history and totality are more complex than this. So, for instance, the political 
is not of a secondary order resting upon and determined in a mono-linear manner by 
the economic base. 
 
We can compare Bernstein’s position and that of other Marxists in a process of 
mediation that potentially can lead to the view that while there is some total ensemble 
of social relations, nonetheless it cannot be grasped comprehensively and finally by 
any single theory. While it includes class struggle, it cannot be reduced to it. Simply 
put, totality is just too complicated and, over decades and centuries, too prone to 
change. Acceptance of contingency means regardless of the various interpenetrating 
systemic logics, there is nonetheless an element of unpredictability. This was grasped 
by Anthony Giddens, though perhaps Giddens underestimates the power of systemic 
logics and the difficulties of collective-will formation amidst the many and varied 
modern forms of ideological and psychological manipulation. 
 
Also of great interest in analysing the tensions between reformism, revisionism, and 
revolution, the post-Marxist scholars Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau have made 
the crucial assertion that it is a mistake to sweepingly “[identify] reformism with 
revisionism” and that “what is essential in a reformist practice is political quietism 
and the corporatist confinement of the working class”. Their suggestion is that 
Bernstein can be interpreted in a revisionist/revolutionary manner, and that he can be 
interpreted in fashion at odds with reformism (Mouffe and Laclau, pp 29-35). There 
are also arguments that later, in Sweden, the corporatist arrangements identified by 
some were alternatively seen by others as a “democratic class struggle” (Korpi, 1983, 
pp 7-25). 
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Liberty and Civil Rights versus Authoritarianism and Terror 
 
The theme of socialist libertarianism or liberalism versus socialist authoritarianism 
must also be considered to glean the array of potential insights from the history of the 
movement. We have observed how Bernstein attempted to reconcile left-liberalism 
with Marxism in the context of evolutionary gradualism, with a rejection of the 
authoritarian methods of any proletarian dictatorship. While Kautsky remained 
committed to political and social revolution as a qualitative break, he rose to become 
one of the most vociferous Marxist critics of Bolshevist authoritarianism. 
 
As suggested, Kautsky opposed dictatorship as a form of government in the practical 
sense, as the dictatorship of a party-elite or as the dictatorship of an individual. The 
democratic majority-rule of the working class was another thing and, indeed, many 
have interpreted Marx’s notion of proletarian dictatorship in this way: As a manner of 
applying democracy. Yet, Kautsky and also Martov preferred to preserve the liberal 
rights of minorities (including the bourgeoisie), even in the midst of vigorous class 
struggles. Kautsky’s position is encapsulated by a reiteration here of his statement that 
democratic processes, rights and institutions were together “what light and air are [to] 
the organism”; “without them it cannot develop its strength”. Kautsky was confident 
that the political revolution would raise the prospect of “higher forms of the class war; 
“a fight of organised, enlightened masses, steady and deliberate” (Kautsky, ‘The 
Social Revolution’, 1902, pp 39–40). 
 
Kautsky, perhaps depending on the opinions and interpretations of his friends in the 
Menshevist movement, was not fully appreciative of the obstacles and threats 
confronting the Bolsheviks. In the final instance Kautsky was vindicated, however. 
He was correct in stating that the damage done by the object lesson of the Red Terror, 
taken to extremes under Stalin, was so harmful to the reputation of Marxism that even 
the great prize of sustained state power was insufficient to justify the associated 
actions. Kautsky had warned of the spectre of ‘Bonapartism’ and, indeed, the regime 
that did finally prevail was so inhumane that the term would not do justice to its 
victims. Kautsky and Martov, in taking a stand against unrestrained terror and 
repression, provided their own object lesson – one that preserved the integrity of 
radical social democracy. 
 
Similarly, and as noted, Luxemburg is also well remembered for her democratic left-
libertarian critique of Bolshevist centralism. Her words came to be seen as prophetic 
in light of the rise of Stalinism. In different ways Bernstein, Kautsky and Luxemburg 
worked to salvage the perceived integrity of various currents in Marxism as against 
the consequences of the ‘whatever it takes’ attitude of Bolshevism. This is a 
significant legacy. 
 
Otto Bauer and other Austro-Marxists attempted a conciliation of democracy and 
revolution through strategies of dual power intended to provide a guarantee for the 
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democratic path. In this the legacy left by their example is both inspirational and also 
a warning. Democratic gains are not necessarily permanent. If the enemies of 
progressive social democracy develop a monopoly over the legitimate means of 
violence, including via the state power, then there is no guarantee for democracy or 
civil liberties. Here the examples and critiques of Kautsky, Bernstein, Luxemburg, 
and the Austro-Marxists stand as a redeeming legacy of a democratic socialist 
tradition, which so often has been unjustly tarred with the same brush as Stalinism. 
 
Elaborating on the Interplay of the Themes of Structure and 
Agency 
 
For Mouffe and Laclau, writing around a century after Kautsky developed his 
perspective, Kautsky’s analysis is one of “simplification” with regards class 
bifurcation, and “instrumentalism” with regards the state. They accuse him of 
developing a position endowed with the “internal rationality and intelligibility of a 
closed paradigm” (Mouffe and Laclau, pp 14-16). However, in the same work, 
Mouffe and Laclau exhibit a degree of doubt with regards their own radical 
voluntarism. They concede that their project – one of radical voluntarism and 
contingency, a project that denies political closure – will nonetheless be affected by “a 
set of structural limits established by other logics – at the level of state apparatuses, 
the economy, and so on” – thus the rejection of a utopianism that neglects to 
recognise these structural logics (Mouffe and Laclau, p 190). 
 
If structure and agency condition each other, this allows for systems and sub-systems 
involving their own internal logics but also impacting upon, and sometimes 
conflicting with one another. Yet, allowing for agency, there is also the potential for 
collective free-will mobilisation to intervene in this process and to alter the 
consequent outcomes. Here there are parallels in my approach with Mouffe and 
Laclau, but also with Giddens’s critique of historical materialism and theory of 
structuration. 
 
The motives behind the various struggles that animate the world are diverse. There is 
Kautsky’s will to live, or his will to live better as expressed both by individuals and 
collectives. However, struggles can also involve principles other than material wealth 
and well-being – such as political, cultural, spiritual freedom, and it can involve the 
motive of altruism and love for others beyond individual or collective self-interest. 
The diversity of motives and the diversity of ideals of ‘the good society’ means that 
social development is not entirely predictable (again a parallel with Giddens). In 
Mouffe’s words, social relations are not ‘sutured’, and despite the powerful logic of 
capitalism there are openings that can become focus points for collective will 
formation and counter-hegemonic strategies. Collective will formation has the 
potential for disrupting, altering or overcoming existing systems and sub-systems.  
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Capitalists have responded to pressures for systemic reproduction, expansion into new 
markets, and intensified exploitation, and often in tandem with national political 
classes that seek position in the economic world order. Often, this has involved an 
intensification of imperialism, and the hegemony of the super-powers and their allies 
– with the exploitation of Third World labourers or, as Wallerstein would call them, 
peripheral economies (Wallerstein, I and Hopkins, 1996 pp 3-10; Wallerstein, 2007, 
pp 11-12) – providing the material basis to integrate First World labour through 
relative prosperity. That is, prosperous workers are won over to capitalism by way of 
that prosperity even if they face injustice and exploitation. Importantly, Kautsky 
anticipated the future possibility of ultra-imperialism with global bourgeois co-
operation and inter-mediation ending war between great powers (though not class 
struggle). 
 
At the same time even within the First World itself, which Wallerstein would call 
“core economies” (Wallerstein, 2007, pp 11-12), there is an intensification of the rate 
of exploitation. Fundamental rights of labour, to pay, conditions, hours, holidays, age 
of retirement are in the process of being curtailed in order to provide an expansion of 
purchasing power, and hence of markets necessary for capitalist reproduction. 
Another consequence is the growth of additional reserves for investment. Corporate 
welfare is also provided for through effective subsidies arising from the tax mix, 
labour market deregulation and from broader austerity. 
 
Collective will formation and the political/economic struggles of organised workers 
and citizens have the potential to disrupt or recast this logic, with internal capitalist 
dynamics and class struggle impacting upon each other. Because confrontation is 
often costly to both parties, as Korpi recognised, this can lead to a series of historic 
compromises based on “the existing equilibrium of class forces” and as Vandenberg 
calls it, “the logic of the situation of class struggle”. This progresses over decades, 
mediating but not negating the class struggle (Pierson, pp 112-113; Vandenberg, p 39; 
Ryner, p 59). This idea of an equilibrium was also found in Otto Bauer, for instance. 
 
So, returning to Bernstein momentarily, similar to radical Swedish democratic 
revisionism, Bernstein does not abandon the class struggle either, contrary to the 
assertions of some important theorists (e.g., Sheri Berman, pp 14-15) Indeed, 
Bernstein’s perspective remains a teleological one. That is, he believes history has a 
direction and that direction is one of progress, a process partly informed by the class 
struggle. Here he is at odds with Swedish democratic socialist Ernst Wigforss, who 
also accounts for the political dead ends and defeats (Wigforss in Vandenberg, p 100). 
 
Between thinkers such as Marx, Engels, Bernstein, Luxemburg and Kautsky can be 
observed the interaction of each of their perspectives, such as to arrive at a synthesis – 
an appreciation of the complexity of totality (all too complex to grasp in a single 
theory, or specifically by Marxism). Nevertheless, the usefulness of the Marxian 
dialectical materialist method with its emphasis on the mode of production and class 
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struggle is apparent. When brought into mediation with Bernstein’s eclectic 
empiricism, a synthesis emerges, within which the Marxist method is a useful frame 
for understanding, although not an exhaustive frame. 
 
There is a legacy, indeed, that the likes of Bernstein, Kautsky, Luxemburg and others 
have provided, as reference points for the exploration of philosophical questions of 
relevance to the Left still. Again, this includes our understanding of such categories of 
totality, teleology, system and determinism versus contingency, free will, imagination 
and voluntarism. Through reading these perspectives we gain insight into these 
themes, their mediation of each other, and the emergence of useful syntheses. 
 
The Relativities of Third Roads and Third Ways 
 
This thesis has argued that during the 1848-1934 period there existed an array of 
Third Roads and Third Ways in various traditions of Marxism, including but not 
limited to the contributions of Kautsky, the early Bernstein, and Luxemburg. The 
thesis has also considered the contributions of Ferdinand Lassalle and (the later) 
Eduard Bernstein, which could arguably be interpreted as Third Ways. Whether the 
later Bernstein is to be considered a Marxist is debatable and contested. For the 
purposes of this thesis, I have argued that the period 1848-1934 is marked by shifting 
relativities. 
 
Third Roads and Third Ways developed in relation to the evolving Second Way as 
well as in relation to each other. Hence, Marxism and Lassalleanism (along with 
various anarchisms, and Kantian-ethical socialisms) fight for dominance on the 
radical Left; but Marxism prevails decisively in 1891 with the acceptance by the 
German Social Democrats of the Erfurt Programme. This begins a period of orthodox 
Marxist supremacy; with Bernstein’s revisionism emerging as a Third Way relative to 
that orthodoxy. 
 
More specifically, radical Marxist social democracy developed during the mid- to 
late-nineteenth century, thanks largely to the efforts of Engels (after Marx’s death); 
and after Engels, the passing of the baton to Karl Kautsky – the so-called Red Pope 
and the keeper of the orthodoxy. During this period, revolutionary social-democratic 
Marxism wrestled with other trends such as the anarchisms of Proudhon and Bakunin, 
the Hegelian socialism of Lassalle, and various attempts to fuse Marxism with 
Kantian idealism. However, with the Erfurt Programme of 1891, Marxism had 
eclipsed Lassalleanism in the SPD (German Social Democrats). Though competing 
tendencies persisted, Marxist revolutionary social democracy emerged as the 
dominant Second Way, that is, the dominant left-revolutionary discourse. 
 
During the early twentieth century, Kautsky adopted a centrist posture as against 
various revisionisms (including Bernstein) and the leftist challenge emanating from 
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Rosa Luxemburg among others. One of the most important threats to the orthodoxy 
emerged only very gradually, with the German Social Democrats increasingly 
integrated via nationalism, militarism, and concessions in the industrial sphere as well 
as the sphere of welfare. Kautsky’s The Road to Power was rejected by SPD 
pragmatists in 1909. By 1914, the majority right Social Democrats had committed 
fully to world war. When Kautsky, Bernstein and others overcame their original 
equivocations and confusion and started to organise against the war, they were 
expelled from the party. Hence the state of affairs characterised by orthodox 
hegemony on the Left (especially in Germany) continued until World War I, after 
which the Kautskyan orthodoxy – now taking on a centrist guise – retreated under 
pressure from both the Left (under the Bolshevist leadership of Lenin) and the right 
(militarist/nationalist/opportunist social democracy). 
 
In 1917, everything changed quite rapidly. The successful Russian Revolution arose 
as a pole of attraction for Marxist revolutionaries the world over. Lenin launched a 
pitiless attack against the centrists and Kautsky more than anyone. Kautsky’s earlier 
equivocations on the war were exploited to the maximum. A shift took place 
throughout Europe with the rise of various communist parties adopting Leninist 
organisational, tactical and strategic principles. Again, the orthodox revolutionary 
Marxist social democracy persisted in places, for instance with Austro-Marxism, and 
with the USPD (Independent German Social Democrats), who later re-merged with 
the mainstream SPD. However, Bolshevism, and then Stalinism, emerged as the 
dominant left-revolutionary discourses and movement. (Emphasized here is the year 
1924, as the year of Lenin’s death, though Trotsky and later Bukharin persisted for 
some time thereafter.) 
 
Orthodoxy, centrism, Austro-Marxism, Luxemburgism. All thereafter could be 
considered relative Third Roads – that is, Third Roads as opposed to Third Ways, 
because they maintained the Marxist/communist final goal – although this also is 
questionable if one queries the Stalinists’ commitment to the principles and final goal 
of Marxian communism. In which case again we would consider them Third Way 
activists at odds with the Stalinist dominance on the revolutionary Left. Austro-
Marxism especially enjoyed important insights even before the crucial 1914 
disjuncture. While the post-war Austro-Marxists developed insightful critiques of the 
nature of Stalinism, they also attempted to heal the rift within international socialism. 
Specifically, their growth from within and protracted dual power strategies comprised 
crucial innovations for which they could be considered as representing a socialist 
Third Way for their time. The example of those innovations provides a legacy that is 
of enduring value. 
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Afterward – Final Observations 
 
Teleology and/or necessity are accepted by all our main thinkers in various ways. 
Even Bernstein, who came to reject the centrality of the class struggle as a grand 
dialectical process (though not rejecting class struggle per se) held to a notion of 
necessary progress. Such assumptions no longer seem tenable. A progressive 
teleology cannot be taken for granted. Socialism is not inevitable as the consequence 
of the core class-struggle dialectic. History and the social forces contesting it are 
complex and plural. History is not ‘sutured’ (Mouffe). We are at the same time 
subjected to social logics and systems greater than ourselves, and we are complicit in 
the interpretation, reproduction and sometimes even the transformation of those 
logics. Giddens refers to this as the “duality of structure”. Here our participation, the 
participation of active and knowing agents and collective actors, means that the 
consequences of contending forces in any given social conjuncture cannot be taken 
for granted. Structure and agency condition each other: There is free will, and 
outcomes are at times unpredictable. As Giddens put it, “the structured properties of 
social systems are simultaneously the medium and outcome of social acts” (Giddens, 
pp 19–20). 
 
Collective will formation often means swimming against the tide, and there are times, 
perhaps, when both Giddens and Mouffe underplay the power of social and economic 
logics, for instance those associated with the reproduction of capitalist social 
relations. Hence Marx himself and those who followed, like Kautsky, assisted in the 
mobilisation of those social forces that actually put paid to their social prophecies 
over the course of the twentieth century. This occurred through the ameliorative 
consequences of Western welfare states. Meanwhile Austro-Marxism occupied a 
position of strength, including a foothold in the state apparatus itself – and yet faltered 
and floundered at crucial conjunctures, the consequence of mistaken political strategy 
and tactics, and/or loss of nerve or resolve. 
 
Power is everywhere in the analysis of the Third Way and Third Road writers: both 
positive (enabling) and negative (repressive) power. For instance, Marxism mainly 
perceives state power as a repressive force, but for Lassalle the state emerges as a 
positive enabler, a force against poverty and ignorance. Hence we return to the 
problems with a narrow class-struggle dialectic, and the underplaying of national, 
political, racial, spiritual and religious factors (and by the same token the modern 
progressive discourse which relegates class and economic democracy to the too-hard 
basket). 
 
In mediating various themes and contested ideologies, all these Third Road and Third 
Way theorists developed important insights, ranging across the nature of nationalism 
to debates on free will versus philosophical and historical materialism; and debates on 
the blurring of the lines between reform and revolution, or alternatively their stark 
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opposition to each other. At times, attempts were made towards conciliation, such as 
the Austro-Marxists’ attempts to merge revolutionary enthusiasm and realpolitik. 
 
Centrist, ethical or even liberal socialism on the one hand – and these are not all the 
one thing – were opposed to the extreme ends and means calculations (Steger) made 
by the Bolsheviks on the other. And to a large extent mainstream social democracy 
capitulated in the face of the Great War, and in the case of German right-wing social 
democracy, embraced militarism fully. Socialist authoritarianism emerging from 
Bolshevism was intended as a temporary but necessary aberration but became 
permanent with Stalin. However, through the course of the twentieth century 
democratic socialism and social democracy were progressively purged of Marxist or 
radical content. Though In the time frame we are dealing with (up to 1934) there 
remained radical currents still adhering to Marxism, such as the Austro-Marxists. 
 
Yet, as we have observed, the Third Roads and Third Ways of the 1848-1934 were 
many and diverse. In relative terms, different movements emerged as Third Roads and 
Third Ways throughout this time. Most notable was the rise and decline of the 
classical orthodoxy as the relative Second Way, but there was also its re-
conceptualization as a Third Road, both through the efforts of Kautsky and of the 
Austro-Marxists. The movements considered during this period have left a substantial 
legacy. Much of that legacy is redemptive as well. Not only are there lessons to be 
learned from the mistakes of the past, enduring concepts and frameworks may be 
applied to today’s conditions. Socialism can also be reclaimed in the name of radical 
and democratic traditions such as those advanced by the authors and political 
movements examined in this thesis. In certain ways, the New Left and 
Eurocommunism attempted this but were themselves exhausted with the co-option of 
and integration of identity-based movements by liberal capitalism, and the emptying 
out of social democracy with the rise of new Third Way movements and ideologies 
that bore little resemblance to those studied here. 
 
The many and varied ways in which Third Roads and Third Ways developed relative 
to each other, and relative to unevenly dominant Second Ways demonstrates the 
flexibility with which a plurality of progressive perspectives might be constructed. 
The Third Ways of Giddens, Blair and others in their company that emerged during 
the 1990s, inspired by the pragmatic politics of the Australian Labor Party, have 
largely been emptied of radical content. The Third Roads and Third Ways of the 
1848-1934 period have left to us a substantial legacy, however. They retain their force 
as possible sources of inspiration and instruction for a modern democratic Left turning 
back to engage with its roots. They provide signposts towards potentially rich, radical 
Third Roads or Third Ways. This is a highly significant legacy. 
 
 
 
226 
 
  
227 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
 
Aarons, E. (2008), Market versus Nature – the Social Philosophy of Friedrich Hayek, 
Australian Scholarly Publishing, Kew 
 
Aarons, E. (2009), Hayek versus Marx—And Today’s Challenges, Routledge, Milton 
Park. 
 
Allen, R.E. (1975), ‘Revolutionary and Counter-Revolutionary Thought in Habsburg 
Hungary, 1914–1918’, European and Working Class History, no. 8, pp 17–19. 
 
Armstong, S.W. (1942), ‘The Internationalism of the Early Social Democrats of 
Germany’, The American Historical Review, vol. 47, no. 2, pp 245–58. 
 
Ascher, A., Axelrod and Kautsky, (1967), Slavic Review, vol. 26, no. 1, pp 94–112) 
 
Ashton E.B. and Vollraft, E. (1973), ‘Rosa Luxemburg’s Theory of Revolution’, 
Social Research, vol. 40, no. 1, pp 83–109. 
 
Balibar, E. (1977), On the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, New Left Books, London. 
 
Barclay, D. and Weitz, E. (2005), Between Reform and Revolution—German 
Socialism and Communism from 1840 to 1990, Berghahn Books, New York. 
 
Bebel, A. (1928), Voices of Revolt—August Bebel, International Publishers, New 
York. 
 
Beck, H. (1997), The Origins of the Authoritarian Welfare State in Prussia, 
University of Michigan Press. 
 
Beilharz, P. (1991), Social Theory—A Guide to Central Thinkers, Allen and Unwin. 
 
Beilharz, P. (1992), Labour’s Utopias—Bolshevism, Fabianism, Social Democracy, 
Routledge, London. 
 
Beilharz, P. (1994), ‘Postmodern Socialism—Romanticism, City and State, Melbourne 
University Press, Melbourne. 
 
228 
 
Berman, S. (2006), The Primacy of Politics—Social Democracy and the Making of 
Europe’s Twentieth Century, Cambridge Press, New York. 
 
Bernstein, E. (1961), Evolutionary Socialism: A Criticism and Affirmation, Schocken 
Paperbacks, New York. 
 
Bernstein, E. (n.d.) Ferdinand Lassalle as a Social Reformer, Prism Key Press 
 
Bernstein, S. (1949/1950), ‘From Utopianism to Marxism’, Science and Society, vol. 
14, no. 1, pp 58–67.  
 
Bernstein, S. (1940) ‘Jean Jaures and the Problem of War’, Science and Society, vol. 
4, no. 3, pp, 127–164. 
 
Bottomore, T. and Goode, P., eds, (1978), Austro-Marxism, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford.  
 
Bronner, S.E. (1982), ‘Karl Kautsky and the Twilight of Orthodoxy’, Political 
Theory, vol. 10, no. 4, pp 580–605. 
 
Bronner, S.E (2011), ‘Socialism Unbound: Principles, Practices, Prospects’, 
Columbia University Press, New York, Second Edition 
 
Callinicos, A. (1987), The Revolutionary Ideas of Marx, Bookmarks, London. 
 
Carrillo, S. (1977), Eurocommunism and the State, Lawrence and Wishart, London.  
 
Cohen-Bendit, D. and Cohen-Bendit, G. (1968), Obsolete Communism—The Left-
Wing Alternative, Penguin, Hamburg. 
 
Craig, G, (1980), ‘Germany 1866-1945’, Oxford, USA 
 
Duczynska, I. (1978), Workers in Arms—The Austrian Schutzbund and the Civil War 
of 1934, Monthly Review Press, London. 
 
Eagleton, T. (1996) The Illusions of Postmodernism, Blackwell, Oxford. 
 
Eley, G. (2002), Gorging Democracy, The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Evans, A.B. (1986), ‘Re-Reading Lenin’s State and Revolution’, Slavic Review, vol. 
46, no. 1, pp 1–19. 
 
229 
 
Ferenc F., Heller, A. and Gyorgy M. (1984) Dictatorship over Needs—An Analysis of 
Soviet Societies, Blackwell, Oxford. 
 
Ferguson, K.E. (1980), ‘Class Consciousness and the Marxist Dialectic: The Elusive 
Synthesis’, The Review of Politics, vol. 42, no. 4, pp, 504–32. 
 
Fletcher, R. (1982), ‘British Radicalism and German Revisionism: The Case of 
Eduard Bernstein’, The International History Review, vol. 4, no. 3, pp 339–70. 
 
Fletcher, R.A. (1983a), ‘In the Interest of Peace and Progress: Eduard Bernstein’s 
Socialist Foreign Policy’, Review of International Studies, vol.9 (, no. 2, pp 79–93. 
 
Fletcher, R.A. (1983b), ‘Cobden as Educator: The Free Trade Internationalism of 
Eduard Bernstein, 1899–1914’, The American Historical Review, vol. 88, no. 3, pp 
561–78. 
 
Footman, D. (1968), Ferdinand Lassalle—Romantic Revolutionary, Greenwood 
Press, New York. 
 
Fried, A. and Sanders, R. (1964), Socialist Thought—a Documentary History, Anchor 
Books, New York. 
 
Galili, Z. (1989), The Menshevik Leaders in the Russian Revolution—Social Realities 
and Political Strategies, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.  
 
Gay, P. (1962), The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism—Eduard Bernstein’s 
Challenge to Marx, Collier Books, New York. 
 
Geras, N. (1976), The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg, New Left Books, London. 
 
Getzler, I (1967), Martov – A Political Biography of a Russian Social Democrat, 
Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 
 
Giddens, A. (1981), A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, University 
of California Press, Berkeley. 
 
Giddens, A (1998), The Third Way – The Renewal of Social Democracy, Polity, 
Cambridge  
 
Gruber, H. (1983), ‘History of the Austrian Working Class: Unity of Scholarship and 
Practice’, International Labor and Working Class History, vol. 24. Fall, pp 49–66. 
  
Gruber, H. (1991), Red Vienna—Experiment in Working Class Culture 1919–1934, 
Oxford University Press, New York. 
230 
 
 
Harmon, C. (2009), ‘Zombie Capitalism – Global Crisis and the Relevance of Marx’, 
Haymarket Books, Chicago, Illinois  
 
Higgins, W. (1985), ‘Ernst Wigforss: The Renewal of Social Democratic Theory and 
Practice’, Political Power and Social Theory, vol. 5. 
 
Hirst, P and Thompson.G (1996), Globalisation in Question, Polity, Cambridge 
 
Hobsbawm, E. (1989), The Age of Empire: 1875–1914, Vintage, London. 
 
Hobsbawm, E. (1994), The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991, 
Vintage, London.  
 
Hobsbawm, E. (1996), The Age of Capital: 1848–1875, Vintage, London. 
 
Hobsbawm, E. (2011), How to Change the World—Reflections on Marx and 
Marxism, Yale University Press, New Haven. 
 
Hopkins, T.K. and Wallerstein, I. et al. (1996), The Age of Transition—Trajectory of 
the World-System 1945–2025, Zed Books, London. 
  
Hudis, P. and Anderson, K., eds, (2004), The Rosa Luxemburg Reader, Monthly 
Review Press, New York. 
 
James, H. (1981), ‘Rudolf Hilferding and the Political Economy of the Second 
International’, The Historical Journal, vol. 24, no. 4, pp 847–69. 
 
Joll, J. (1990), Europe since 1870: An International History, Penguin Books, London. 
 
Kautsky, J.H. (1994), Karl Kautsky: Marxism, Revolution and Democracy, 
Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick. 
 
Kautsky, K. (1903), On the Morrow of the Social Revolution, Twentieth Century 
Press, Clerkenwell. 
 
Kautsky, K. (1971), ‘The Class Struggle’ (Erfurt Programme), Norton Library 
Publishers, Toronto. 
 
Kautsky, K. (1964), The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, University Of Michigan 
Press, Ann Arbor. 
 
Kautsky, K. (1991), The Economic Doctrines of Karl Marx, Hyperion Press, 
Connecticut. 
231 
 
 
Kautsky, K. (1996), The Road to Power, Humanities Press, New Jersey. 
 
Kautsky, K. (1903), The Social Revolution, Twentieth Century Press, Clerkenwell. 
 
Kleene, G.A. (1901), ‘Bernstein versus “Old School” Marxism’, Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 18, (Nov), pp 1–29. 
 
Kolakowski, L. (2008), ‘Main Currents in Marxism’ vols I, II and III, W.W. Norton 
and Company, New York. 
 
Korpi, W. (1983), The Democratic Class Struggle, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. 
 
Korpi, W. (1980), The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, London. 
 
Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (2001), Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics, 2nd edn, Verso, London. 
 
Lassalle, F. (1927), Voices of Revolt: Speeches of Ferdinand Lassalle, with a 
Biographical Sketch, International Publishers, New York. 
 
Lenin, V.I. (1996), Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Pluto Press, 
London. 
 
Lenin, V.I. (1960), Selected Works: Volume 2, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
Moscow. 
 
Lenin, V.I. (1961), Selected Works: Volume 3, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
Moscow. 
 
Lesor, Norbert, in ‘Journal of Contemporary History: 2’ ‘The Left Wing Intellectuals 
Between the Wars’ 1919–1939. ; Harper Torchbooks, New York; 1966 
 
Loew, R. (1979), ‘The Politics of Austro-Marxism’, New Left Review, vol. 118, no. 
November–December, pp 15–51.  
 
Marcuse, H. (1968), One Dimensional Man, Sphere, London. 
 
Marx, K. (1973), The Poverty of Philosophy, Progress Publishers, Moscow. 
  
Marx, K. and Engels, F (1977), Selected Works II, Progress Publishers, Moscow. 
 
Marx, K and Engels, F (1983), Selected Works III, Progress Publishers, Moscow. 
232 
 
 
Marx, K. and Engels, F(1989), Selected Works I, Progress Publishers, Moscow. 
 
McLellan, D., ed., (1988), Marxism: Essential Writings, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
 
McLellan, D. (1980), The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, Papermac, London. 
 
Meldolesi, L. (1984), ‘The Debate on Imperialism Just before Lenin’, Economic and 
Political Weekly, vol. 19, no. 42–43, pp 1833–39. 
  
Morgan, D.W. (1979), ‘The Father of Revisionism, Revisited: Eduard Bernstein’, The 
Journal of Modern History, vol. 51, no. 3, pp 525–32. 
 
Mouffe, C. (2005a), On the Political, Routledge, Abingdon. 
 
Mouffe, C. (2005b), The Return of the Political, Verso, London. 
 
Mukherjee, S. and Ramaswamy, S. (2000), A History of Socialist Thought: From the 
Precursors to the Present, Sage, London. 
 
O’Boyle, L. (1951), ‘The German Independent Socialists during the First World 
War’, The American Historical Review, vol. 56, no. 4, pp 824–31. 
 
Osborne, P., ed., (1991), Socialism and the Limits of Liberalism, Verso Books, 
London. 
 
Pierson, C. (1986), Marxist Theory and Democratic Politics, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
 
Pierson, C. (2001), Hard Choices – Social Democracy in the 21st Century, Polity, 
Malden 
 
Piketty, T (2014), Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Belknap-Harvard, Cambridge  
 
Potgieter, T. & Liebenberg, I. (2012), Reflections on War: Preparedness and 
Consequences, African Sun Media, Matieland South Africa  
 
Poulantzas, N. (1978), State, Power, Socialism, New Left Books, London. 
 
Rabinbach, A. (1983), The Crisis of Austrian Socialism: From Red Vienna to Civil 
War, 1927–1934, University of Chicago Press, London. 
 
Richards, H. and Swanger, J. (2006), The Dilemmas of Social Democracies: 
Overcoming Obstacles to a More Just World, Lexington Books, Oxford. 
233 
 
 
Roberts, D. (1995), Reconstructing Theory: Gadamer, Habermas, Luhmann’, 
Melbourne University Press, Melbourne. 
 
Rosselli, C. (1979), Liberal Socialism, Princeton University Press, New Jersey. 
 
Rousseas, S. (1979), ‘Rosa Luxemburg and the Origins of Capitalist Catastrophe 
Theory’, Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics, vol. 1, no. 4, pp 3–23. 
 
Salvadori, M. (1979), Karl Kautsky and the Socialist Revolution 1880–1938, New 
Left Books, , London. 
 
Schurer, H. (1962), ‘Reflections on Rosa Luxemburg and the Bolshevik Revolution’ 
The Slavonic and East European Review, vol. 40, no. 95, pp 356–72. 
 
Sejersted, F. (2001), The Age of Social Democracy, Princeton University Press, New 
Jersey. 
 
Shandro, A. (2001), ‘Reading Lenin: Dialectics and Eclecticism’, Science and 
Society, vol. 65, no, 2, pp 216–25).  
 
Sherman, Howard.J, (1995) Reinventing Marxism, John Hopkins, London 
 
Singer, P. (1983), Hegel: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, New 
York. 
 
Stanford, J. (2008), Economics for Everyone: A Short Guide to the Economics of 
Capitalism, Pluto Press, London. 
 
Steenson, G.P. (1978), Karl Kautsky 1854–1938: Marxism in the Classical Years, 
University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh. 
 
Steger, M. (1997), The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and 
Social Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Steger, M., ed., (1996), Selected Writings of Eduard Bernstein, 1900–1921, 
Humanities International Press. 
 
Stuart Mill, J. (1987), On Socialism, Prometheus Books, New York. 
 
Taylor, K. (1982), The Political Ideas of the Utopian Socialists, Frank Cass, London. 
 
Trotsky, L. (2007), Terrorism and Communism, Verso, New York. 
 
234 
 
Vandenberg, A. (1998), Social Democracy and Wage Earners’ Funds in Sweden 
(unpublished PhD thesis) 
 
Wallerstein, I. (2007), World Systems Analysis: An Introduction, Duke, London. 
 
Wolfe, B.D. (1968), ‘Rosa Luxemburg and V.I. Lenin: The Opposite Poles of 
Revolutionary Socialism’, The Antioch Review, vol. 21, no. 2, pp 209–26). 
 
Trotksy Quote in Chapter 8 http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Leon_Trotsky 
 
